Concept
Enforcing Statutory Duties
Congressional limits on the executive
Enforcing Statutory Duties
Kendall decided what the Postmaster General had to do. It left a second problem: making him do it. A duty that no one can compel rests on the officer’s good will, and the contractors, for all their statutory right, had no credit on the books until a court ordered one entered.
Two enforcement questions follow. The first asks when a court may compel a subordinate officer to perform a statutory duty. The contractors won a writ of mandamus, an order commanding a public officer to perform a duty the law imposes, and the conditions that made that writ the right one are the subject of the next subsection. The second asks whom the order runs against. In Kendall it ran to the Postmaster General, the officer who owed the duty, and not to the President above him.
The two answers meet at one boundary. A court can command only what a statute has already fixed, so the ministerial label that defeated the Postmaster General’s defense also marks the duties a court will order performed. And by addressing the officer who owes the duty, a court holds the executive to a statute without issuing a command to the President.
Mandamus Against Officers
Having treated the Postmaster General’s duty as a ministerial act, the Court asked whether mandamus fit it. The common law supplied the answer. The writ commands a person, corporation, or inferior court to do a particular thing that belongs to its office or duty, that is consonant with right and justice, and for which no other adequate specific remedy exists.1 The Court read the writ as the common law did, varying only in form to suit the different character of our government.2 Measured against that description, the writ was “peculiarly appropriate” to the contractors’ case: the right was established by positive law (law enacted by a legislature), the duty was clear and specific, and no other adequate remedy existed.3 Mandamus thus serves a duty the law has already fixed, and the court’s only task is to see the duty performed.
The writ reaches an officer because the officer is the party a court can order. The contractors’ real adversary was the United States, which could not be sued on their claims without its consent.4 Yet federal courts have long exercised mandamus authority over executive officials, compelling them to take action the law requires.5 A statutory right needs a defendant who can be ordered to honor it, and the officer through whom the government acts fills that role.
The first two conditions confine the writ to cases in which Congress has already decided the matter, so a court that orders performance puts no judgment of its own in the executive’s place. The third keeps the writ extraordinary: when the law already supplies a specific and adequate route to what it promised, the claimant should take that route.
In Kendall the first two conditions required little argument. The right rested on positive law, and the duty was clear and specific. The contest came on the third, because the Postmaster General’s side could point to other roads the contractors might have taken. Counsel suggested three, an application to Congress, removal of the Postmaster General from office, and an action against him for damages, and the Court found each unavailable or inadequate.6
The application to Congress, the Court said, “has been tried and failed.”7 The contractors had already taken their claim there, and the Court counted that route spent.
Removal “might not afford any certain relief, for his successors might withhold the credit in the same manner.”8 The duty belongs to the office, so a new officeholder would face the same decision and could refuse it too. The Court added that such extraordinary measures are not the remedies the law has in mind when it speaks of remedies that displace mandamus.9 Removal sanctions a person, and the contractors needed an entry in their account.
The action for damages fared no better. A private action at law seldom affords an adequate remedy.10 If the refusal were treated as a continuing injury, redress would take a series of successive actions for as long as the credit was denied, and the series would never furnish a complete remedy.11 If the whole award were the measure of damages, the remedy would generally be inadequate where the damages were large, because a judgment against an individual is worth only what that individual can pay. The Court borrowed the language of Osborn v. United States Bank to call such a remedy one with nothing real in it, a remedy in name only and not in substance.12
Each alternative fell short for the same reason: none could deliver the credit the law commanded. The contrast is easier to see in a case where the third condition fails.
The same conditions explain why the writ has issued against other officers and why it has been denied. Mandamus has compelled the Treasurer of the United States to make a payment the law clearly required, as in Roberts v. United States, and has compelled the land office to issue a patent reflecting the petitioner’s ownership of the property, as in Lane v. Hoglund.13 Decatur v. Paulding went the other way. It too concerned an executive officer’s payment of money, but the statute gave the officer discretion over the basis on which pension claims would be paid, and the Court denied the writ.14 The difference lies in the statute. In Roberts the law fixed the payment, while in Decatur it left the basis to the officer, so a writ would have required the court to make a choice Congress had given someone else. The duty condition thus filters out the cases in which mandamus would become a device for directing executive judgment.
The availability of the writ in principle left a second question: whether the circuit court of the District had jurisdiction and power to issue it.15 The Court began from a principle. Congress had the power to command the act, and “the power to enforce the performance of the act must rest somewhere,” or the case would present “a monstrous absurdity in a well organized government, that there should be no remedy, although a clear and undeniable right should be shown to exist.” If the circuit court of the District could not supply the remedy, the Court said, “it exists nowhere.”16
Earlier decisions had found that power wanting in the circuit courts in the states. M’Intire v. Wood and M’Cluny v. Silliman turned on a statutory point: Congress had not delegated to those courts all the judicial power the Constitution would allow it to confer.17 The common law had also not been adopted as a system in the states generally, as it had been for the District.18
The District differed in two ways. Congress’s act continued the laws of Maryland in the part ceded by that state, and the power to issue a mandamus is a branch of the common law then in force in Maryland.19 The same act delegated to the District’s circuit court the whole judicial power in the very language of the Constitution, which extends the judicial power to all cases in law and equity arising under the laws of the United States.20 The majority concluded that the court had power to issue the writ.
The dissenting Justices disagreed with that conclusion, and the disagreement did not concern Congress’s constitutional power. One dissenter had no doubt that Congress may authorize the federal courts, including the circuit court of the District, to issue the writ to the Postmaster General to compel any ministerial duty the law places on him.21 That concession places the dispute in whether Congress had actually conferred the authority on this court. The quarrel therefore concerned the reach of a statute, not the separation-of-powers holding of the earlier sections.
Officers Versus the President
The writ in Kendall ran to one person, the Postmaster General. The Court said its object was not to direct or control him in any official duty of an executive character but to enforce a mere ministerial act that neither he nor the President had any authority to deny or control.23 The two statements fit together. The writ reached the officer who held the duty, and the statute had already fixed the duty, so the President’s place above the Postmaster General gave him no more power over the credit than the officer had. An order to the officer delivered everything the statute promised, and no order ever had to run to the President.
A structural reason lies behind the choice of defendant. The real parties to the dispute were the contractors and the United States, and the United States could not be sued on the claim without its consent.24 The statute created the right, the sovereign’s immunity kept the government itself out of court, and the officer through whom the government acts was the one defendant a court could order to perform. Federal courts have long used mandamus against executive officials in just this way, compelling them to do what the law requires.25 Naming the subordinate also spares the courts and the President a direct confrontation, because the court enforces the statute without commanding the chief executive. Courts that compel ministerial duties of subordinate officers while declining to dictate their discretion apply the same pattern, as the preceding subsection showed.26
The President stands differently. Nixon v. Fitzgerald recognized that the President has absolute immunity from suits for money damages for official acts.27 The Chief Justice, concurring, stressed that this immunity derives from and is mandated by the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.28 The concern is visible in what a damages judgment does. It attaches to the person who must pay it, so a President exposed to such judgments for official decisions would weigh personal financial risk in each of them, and absolute immunity removes that pressure. The two lawsuits thus sit on opposite sides of a line. The contractors sued a subordinate officer to compel a ministerial entry and could proceed, while a plaintiff who sues the President for money damages over official acts cannot.
Immunity from damages does not make the President exempt from judicial process. It applies to suits for money damages and does not prevent courts from entering specific orders that name the President.29 Federal courts may issue a subpoena to the President, as the Court held in United States v. Nixon, and the Court held in Trump v. Vance that a President must comply with a criminal subpoena for personal documents issued by a state district attorney.30 A subpoena from Congress raises separation-of-powers concerns of its own, so under Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP courts must scrutinize a congressional subpoena for the President’s personal papers with those concerns in mind.31 Accountability for the President therefore continues through channels other than damages, and the shape of each channel depends on who is asking and what the request would do to the separation of powers.
What a court may order the President himself to do is a separate question, and Kendall does not answer it. The writ there ran to a subordinate, so the Court had no occasion to say what would follow if a ministerial duty rested on the President personally. The Supreme Court has touched the question without resolving it. In Mississippi v. Johnson the Court declined to decide whether the President may be required by judicial process to perform a purely ministerial act under a positive law.32 A dissent in Nixon v. Fitzgerald added that Kendall did not indicate the President could never be subject to judicial process. If anything it implied the contrary, because the Kendall Court rejected the claim that the mandamus infringed on the Executive Branch.33 That reading comes from a dissent and carries the force of an argument, not a holding. The question stands as the Court has left it: an injunction against the President to compel a ministerial act is a possibility the Court has neither foreclosed nor approved.34
A refused statutory payment sorts claimants into three groups, which differ only in defendant and remedy.
The first claimant’s position tracks Kendall, the second tracks Nixon v. Fitzgerald, and the third is the question Mississippi v. Johnson reserved. Students commonly err in one of two directions. One error treats the President’s damages immunity as a bar to every court order, which overlooks the subpoena decisions and the reservation about ministerial acts. The other treats Kendall as proof that the President can be commanded like a subordinate, which overreads a writ that ran to the Postmaster General and decided nothing about orders to the President.