Concept
Impeachment and Judicial Tenure
Removal of officers
Impeachment and Judicial Tenure
Article II, Section 4 states the one route for removing an officer that the Constitution itself provides: the President, the Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States “shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”1 Bowsher v. Synar rested its bar on congressional removal on that text. After an officer has been appointed and confirmed, the Court explained, Congress may remove the officer only through impeachment by the House and conviction by the Senate, and any further direct congressional role in removing officers who execute the laws is inconsistent with separation of powers.2 For those officers, impeachment is the only removal tool Congress holds. This section shows how the tool works and why it was built to be hard to use. It then turns to federal judges, whose tenure the Constitution protects in its own terms and who therefore stand apart from the executive officers of the earlier sections.
The Impeachment Route
Two chambers share the process, and each holds its part alone. The House has the sole power of impeachment and acts by majority vote. The Senate has the sole power to try impeachments, and it may convict only with the concurrence of two thirds of the members present.3 Impeachment by itself therefore removes no one: it accuses, and conviction removes. Andrew Johnson shows the gap. The House impeached him, and he avoided removal by a single vote in the Senate.4 The consequence of conviction is also narrow. A judgment in a case of impeachment extends no further than removal from office and disqualification from holding any further office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States. A convicted official nevertheless remains liable to indictment, trial, and punishment under the criminal law, because the aim of impeachment is removal and not punishment.5
The Constitution makes removal hard on purpose. The chamber that accuses is not the chamber that decides, and conviction requires two thirds of the senators present, far more than the majority that suffices to impeach. The grounds are limited as well. At the Constitutional Convention, George Mason proposed adding “maladministration” to the list, but James Madison objected that so vague a term would be “equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate.” The delegates chose “other high crimes and misdemeanors” instead.6 Bowsher returned to that history when it examined the Comptroller General's removal statute. The statute permitted removal for “inefficiency,” “neglect of duty,” or “malfeasance,” terms the Court found broad enough, as Congress interpreted them, to sustain removal for any number of actual or perceived transgressions of the legislative will.7 An officer exposed to removal on grounds that loose serves, in practice, at Congress's pleasure. That is the result the Convention declined to authorize, and it explains why the Constitution leaves Congress no easier route than impeachment.
The phrase “other high Crimes and Misdemeanors” was a middle course. It lets Congress remove officers whose misconduct is serious but is neither treason nor bribery, while avoiding grounds so broad that impeachment would work like a parliamentary vote of no confidence.8 The phrase does not track the criminal code. The House impeached Justice Chase in 1804 for intemperate, partisan criticism of the Republican Party from the bench, conduct that was surely not criminal. Not every crime would qualify, either. The category reaches an abuse of power, a serious breach of trust, or other conduct that shows an official unsuitable for office, whether or not the conduct is also a crime.9 Beyond that, the Constitution defines nothing, and views diverge sharply. One holds that impeachable acts are limited to violations of the criminal law that seriously threaten society. At the opposite pole stands Gerald Ford, who as a congressman proposed impeaching Justice William Douglas largely because of Douglas's liberal views and declared that an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House considers it to be.10
The courts have stayed out of that dispute. In Nixon v. United States, Walter Nixon, a former chief judge of a federal district court, had been convicted by a jury of making false statements before a federal grand jury. The House impeached him, a committee of senators heard the evidence and presented briefs and arguments to the full Senate, and the Senate convicted him and ordered him removed.11 Nixon argued that the Senate had not “tried” him, because the whole body had never heard the evidence. The Court dismissed the suit as a nonjusticiable political question. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and five colleagues, found the text dispositive: by vesting in the Senate the “sole power to try all impeachments,” Article I reflects a textual commitment to the Senate, and not to the courts, of the power to decide the procedures for trying impeachments. The history and contemporary understandings of the impeachment provisions supported that conclusion.12 Justice Souter, concurring only in the judgment, would not make the bar absolute. Under “different and unusual circumstances,” such as a conviction on a coin toss or on a summary determination that an officer was simply “a bad guy,” he thought a more searching judicial review might be proper.13 On an exam, a claim that a court may set aside a Senate conviction because of how the Senate ran its trial fails under the majority opinion; Souter's reservation is a concurrence and not the holding.
Judges and Non-Article III Tribunals
Article III protects federal judges in the Constitution's own words. Judges of the Supreme Court and of the inferior courts hold their offices during good behavior and receive compensation that cannot be diminished while they remain in office.15 Good-behavior tenure leaves impeachment as the only way to end a judge's service, and neither the President nor Congress holds another lever. Mistretta v. United States shows how firmly the protection attaches to the judgeship itself. Federal judges could serve on the Sentencing Commission, and the President could remove Commission members, but the Court observed that the Act did not, and could not under the Constitution, authorize the President to remove or diminish Article III judges as judges. A judge removed from the Commission would still, absent impeachment, enjoy tenure during good behavior and a full judicial salary.16 The President could reach the Commission seat, and he could not reach the judgeship.
Hamilton explained why the guarantee matters. The inflexible and uniform adherence to constitutional rights that courts require, he wrote, cannot be expected from judges who hold office by a temporary commission.17 The Bowsher majority applied the same instinct to the statute before it. “Surely,” the Court said, no one would seriously suggest that judicial independence would be strengthened by allowing removal of federal judges only by a joint resolution finding “inefficiency,” “neglect of duty,” or “malfeasance.”18 The comparison had point because the Comptroller General's statute used those very grounds.
Justice White's dissent drew a different lesson from the contrast. Article III judges, unlike other officers, are specifically protected against removal for other than constitutionally specified cause, so a statute allowing their removal on other grounds would violate that specific command. Nonjudicial officers have no similar textual limit, and White would therefore have asked whether the asserted congressional removal power amounted to a real and substantial aggrandizement of congressional authority at the expense of executive power.19 His test was a dissent, but his observation about judges holds: the judge's immunity from other removal routes rests on specific text.
That text protects the judges of the courts Article III describes. Congress may also create tribunals outside Article III, and the justification for those courts is a subject of its own.20 For removal purposes the consequence is plain. Judges of such a tribunal do not hold Article III's good-behavior tenure, so whatever protection they receive comes from the statute that created the tribunal. The validity of that protection falls to the removal framework this chapter has developed, and not to Article III.