Concept
Other Enumerated Powers
Other powers
Other Enumerated Powers
Article I, Section 8 gives Congress far more than the powers to tax, spend, and regulate commerce. Congress may also establish a uniform rule of naturalization and uniform laws on bankruptcy, coin money and fix the standard of weights and measures, punish counterfeiting, establish post offices and post roads, secure exclusive rights to authors and inventors, constitute courts below the Supreme Court, define and punish piracies and offenses against the law of nations, and exercise exclusive legislation over the seat of government and over federal forts, arsenals, and other needful buildings. A run of further clauses supplies the war and military powers.1 The last clause of the section attaches the Necessary and Proper power to every one of these grants, because it authorizes laws for carrying into execution “the foregoing Powers” and all other powers vested in the national government or in any department or officer of it.2
Each of these clauses names its own subject, so a statute that falls within the subject needs no link to interstate commerce. That feature matters because the commerce power has limits of its own: mere possession is not “economic activity” that the Commerce Clause reaches, and Congress cannot use the commerce power to issue individual mandates.3 A measure that fails under commerce may therefore stand on another grant, and an answer about the source of congressional authority should survey the whole list before concluding that Congress lacked power. The survey serves the requirement of Article I, Section 1, which vests in Congress only the legislative powers “herein granted”; each clause here is one more way of meeting it.4
The Necessary and Proper Clause then supplies the means for every grant. It is an auxiliary power, authorizing Congress to make all laws necessary and proper, meaning appropriate, for carrying into execution any power granted to any branch of the federal government.5 The McCulloch analysis therefore applies to each power in this unit: the end is the subject the grant names, the means must be appropriate to that end, and no constitutional prohibition may stand in the way. The war and military powers come first because they form the largest cluster, naturalization follows, and the smaller specific grants close the unit.
War and Military Powers
Section 8 groups its war and military grants in adjacent clauses. Congress may declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water. It may raise and support armies, although no appropriation for that use may run longer than two years, and it may provide and maintain a navy. It may make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, call forth the militia to execute the laws, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, and provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, with the states keeping the appointment of officers and the authority to train the militia under the discipline Congress prescribes.6 The last clause of Section 8 carries each of these grants into execution.7
These powers reach far beyond the battlefield. Congress may use them to prepare for war, to conduct it, and to remedy its effects afterward. In preparation for the possibility of war, Congress might fund a student loan program that ensures a supply of scientists and engineers; during a war, it might freeze wages and prices to stabilize the economy; and afterward, it might give educational benefits to veterans to prevent saturation of the postwar job market. All of these measures fall within the war powers.8 Joined with the Necessary and Proper Clause, the enumerated war powers give Congress broad authority over activity far removed from foreign shores, including many matters of daily life that involve no military operations.9
The World War I prohibition law shows how far the reasoning travels. Congress barred the sale of intoxicating beverages to every would-be drinker in the nation, and the Court upheld the ban “as a means of increasing our war efficiency” because it fostered the sobriety, and so the productivity, of the American work force. The Court accepted that result despite the law’s “undoubtedly commercially crippling” effect on brewers, distillers, and liquor distributors.10
The war power does not end when the shooting stops. In Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co. the Court said the war power includes the power “to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress,” and that it continues for the duration of that emergency. Whatever the consequences when a war is officially terminated, the war power does not necessarily end with the cessation of hostilities.11
Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co. applied that principle to rent control. Congress regulated rents after hostilities had ended, and the Court upheld the regulation because the war effort contributed heavily to the housing deficit that prompted it, a deficit that included a reduction in residential construction during the hostilities.12 Since the war had helped create the shortage, Congress could act after the cessation of hostilities to control the forces that the short supply created, and a contrary rule would have drastically limited the Necessary and Proper Clause as applied to the several war powers.13
The same opinion draws the limit. Constitutionality does not depend on recitals of the power Congress invokes; it depends on whether Congress used the war power to cope with a current condition that the war directly and immediately caused.14 Present-day law would almost certainly sustain rent regulation under the Commerce Clause as a regulation of economic activity, so Woods now serves chiefly as an illustration of independent footing: a defender of a domestic measure that cannot win under the Commerce Clause may still draw on the war powers.15
The war powers also reach civilians in peacetime when their conduct threatens the fighting readiness of the forces. The Court has recognized Congress’s ability to regulate off-base civilian conduct, even in ways the Commerce Clause could not support, when doing so enhances troop morale, fitness, and discipline and so qualifies under the Necessary and Proper Clause. McKinley v. United States illustrates the point.16 In this setting the link to the forces carries the whole justification.
Individual mandates mark the sharpest contrast with the commerce power. The Court has made clear that Congress cannot compel individuals to act under the commerce power, as NFIB held, and in announcing that principle it noted that Congress may impose individual mandates under its military powers.17 The history of conscription explains why. The Court has long recognized that Congress may require citizens to serve in the armed forces, compelling millions to risk death or severe injury, under its powers to “raise . . . an army” and to “provide . . . a navy.”18 Arver v. United States, the Selective Draft Law Cases, is the classic example. The grants differ in their verbs. The commerce power is a power to regulate, which presupposes activity already under way, while the army and navy clauses authorize Congress to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a navy, which means bringing into existence what did not exist before.19
McCulloch itself drew on these powers. Marshall asked whether a construction of the Constitution should be preferred that made difficult, hazardous, and expensive the operations of a nation whose revenue must be collected and expended and whose armies must be marched and supported across a vast republic, with treasure raised in the north sometimes needed in the south.20 The war powers and the other non-commerce grants have grown in importance in recent decades, because doctrines that increasingly constrain the commerce power leave more work for them to do.21
The breadth of these powers has limits that an answer must respect. Like every granted power, the war power remains subject to constitutional limits, including the Bill of Rights, yet the Court has not always applied those limits with full force during war. In Korematsu v. United States it deferred to the detention of Japanese Americans during World War II, and the Court did not firmly establish until 1919 that war-powers legislation is subject to judicial review. In this sense, the war power is perhaps the most dangerous of all constitutional powers.22 A further check asks whether essential attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by the assertion of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause; if so, that is a factor suggesting the power is not properly within federal reach.23 An answer that tests a military-adjacent civilian statute only under the commerce power overlooks an independent source of authority, and an answer that treats the word “war” in a recital as enough overlooks the requirement that the regulation serve the war effort or the readiness of the forces.
Naturalization
Clause 4 of Section 8 gives Congress power “To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization,” the process by which a person born outside the United States becomes a citizen.25 The word “uniform” calls for a single national rule, which fits a status that is one citizenship for the whole country. If each state set its own terms, the most lenient state would in effect decide who becomes a citizen of all the others.
The text speaks of naturalization and citizenship and says nothing about admitting or excluding aliens. The Justices have filled that gap by insisting that every sovereign nation has the power, inherent in sovereignty and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners or to admit them on such conditions as it sees fit, and the Court once said that over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than over the admission of aliens.26 The Chinese Exclusion Case first held that the federal power to exclude noncitizens is an incident of national sovereignty.27 The Court reasoned that every national government has the inherent authority to protect the national public interest, and that immigration is a matter of vital national concern.28 A later section develops those inherent powers. For present purposes, the point is that Congress’s authority over aliens under this clause is plenary, but only “so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction.”29
Like every grant in Section 8, this one carries incidental means, because the Necessary and Proper Clause lets Congress choose appropriate means for carrying a granted power into execution. Certifying citizenship is the plainest example. In his Zivotofsky v. Kerry dissent, Justice Scalia reasoned that if Congress may grant a person born abroad a passport and a report of birth, it may also require those papers to record his birthplace. The birthplace entry serves the documents’ citizenship-authenticating function by identifying the bearer, distinguishing people with similar names, helping authorities uncover identity fraud, and aiding retrieval of the government’s citizenship records, and when several entries would serve, Congress has discretion to choose the one it deems most beneficial to the people.30 The majority held the provision unconstitutional on a separate ground, the Executive’s recognition power, so the dissent’s Article I analysis is persuasive authority and not a holding.31 Its premise is the McCulloch logic applied to one grant: papers that authenticate citizenship carry the naturalization power into execution.
Canceling a wrongfully obtained certificate rests on the same footing. Congress derives its authority to revoke such certificates from the naturalization power together with the Necessary and Proper Clause, and in Costello v. United States the Court sustained a statute permitting cancellation of certificates procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.32 The person in that situation never met the conditions Congress set for becoming a citizen, so undoing the grant enforces Congress’s own rule.
Schneider v. Rusk marks the limit. Congress’s power over naturalization does not let it treat naturalized citizens as a lesser class. The Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, but it forbids discrimination “so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process,” and the Court held that a provision that took nationality from naturalized citizens who lived abroad discriminated against them in violation of due process, creating a “second-class citizenship” without a rational justification.33 The two cases differ in who bears the loss. Costello reaches a person who obtained citizenship without meeting Congress’s terms, while Schneider reaches a person who met them and then did something a native-born citizen could do freely.
A second limit protects every citizen, native-born or naturalized: Congress may not take away a person’s citizenship without that person’s consent. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Afroyim v. Rusk held unconstitutional a statute that provided for loss of citizenship upon voting in a foreign election, and Vance v. Terrazas later allowed intent to relinquish citizenship to be expressed by words or conduct and to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
An exam stem in which Congress issues citizenship papers or cancels a fraudulently obtained certificate points to the clause’s incidental powers. A stem in which Congress strips status from a lawfully naturalized citizen, or from any citizen who has not agreed to give it up, engages the limits. Questions about admitting or removing noncitizens draw on Congress’s plenary control over aliens, which a later section develops.
Other Specific Grants
Each of the narrower grants in Section 8 pairs a subject with the incidental means needed to control it. McCulloch supplies the reading rule: the Necessary and Proper Clause is an auxiliary source of authority that lets Congress choose appropriate means for executing specifically granted powers, and it creates no freestanding power.35 The grants themselves are these:
- The bankruptcy clause authorizes uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States, and the courts and procedures that administer those laws are means the last clause supports.36
- The coinage clause authorizes Congress to coin money, to regulate its value and the value of foreign coin, and to fix the standard of weights and measures.37
- The counterfeiting clause authorizes punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States, and it reaches steps that precede the finished counterfeit, such as possessing a die made to stamp false coin.38
- The postal clause authorizes Congress to establish post offices and post roads.39
- The patent and copyright clause authorizes Congress to promote the progress of science and the useful arts by securing exclusive rights to authors and inventors, and its text builds the boundary into the grant by allowing those rights only for limited times.40
- The tribunals clause empowers Congress to constitute courts inferior to the Supreme Court, and the Constitution presumes that Congress will supply much of the design and most of the detail of the judicial branch.41
- The piracies clause lets Congress define and punish piracies, felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations, and the word “define” gives Congress authority over the content of those offenses as well as their punishment.42
- The enclave clause gives Congress exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over the seat of government, a district of no more than ten miles square, and over places bought with the consent of the state legislature for forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings, so the breadth comes from the grant’s own words.43
The reason to learn these clauses as separate grants, and not as footnotes to the commerce power, is that each measures Congress’s reach by its own subject. Justice Thomas, concurring in Lopez, pressed the point from the opposite direction: much if not all of Article I, Section 8 would be surplusage if Congress had authority over everything that substantially affects interstate commerce, and “[a]n interpretation of cl. 3 that makes the rest of § 8 superfluous simply cannot be correct.”44 That is a concurring opinion and states one Justice’s view of the commerce power, not the Court’s holding. The structural observation holds on any reading, however: the Framers wrote these subjects out separately, which gives each an independent footing.
Coinage shows what an independent footing looks like. The grant in Section 8 to coin money has a counterpart in Section 10, which forbids the states to coin money or to make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.45 The pairing has a functional logic, because a single currency needs a single issuer. A state that could decide what counts as payment of a debt could make the same coin good in one state and worthless in the next.
Possession offenses mark the first difference between this grant and commerce. In Baender v. Barnett the Court upheld a federal crime for knowingly possessing, without lawful authority, a die in the likeness of one used to make genuine coin, calling the ban, “[i]f this be not a necessary, . . . at least an appropriate, step in effectively suppressing and preventing the making and use of illegitimate coin.”46 Lopez, by contrast, indicated that mere possession of a handgun fails to qualify as economic activity under the Commerce Clause.47 The act of possession is the same in both. What differs is the grant: a die bears on the counterfeiting and coinage powers, while the handgun was tested only against commerce.
Compelled action marks the second difference, and exam stems are most often built on it. The instinct is to ask whether the compulsion fits within commerce, and for individual mandates the answer is no, since the Court has made clear that Congress cannot issue individual mandates under the commerce power.48 Yet in Nortz v. United States the Court treated Congress’s authority under the coinage power “to compel all residents of this country to deliver unto the Government all gold bullion, gold coins and gold certificates in their possession” as a power that could not be successfully challenged.49 The same coinage reasoning supports Congress’s abrogation of contractual pay-in-gold clauses, including retroactively, because in the words of Knox v. Lee “[e]very contract for the payment of money, simply, is necessarily subject to the constitutional power of the government over the currency, whatever that power may be.”50
The two results fit together because the two powers have different objects. The commerce power regulates activity already under way, so a mandate would reach people who have done nothing to join the regulated field. The coinage power is a power over the money itself, and an order about the form in which the nation’s money must be held exercises power over the very subject the grant names, without requiring any prior market participation by the people it reaches.
Treaty implementation shows the same structure from outside Section 8. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause as construed in Missouri v. Holland, Congress may implement a valid treaty by legislation even when it has no independent power to pass that legislation. If the President made the treaty with the advice and consent of the Senate, the only question is whether the treaty’s subject is a proper one for a treaty.51 The path works because the last clause of Section 8 reaches not only the foregoing powers but “all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.”52
A specific grant widens the places Congress may look for authority and leaves the other requirements in place. The statute must still trace to a grant, because Article I, Section 1 vests only the legislative powers herein granted, and a recital that names a grant cannot stand in for a real connection to its subject.53 The means must still be appropriate to the grant’s subject. Finding a grant also leaves open whether the law infringes an individual liberty, a separate fundamental question that the constitutional framework analyzes apart from the question of governmental power.54 On an exam, a statute that cannot be defended under commerce therefore calls for a survey of the other grants before any conclusion that Congress lacked power. The answer names the subject the statute actually addresses (money, the mail, intellectual property, bankruptcy, the lower courts, offenses on the high seas, federal enclaves, the armed forces, or a treaty), identifies the clause for that subject, and then uses the Necessary and Proper Clause only to vouch for the means.