Concept
Debating Clinton
The presentment requirement and the president’s power to veto or to withhold action
Debating Clinton
Clinton v. City of New York divided the Justices over what Article I, Section 7 demands and over how to read a constitutional procedure. The section requires that every bill passed by both houses be presented to the President, who either signs it or returns it with his objections to the house where it originated; if two thirds of each house then repass the bill, it becomes law.1 The majority held that the Line Item Veto Act's cancellation provisions violate that section, and it found it unnecessary to consider the District Court's alternative holding that the Act disrupts the balance of powers.2 Because the President sits at the center of the separation of powers, any device that changes his part in making law reaches the structure itself.3
The opinions differed in method as much as in result. Justice Stevens's majority opinion stressed the procedures the Constitution prescribes for enacting laws and set aside any consideration of the practical benefits of a line-item veto. Justice Breyer's dissent stressed the need for such a veto given the ways the budget process has changed over two centuries of growing government.4 The contrast is between a formalist and a functional approach to separation of powers, and it recurs throughout this chapter. The sections below take up the dissents of Justices Scalia and Breyer, the concurrence of Justice Kennedy, and the item vetoes that many states give their governors.
The Dissents: Delegation and Discretion
Justice Scalia found the Presentment Clause satisfied. The Clause requires that a bill passed by both houses be presented to the President, who signs it or returns it.5 The House and Senate passed the Balanced Budget Act and the President signed it; only after those steps did he use the Line Item Veto Act to cancel the spending item.6 In Scalia's view, then, the Court's objection is not that the Act lets the President veto parts of a bill and sign others into law. The objection is that the Act lets him “cancel” parts of duly enacted statutes.7
Scalia accepted that a President who cancels without statutory authority acts unlawfully. Section 7, he wrote, obviously prevents the President from canceling a law that Congress has not authorized him to cancel: such action cannot be part of his execution of the law, and if it is legislative, “repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I.”8 The dispute therefore concerns a statute that itself authorizes cancellation. The argument that a statute cannot do that, Scalia noted, has long since been made and rejected; in 1809 Congress passed a law authorizing the President to cancel trade restrictions against Great Britain and France if either revoked edicts directed at the United States.9
From that history Scalia drew a different source for the limit. Section 7 contains no categorical prohibition on authorized executive reduction or augmentation of congressional dispositions, he wrote, and the Court's cases conclusively disprove one. The limit comes instead from the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation: when authorized executive reduction or augmentation goes too far, it usurps the nondelegable function of Congress and violates the separation of powers.10 The distinctions the majority drew between the Act and earlier authorizations bear on that question, not on whether Section 7's details were followed. They matter because they show whether Congress transferred to the Executive a degree of political, lawmaking power that tradition demands the Legislative Branch retain.11 The reframing changes what a court asks. Presentment asks whether a procedure was followed, a question with a yes-or-no answer. Delegation asks how much lawmaking power Congress handed over, a question of degree.
Putting the delegation question, Scalia concluded that Congress had not given away a power it must keep, because Congress has long committed spending decisions to the President's discretion. In 1803 it appropriated $50,000 for gunboats “to be armed, manned and fitted out, and employed for such purposes as in his opinion the public service may require.” President Jefferson reported the money unspent because the peaceable turn of affairs on the Mississippi made immediate execution of the law unnecessary. Examples of appropriations committed to the President's discretion, Scalia noted, “abound in our history.”12
Congress's earlier use of the word “cancelled” points the same way. Under the 1985 Act in Bowsher v. Synar, sequestered amounts were “permanently cancelled.” The Court nonetheless held that Act unconstitutional, not because it gave the Executive legislative power, but because it gave the Comptroller General, an officer of the Legislative Branch over whom Congress retained removal power, the ultimate authority to determine the budget cuts to be made.13 Scalia thought the President's discretion under the Line Item Veto Act broader than the Comptroller General's but no broader than the discretion traditionally granted the President in executing spending laws.14 Train v. City of New York implicitly confirmed that Congress may confer discretion upon the Executive to withhold appropriated funds, even funds appropriated for a specific purpose; the statute there authorized spending “not to exceed” specified sums.15
On that reasoning Scalia would have held that the President's cancellation of § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act as an item of direct spending does not violate the Constitution. He found no party with standing to challenge the cancellation of § 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, so he did not reach that question.16
Justice Breyer dissented on a different ground: he denied that the President changed any law. “When the President ‘canceled’ the two appropriation measures now before us, he did not repeal any law nor did he amend any law. He simply followed the law, leaving the statutes, as they are literally written, intact.”17 He added an argument from scale. When the Constitution was written, the national budget was $4 million and each appropriation could be a separate bill. A federal budget of $1.5 trillion now produces appropriations bills with a dozen titles, hundreds of sections, and more than 500 pages in the Statutes at Large.18
The majority met these arguments from the other direction. The Court emphasized that the Constitution's procedures for enacting and vetoing laws must be followed strictly, and it observed that “[t]here is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.” Any change in those procedures must come by constitutional amendment, not legislative action.19 That reasoning answers the point that Congress itself authorized the cancellations: an authorizing statute is legislative action, so it cannot supply what only an amendment can. It also lets the majority leave the delegation question aside, because the only issue it addressed was the “finely wrought” procedure the Constitution commands.20
Each opinion thus asked a different question about the same cancellation. The majority asked whether the President had amended or repealed enacted law without the Article I procedure. Scalia asked whether Congress had delegated lawmaking power that tradition requires it to keep. Breyer asked whether the President had done anything beyond following the statute. The majority's question controls, because it produced the holding.
Kennedy's Concurrence on Liberty
Justice Kennedy joined the Court's opinion and wrote separately to answer Justice Breyer, who had observed that the statute does not threaten the liberties of individual citizens. Kennedy disagreed.27 Separation of powers, he explained, operates on a vertical axis as well as among the branches: it governs the relation between each branch and the citizens in whose interest power must be exercised, and the citizen has a vital interest in the regularity of that exercise.28
Spending shows why that interest is real. Money is the instrument of policy, and policy affects the lives of citizens. If the Executive alone determines the measure of a tax or the decision to spend, without adequate control by the citizen's Representatives in Congress, liberty is threatened; the individual loses liberty in a real sense when that instrument is not subject to traditional constitutional constraints.29 Kennedy called the Act “the functional equivalent of a line item veto” and said it enhances the President's powers beyond what the Framers would have endorsed.30
Kennedy then answered the suggestion that the political branches have a somewhat free hand to reallocate their own authority. That suggestion, he wrote, requires two premises: that the public good demands the reallocation, and that liberty is not at risk. The first is inadmissible, because the Constitution's structure requires a stability that transcends the convenience of the moment.31 The second fails for the reasons above, and Congress's own consent does not repair it. It is no answer to say that Congress surrendered its authority by its own hand, or that a later statute, signed by the President or enacted over his veto, could restore the power; “[t]hat a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.”32
Kennedy took the deficit problem seriously. A nation cannot plunder its own treasury without putting its Constitution and its survival in peril, and he thought the Act would tend to restrain persistent excessive spending. Even so, he wrote, “[f]ailure of political will does not justify unconstitutional remedies.”33 The Constitution is not bereft of controls over improvident spending. Federalism is one safeguard, because political accountability is easier to enforce within the States than nationwide, and control of the political branches by an informed and responsible electorate is the other principal mechanism.34
Both versions cut spending, but only the first follows Article I. Congress remains free to cut spending, and to name its targets, through bicameral passage and presentment.35 What Kennedy's rationale rules out is a shortcut that gives one officer the power to choose which items stand, and it rules the shortcut out even when both political branches endorse it.
State Item Vetoes and the Article V Route
The federal Constitution gives the President no item veto. Article I, Section 7 describes his part in lawmaking in terms of a bill: he signs it or returns it with his objections, and the text says nothing about disapproving one item inside it.37 Some state constitutions grant that power to the governor expressly, and the U.S. Constitution does not grant it to the President.38 Many states depart from the federal model by letting the governor disapprove individual parts or “items” of a measure instead of vetoing the whole, and some confine the power to the dollar amounts of items in appropriations measures. Even so limited, the power can substantially change the legislative dynamic between governor and legislature.39
The federal statute resembled the state power in name only. Despite its title, the Line Item Veto Act did not give the President the power governors hold; it permitted him to “cancel” certain expenditures in an appropriations bill that he had already signed into law. Two years after Congress passed the Act, the Court struck it down in Clinton.40 The Court held that the Act's cancellation provisions violate Article I, Section 7.41
State comparisons also call for care because state legislatures differ. Each legislature sets its own internal rules, so important variations exist between Congress and the state legislatures and among the states themselves; Nebraska has a single chamber, while the other forty-nine states, like Congress, are bicameral.42 State experience is therefore instructive evidence about how item vetoes operate, but it supplies no federal authority.
A student comparing the two systems may reason that if a state can entrust the item veto to its governor, Congress can entrust one to the President by statute. That inference skips the source of the state power. A governor holds the item veto because the state's constitution says so. The federal Constitution contains no such grant, and in Clinton Congress tried to supply one by ordinary statute.43
The Court named the remedy in its closing paragraph. If there is to be a new procedure in which the President plays a different role in determining the final text of what may “become a law,” the change “must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V of the Constitution.”44 The reason follows from what an ordinary statute is. A statute results from the Article I procedure, so a statute that rearranged the roles of the houses and the President would use that procedure to rewrite itself. Article V is the Constitution's own route to changing its text. A properly adopted amendment could give the President an item veto of the kind many state constitutions give governors; an ordinary statute cannot, however many legislators and however enthusiastic a President support it.
Whether to amend the Constitution to add an item veto is a policy question, and the holding takes no side. The state record suggests that the power shifts leverage between the branches more than it changes total spending: all appropriations bargaining in a state takes place in the shadow of an empowered governor.45 A comparable shift in the federal system would alter a role the Framers designed deliberately. The President's participation in lawmaking was meant to protect the Executive Branch from Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident laws.46 Whether an item veto would serve or strain that design is a question the Court left open, because it found it unnecessary to reach the alternative balance-of-powers holding.47 Whichever view prevails, the route to a federal item veto remains Article V.