Concept
Gibbons and the Meaning of Commerce
Commerce Clause
Gibbons and the Meaning of Commerce
The Commerce Clause gives Congress power “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,” but it never says what commerce is.1 Chief Justice Marshall supplied the missing definition in Gibbons v. Ogden. His answer was broad: commerce is commercial intercourse in all its branches, so Congress may regulate dealings that reach across State lines. It also had an edge, because the same opinion marks off a zone of purely internal commerce that the Clause does not touch. The two halves of that holding set up the dispute that later cases keep reopening.
The definition came out of a fight over steamboats. A State had granted a private party the exclusive right to run steam vessels on its waters, and a shipowner holding a federal license for the coasting trade claimed the right to operate there anyway. Ogden’s counsel replied that commerce means traffic, meaning buying and selling or the interchange of commodities, and does not comprehend navigation.2 On that reading, federal licensing of vessels would regulate nothing the Clause covers, and the shipowner would have no federal law to set against the monopoly. One word therefore decided the case.
Marshall refused to shrink a general term to one of its meanings. Commerce is undoubtedly traffic, he wrote, but it is something more: it describes “the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches.” Counsel’s reading would “restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations.”3 A rule of construction carried him the rest of the way. Exceptions from a power mark its extent, because it would be absurd and useless to except from a granted power something the grant never comprehended.4 The Constitution contains plain inhibitions on how the navigation power may be used. Article I, section 9 forbids any preference to the ports of one State over those of another, and it forbids requiring vessels bound to or from one State to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.5 Those who wrote the exceptions, Marshall reasoned, must have understood the power they limited as granted.6 Treating commerce as a synonym for sale is the standard error, and this argument is the answer to it.
Defining commerce settled one question and raised another: how far inside a State may federal power operate? Marshall rested his answer on the word “among,” which “means intermingled with.” Commerce among the States cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior.7 Geography compels the result. A trading expedition between adjoining States must begin in one and end in the other, and trade between remote States must begin in one, end in another, and probably pass through a third.8 A power that halted at each border would be useless against the very commerce it was granted to govern, and a vessel on a voyage between States does not leave the commerce power behind when it enters the waters of either. A State’s territorial line therefore does not mark the edge of federal power. The character of the activity does.
If the power runs into the interior of every State, what is left to the States? Marshall answered in the same passage: “It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States.” Such a power, he added, “would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.”9 The limit comes from the same text that produced the breadth. The Clause names particular classes of commerce, and naming some presupposes something not named; given the language and subject of the sentence, that remainder is the exclusively internal commerce of a State. Marshall also described the structure behind it. Federal action applies to the external concerns of the nation and to internal concerns that affect the States generally, but not to those completely within a State that do not affect other States, so the completely internal commerce of a State “may be considered as reserved for the State itself.”10
Marshall’s last clause defines the reserved zone by two absences: the commerce must be completely internal, and it must neither extend to nor affect other States. Everything therefore turns on how much weight “affect” carries. A court that counts any economic influence on another State as an effect leaves almost no commerce completely internal, while a court that demands a closer connection leaves more of it with the State. Marshall’s formula does not choose between those readings. Later Justices have.
Justice Jackson, writing in Wickard v. Filburn, described Marshall’s account of the commerce power as having a breadth never yet exceeded, and he stressed Marshall’s warning that effective restraints on its exercise must proceed from political rather than judicial processes.11 The dissent in United States v. Morrison read the carve-out in the same spirit. Wickard’s aggregate effects test, applied to ostensibly domestic, noncommercial farming, was consistent with Marshall’s indication that the power may be understood by its exclusion of subjects “which do not affect other States.”12 Lopez pushed the other way. The Court there rejected a government argument as too attenuated, because accepting it would require piling inference upon inference until the commerce power became a general police power of the sort retained by the States.13 That is Marshall’s reserved zone seen from the opposite side: if inference can stretch the power without end, nothing is left to the States. Raich shows how the zone fares under the broader approach. The Ninth Circuit had isolated the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes as a class beyond federal reach, but the Court held that Congress acted rationally in treating that class as an essential part of a larger regulatory scheme, and that the claim that a locally cultivated product used domestically rather than sold on the open market escapes federal regulation is foreclosed by Wickard and its progeny.14 The disagreement is over weight: one side treats the carve-out for completely internal commerce as a boundary courts enforce, and the other treats it as whatever a broad effects inquiry leaves untouched. The sections that follow trace that disagreement through Wickard, Lopez, and Raich.