Concept
The Lopez Framework
Commerce Clause
The Lopez Framework
From 1937 until 1995 the Supreme Court sustained every law but one that Congress claimed as an exercise of the power to regulate interstate commerce.1 Jones & Laughlin Steel, Darby, and Wickard had ushered in that era and greatly expanded Congress's authority.2 In 1995 the Court began imposing limits, and United States v. Lopez gave those limits a structure. Even the modern precedents that expanded congressional power, the Court said, confirm that the power has outer limits.3
Alfonso Lopez, a high school senior in San Antonio, Texas, was indicted under the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 for carrying a handgun to his school.4 The Act made it a federal crime knowingly to possess a firearm at a place the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone, and it defined a school zone as the grounds of a public, parochial, or private school plus the area within 1,000 feet of those grounds.5 Lopez defended by arguing that the law exceeded the Commerce Clause. The Fifth Circuit agreed and reversed his conviction, citing insufficient congressional findings and legislative history, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed.6
The Court's opinion identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its power to regulate commerce among the several States.7 First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second, it may regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities. Third, its authority includes the power to regulate activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.8 The Court disposed of the first two categories quickly, because the school-zone statute neither regulated the channels nor protected an instrumentality or thing in commerce. It could survive, if at all, only as a regulation of an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.9
The categories differ in how directly the regulated subject touches interstate commerce. In the first two, Congress regulates the ingredients of interstate commerce itself, which Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment in Gonzales v. Raich, called self-evident. The third category, he wrote, is different in kind, and reciting it without explanation is misleading and incomplete.10 That difference helps explain why Lopez fell within the third category, as have almost all the commerce cases decided by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. The Justices most concerned about enumerated powers worry that statutes defended under that category could obliterate the idea of a national government of limited, enumerated powers.11
Lopez also reorganized the older doctrine. It divided the traditional first standard, which let Congress regulate anything or anyone that crosses a state line, into two: the channels of commerce, and the instrumentalities of commerce together with the people and products that travel in it.12 The structure suggests a working method. Ask first what the statute operates on, whether a route, a vehicle or shipment, or a local activity, and turn to the third category only when the first two do not fit. The sections below take the categories in that order. Later sections apply the third category to Lopez and to Morrison.
Channels of Commerce
The first category is the power to regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.13 Channels are the routes along which goods and people move, such as highways and navigable waters, and the power reaches channels of shipment by land as well as by water.14 The Court has said that “the authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.”15
The power over routes traces to Gibbons v. Ogden, which refused to confine commerce to buying and selling and treated the word, a general term, as comprehending navigation.16 Gibbons in effect held that the Clause authorizes Congress to remove obstructions to interstate commerce. The Daniel Ball extended the point by upholding federal licensing and inspection requirements for a steamboat that operated entirely within one State, on a river that emptied into Lake Michigan. The river was part of “a continued highway for commerce, both with other States and with foreign countries,” and the boat “was employed as an instrument of that commerce.”17 Later decisions built on that ruling to recognize a comprehensive federal power over the infrastructure of interstate movement, including railways, aircraft, and the facilities of telephone and telegraph communications.18
Congress uses the channels power in two ways. It can set rules for how the routes are used, and it can prohibit what crosses state lines. The prohibition technique reached the Court in the Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), where challengers argued that a ban on carrying lottery tickets across state lines was not a regulation of commerce. Justice Harlan replied that a prohibition is a form of regulation. Because the ban was in its very nature a regulation of interstate commerce, constitutional history and congressional motives were beside the point.19 The power attaches to the crossing of the state line, so Congress can set conditions on what crosses even when the activity is not “commercial.”20
United States v. Darby supplies the standard example. Congress may prohibit the interstate shipment of goods manufactured by workers paid less than a federal minimum wage or employed for more than a federal maximum number of hours.21 Production is not itself interstate commerce, but the shipment of what is produced is, so a ban on that shipment regulates commerce directly, however much it aims to change conditions inside the producing State. Hammer v. Dagenhart belonged to the older line of cases that separated production from commerce, and Darby overruled it.22 The Act's other component did not regulate interstate commerce at all. It regulated an aspect of manufacturing, the wages and hours of those who produce goods, and the Court upheld that regulation of a local commercial activity as a permissible exercise of the commerce power as augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause.23 A single statute can therefore contain a channels provision and a provision that needs a different justification.
The channels power also reaches people. Congress can prohibit racial discrimination in hotel accommodations that diminish interstate travel for persons of color, as Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States held.24 Lopez cites that decision as a channels case, although the 1964 Court reasoned in terms of the effects of the discrimination on interstate commerce, so it can also be read under the third category.25 Later decisions repeat the formula. Pierce County v. Guillen quoted Lopez's three categories and again named the use of the channels first.26
The cases in which the channels argument failed show what the category does not cover. The school-zone statute “is not a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, nor is it an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity through the channels of commerce.”27 The offense turned on where a person stood, and said nothing about any road, river, or shipment. Morrison said the same of 42 U.S.C. § 13981, and the petitioners there did not even contend that it fell within the first two categories, because it focused on gender-motivated violence wherever it occurs.28 A criminal travel provision in the Violence Against Women Act shows the contrast. The courts of appeals have uniformly upheld it under the first category because it regulates the use of the interstate transportation routes through which persons and goods move.29 The civil provision attached to violence anywhere, and the criminal provision attached to the use of interstate routes.
On an exam, ask whether the statute operates on the routes or on what moves across them. Conduct near a highway, or conduct with economic consequences for interstate commerce, does not make a statute channels regulation. Those are arguments for the third category, which has its own tests.
Instrumentalities and Things in Commerce
The second category covers the vehicles and cargo of interstate commerce. Congress may regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.31 Instrumentalities are things like railroads, vehicles, boats, and planes, the conduits through which interstate commerce occurs.32 A person or thing in interstate commerce is a traveler or shipment that is itself moving in that commerce. The closing clause carries the weight: the threat to the instrument or thing may come only from intrastate activities, and Congress may still reach it.
Railroads were an early target of this power. When Congress began using the Commerce Clause much more extensively in the late nineteenth century, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was largely meant to provide for federal regulation of railroads.33 The Shreveport Rate Cases (1914) applied the principle to rates: Congress can regulate the intrastate rates of common carriers that discriminate against and harm interstate transportation.34 Southern Railway Co. v. United States (1911) upheld amendments to the Safety Appliance Act as applied to vehicles used in intrastate commerce.35 The reason is practical: local and interstate carriers share the same railway tracks, airspace, and highways, so Congress may impose safety standards on a local carrier to keep it from endangering the interstate carriers on its route.36 The steamboat in The Daniel Ball, discussed above, fits here too, since the boat “was employed as an instrument of that commerce.”37
Lopez drew two further examples from Perez v. United States: the destruction of an aircraft, and thefts from interstate shipments.38 The saboteur or thief may act within a single State, but the federal interest attaches to the aircraft and the shipment. Perez also sustained the federal loan-sharking statute. Some treatments file that holding with the second category, but Lopez counts intrastate extortionate credit transactions among the activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, and Raich cites Perez for the class-of-activities reasoning of the third category.39
The handgun in Lopez shows where the second category stops. Alfonso Lopez was a local student at a local school, there was no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and the statute did not require his possession to have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.40 The Court therefore held that the statute could not be justified as a regulation protecting an instrumentality of interstate commerce or a thing in interstate commerce.41 A statute that builds in the tie looks different. The federal carjacking law reaches the taking of a motor vehicle “that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce.” Cars are an instrumentality of interstate commerce, and the statute regulates cars that have traveled in it, so the Court did not need to consider whether Congress could regulate local criminal activity under its commerce power.42 The jurisdictional-element section below returns to how such limiting language works.
On an exam, sort the statute by what it touches. A rule about the road points to channels. A rule about the vehicle, the traveler, or the cargo points here. A rule about a local activity justified by its combined economic effects points to the third category. The first two categories rest on the same ground, so which label a borderline item receives rarely changes the result. Two errors recur. One answers an instrumentality question with an economic-effects argument, saying that the truck or shipment matters to the national economy. The other says Congress cannot act because the threat is local, when the origin of the threat does not matter if the thing protected is an instrument or thing in interstate commerce.
Substantial Effects Category
The third category carries federal power to local activity that is not itself commerce. Lopez states it as the power to regulate “those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce,” that is, “those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”44 Justice Thomas, concurring in Lopez, began from the founding-era meaning of commerce: selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for those purposes.45 Against that background, the first two categories regulate interstate commerce itself, while the third reaches activities that are not themselves part of it.46
Because the regulated activity may lie wholly within one State, the third category is where the limits are tested. Lopez fell within it, as have almost all the cases decided by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, and the conservative Justices have been most concerned that statutes defended here could obliterate the idea of a national government of limited, enumerated powers.47 Three features control how the category works: the effect must be substantial, it is measured for a class of activity, and Congress's finding of an effect is reviewed for a rational basis.
The effect must be substantial. Before Lopez, the case law had not been clear whether an activity must “affect” or “substantially affect” interstate commerce.48 The Court resolved the point: “consistent with the great weight of our case law,” the proper test asks whether the regulated activity “substantially affects” interstate commerce.49 Jones & Laughlin Steel explains why. The commerce power may not be extended to effects “so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government.”50 Lopez also drew on Maryland v. Wirtz for the corollary that neither Wirtz nor Wickard “declared that Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state or private activities.”51
The effect is measured for the class of activity. Wickard held that a farmer's own contribution to the demand for wheat “may be trivial by itself” and still be regulable where, “taken together with that of many others similarly situated,” it is “far from trivial.”52 Raich restates the rule: Congress may regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic “class of activities” with a substantial effect on interstate commerce.53 Lopez, quoting Wirtz, said that where “a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.”54 Lopez also tightened the method. Some opinions before it could be read to permit regulation of a class whose combined effect was only trivial, and after Lopez the class as a whole must substantially affect interstate commerce.55 A regulated business also cannot slice itself into commercial and noncommercial parts to escape aggregation. McClung upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to a local restaurant, Lopez found that decision posed no problem under its economic-activity test, and lower courts have rejected regulated parties' efforts to dodge federal laws as applied to business operations.56
The statutes that have survived under this category regulated economic activity: the wheat grower in Wickard, the restaurant in McClung, the motel in Heart of Atlanta, and loan sharking in Perez.57 The school-zone statute was the contrast. Possession of a gun in a local school zone “is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.”58 The statute was a criminal law that by its terms had nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic enterprise, and it was not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity that would be undercut unless the local conduct were regulated. The cases that aggregate activities connected with commercial transactions therefore could not sustain it.59 That result shows the category has an edge, and the next section turns to how the Court locates it.
Review of Congress's finding of an effect is deferential, but only up to a point. Since Jones & Laughlin's warning, the Court has asked whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce.60 The Court has never required Congress to legislate with scientific exactitude, so when Congress decides that the “total incidence” of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.61 Deference has an edge, however. The Court has “ample power” to enforce the limits of the commerce power, and Congress's broad authority over activities that substantially affect commerce does not permit piling inference upon inference to establish that noneconomic activity has a substantial effect.62 A congressional declaration that settled the question would let an enumerated power mean whatever Congress said it meant. Review with no deference at all would replace a legislature's judgment about markets with a court's. The doctrine runs between those poles.
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment in Raich, offered a different account of why the category exists. The first two categories are self-evident because they are the ingredients of interstate commerce itself, but the third is different in kind.63 Congress's authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce, even those with a substantial effect on it, derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause, which lets Congress make all laws necessary and proper for carrying its enumerated powers into execution.64 On that view, whenever Congress regulates an activity that is neither interstate commerce nor an instrumentality of it, what is at issue is the reach of the Necessary and Proper Clause as it augments the Commerce Clause.65 He added that Congress may regulate even intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce where that is necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective.66 The Raich majority treated the case as implicating only the third category.67
Two arguments go wrong on this category. The government cannot satisfy it by showing only that a local activity has some effect on commerce, because the effect must be substantial. A challenger cannot defeat it by showing that one instance of the activity is trivial, because the class is the unit of measurement. Morrison later treated Lopez as the proper framework for analysis under this category, and the next section follows both decisions through the limits they place on it.68