Concept
Garcia and the Political Process
State immunity from federal law, including the 10th Amendment
Garcia and the Political Process
Congress has no general police power. The Constitution grants it specific powers, and every federal law must rest on one of them, most often the power to regulate commerce among the several States.1 The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states the powers that the Constitution neither delegates to the United States nor prohibits to the states.2 As Darby put it, the Amendment is simply a reminder that Congress, to legislate, must point to an express or implied power.3
The harder question arises when Congress does point to a delegated power, writes a valid law, and applies it to state governments along with private parties. On one view, federalism can check Congress even then, by working as an independent limit on a granted power in much the way the Bill of Rights does: Congress may no more use the commerce power to violate federalism than to violate the First Amendment.4 In 1976 the Court enforced that limit against the federal minimum wage.5 In 1985 it abandoned the attempt and sent the states to the political process for protection.6
This section follows that reversal, and it concerns federal laws that reach states along with everyone else. Congress remains free to regulate many state activities this way. What it may not do is commandeer the states, a limit that the later sections develop.7
Usery's Traditional Functions Test
Usery is no longer good law, but Garcia answers it point by point, and the answers make sense only if you know the question. The question grew out of the Fair Labor Standards Act's slow spread onto public payrolls. The Act first covered only private-sector employees. In 1966 Congress extended it to schools, hospitals, nursing homes, and local transit agencies, and two years later the Court upheld that extension in Maryland v. Wirtz. The Court then held that the Eleventh Amendment barred public employees from suing to enforce the Act, and in 1974 Congress amended the Act again to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity and to cover virtually all government employees.8
National League of Cities v. Usery then drew a line through that coverage. The Court held, by a 5–4 vote, that applying the Act to states and their subdivisions violated the Tenth Amendment by intruding on state sovereignty in “areas of traditional governmental functions.”9 Nontraditional, or proprietary, functions stayed covered.10 The decision cut against the Darby reading of the Amendment, which today's law again reflects: the Amendment is no longer seen as reserving a zone of activities for exclusive state control.11
The Court's worry was about money as much as sovereignty. Requiring state and local governments to pay the federal minimum wage would force them to raise taxes or cut other services. That, the Court said, would displace decisions traditionally left to the states and “may substantially restructure traditional ways in which the local governments have arranged their affairs.”12 A government's payroll competes with everything else it funds, so a federal rule that raises the price of labor decides, indirectly, how much remains for the rest.13 The Court condensed the objection into one formula: the statute “operate[d] to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.”14 Garcia later summarized the central theme. The states occupy a special position in the constitutional system, and the commerce power is limited because the states are an integral part of the federal system, so Congress may not exercise it in a way that impairs the states' “integrity” or their “ability to function effectively in a federal system.”15
Notice what kind of limit this was. The Court did not say that the wage rule exceeded the commerce power, which still reached private employers. It held that a state performing a traditional function held a privilege against a law that was otherwise valid, so federalism acted as an independent check on a granted power, as the Bill of Rights does.16 Two facts had to coincide before the privilege arose: the regulated party was a state, and its function was traditionally governmental.17 A private bus company and a city bus system could face the same federal wage rule, and only the city could raise the Tenth Amendment objection.
The idea of a protected state core was older than Usery, but Usery drew a wider zone. Coyle v. Oklahoma had held that Congress could not dictate where a state located its capital, a decision about the state's own organization as a government. In United States v. California, by contrast, the Court refused to exempt a state-owned railroad from federal regulation. It found it unnecessary to decide whether running the railroad was a sovereign function, observed that the sovereign power of the states “is necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants of power to the federal government,” and rejected immunity for “activities in which the States have traditionally engaged,” because “there is no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce.” The state, it said, “can no more deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an individual.”18 Usery revived the argument that California had lost.
Inside the Court, Usery was fragile from the start. Justice Brennan, writing for the four dissenters, said that the majority had “manufactured an abstraction without substance, founded neither in the words of the Constitution nor on precedent.” Justice Blackmun supplied the fifth vote but wrote separately to say that he saw the majority as adopting “a balancing approach” that would not outlaw federal power “in areas such as environmental protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably greater.”19 He voted with the four dissenters to uphold federal laws from then on, and in 1985 he wrote Garcia.20
The Court narrowed the test in later cases. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, the majority said that when Congress has determined that an activity affects interstate commerce, courts need inquire only whether the finding is rational. It then read Usery to demand three things before a court could invalidate a commerce-power statute. The statute had to regulate “States as States.” It had to regulate “matters that are indisputably attributes of state sovereignty.” And compliance had to directly impair the state's ability “to structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions.”21
EEOC v. Wyoming shows how narrow the test had become. Wyoming required its game wardens to retire at 55 and claimed that federal age-discrimination law intruded on its sovereignty. Justice Brennan found no reason to see any “wide-ranging threat to the structure of state governance.” Usery had turned on the effect of a wage mandate on the state's spending choices, and not every federal commerce regulation that touches how a state allocates resources offends the Tenth Amendment. Wyoming could pursue its goal of physically fit wardens by assessing individual fitness, or keep its age limit by showing that age is a bona fide occupational qualification.22
The second condition, a traditional governmental function, did the real work in all of this, and it was also the weak point. An answer that has a state resist a generally applicable federal employment law by calling its function traditionally governmental invokes a test the Court has abandoned.
Why Garcia Overruled Usery
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985), the Court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act may constitutionally be applied to state and local governments, and it overruled Usery.24 The case was argued over whether operating a mass-transit system is a traditional governmental function. The majority answered by rejecting the premise of the question: it found no principled role for the judiciary in granting state and local governments immunity from otherwise valid commerce-power legislation that similarly governs private parties.25 The attempt to separate traditional from nontraditional governmental functions was, the Court held, unworkable and inconsistent with established principles of federalism.26
Justice Blackmun wrote for a five-Justice majority made up of the four dissenters from Usery and Blackmun himself, who had joined Usery's majority but had been voting with those four to uphold federal laws since 1976.27 Because the Court rejected the classification itself, no state function earns immunity from a generally applicable federal law merely by being traditionally governmental. The label matters as little for police and schools as it did for the transit authority.28
The majority gave two reasons, and they are logically independent. It rejected a rule of state immunity that “turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional’” as “unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.” Such a rule “leads to inconsistent results at the same time that it disserves principles of democratic self-governance, and it breeds inconsistency precisely because it is divorced from those principles.”29 A test can be easy to apply and still wrong, or sound in theory and impossible to administer, so each failing needs its own account. Practice comes first below because it is easier to see.
The first failing is practical. Usery's only guidance was a list of examples of traditional governmental functions: regulating intrastate commerce, running a railroad, operating a municipal airport, imposing a nondiscriminatory tax on motor vehicles using state highways, and regulating traffic on state highways.30 The Court never explained how to identify an “integral” or “traditional” function, and in later cases it distinguished Usery unpersuasively.31 Lower courts spent nine years trying to find the line,32 and they sorted similar services differently. The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Virginia, held that running a state mental health facility was a traditional governmental function, while the Ninth Circuit, in Bonnette v. California, held that running an in-home care program for the elderly and disabled was not.33 Two services that look alike by any ordinary measure landed on opposite sides of the line because of the label each court chose, not because of any difference in what the state was doing.
The Court asked whether a standard not tied to history could do better and found no promising candidate. Immunity limited to “uniquely” governmental functions had already been rejected in the law of government tort liability, in part because that notion is unmanageable.34 The governmental-proprietary distinction had never been given a stable basis in the intergovernmental tax-immunity cases, and the Court judged that an attempt to draw similar distinctions for federal regulatory authority “is unlikely to succeed regardless of how the distinctions are phrased.”35 No distinction that purports to separate out important governmental functions, on this view, can be faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic society.
The second failing is one of principle, and it would survive even a perfectly consistent test. “The essence of our federal system,” the Court wrote, “is that within the realm of authority left open to them under the Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal, no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else — including the judiciary — deems state involvement to be.”36 A rule that shields only traditional or integral functions makes federal judges rank state undertakings by importance. Garcia quoted an earlier opinion for the point that there cannot be “any unchanging line of demarcation between essential and non-essential governmental functions,” because many functions that governments perform today were once nongovernmental, and that the people, “acting not through the courts but through their elected legislative representatives,” decide what services the public welfare requires.37
The second city's residents, acting through elected officials, decided what service the public welfare required, and a historical test could have attached a federal cost to that choice. That is the sense in which the Court found the test unfaithful to democratic self-government, and it is why the Court called this the more fundamental problem. The two failings also connect. A rule divorced from democratic principles has nothing to anchor its line-drawing, so it produces inconsistent results from one court to the next.38
Rejecting the test did not announce that the states lack all protection. If there are to be limits on the federal government's power to interfere with state functions, “as undoubtedly there are,” the Court said, “we must look elsewhere to find them.”39 The next section takes up where it looked. The dissenters attacked the majority's view of the judiciary's role in the federal system and its overruling of a decision only nine years old.40 Congress, for its part, answered Garcia with the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, which accommodated the fiscal problems and historical practices of public employers, including compensatory time off in place of cash overtime.41
Structural Political Safeguards
If courts cannot protect the states by sorting their functions, something else must. Garcia answered that the Framers relied on the workings of the national government itself, not on “discrete limitations on the objects of federal authority.” State sovereign interests, the Court concluded, are better protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limits on federal power.43 The Court has returned to the point since. Printz invoked Garcia's account of “the principal means chosen by the Framers.”44
The majority first cleared away the competing approach. That the states remain sovereign as to every power not vested in Congress or denied them by the Constitution offers no guidance about where the frontier between state and federal power lies, because the power of the federal government is also “a power to be respected.” Courts therefore have “no license to employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.”45
The safeguards the majority identified are features of how the national government is assembled. The states control electoral qualifications for the House and have a role in presidential elections, which gives them indirect influence over the House and the presidency. They were given more direct influence in the Senate, where each state has equal representation and, as the Constitution was originally written, each senator was chosen by the state legislature. Article V underscores the point by barring any amendment that would deprive a state of equal Senate representation without its consent.46 Madison placed particular reliance on that representation, which he saw as “at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty.”47
Justice Blackmun put the idea this way: the “principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action—the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal governmental action. The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated.”48 The majority conceded that the Seventeenth Amendment's substitution of popular election for legislative selection of senators, among other changes since 1789, may alter the states' influence in federal politics. Even so, it held, the limit the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the “States as States” is one of process rather than of outcome.49
That formulation answers the difficulty that sank Usery. A court applying the old test had to rank state activities by importance. If the political process is the protection, the judicial question that remains is whether the process failed for some state, and answering it requires no choice among state policies.50
The dissenters refused to accept any of this. “The States' role in our system of government is a matter of constitutional law, not of legislative grace,” Justice Powell wrote for four Justices, and a holding that “federal political officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole judges of the limits of their own power” is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the constitutional system.51 At least since Marbury v. Madison, the dissent added, it has been the settled province of the federal judiciary “to say what the law is” on the constitutionality of acts of Congress.52 The objection has a simple structure. The check on Congress is entrusted to the body whose limits are in question, which is the opposite of what judicial review exists to supply.
The dissent also doubted that the structure still works as the Framers imagined. Members of Congress are elected from the states, but once in office they belong to the federal government, and the states' participation in the Electoral College hardly makes the President their representative against federal encroachment.53 The political process, the dissenters said, had not protected the states against encroachments that directly impinge on their ability to make and enforce their laws. With Usery abandoned, a dissent warned, all that stands between the remaining essentials of state sovereignty and Congress is Congress's own capacity for self-restraint.54 Justice Rehnquist, who joined both the Powell and O'Connor dissents, wrote separately to say that the Constitution imposes some limit on federal power over the states and to predict that the principle of Usery would “in time again command the support of a majority of this Court.”55
The two sides disagree about more than outcomes. They disagree about how much protecting state sovereignty and federalism matters, and about whether courts or the political process should do the protecting.56 The majority asks whether the states had a fair chance in the national political process. The dissenters ask whether any political process can stand in for a court when the issue is the limit of federal power.
The majority's side has prevailed. In the four decades since Garcia, the Court has never called it into question, so federal pollution rules apply fully to vehicles and facilities that state governments own.57 The majority did leave a narrow opening. It declined “to identify or define what affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause,” and the Court has since suggested only by illustration the extraordinary defects that might justify intervention, such as a state being deprived of any right to participate in the national political process or being singled out in a way that leaves it politically isolated and powerless.58
South Carolina v. Baker shows how demanding that exception is. South Carolina challenged a federal tax on the interest on state bonds, and the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, found no evidence that Congress had deprived the state of “any right to participate in the national political process” or had “singled out” the state so as to leave it “politically isolated and powerless.” It also confirmed that state bond interest is not immune from a nondiscriminatory federal tax.59 The complaint was about the wisdom of a law, and a defect in the process itself looks different.
A state that wins an exam answer by calling its function integral to sovereignty, or by arguing that Congress ignored state interests in passing a generally applicable law, has applied a theory Garcia rejected. The Court will uphold the application of an otherwise valid commercial regulation to state governments so long as it does not single out the states for special burdens.60
That deference has a boundary. The Federal Government “may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program,”61 and the Court began enforcing that rule in 1991 in New York v. United States.62 Printz later struck down Brady Act amendments that imposed background-check duties on state law enforcement officers.63 Even seemingly minor duties imposed only temporarily were not allowed, because Congress must depend on the federal Executive, not the state executive, to enforce its laws.64 These cases restrict the method by which Congress may act on the states, so they do not revive the subject-matter immunity that Usery recognized. The Printz dissent pointed to the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, which lets members of Congress raise a point of order against a bill containing an unfunded mandate above $50 million, as evidence that unelected judges are better off leaving the protection of federalism to the political process in all but the most extraordinary circumstances.65