Concept
Origins of the Voting Rights Act
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power
Origins of the Voting Rights Act
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment gives Congress power "to enforce this article by appropriate legislation," and the principal use Congress has made of that sentence is the Voting Rights Act of 1965.1 The Act turns an abstract grant into concrete duties: before a covered jurisdiction changes how people vote, it must ask Washington. Every later question in this chapter, including the limit the Court drew in Shelby County v. Holder, asks whether some feature of the Act is still "appropriate" legislation. That question cannot be answered without knowing what each feature does and what problem it was built to solve.
The design is what needs explaining. Section 1 of the Amendment was already enforceable in court, yet Congress did not simply authorize more lawsuits. It built a regime that acts in advance, targets particular jurisdictions, and burdens them before any court has found a violation. The later cases test the fit between that remedy and its problem, so the problem comes first: why ordinary litigation could not do the job. The machinery follows. A coverage formula, preclearance, and bailout carry most of the weight in the cases ahead.
Failure of Case-by-Case Enforcement
For roughly a century, ordinary enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment lost to a simple asymmetry: States could build new barriers faster than courts could tear down old ones. Congress did try. The Enforcement Act of 1870 made it a crime for public officers and private persons to obstruct the right to vote, and an amendment the following year added detailed federal supervision of the electoral process, from registration through the certification of returns.2 The effort faded. As fervor for racial equality waned, enforcement became spotty and ineffective, and Congress repealed most of these provisions in 1894.3 Shelby County, quoting an earlier decision, put the verdict bluntly: the first century of congressional enforcement "can only be regarded as a failure."4
The States answered with registration tests. Beginning in 1890, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia enacted tests designed to keep Black citizens from voting. Typically the tests made the ability to read and write a qualification and also required applicants to complete a registration form.5 A literacy requirement sorted applicants by race because in each of those States in 1890 more than two-thirds of adult Black residents were illiterate, against fewer than one-quarter of adult whites. The same States also prescribed alternate routes to the ballot so that white illiterates kept the franchise: grandfather clauses, property qualifications, good-character tests, and a requirement that registrants "understand" or "interpret" certain matter.6
Litigation under the Amendment succeeded, but one device at a time. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach the Court catalogued the results. Courts struck down grandfather clauses (Guinn v. United States and Myers v. Anderson), procedural hurdles (Lane v. Wilson), the white primary (Smith v. Allwright and Terry v. Adams), improper challenges to voters (United States v. Thomas), racial gerrymandering (Gomillion v. Lightfoot), and discriminatory application of voting tests (Schnell v. Davis; Alabama v. United States; Louisiana v. United States).7 Each judgment reached only the practice before the court. A decree against a grandfather clause says nothing about a property qualification, and a ruling against the white primary leaves a literacy test untouched. A State that lost one case therefore kept every other device and could invent new ones.
Statutes did not change the pattern. Congress's initial efforts in 1957, 1960, and 1964 proved largely ineffective. They facilitated suits, but litigation remained slow and expensive, the States came up with new ways to discriminate as soon as existing ones were struck down, and Black voter registration barely improved.8 The Court explained how evasion worked. Even a favorable decision often settled little. Some States merely switched to discriminatory devices that the federal decree did not cover, or enacted difficult new tests that prolonged the existing disparity between white and Black registration. Some local officials defied or evaded court orders, or simply closed their registration offices to freeze the voting rolls. The 1960 provision authorizing registration by federal officers had little effect on local maladministration because of its procedural complexities.9
The imbalance is structural. The party seeking relief must gather proof of each violation, while the jurisdiction needs only to change what it is doing. Every round of litigation therefore spends time and money on a practice that may already have been replaced. A remedy that waits for proof of each violation favors the side that wants the discrimination to continue.
Dallas County, Alabama, whose seat is Selma, supplied the standard illustration. The Justice Department litigated there for four years and obtained two findings of widespread voting discrimination, yet Black registration rose only from 156 to 383 in a county with approximately 15,000 Black residents of voting age.10 The House Committee on the Judiciary reported that the difficulties experienced in suits in Dallas County had been encountered over and over again under existing voting laws, and it concluded: "Four years is too long."11
That record explains the shape of the 1965 response, and it also marks the response's limit. The Act created stringent new remedies for voting discrimination where it persists on a pervasive scale, while strengthening the existing remedies for pockets of discrimination elsewhere in the country.12 Ordinary litigation stayed in place for isolated violations, where a single suit can end the practice. It gave way only where a jurisdiction had shown, through repeated evasion, that it could outlast any one decree. Congress concluded that the unsuccessful remedies of the past had to be replaced by sterner and more elaborate measures,13 measures designed to prevent discrimination before it occurs rather than to detect and punish it afterward. That departure from ordinary enforcement carried a price that later cases would collect. In upholding the Act, Katzenbach said that "exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate," and the rest of this chapter asks whether those conditions continued to exist.14
Coverage Formula and Preclearance
Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 decided which parts of the country would receive the Act's special remedies, and it did so with two findings made by two federal officers. The remedies applied to any State or political subdivision that the Attorney General determined had maintained a test or device on November 1, 1964, and as to which the Director of the Census determined either that fewer than 50 percent of the persons of voting age were registered on that date or that fewer than 50 percent voted in the November 1964 presidential election.16 Katzenbach described the result as automatic: the remedies attached to any State, or to any separate subdivision such as a county or parish, for which both findings had been made.17 The coverage formula is thus the entry point for the whole regime. The rest of this section follows what it triggers and how a jurisdiction could leave.
The statute defined a test or device broadly. It reached any requirement that a registrant or voter demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter; demonstrate educational achievement or knowledge of a particular subject; possess good moral character; or prove qualifications through the voucher of registered voters or members of another class.18 The two prongs measure different things. The first identifies the instrument. Literacy requirements and their companions were the means by which Southern States after 1890 screened Black applicants off the rolls, so a jurisdiction still using one in 1964 held the tool with the longest record of discriminatory use. The second looks for the result, because a screening device that works on a large scale depresses the share of the voting-age population that registers and votes. Neither prong proves that any official meant to discriminate. Together they pick out the areas at which, as Katzenbach put it, the Act's remedies were aimed: those where voting discrimination had been most flagrant.19
The fourth step is the one students most often miss. A county that once used a literacy test is not covered merely because it used one, and an answer that stops after the first prong has not applied the formula. The statute also treats a subdivision "as a separate unit," so a county can be covered even though its State is not, as with the 39 North Carolina counties and the one Arizona county covered in 1965.20
When the formula was applied in 1965, it covered Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia, along with 39 counties in North Carolina and one in Arizona.21 Coverage triggered three principal remedies: the suspension of literacy tests and similar qualifications, the suspension of new voting rules pending federal review, and the assignment of federal examiners to list qualified applicants.22 The first, in Section 4(a), barred a covered jurisdiction from denying any citizen the vote in a federal, state, or local election for failure to comply with a test or device.23 That removed the instrument the jurisdiction had been using. It did not stop the jurisdiction from inventing a replacement, which is the gap the second remedy was built to close.
Section 5 reverses the ordinary sequence in which a legislature enacts a rule and a challenger sues afterward. Once a jurisdiction was covered, it could not enforce any voting qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure different from the one in force on November 1, 1964, until the change had been cleared. The jurisdiction could submit the change to the Attorney General and, if no objection came within 60 days, put it into effect. Or it could seek a declaratory judgment from a three-judge court in the District of Columbia, with direct appeal to the Supreme Court, that the rule would not abridge the franchise on racial grounds.24 Either way the jurisdiction carried the burden of this preclearance: it had to prove that the change had neither the purpose nor the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.25 Clearance was not immunity, either. Neither the Attorney General's silence nor a declaratory judgment barred a later action to enjoin enforcement of the rule.26
The breadth of the freeze shows in the facts of Katzenbach itself. South Carolina had extended its polling-place closing hour from 6 p.m. to 7 p.m. in 1965 and had submitted the change neither to the Attorney General nor to the District of Columbia court, although the Attorney General announced at argument that he did not challenge the amendment.27 A one-hour change is about as minor as a voting change can be, and it still fell within the freeze, because Section 5 reached any difference from the 1964 rules. The reason for requiring approval first comes from the record above. Where only ordinary litigation was available, a jurisdiction could adopt a new device, use it while plaintiffs gathered proof, and replace it again once a court ruled. Delay worked in favor of the discrimination. Section 5 takes away that head start by holding the new rule in suspension and placing the burden of proving it harmless on the jurisdiction that proposed it. Shelby County later called this requirement a drastic departure from basic principles of federalism, since covered States had to obtain federal permission before enacting any law related to voting.28
Section 5 asked about effect as well as purpose, and that detail matters in the later cases. A rule could be refused preclearance even though no one could show that its adopters meant to discriminate, because the statute asked whether the change would have the effect of denying or abridging the vote on racial grounds.29 Whether Congress may reach conduct that Section 1 would not itself forbid is the question taken up in the discussion of Katzenbach below.
The Act also gave covered jurisdictions a way out. Bailout is the route by which a covered State or subdivision could end its coverage, and under Section 4(a) it required a declaratory judgment action against the United States before a three-judge court in the District of Columbia. The plaintiff had to show that no test or device had been used during the preceding five years for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.30 Two further rules limited the exit. No judgment could issue for five years after a final federal judgment determining that discrimination through tests or devices had occurred anywhere in the plaintiff's territory. And the court kept jurisdiction for five years after judgment and would reopen the action on the Attorney General's motion if a test or device was later used with a discriminatory purpose or effect.31 Keep the three five-year periods apart: the lookback the plaintiff must clear, the bar after an adverse judgment, and the court's retained jurisdiction.
Coverage itself could not be contested on its facts. The determinations of the Attorney General and the Director of the Census were not reviewable in any court and took effect upon publication in the Federal Register.32 A jurisdiction could not litigate whether it had really maintained a test on the key date or really fell below 50 percent, so its legal exit was bailout. The structure fits the history above, because a coverage determination open to a lawsuit would invite the same delay the regime was designed to remove. The bar reaches only the two findings, not the statute's constitutionality, which South Carolina challenged in Katzenbach as to the provisions then operating in that State.33
Congress treated the remedies as temporary: the suspension of tests ran for five years from the last occurrence of substantial voting discrimination.34 Yet nearly fifty years later Sections 4 and 5 remained in effect, had been made more stringent, and were scheduled to last until 2031.35 Two features of the Act work without regard to the formula. Section 2 forbids, in all 50 States, any standard, practice, or procedure imposed or applied to deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race or color.36 The ban on tests and devices began as a remedy for covered jurisdictions, but Congress later extended it nationwide.37 A ruling on the coverage formula therefore does not by itself touch Section 2 or the nationwide test ban, a point that governs how far Shelby County reaches.