Concept
The Tenth Amendment Framework
State immunity from federal law, including the 10th Amendment
State Immunity from Federal Law
The Tenth Amendment Framework
The Tenth Amendment sorts governmental power by subtraction. It reads: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."1 Subtract what the Constitution delegates to the federal government and what it prohibits to the states, and whatever remains is reserved.
That sorting gives the two governments opposite starting points. Where the Constitution is silent about a power, neither expressly nor by necessary implication, the federal government lacks it and the states enjoy it, so the states may exercise every power the Constitution does not withhold from them. The Federal Constitution does not say whether a reserved power rests with a state government or with that state's people; each state's constitution settles that.2
The Amendment's wording also marks a change from the Articles of Confederation. The Articles gave the national government specific powers, among them regulating the alloy and value of coin, fixing weights and measures, managing affairs with the Indians, establishing post offices, and making rules for the land and naval forces.3 But Article II stated that each state retained "every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States."4 The Tenth Amendment drops the word "expressly." A power may therefore be delegated by necessary implication as well as by express grant, and only a power delegated in neither way stays reserved.5
Whether the Amendment adds anything to that arrangement is disputed. On one view, it does not limit in any way the powers delegated to the federal government, so Congress, when regulating interstate commerce, may treat the states no differently than ordinary persons.6 On the competing view, the Constitution merely modified the sovereignty the states held under the Articles and recognizes them as sovereign entities. The Amendment, or the underlying principles of federalism, then limit federal power in important ways, and Congress must acknowledge state sovereignty and state sovereign immunity even when it regulates interstate commerce.7
Before 1937 the Court answered with limits, through what is called the enclave theory. The Amendment, on that theory, reserved a zone of activities to the states, and a federal law within the scope of the Commerce Clause was unconstitutional if it invaded the zone.8 Carter v. Carter Coal Co. supplied the rationale. Every addition to national legislative power detracts from state power, so the powers of the general government cannot reach beyond the express terms of the grants and the implications necessarily drawn from them.9
Hammer v. Dagenhart applied the theory to a federal ban on interstate transportation of goods made with child labor. Because shipping such goods was not inherently dangerous, the Court deemed the law a regulation not of commerce but of the conditions under which the goods were made. Its real object was manufacturing, a purely local activity reserved to the states, so the ban fell even though it literally regulated interstate commerce itself.10
The theory was not applied evenly. The Court upheld federal laws prohibiting lotteries11 and federal laws regulating sexual behavior,12 yet it struck down the child-labor ban.
United States v. Darby ended the enclave theory. The Fair Labor Standards Act fell within the commerce power, which the Constitution had surrendered to the United States, so the Tenth Amendment had no bearing on the Act's validity.13 In Darby's account, the Amendment is simply a reminder that Congress, to legislate, must point to an express or implied power. It no longer reserves a zone of activities to exclusive state control.14
Consider a federal recordkeeping rule, enacted under the commerce power, that binds every large employer, including a state highway department. The department objects that the Tenth Amendment reserves its internal operations to the state. The Amendment's words give it no help. A power delegated to Congress is not reserved to the states, and the commerce power is delegated, so nothing remains for the Amendment to reserve on this subject. Any protection for the department would have to come from somewhere else.15
Justice Stevens made the textual point in his dissent in Printz v. United States. The First Amendment removes from Congress a category of laws that Article I would otherwise authorize, but the Tenth Amendment, whose language refers only to powers not delegated to Congress, imposes no restriction on the exercise of delegated powers.16 New York v. United States made a parallel point about the text. Any limit on Congress does not derive from the Amendment itself, which is essentially a tautology; the Amendment confirms that federal power is subject to limits, from the structure of the Constitution among other sources, that may in a given instance leave power with the states.17
Federalism can restrain Congress in two ways. As a rule of construction, it narrows the scope of a granted power; the Court did that in United States v. Lopez when it put teeth into the "substantially affects" test for the commerce power. As an independent check, it limits the exercise of a granted power just as the Bill of Rights does: Congress may not use the commerce power to transgress the First Amendment, and it may not use that power to violate the principle of federalism.18 The immunity cases that follow resemble the second kind. They ask whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power.19
New York shows structure, rather than text, supplying the limit. Congress there offered the states a choice between taking title to waste and obeying a direct order to regulate. Either instruction standing alone was beyond Congress's authority, so a choice between the two was no choice at all: the Act commandeered the legislative processes of the states by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.20 The Court treated it as immaterial whether one calls the take title provision a stretch beyond Congress's enumerated powers or an infringement of the state sovereignty the Tenth Amendment reserves. Either way, the provision was inconsistent with the federal structure.21
Not every federal law that touches a state triggers that limit. Most of the Court's recent Tenth Amendment cases have concerned Congress's authority to subject state governments to generally applicable laws, and New York was not one of them, because Congress had not subjected the state to the same legislation that applies to private parties.22 The line therefore falls between regulating states along with everyone else and conscripting state governments to carry out a federal program. The first is the baseline, and the second marks where the structural limit begins.
The sections ahead follow the structural limits in the order the Court developed them: the political-process rule of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, then the anticommandeering decisions in New York, Printz, and Murphy, and the reasons behind the rule. After those come the narrower protections: the limits on the rule, the clear-statement protection for ambiguous federal statutes, and the question of federal taxation of states.