Concept
Jackson's Three Categories
As commander in chief
Jackson's Three Categories
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer tests every contested presidential act with one question: where does Congress stand? His answer sorts the act into one of three categories. When the President acts under an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum. When he acts where Congress has neither granted nor denied authority, he can rely only on his own independent powers, in a “zone of twilight” where he and Congress may share authority or where its distribution is uncertain. When he acts against the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.1
Jackson's opinion is the central text for the functionalist reading of the separation of powers. Rather than begin with the text of the Constitution, he begins with the actual relationships between the executive and legislative branches, and a functionalist would have a court stay out of any relationship the elected branches have found acceptable.2 The framework therefore gives the President no fixed measure of power. It grows when Congress adds what it can delegate and shrinks when the powers Congress holds over the subject come off the total.3
Later decisions follow Jackson's analysis, among them Dames & Moore v. Regan and Zivotofsky v. Kerry, though the framework is better understood as a spectrum than as three sealed boxes.4 Sorting an act therefore begins with reading what Congress actually did, and the steel seizure shows the method. Jackson ruled out the first category because the Government conceded that Congress had authorized nothing. He ruled out the second because Congress had covered the seizure of private property with three statutory policies, none of which the President invoked. That left the third.5 The subsections below take the categories in order, beginning with the one in which the President and Congress act together.
Category One: Authorization
When the President acts under an express or implied authorization of Congress, Jackson wrote, his authority “is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.” The formula is a sum. Article II supplies a baseline of presidential power, Article I supplies whatever more Congress can confer, and in this category the President holds both at once. The words “can delegate” set a ceiling, because Congress cannot hand the President more than the Constitution lets it give. In these circumstances, and in these only, Jackson added, the President may be said “to personify the federal sovereignty.”6
Authorization also changes the litigation. A seizure executed by the President under an Act of Congress, Jackson said, “would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.”7 The presumption has a structural source. The usual objection to executive action is that the President has taken something that belongs to Congress, and that objection loses most of its force once Congress has approved the act. A court that strikes down such an act overrides both political branches at once, so the challenger carries the burden.
Youngstown shows the category by its absence. The Government conceded that no congressional authorization existed for the steel seizure. That concession ruled out the first category and also took away the support of the many precedents and declarations that were made in relation to it and, Jackson said, “must be confined” to it.8 A historical example of presidential action therefore proves little unless Congress stood behind the example.
Presidential practice sorts itself along the same line. In 1940 President Roosevelt proposed to transfer overage destroyers and small patrol boats to Great Britain, without relying on any claim of constitutional power as Commander in Chief. He was advised that the destroyers, if certified as not essential to the defense of the United States, could be transferred because Congress had so authorized, and they were exchanged for air bases. He was also advised that Congress had prohibited release of the so-called mosquito boats then under construction, and those boats were not transferred.9 The recipient was the same; what Congress had said about each kind of vessel was not. The destroyers sat in the first category with both branches behind them, while the boats met a legislative bar, the situation Jackson placed at the opposite end of his range.
Express authorization appears in the detention setting too. A court applying Jackson's framework to Padilla's detention distinguished Quirin, taken up later in the chapter, as a case in which the President's authority was “at a maximum” because Congress had explicitly authorized detentions as part of the Articles of War.10 Authorization need not be express, however. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a plurality read the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) to authorize the detention of enemy combatants although the resolution never uses the word. Because detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, the plurality reasoned, “in permitting the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force,’ Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here,” and “it is of no moment that the AUMF does not use specific language of detention.”11 Read through Jackson's framework, that reading placed the detention in the first category, with Article II and the congressional grant operating together.
Hamdi divided over how plainly Congress had to speak. Justice Souter rejected the Government's claim, accepted by the plurality, that the Force Resolution authorized detention, because he read § 4001(a) to require a clear statement of authority to detain.12 The resolution, adopted one week after the September 11 attacks, “naturally speaks with some generality,” he reasoned, but its focus is on the use of military power. It “never so much as uses the word detention,” and nothing suggests that Congress perceived any need to augment executive power over dangerous citizens within the United States, given the many criminal offenses already defined by statute.13 His insistence on clarity rests on an institutional point. The branch asked to counter a serious threat is not the one on which to rest the Nation's entire reliance in balancing the will to win against the cost in liberty, because responsibility for security amplifies the claim that security raises, and “[a] reasonable balance is more likely to be reached on the judgment of a different branch.”14
An implied authorization reaches only as far as the incident of war from which it is inferred. The plurality tied detention to its purpose, “to prevent captured individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking up arms once again,” and confined its holding to “the narrow circumstances considered here.”15 Detention for some other purpose does not ride on the same reasoning. The Court's older treatment of martial rule, which the chapter takes up later, rests on the same logic of limits: where courts are actually closed and criminal justice cannot be administered, necessity permits military government, but “as necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration,” and martial rule “can never exist where the courts are open.”16
Even where authorization exists, it answers only whether the President holds the power. It removes the objection that he has taken something that belongs to Congress, and it leaves open the separate objection that the Constitution's guarantees to individuals forbid the act, a point the later discussion of the process due in Hamdi takes up.
The usual trap is treating any statute on the general subject as authorization. In the steel seizure Congress had legislated on the seizure of private property through three statutory policies, yet none was invoked, so those statutes gave the President no first-category footing for an order that followed a different course.17
Category Two: Congressional Silence
Jackson defines the middle category in a single sentence: “When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”19 Beside its neighbors, that sentence describes a position in which Congress neither adds nor subtracts. The President stands on Article II alone, with powers such as command of the armed forces,20 and the twilight zone concedes that a subject may lie within the reach of both branches at once.
Congressional silence matters because it leaves the President's own powers unopposed. Jackson recognized that “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.”21 The hedges carry the meaning. Inaction is not legislation, so it adds no legal power to the President's side of the ledger, but a practice that Congress can see and tolerates makes the claim that the arrangement is settled more believable.
Silence enlarges the President's opportunity to act and leaves the list of his powers where it was. Jackson treated the executive branch, like the federal government as a whole, as holding only delegated powers, and he observed that the Constitution was meant “not only to grant power, but to keep it from getting out of hand.” Yet because the President enjoys no unmentioned powers, he added, the mentioned ones should not be “narrowed by a niggardly construction.”22 An act in this category must therefore trace to a power Article II lists, read with practical latitude. It also cannot amount to lawmaking, because Article I vests “[a]ll legislative Powers” in Congress and gives the President a part in lawmaking only by recommending legislation and vetoing measures Congress has approved.23
Silence also means less than students expect. It means that Congress has not addressed the subject, which differs from Congress having failed to authorize the particular act. Jackson tested the steel seizure against that line. It could not be defended under the flexible tests of the second category, he found, because Congress “has not left seizure of private property an open field but has covered it by three statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure.”24 The three policies were these:
- for supplying the government's own needs, seizure of a plant that fails to comply with obligatory orders placed by the government;
- for the same purpose, condemnation of facilities, including temporary use under the power of eminent domain;
- where the general economy, rather than exclusive governmental interests, was to be protected, a third course.25
None was invoked, and Jackson drew the consequence. In choosing a different and inconsistent way of his own, the President could not claim that Congress's failure to legislate on the occasions, grounds and methods for seizing industrial properties had necessitated or invited his course.26 A legislature that supplies three ways to take property for stated purposes has chosen how those purposes are pursued, and letting the executive add a fourth would override that choice under the label of filling a gap. The seizure therefore left the second category and could be justified only by the severe tests of the third grouping.27
Justice Clark drew the same line in plain terms. Where Congress has laid down specific procedures for the type of crisis confronting the President, he must follow them; where Congress has not acted, the President's independent power to act depends on the gravity of the situation.28 That sentence marks the border between the second category and the third. Urgency counts only where Congress has left the field open, and the first question is whether Congress has prescribed methods.
The category does its work where the President's own power is engaged and Congress has not spoken, and the Prize Cases mark one edge of that sphere. By the Constitution Congress alone has the power to declare a national or foreign war, the Court explained, but “[i]f a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority.”29
Acquiescence tips close cases and settles none. Jackson warned that in this area any actual test of power is likely to depend on “the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”30 The category therefore yields no mechanical test, and an answer has to argue from context: how strong the textual claim to the power is, how directly the act reaches a function Article I gives Congress, and how long and openly Congress has tolerated similar acts. Repeated, visible tolerance persuades more than silence in the face of a first-time act, and no amount of it authorizes what Article II cannot reach, as the overtime order shows. Congress can also end the twilight whenever it chooses, because a later statute contrary to the President's act would move the same act into the third category, where its footing is far weaker.
Category Three: Lowest Ebb
Jackson's third grouping covers the President who acts against Congress. “When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”32 The formula completes a progression. In the first category Congress adds what it can delegate to the President's powers, in the second it adds and subtracts nothing, and here it subtracts: whatever Article I commits to Congress on the subject comes off the President's side of the ledger.
A court can sustain the act only by holding the power exclusive to the President. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case, Jackson wrote, “only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject,” and a claim “at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”33 The text of the war power explains the caution. Article II makes the President Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,34 but the Constitution also reflects a compromise between fear of a national standing Army and the danger of relying on inadequately trained soldiers, so it authorizes Congress both to raise and support a national Army and to organize the Militia.35 A President who overrides a statute on a military subject therefore claims a power the text divides between the branches. A practical danger follows. If any plausible presidential claim could displace a statute, Congress's authority over the military would last only as long as the President chose to honor it.
The steel seizure reached this category by elimination, and the exclusivity question then decided it. The Government conceded that no congressional authorization existed, and Congress had covered seizure with three statutory policies the President did not invoke. The order could therefore be justified only “by the severe tests under the third grouping,” where it “can be supported only by any remainder of executive power after subtraction of such powers as Congress may have over the subject.” In short, the President could be sustained only by holding that seizure of strike-bound industries lay “within his domain and beyond control by Congress,” which left presidential power “most vulnerable to attack.”36
Congress's will can be implied from how it handled the subject, and no statute need forbid the act in terms. Justice Burton read the Taft-Hartley Act's omission of any authority to seize an affected industry as deliberate: collective bargaining, not seizure, was to be relied upon; seizure was not to be resorted to without specific congressional authority; and Congress reserved to itself the opportunity to authorize seizure to meet particular emergencies.37 Justice Clark reached the same result through Little v. Barreme, reasoning that where Congress has prescribed methods for the emergency at hand, the President must follow them.38 Justice Marshall reasoned in the same way in New York Times Co. v. United States. It would be “utterly inconsistent with the concept of separation of powers,” he wrote, for a court to use its contempt power to prevent behavior that Congress has specifically declined to prohibit, and the damage would be similar if an Executive with adequate authority from Congress to protect national security could invoke a court's contempt power instead. The Constitution provides, he noted, that Congress shall make laws, the President execute them, and courts interpret them.39 The same structural problem arises when the President tries to make domestic law by order, as Medellin v. Texas illustrates: the Court placed the President's order directing state courts to honor an international judgment in Jackson's third category.
A court applying the framework to Padilla's detention reached the same classification. The Non-Detention Act, it held, was an explicit congressional prohibition on executive detentions absent congressional authorization, which placed the President's powers at their “lowest ebb,” and the AUMF was not the explicit authorization the Act demands. The President was left to “rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter,” and the court found his Commander in Chief powers insufficient to authorize the detention.40 The AUMF thus supported a first-category classification for the Hamdi plurality and fell short of what the Non-Detention Act demanded for the Padilla court, which shows how much turns on the clarity Congress must supply.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld supplies the commission example. Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national held at Guantanamo Bay, faced a conspiracy charge before a military commission that the President had created by order.41 Nothing in the text or legislative history of the AUMF even hinted that Congress meant to expand or alter the authorization already set out in Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,42 so the resolution that supported detention in Hamdi gave the commission no added footing. The commission then failed the limits Congress had set. Its procedures departed from court-martial guarantees that Congress had prescribed, with no evident practical need, so it was not regularly constituted under United States law and did not satisfy Congress's requirement that commissions conform to the law of war.43 Justice Kennedy accordingly placed the case “within Justice Jackson's third category, not the second or first.”44
The category describes where Congress stands when the President acts, and Congress can change its position. The Hamdan ruling “left the door open for a congressional response,” and the President sought one: only months after the decision, and at his urging, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act, which expressly authorized commission procedures similar to those held unlawful.45 Conduct that had been at the lowest ebb of presidential authority was thereby elevated to its maximum, and no court since has held the Guantanamo commissions wholly unlawful.46 The conduct stayed the same while the category changed. A challenge to the commissions after the statute faces the strongest presumption of validity and a heavy burden, whereas the same challenge before it began from the President's weakest footing.
The decisions in this unit leave one question unanswered. Each was resolved on a narrower ground, whether the seizure of private industry, the detention of a citizen, or the creation of a commission, so none decides whether the Commander in Chief Clause ever bars Congress from limiting how the President conducts a campaign. Authority pointing toward congressional control includes Brown v. United States, in which the Court held that the power to confiscate enemy property lay in the legislature. A President who claims preclusive command power must still meet Jackson's test, which asks whether Congress is disabled from acting on the subject, and the executive claims examined above did not meet it.47 A strong answer states what the cases settle, that the steel seizure failed and that the Padilla court found Commander in Chief powers insufficient to authorize that detention, and says plainly that the question of core command remains open.
Step four does the real work. A student who stops after classifying the act and declares it invalid has skipped the question the category itself poses, and a student who assumes the President's title answers that question has skipped the reasoning that defeated the steel seizure.