Concept
Chilling Effect Rejected
Younger abstention
Chilling Effect Rejected
Younger v. Harris refused to read Dombrowski v. Pfister as letting a federal plaintiff enjoin a state prosecution merely by showing that the statute is vague or overbroad and chills protected speech. Dombrowski had allowed an injunction against enforcement of state criminal laws on behalf of members of the Southern Conference Educational Fund, a group that sought to foster civil rights for Black people in the South, and it seemed to invite federal courts to enjoin state criminal proceedings that threaten speech and associational rights.1 The Court declined the invitation. It held that Dombrowski did not upset the settled doctrines that have always confined very narrowly the availability of injunctive relief against state criminal prosecutions, and that a federal court cannot enjoin enforcement of a statute solely on a showing that it “on its face” abridges First Amendment rights.2
Three terms carry the argument. A statute is vague when a person cannot tell what it forbids and overbroad when it reaches protected expression along with unprotected conduct. A facial challenge attacks the statute as written, not as applied to the plaintiff's own conduct. The “chilling effect” is the deterrence of protected speech that the existence or enforcement of such a law can produce. Younger holds that this kind of chilling effect should not by itself justify federal intervention.3 The Court reached that result by confining Dombrowski to its facts and then giving two reasons why a chill cannot carry an injunction alone.
Dombrowski as a Harassment Case
The Dombrowski plaintiffs were targets of enforcement, not just people living under an unclear law. Louisiana officials viewed the SCEF as a Communist front or subversive organization and raided its offices under the authority of Louisiana law.4 As Younger reads the case, circumstances of that kind establish irreparable injury above and beyond the burden of defending a single prosecution brought in good faith, the sort of injury that had always been considered sufficient to justify federal intervention.5 On that reading Dombrowski needed no new doctrine, and its broad language about facial attacks was not what produced the relief.
Harris stood on the other side of the line. A proceeding was already pending in state court, giving him an opportunity to raise his constitutional claims there. Nothing suggested that the single prosecution against him was brought in bad faith or was one of a series of repeated prosecutions, so his injury was solely “that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith.” Under the settled doctrine, that left him without equitable relief “even if such statutes are unconstitutional.”6
Both sets of plaintiffs attacked state criminal statutes on constitutional grounds, so the difference between them lay in the conduct of the enforcing officials. An exam fact pattern that moves a plaintiff from Harris's position toward Dombrowski's must therefore add enforcement misconduct, such as raids on the plaintiff's offices, a series of repeated prosecutions, or other bad faith. A sharper argument that the statute is vague adds nothing to the showing.
Why an Injunction Cannot Cure the Chill
The first reason is practical: a federal injunction cannot satisfactorily eliminate the chill.7 The injunction in Dombrowski itself could be lifted if the State obtained an “acceptable limiting construction” from its own courts. A valid narrowing construction can then be applied even to conduct that occurred before the narrowing, absent a fair-warning problem, and Dombrowski itself reaffirmed that principle for prosecutions in the State's own courts.8
Only a sweeping injunction would end the chill outright, one prohibiting any prosecution for conduct occurring before a satisfactory rewriting of the statute. That remedy would strip the State of all power to prosecute even the socially dangerous and constitutionally unprotected conduct the statute had covered, until the legislature passed a new statute and the federal courts approved it in potentially lengthy trial and appellate proceedings.9 The choice is between a remedy that does not cure the chill and one that costs the State its enforcement power.
The Court made a second point about the chill itself. Just as the incidental chilling effect of such statutes does not automatically render them unconstitutional, the chilling effect that admittedly can result from the very existence of certain laws does not in itself justify prohibiting the State from enforcing them against socially harmful conduct that it believes in good faith to be punishable under its laws and the Constitution.10 And a state court hearing the pending prosecution can apply a valid narrowing construction to the defendant's conduct, the same event on which the Dombrowski injunction would have waited.11
No Review in the Abstract
The second reason goes to the function of the federal courts. The power exercised in Marbury v. Madison is the power to decide a concrete controversy, and that differs from surveying the statute books for flawed laws. The Court noted that ever since the Constitutional Convention rejected a proposal for having members of the Supreme Court render advice concerning pending legislation, it has been clear that, even when a suit satisfies Article III, analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction before it takes effect is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary.12
Three features make an abstract challenge a poor vehicle for constitutional decision: the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of line-by-line analysis of a detailed statute.13 A pending prosecution supplies what the abstract challenge lacks, a defendant and a specific application of the statute to judge. The Framers' conception of the federal courts' place in passing and enforcing laws means it can seldom be appropriate for those courts to exercise any power of prior approval or veto over the legislative process.14
On these grounds the Court held that the possible unconstitutionality of a statute “on its face” does not in itself justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it, and that Harris had failed to show bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance calling for equitable relief.15 The Court added that there may be extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even without the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment, a point the later treatment of exceptions develops.16
The Contrary View
The contrary view starts from Dombrowski's own reasoning. Normally a person charged under an unconstitutional state statute has an adequate remedy at law, which is to raise the constitutional defense in the state proceeding. Federal courts had often followed that practice, but never as an absolute, and they had recognized that it could be departed from to prevent irreparable injury.17 In Dombrowski the Court thought that the chilling effect on First Amendment rights may derive from the fact of the prosecution itself, unaffected by the prospect of its success or failure. It found irreparable injury sufficient for equitable relief in the substantial loss or impairment of expressive freedoms that would occur if the plaintiffs had to await disposition of the state criminal actions.18 On that view a defense raised at trial comes too late to repair the harm, and First Amendment cases deserve an exception from the ordinary rule.
Younger answers that a federal injunction would not repair the harm either, because it cannot satisfactorily eliminate the chill. It also holds that the chill from a law's mere existence does not by itself bar good-faith enforcement.19 The state forum, meanwhile, was open to Harris, who could raise his constitutional claims in the pending prosecution.20 An essay that starts from the premise that facial flaws or the chill alone are enough will reach the wrong result. Whether a chill argument fares better before any prosecution has begun is a separate question, taken up in the discussion of pre-enforcement suits.
When an exam problem pairs a pending state prosecution with a federal plaintiff who argues only that the statute is vague or overbroad and that it chills speech, the analysis turns on enforcement conduct. The plaintiff must allege bad faith, harassment, or another unusual circumstance, as in Dombrowski, and a persuasive attack on the statute does not supply that showing.