Concept
Aftermath and Open Questions
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power
Aftermath and Open Questions
Shelby County v. Holder left the Fifteenth Amendment's grant of power intact. Section 2 of the Amendment still gives Congress power “to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”1 What the Court removed was one use of that power. Congress may not subject some states, but not others, to preclearance for changes in voting laws on the strength of outdated coverage formulas: the Tenth Amendment and principles of equal sovereignty demand extraordinary justification for such disparate treatment, and reliance on decades-old data is unconstitutional under the enforcement power.2 This unit follows the consequences: what became of preclearance, how states and courts responded, what Congress would have to do to revive it, and which tools remain.
Preclearance without a formula
Preclearance cannot be enforced today. The Court held that Congress exceeded its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power when it relied on 40-year-old data to pick out the state and local governments that had to obtain federal preclearance for many voting-related changes. Those requirements are in many ways the heart of the Voting Rights Act, and they will remain unenforceable unless and until Congress passes a new law that identifies covered jurisdictions from much more up-to-date voter information.
The procedural consequence is a reversal of the old order. Preclearance made covered jurisdictions seek federal approval before changing their voting laws. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act works on a different model: it applies nationwide, it has no preapproval requirement, and voters or the United States who believe a practice produces discriminatory results must bring suit and attempt to prove the claim.3
State and judicial responses
In the immediate aftermath of the decision, a number of states passed restrictive new election laws.4 The courts did not respond uniformly. The Fourth Circuit struck down a North Carolina law widely described as one of the most restrictive in the nation, while a revised version of Texas's voter ID law was allowed to go into effect.5 With preapproval gone, each of these laws had to be attacked in litigation, and the results varied.
What Congress would have to do
Only new legislation can restore preclearance, and any such law faces a constitutional constraint. If Congress wants to use its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers to prevent future violations rather than punish past ones, it must adjust its measures to reflect current rather than historical voting circumstances.6 Whatever jurisdictions a new formula names, the justification must come from present evidence, not from history alone. Whether a particular formula would satisfy the Court cannot be known until Congress writes one.
Section 2 after Shelby County
Section 2 is the nationwide alternative, and it asks challengers to prove their case after the fact. If voters or the United States believe that a districting scheme or other voting practice produces discriminatory results, the onus is on them to sue.7 The statute also disclaims any entitlement to proportional representation: “nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion of the population.”8 Many of these disputes arise in redistricting. Since Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Court has decided redistricting cases under the Equal Protection Clause, the Fifteenth Amendment, and the Voting Rights Act, some concerning the use of race in drawing districts and others the use of party.9
Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee shows how heavily the burden of proof can weigh. For rules that specify the time, place, or manner of casting ballots, the Court listed five factors relevant under Section 2: (1) the size of the burden on voting, which must be more than “mere inconvenience”; (2) how far the rule departs from standard practice when Section 2 was amended in 1982; (3) the size of the disparities in the rule's impact on different racial groups; (4) the other opportunities for voting the state's system provides; and (5) the strength of the state's interest in the rule. The Court upheld both of Arizona's challenged rules, one on in-precinct voting and one on ballot collection. It noted that Arizona law “generally makes it quite easy for residents to vote” and found the modest burdens and disparities justified by the state's administrative and election integrity interests. It also affirmed the lower court's finding that the law had no discriminatory purpose, which would presumptively have violated both Section 2 and the Equal Protection Clause.10
The constitutional footing of Section 2 itself was contested in Allen v. Milligan. Justice Thomas, writing for himself and Justices Gorsuch and Barrett, asserted that Section 2, as applied by the district court and the majority, was unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.11 Justice Alito, joined by Justice Gorsuch, wrote separately that even under the Gingles framework, plaintiffs must show that their illustrative districts were created without giving race a “predominant role.”12 Those positions were dissents, and the majority applied Section 2.
Open questions
Two further questions are unresolved. The first concerns time. Justice Kavanaugh observed that “Alabama did not raise that temporal argument in this Court,” and declined to “consider it at this time.”13 The phrase marks an argument about how long a race-conscious remedy may last. It resonates with Shelby County, which already requires that remedial measures reflect current rather than historical circumstances. But declining to consider an argument decides nothing about it. A statement that the Court has made Section 2 expire would be wrong.
The second concerns equal sovereignty. Shelby County invalidated the coverage formula in large part because it abridged the “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” among the states.14 Some lower courts have held that the principle, though now undoubtedly applicable to the Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power, does not restrict Congress's use of the commerce power. And because Shelby County emphasized the Act's regulation of state choices about their own voting-based self-governing systems, the principle in its strongest form may be inapplicable to most of Congress's Article I powers.15 More generally, recent cases reveal a judicial reluctance to follow Congress blindly, even in voting rights.16