Concept
Discrimination as the Threshold
Negative implications of the commerce clause
Discrimination as the Threshold
Every dormant Commerce Clause case begins with one sorting question: does the state law treat in-state and out-of-state economic interests differently, to the advantage of the in-state side? The answer picks the test. If the law discriminates against out-of-staters, a strong presumption runs against it, and it survives only if it is necessary to achieve an important purpose. If the law treats in-staters and out-of-staters alike, the presumption runs the other way, and a challenger must show that the law’s burdens on interstate commerce outweigh its benefits.1 The first track is close to fatal for the state; the second is deferential. Most later rules in this chapter explain why a particular law lands on one track or the other.
Two reasons are usually given for letting discrimination, rather than burden alone, pick the track. Protectionist laws are thought most likely to interfere with the economy, and a law that applies to in-staters and out-of-staters equally gives at least some of the people it affects a voice in the political process.2 A law that burdens only outsiders offers neither safeguard.
“Discrimination” carries a narrow meaning here: differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.3 On an exam, ask of any state law touching commerce whom it favors, whom it burdens, and whether the line it draws follows state boundaries.
At the center of the doctrine stands the principle that broadly prohibits laws that discriminate on their face against interstate commerce.4 Courts almost always strike such laws down under a virtually per se rule of invalidity.5 Laws that are neutral on their face fall too when they have an impermissibly protectionist purpose or effect, because they in fact favor local economic interests at the expense of out-of-state competitors.6 Facial discrimination, discriminatory effect, and protectionist purpose are therefore three routes onto the strict track. The last subsection asks what a state must prove once discrimination is shown.
Facial Discrimination
Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality supplies the working definition: “discrimination” means “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.” A law discriminates on its face when its own terms draw that line, so a court can find the discrimination by reading the statute. Oregon’s waste surcharge shows how. The fee depended on whether solid waste was “generated out-of-state,” and the out-of-state fee was almost three times the $0.85 per ton charged on in-state waste. Because the statute sorted shipments by origin, the Court held that it patently discriminates against interstate commerce.7
The inquiry therefore centers on the statutory trigger. A court asks what the statute makes the outcome depend on, and if the answer is where the article of commerce came from, the law sorts by geography. Tax cases apply the same test: a law is discriminatory if it taxes a transaction more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the state.8 Because the legislature wrote the line itself, a court needs no theory of hidden motive.
The state’s reason for drawing the line does not change the answer. Oregon argued that its surcharge only recouped the costs of disposing of out-of-state waste in Oregon. The Court replied that, even so, the differential charge favors shippers of Oregon waste over shippers of waste from other states.9 Philadelphia v. New Jersey made the same point earlier. The Court did not need to decide whether New Jersey meant to cut its residents’ disposal costs or to save open land, because “the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends.” New Jersey could pursue either goal, but not “by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”10 Purpose does not vanish from the analysis. It moves to the justification stage, covered in the last subsection below.11
The size of the gap is equally beside the point. The Oregon dissent argued that a $2.25 per ton surcharge was too small to count as discrimination. The majority answered that the degree of a differential “measures only the extent of the discrimination” and “is of no relevance to the determination whether a State has discriminated against interstate commerce.”12 The amount tells a court how large the local advantage is, not whether one exists.
Facial discrimination does not require the words “out of state.” Any term that sorts by where an article was grown, taken, processed, or sold will do. A ban on importing baitfish, a requirement that shrimp taken in state waters be processed in the state, a requirement that natural gas suppliers favor in-state buyers in times of shortage, and a mandate that only apples grown in other states be labeled in a certain way each favor local over out-of-state interests by their very terms.13
Nor does facial discrimination require an outright ban. In Granholm v. Heald, Michigan let in-state wineries ship directly to consumers but barred out-of-state wineries from doing so, and New York let out-of-state wineries ship directly only if they opened a branch office and warehouse in the state. Conditioning access on an in-state presence is differential treatment all the same, because it raises costs only for outsiders. The Court held that both schemes violate the virtually per se rule by their own terms.14 Whether the Twenty-first Amendment can rescue such a law is a separate question, taken up with the exceptions below.
A statute that looks discriminatory in isolation can still fall outside the definition once the rest of the state’s law is read with it. In Sporhase v. Nebraska, the Court upheld a Nebraska law barring the shipment of groundwater out of state when the water was needed locally. Standing alone, the ban preferred Nebraska water users over buyers elsewhere. But another Nebraska law strictly limited the use and transfer of groundwater within the state, which placed equally heavy burdens on intrastate commerce in water. As the Court put it, “a State that imposes severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its own citizens is not discriminating against interstate commerce when it seeks to prevent the uncontrolled transfer of water out of the State.”15 Where the burdens match, no differential treatment exists. The ordinary case remains the Oregon pattern, in which the statute’s trigger is origin and no matching burden falls on local interests.
Discriminatory Effect
A statute that never mentions origin can still sort commerce by origin, so the doctrine follows a law into its operation as well as its text. The leading illustration is Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison. Madison, Wisconsin made it unlawful to sell milk as pasteurized unless it had been processed and bottled at an approved plant within five miles of the city’s central square. Dean Milk, an Illinois distributor whose pasteurization plants stood about 65 and 85 miles away, was refused a license solely because of that distance, even though its milk came from farms and plants inspected by Chicago health authorities.17
The Court held that the ordinance, in practical effect, excluded wholesome milk produced and pasteurized in Illinois, and that by “erecting an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against competition from without the State,” Madison plainly discriminated against interstate commerce. That Wisconsin milk from outside the Madison area faced the same prohibition was immaterial. The Court accepted that protecting health was a legitimate aim, but a city may not discriminate even in pursuit of that aim when reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to conserve its local interests are available.18 Madison had such alternatives: it could charge importing producers the actual cost of inspecting distant plants, or rely on health ratings issued where the milk was produced and pasteurized.19
The immateriality of the Wisconsin dairies is the hinge of the case. Madison’s line followed distance rather than the state boundary, so some Wisconsin dairies were shut out along with every Illinois one. But the benefit of the line still ran to the plants inside the circle. All out-of-state pasteurized milk was barred while only some Wisconsin milk was affected, so all pasteurized milk sold in the city had to be pasteurized in Wisconsin and none could be pasteurized outside the state.20 A burden that reaches some local interests therefore cannot excuse a rule that shields a local industry. If it could, a legislature could defend any protectionist barrier by sweeping a few insiders into it.
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission shows effect doing the work where no geographic line appears at all. North Carolina required that closed containers of apples sold or shipped into the state bear no grade other than the applicable federal grade, which barred the Washington State grades that were equal or superior to the federal ones.21 The rule applied to every apple seller, yet it raised the cost of doing business in North Carolina for Washington growers and left their North Carolina competitors’ costs unaffected. It also stripped Washington of the competitive advantage its grading system had earned, and it forced apples that qualified for the superior Washington grade to be sold under the lower federal one, which protected local growers from out-of-state rivals. The Court found discrimination in that practical effect without attributing an economic-protection motive to the legislature.22
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, taught in full under local processing mandates below, has the same structure. Clarkstown required all nonhazardous solid waste in the town to be deposited at a particular transfer station, and the ordinance applied to in-town and out-of-town businesses alike. The Court still found discrimination, because only the favored operator could process waste within the town’s limits, and it said the ordinance was “no less discriminatory because in-state or in-town processors are also covered by the prohibition.”23 Dean Milk, Hunt, and Carbone share a pattern: a rule written in neutral terms channels business to a favored local operator or class, and burdens that also reach some insiders do not undo the advantage.
The effects test has a boundary that keeps it from capturing every regulation with an uneven impact, and Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland marks it. Maryland barred producers and refiners of petroleum products from operating retail service stations. No gasoline was produced or refined in Maryland, so the divestiture requirement fell solely on out-of-state companies, and the Court still found no discrimination. The Act created no barriers against interstate independent dealers, who competed directly with Maryland’s independent retailers: it did not prohibit the flow of interstate goods, place added costs on them, or distinguish between in-state and out-of-state companies in the retail market.24 The Court explained that the Clause “protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations.”25 If every uneven burden on out-of-state firms counted as discrimination, any regulation of an industry located mostly elsewhere would face near-fatal scrutiny, and the Clause would defend particular companies’ market positions instead of competition across state lines.
Justice Blackmun, dissenting, would have found discrimination, because the law shielded retail stations run almost entirely by local businesses from competition by an excluded class that was almost entirely out of state.26 The majority’s question is the one to apply: did the law give local interests an advantage over out-of-state competitors in the same market? In Dean Milk, the excluded Illinois pasteurizers competed for the same Madison milk sales as the plants inside the five-mile circle, and the ordinance shut them out while shielding those plants. In Exxon, the out-of-state independent dealers who competed with Maryland’s independents remained free to do so, so no local class gained an edge over a rival in its own market.
The same-market requirement appears as a general principle: the out-of-state interests said to be disfavored must compete in the same market as the supposedly favored local ones.27 In General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, Ohio exempted regulated natural gas production companies, all of them local, from a tax while denying the exemption to gas marketers, all of them out of state. The Court found no discrimination because the two groups sold different products in distinct markets.28
Nor is a law discriminatory merely because its burden lands mostly outside the state, if it treats similarly situated in-state and out-of-state parties the same.29 In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, about 90 percent of the coal mined in the state was shipped to consumers elsewhere, so out-of-staters bore about 90 percent of the severance tax, yet the tax did not discriminate, because every consumer paid the same amount on the coal it consumed.30 Challengers to California’s Proposition 12 made a similar argument: because California imports most of the pork it consumes, they said, most of the compliance costs would fall on out-of-state firms, even though California producers would bear costs as well.31 A burden concentrated on outsiders does not, standing alone, establish discrimination.
Effects analysis also reaches enforcement. A statute that is neutral on its face, and that would not disproportionately burden interstate commerce if enforced as written, can still discriminate because of how state or local officials apply it.32
Had the agency denied permits at the same rate to local and out-of-state applicants with the same deficiencies, local distributors would gain no advantage over their competitors, and the claim would fail even if most denied applicants happened to be based elsewhere.
Protectionist Purpose
The first two forms of discrimination look at what a statute says and does; the third asks why the legislature enacted it. Maine v. Taylor restated the governing rule: shielding in-state industries from out-of-state competition is almost never a legitimate local purpose, so laws that amount to “simple economic protectionism” are subject to a “virtually per se rule of invalidity.”34 That rule changes what happens after discrimination is found. An ordinary discriminatory law reaches the justification stage, where the state offers a local interest for the court to examine. A law enacted to shelter local business from competition has no justification to offer, because that shelter is the purpose the Clause forbids. A finding of protectionist purpose therefore ends the case, which makes the finding both decisive and, as later paragraphs show, unusual.
Because almost every trade barrier helps some local producer, the test cannot ask whether local business benefited. It asks whether the legislature adopted the measure because of its competition-shielding effects or in spite of them, and that is a question of fact.35
The rule reaches protectionism even when it is only a stepping stone toward a goal the state may lawfully pursue. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. arose after New York set minimum prices that dealers had to pay New York milk producers and extended the minimum to milk bought in other states, so that a dealer who bought Vermont milk below the New York price could not sell it in New York. The state refused Seelig a license on that basis. Though the state collected no money, the law worked as a tariff, because it raised the price of out-of-state milk until buyers could no longer undersell the local product.36 New York defended the scheme as a health measure: farmers who cannot earn a living income cannot maintain a supply of pure milk. The Court answered that economic welfare is always related to health, and that accepting the excuse would “eat up the rule under the guise of an exception,” because a state would need only say that its farmers and merchants had to be shielded from outside competition.37
Philadelphia v. New Jersey generalized the lesson. The Court had consistently invalidated parochial laws whether their aim was a steady supply of milk, jobs kept within the state, or protection of the state’s finances from indigent immigrants. In each, a presumably legitimate goal was pursued by the illegitimate means of isolating the state from the national economy.38 The end may be lawful, but the means hands local firms a market insulated from rivals, and the means is what the Clause bars. A state remains free to pursue the same end through measures that treat in-state and out-of-state goods alike, such as slowing the flow of all waste into its landfills.39
Maine’s ban on importing live baitfish also left local bait dealers better off, and the challenger argued that the benefit was the point. The challenger relied on statements by a state agency. The Court, agreeing with the magistrate, found that the statements were advanced not in direct support of the statute but to counter the argument that inadequate bait supplies in Maine required accepting the environmental risks of imports, and that an agency speaking long after the statute’s enactment offers only weak evidence of legislative intent.40 Local dealers no doubt welcomed the ban, but Maine adopted it in spite of that effect, so the per se rule did not apply. A genuine quarantine law against diseased crops or animals works the same way: it is not protectionist when adopted for health reasons, even though it incidentally shields local sellers. Such a law is not immune from the doctrine, since it can still fail another requirement, and the baitfish decision appears in full with import bans below.41
Proof of purpose comes from the record, and sometimes the state supplies it. In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, Alaska required timber taken from state lands to be processed in Alaska before export, and its admitted purpose was to shield its infant timber-processing industry from interstate and foreign competition. The measure was held invalid per se.42 In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, the Court did not need to guess at motive, because it was undisputed that Hawaii exempted okolehao from its liquor tax to aid Hawaiian industry, and the exemption reached only locally produced beverages.43 An admission, a sponsor’s statement, or a legislative finding is the kind of fact that carries the argument.
The jobs defense adds nothing, because keeping industry within the state to create jobs is one of the ends the Court has already treated as pursued by an illegitimate means.44
Because a finding of protectionist purpose is fatal, courts are slow to make one. In Hunt, the Court acknowledged some indications in the record that North Carolina’s apple-grading rule was meant to protect local growers but stopped short of finding an economic-protection motive, and it struck the law on the strength of its practical effects.45 Declining to find protectionist purpose does not rescue a law. Allegedly protectionist laws always involve discrimination against interstate commerce, so they still face very strict scrutiny and are frequently struck down because the state failed to use the least discriminatory means of reaching its goal.46 That is the usual route in practice, and it leads directly to the justification burden. On an exam, argue protectionist purpose when the facts supply a record of it, such as an admission, a sponsor’s statement, or a legislative finding. Where they do not, treat the law as discriminatory and press the less-discriminatory-alternatives argument.
The Justification Burden
Once a challenger has shown that a state law discriminates against interstate commerce, the case turns to a different question: can the state justify the discrimination? The test comes from Hughes v. Oklahoma. The statute must serve a legitimate local purpose, and the purpose must be one that cannot be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means.48 The challenger bears the burden of showing discrimination, either on the face of the statute or in its practical effect. Once it does, the burden falls on the state to demonstrate both elements.49 The earlier subsections taught how to show discrimination; this one covers the state’s two showings.
That allocation of the burden separates the two tracks. For an even-handed law, the presumption favors the law, and the challenger loses unless it shows that the law’s burdens on interstate commerce outweigh its benefits. For a discriminatory law, a strong presumption runs against the law, and the state must justify it.50 The balancing test for even-handed laws comes next in this chapter.
Oregon Waste shows what the state is up against. After finding the surcharge discriminatory, the Court treated it as virtually per se invalid.51 Oregon’s principal defense was that the surcharge was a “compensatory tax” making out-of-state shippers pay their fair share of the costs their waste imposes on Oregon. The Court had noted in Chemical Waste that such an argument might justify a discriminatory surcharge, but Oregon still had to come forward with other legitimate reasons for charging out-of-state waste more. The Court contrasted Maine v. Taylor, where the ban on out-of-state baitfish rested on parasites completely foreign to Maine’s own baitfish.52 The compensatory-tax defense is taken up with the waste-fee cases below.
The Court has compressed the standard into one sentence: discrimination in favor of local business or investment “is per se invalid, save in a narrow class of cases in which the municipality can demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local interest.”53 The per se label is therefore a presumption with a narrow exit. Invalidity is absolute only when the purpose is also protectionist, meaning the law was designed to shield local interests from out-of-state competition. Otherwise the state gets its chance to show that no less discriminatory alternative exists.54
On the purpose question, the state usually has the easier time. Hughes accepted that Oklahoma’s interest in maintaining the ecological balance of its waters by avoiding the removal of inordinate numbers of minnows may well qualify as a legitimate local purpose, as health and safety do.55 Some purposes cannot qualify. Shielding local business from competition fails, as the preceding subsection showed. Raising revenue fails too: Carbone held that revenue generation cannot justify discrimination against interstate commerce, because states could otherwise impose discriminatory taxes on waste originating outside the state.56 The real contest therefore comes over alternatives, where a legitimate goal meets the demand that the state pursue it without discriminating.
Two facially discriminatory laws, each wearing a health or environmental label, ended differently, and the difference is what the alternatives inquiry tests. In Dean Milk, the Court accepted that inspecting remote milk sources can raise real difficulties, but the record showed reasonable alternatives. Madison could inspect distant sources itself and charge importers the actual and reasonable cost, or it could follow a model ordinance that relies on safety ratings issued where the milk is produced and lets the receiving city verify them through spot checks by the U.S. Public Health Service. Madison’s own Health Commissioner testified that consumers would be adequately safeguarded either way, so the geographic line was not essential to local health.57
Hughes shows the same weakness from another angle. Oklahoma placed no limit on how many minnows licensed dealers could take, yet it forbade shipping them out of the state. The Court called that the most overtly discriminatory way to conserve, observed that the ban was not a last-ditch effort after nondiscriminatory alternatives proved unfeasible, and found it likely that nondiscriminatory measures would serve the purpose more effectively.58 Carbone added uniform safety regulations enacted without an object to discriminate, and subsidies paid from general taxes or municipal bonds, to the catalog of alternatives.59 The subsidy alternative has a limit. A tax on out-of-state goods earmarked to subsidize local farmers works like a tariff, while true subsidies paid from a state’s general revenues should not be invalidated under the dormant Commerce Clause.60
Maine’s ban on importing live baitfish was just as facially discriminatory as Madison’s ordinance, yet it stood, because the state carried the burden that Madison could not. In an 8-1 decision that gave great deference to the district court’s findings, the Court upheld the ban as serving a legitimate environmental purpose, guarding against parasites completely foreign to Maine’s baitfish, that nondiscriminatory means could not serve as well.61 The outcome turned on the state’s evidence. Maine v. Taylor is thus the exception that demonstrates the rule, and the full treatment of the baitfish decision comes with import bans below.
The alternatives inquiry asks whether a less discriminatory way exists. It does not ask whether the state chose the measure that burdens commerce least overall. In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Court noted that New Jersey might pursue its goal by slowing the flow of all waste into its remaining landfills, even though interstate commerce may incidentally be affected.62 That alternative still burdens commerce in waste, but it spreads the burden across in-state and out-of-state waste alike, so it counts as nondiscriminatory. A discriminatory law falls unless there are no less discriminatory ways for the state to achieve its goal. In practice, the challenger names the alternative, and if the state cannot then show that the alternative would be less effective, the statute is held unconstitutional.63
The fourth step does the real work, because nearly every state can offer a legitimate-sounding purpose, and discriminatory laws win or lose on the proof about alternatives.