bailout

In 1998 Congress enacted the Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the duration of all federal copyrights by twenty years. For works created by identified natural persons the new term runs from creation until seventy years after the author's death. For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire the term is ninety-five years from publication or one hundred twenty years from creation, whichever expires first. The statute applied these extended terms both to copyrights already in existence and to works created after its effective date. Petitioners are individuals and businesses whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaration that the extension of existing copyrights exceeded Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and violated the First Amendment. On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings the district court entered judgment for the Attorney General. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. A majority of the panel upheld the statute against both challenges, while Judge Sentelle dissented in part on the Copyright Clause issue. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the extension of existing copyrights exceeds Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and whether the extension violates the First Amendment.

In 1976, parents of black children attending public schools in seven states filed a nationwide class action in the District Court for the District of Columbia against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The suit challenged the IRS guidelines and procedures for determining whether private schools maintain racially discriminatory policies. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the IRS from granting tax-exempt status to any private school unless it first satisfied the court that it had adopted and was following a policy of racial nondiscrimination. Respondents are parents of black children attending public schools in the metropolitan areas of Atlanta, Georgia, and Memphis, Tennessee. They filed their own action in the same district court. Respondents alleged that the IRS had failed to carry out its responsibilities by granting tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools in their communities. The complaint identified by name seventeen schools or school systems that allegedly received tax exemptions despite discriminatory policies. Respondents claimed injury in two ways. The nearby presence of such schools made it more difficult to persuade white parents to enroll their children in public schools. The tax benefits provided an indirect financial subsidy that helped the schools remain open and thereby reduced the chance their own children would attend integrated public schools. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing after concluding that respondents had not alleged sufficient injury in fact, that any injury was not fairly traceable to IRS actions, and that the claims were not redressable by the relief sought. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. It held that respondents had alleged a sufficient stigmatic injury that was traceable to the IRS conduct and redressable by the requested relief. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The IRS guidelines in Revenue Procedure 75-50 require applicant schools to adopt and publicize a racially nondiscriminatory policy, to provide racial breakdowns of students, faculty, and staff, to list founders and donors, and to certify compliance annually under penalty of perjury. Respondents alleged that these procedures were inadequate because they permitted schools to receive exemptions merely by certifying a nondiscrimination policy without implementing it.

In 2000 Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Petitioners are current and former inmates of institutions operated by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction who adhere to nonmainstream religions including the Satanist, Wicca, and Asatru religions and the Church of Jesus Christ Christian. They initially filed suit against Ohio prison officials asserting claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. After enactment of the Act petitioners amended their complaints to add claims under Section 3. The inmates complained that prison officials failed to accommodate their religious exercise in a variety of ways including denying access to religious literature, denying opportunities for group worship granted to adherents of mainstream religions, forbidding adherence to dress and appearance mandates, withholding religious ceremonial items, and failing to provide a chaplain trained in their faith. For purposes of the litigation respondents stipulated that petitioners are members of bona fide religions and sincere in their beliefs. Respondents moved to dismiss the statutory claims arguing that Section 3 violates the Establishment Clause. Pursuant to statute the United States intervened in the District Court to defend the constitutionality of the Act. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss. On interlocutory appeal the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court determination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among Courts of Appeals on whether the institutionalized-persons provision of the Act is consistent with the Establishment Clause.