Concept
Discriminatory Laws in Practice
Negative implications of the commerce clause
Discriminatory Laws in Practice
The Commerce Clause grants Congress power over interstate commerce, but it has long been understood to carry a negative aspect as well: it denies the states the power unjustifiably to discriminate against, or burden, the interstate flow of articles of commerce.1 Enforcement runs on two tracks. A law that treats in-staters and out-of-staters alike meets a presumption of validity and falls only if its burdens on interstate commerce outweigh its benefits. A law that discriminates against out-of-staters meets a strong presumption against it and survives only if it is necessary to achieve an important purpose.2 The line falls between statutes that burden interstate transactions only incidentally and statutes that affirmatively discriminate against them.3 Once a challenger shows discrimination “either on its face or in practical effect,” the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate that the law serves a legitimate local purpose and that available nondiscriminatory means could not serve that purpose as well.4
Legislatures build discriminatory barriers in four recurring ways, and a leading decision marks each. A state can keep its own resources from leaving, as Oklahoma did in Hughes v. Oklahoma. It can keep outside goods from entering; Maine v. Taylor upheld such a ban on live baitfish and stands as the rare facially discriminatory law to survive.5 It can charge more for out-of-state business, as Oregon did in Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality. And it can require that one step of a business happen inside its borders, as Clarkstown did in C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, whose ordinance fell as a protectionist trade barrier.6
Two questions carry the analysis in all four settings. The first asks whether the law aims at origin, meaning that its terms, its practical operation, or its purpose draw a line at the state's border. A yes sends the law to the justification track; a no leaves it to deferential balancing. The second asks whether the state could reach its goal without burdening outsiders. States nearly always offer a respectable goal, such as conservation or health, so the fight is over means. A challenger who points to a less discriminatory alternative puts the state to its proof that the alternative would work less well.7 A state that proves on a record that no workable alternative exists sometimes wins, as Maine did. A state that offers only a goal, or a justification the doctrine condemns as economic protectionism, loses.
Export Bans on Natural Resources
In Hughes v. Oklahoma, the Court held that a state may not forbid the export of a locally taken natural resource, there natural minnows, merely to keep it for in-state buyers. Oklahoma had made it a crime to ship minnows seined within the state out of the state for sale. The state defended the ban on a theory of ownership: wild animals within its borders belong to the state, so the state may decide that they will never become objects of interstate commerce.
The theory descended from Geer v. Connecticut, where the Court reasoned that a state's power to control the killing and ownership of wild game let it prohibit the game from leaving the state. A statute that kept game at home, on that reasoning, kept it out of the stream of interstate commerce, so no Commerce Clause challenge could lie.8 The theory handed a state a short route around the Clause.
Hughes closed the route. A state's theoretical title in wild animals, the Court held, does not justify discrimination against out-of-state businesses.9 Earlier decisions had already worn the theory down. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel struck down a Louisiana law that required shrimp to be stripped of heads and shells in the state before export; Toomer v. Witsell called the ownership theory a fiction; and Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc. dismissed the idea of owning wild fish as pure fantasy. Hughes then overruled Geer. What survives is the legitimate core of the old language. The Court had long read the ownership talk as shorthand for a state's substantial interest in preserving and regulating the exploitation of its fish, game, and other natural resources for its citizens' benefit.10 That interest counts as a local purpose; it no longer exempts the means chosen to serve it.
Export embargoes draw hard scrutiny because of where the burden falls. In H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, New York's ad hoc licensing scheme discriminated against interstate commerce because the primary burden of the state action fell on the people of Massachusetts who wanted to buy the milk exported from New York. Those buyers had no representation in New York's political process, and the scheme imposed a classic trade barrier of the kind the Clause was drafted to eliminate.11 The same reasoning bars a state from burdening the export of local products in order to retain domestic resources for local consumption, to insure local employment, to enhance the reputation of local goods, or to keep a market open only to its own residents. Even privately owned water, the Court has found, is an article of commerce.12
Against an export ban on a natural resource, the Hughes test asks whether the ban serves a legitimate local purpose that available nondiscriminatory means could not serve as well.13 Conservation of wildlife can qualify as a legitimate purpose,14 but the fiction of ownership no longer lets a state make outsiders carry the whole cost of conserving it. Oklahoma lost on means. It set no limit on how many minnows licensed dealers could take, yet it banned shipping the catch out of the state, the most discriminatory choice available when nondiscriminatory limits seemed likely to serve the purpose better. Depletion happens at the stream. A minnow taken is gone whether it is later sold in Oklahoma or in Texas, so a rule that leaves the taking unlimited while blocking only the out-of-state sale conserves nothing that it does not also hand to local buyers.
The cap still burdens commerce, because it reduces how many minnows anyone can sell. It differs from the ban in how it spreads that burden: every user of the resource carries the cost of conservation, and none of it falls on buyers in other states. A court reviews it under the presumption of validity, which yields only if the burdens on commerce outweigh the benefits.15 Against the ban, by contrast, a challenger need only suggest the cap or another alternative, and the state must then show that the alternative would be less effective.16
The dissent in Hughes leaned on the history of Geer, noting that a statute keeping game at home was thought to keep it out of interstate commerce altogether.17 The majority's answer lies in what a ban at the border does. A rule forbidding every shipper, resident or not, to carry the resource out still keeps it available to buyers inside the state and cuts off buyers outside, who have no vote in the legislature that chose to keep the supply at home.18
A state that sells a product it makes stands differently from one that regulates. South Dakota could refuse to sell cement from a state-owned plant to out-of-state buyers during a shortage, a result that treats quasi-proprietary state activity as free of the usual Commerce Clause restraints. Hughes marks the limit, because a state's theoretical title in wild animals does not make it a seller.19 The market participant doctrine returns below.
A fact pattern in which a state forbids shipping game, fish, or water taken within its borders to buyers elsewhere calls for the discrimination analysis, and the state's ownership claim adds nothing to its side. Ask whether the law keeps the resource at home for local buyers. Then ask whether a limit on the quantity taken, applied alike to every destination, would serve the same conservation goal.
Import Bans and the Narrow Justification
Maine v. Taylor upheld Maine's ban on importing live baitfish. The 8-1 decision is the notable exception to the rule that discriminatory laws are virtually per se invalid.21 The Court gave great deference to the district court's findings that the ban served a legitimate environmental purpose,22 and the case shows what a state must prove to win: a legitimate and important non-economic local interest, such as protecting its ecological resources and wildlife, and the absence of reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.23
The form of the ban gave Maine no help. The statute blocked all inward shipments of live baitfish at the state's border, restricting interstate trade in the most direct manner possible. That fact alone did not condemn it, because the Commerce Clause limit on state regulatory power “is by no means absolute,” and the states keep authority under their police powers to regulate matters of legitimate local concern even though interstate commerce may be affected.24 Because the ban discriminated, it had to satisfy the Hughes test: a legitimate local purpose that available nondiscriminatory means could not serve as well.25
Maine also argued that the Lacey Act Amendments should lower the intensity of the scrutiny, and the Court refused. Congress must give an unambiguous indication before a federal statute will be read to authorize otherwise invalid state legislation, whether the authorization takes the form of a flat exemption or a reduced level of scrutiny.26 Congressional consent returns below. The Court's own footnote states the exception in general terms: even overt discrimination may be justified where out-of-state goods are particularly likely to threaten the health and safety of a state's citizens or the integrity of its natural resources, and where outright prohibition of entry, rather than some intermediate form of regulation, is the only effective method of protection.27
The record supplied each element of that description. The prosecution's experts testified that no satisfactory way existed to inspect shipments of live baitfish for parasites or commingled species. The fish are so small, and shipped in such quantities, that checking for commingled species was “a physical impossibility.” Parasite inspection required destroying the fish. Statistical sampling had been developed for salmon and trout, so that a shipment could be certified parasite-free from an examination of some of the fish, but no scientifically accepted procedure existed for baitfish.28 The District Court credited that testimony. It found that Maine “clearly has a legitimate and substantial purpose in prohibiting the importation of live bait fish,” because substantial uncertainties surrounded the effects of baitfish parasites on the state's unique population of wild fish and the consequences of introducing nonnative species were similarly unpredictable. It also found that less discriminatory means were unavailable, because no testing procedures for baitfish parasites had been devised and developing them would probably take considerable time.29 The Supreme Court held that the record could hardly support a contrary finding: two prosecution witnesses testified to the lack of procedures, and the challenger's own expert conceded the point.30
Unsettled science did not defeat Maine's purpose. A state has a legitimate interest in guarding against imperfectly understood environmental risks, even if they ultimately prove negligible, and the Commerce Clause cannot be read to require the state to “sit idly by and wait until potentially irreversible environmental damage has occurred or until the scientific community agrees on what disease organisms are or are not dangerous before it acts.”31 Irreversibility drives that rule. Damage to a fragile fishery cannot be undone, so a rule that withheld the state's power until proof was complete would let the harm arrive first.
The same record answered the charge of protectionism. Maine admitted salmonids because standardized inspection procedures existed for them and not for baitfish. Other states' failure to adopt similar bans meant little, given testimony that Maine's fisheries are unique and unusually fragile. And the fact that fish can swim into Maine from New Hampshire was of little relevance. The case was not one of arbitrary discrimination: Maine had legitimate reasons, “apart from their origin,” to treat out-of-state baitfish differently, and the Court reversed the judgment that had set aside the dealer's conviction.32
The alternatives question decided the case. The challenger remained free to work toward scientifically acceptable sampling and inspection procedures, and if and when they were developed, Maine might no longer be able to justify its ban. The state, however, need not join in those efforts and need not pretend they have already succeeded.33 The justification therefore tracks the state of the science. Had screening worked as well as a total ban, the ban would have fallen.34 The Court has since described the pattern: it upholds discriminatory regulation only after finding, on concrete record evidence, that the state's nondiscriminatory alternatives will prove unworkable.35 A state that offers a health rationale without expert evidence, and without explaining why inspection or sampling would fail, gives a court nothing to credit. The strictness has a structural reason. Every protectionist statute can claim a health or environmental purpose, so if the label were enough, the Clause would restrain a state only when it announced its own protectionism.
New Jersey's ban in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey had the same shape as Maine's, a prohibition on importing most waste originating outside the state, and it lost.36 The parties disputed whether New Jersey wanted to favor local industry or to protect its limited landfill space from overuse, and the Court found it unnecessary to decide. “[T]he evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends,” so whatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it could not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce from outside the state “unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”37 New Jersey remained free to slow the flow of all waste into its remaining landfills, even though interstate commerce might incidentally be affected. It could not single out waste by origin without a reason apart from origin. The Court had consistently invalidated parochial laws of this kind, whether they aimed to assure a steady milk supply, to create jobs by keeping industry in the state, or to preserve state finances by fencing out indigent immigrants, because each pursued a presumably legitimate goal by the illegitimate means of isolating the state from the national economy.38 New Jersey had no such reason. The feared harm arose when waste was buried, and buried waste is the same whatever its origin, so the ban imposed on out-of-state interests the whole burden of conserving the state's landfill space.
The phrase “apart from their origin” links the two cases. In Maine, the reason lay in the fish: the parasites were foreign to Maine's baitfish, so imported fish differed from local fish in the very respect that created the risk. The Court later pointed to that feature when it noted that Oregon had offered no safety or health reason unique to out-of-state waste, of the kind that supported the baitfish ban.39
Quarantine laws mark the boundary of the category. A genuine quarantine law that bars diseased crops or animals is not economic protectionism if adopted for health reasons, even though it incidentally shields local sellers from out-of-state competition. It is not per se invalid, but it can still fall by failing another requirement of the analysis.40 The dissent in Philadelphia argued that waste could not be distinguished from germ-infected rags or diseased meat, which New Jersey could require to be disposed of within the state while prohibiting their importation for disposal at its facilities.41 In the dissent's words, “[t]he physical fact of life that New Jersey must somehow dispose of its own noxious items does not mean that it must serve as a depository for those of every other State.”42 The majority's answer turns on where the danger lies. A quarantine addresses articles that are dangerous in transit, so the ban follows the danger, whereas waste endangers health only after burial, where local and imported waste are alike.
A failure at the first step is the New Jersey waste pattern. A failure at the third is how a ban of the Maine type would fall once effective screening exists.
Discriminatory Fees on Waste
Waste belongs in this doctrine because a generator must pay to be rid of it, and that payment turns waste into an article of commerce; transporting and processing waste is big business.44 In Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality, Oregon imposed a surcharge on every person who disposes of solid waste generated out of state. The legislature required that the amount rest on the costs to Oregon and its political subdivisions of disposing of that waste which were not otherwise paid for, left the figure to the Environmental Quality Commission, and the Commission set it at $2.25 per ton.45 Solid waste generated in Oregon bore a charge of $0.85 per ton, so the surcharge ran almost three times higher.46 The Court held the surcharge facially discriminatory and therefore virtually per se invalid.
The statute made the fee turn on one fact: whether the waste was generated out of state. A law discriminates when it taxes a transaction more heavily if it crosses state lines than if it occurs entirely within the state, and the law's stated purpose cannot change that finding. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt had already reiterated that the purpose of, or justification for, a law has no bearing on whether it is facially discriminatory. So even if the surcharge merely recouped the cost of disposing of out-of-state waste, the differential charge still favored shippers of Oregon waste over shippers handling waste from other states.47 “Discrimination” here means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter. A discriminatory restriction is virtually per se invalid, while a nondiscriminatory regulation with incidental effects stands unless its burden is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.48
The contest therefore moved to justification, and Oregon had to come forward with legitimate reasons to subject out-of-state waste to the higher charge.49 The Court first noted two justifications Oregon had not presented. The state did not claim that disposing of out-of-state waste cost it more than disposing of in-state waste, and it offered no safety or health reason unique to nonhazardous waste from other states, of the kind that supported the Maine baitfish ban.50 The record explains why. The Commission fixed the $2.25 per ton cost of disposal without reference to where the waste originated, and Oregon's own economic consultant recognized that the per-ton costs were the same for in-state and out-of-state waste.51
Those two omissions mark the routes by which a differential fee can survive. If out-of-state waste did impose higher costs on Oregon, the state could recover the increase through a differential charge, because there would then be a “reason, apart from its origin, why solid waste coming from outside the [State] should be treated differently.”52 A charge justified that way follows a real difference between the goods and not the border, as in the baitfish case, where parasites foreign to Maine's fish made imported fish differ from local fish in the respect that created the risk. The common error is to treat a statute's recital of cost recovery as if it supplied that difference.
Oregon's surcharge carried the same cost-based label and none of that substance. Its statute recited a cost basis, while its record showed identical per-ton costs for waste from every source.
Oregon's principal defense was that the surcharge was a compensatory tax, a charge needed to make shippers of out-of-state waste pay for the burdens their waste imposed. The Court explained that the compensatory tax is not a doctrine unto itself but a specific way of justifying a facially discriminatory tax as achieving a legitimate local purpose that nondiscriminatory means cannot achieve, so the state carries the burden of proving each part of it.53 That follows from the general rule for discriminatory taxes. A tax that discriminates, facially or by design, is unconstitutional unless the state shows no less discriminatory way to achieve a legitimate interest, and a state whose only justification is protecting or encouraging local business activity loses.54
The standard success is a use tax on goods bought out of state paired with a sales tax on goods bought in state. Together they put every purchase under nondiscriminatory taxation, even though the tax on in-state purchases takes the form of a sales tax and the tax on out-of-state purchases takes the form of a use tax.56 As Justice Cardozo put it for the Court in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., under such a scheme “the stranger from afar is subject to no greater burdens as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within the gates. The one pays upon one activity or incident, and the other upon another, but the sum is the same when the reckoning is closed.”57
Oregon's surcharge missed the first two parts by a wide margin. Oregon imposed no specific charge of at least $2.25 per ton on shippers of Oregon waste for the surcharge to offset. The only analogous charge was $0.85 per ton, about one-third of the surcharge, and the failure to identify an equal or greater intrastate charge was fatal to the claim.58 The state's fallback was that its residents already carry waste costs through general taxes. The Court's footnotes answer that shippers of out-of-state waste in all likelihood pay income taxes in their own states, a portion of which may fund waste reduction there. They add that treating general tax funding as the offsetting burden would let a state tax interstate commerce more heavily than in-state commerce anytime the businesses involved used any facility supported by general state funds.59 The third part exposes a related gap, since an income tax falls on earning income and the surcharge falls on dumping waste at a landfill, and two charges on different events cannot stand in for each other. Later cases have put the compensatory-tax limitation on so short a leash that it almost never operates outside the sales-and-use-tax setting.60
Oregon's other arguments did not depend on the compensatory label, and the first was cost spreading. All Oregonians benefit from proper disposal of Oregon waste, Oregon argued, so Oregonians may fairly carry part of that cost through general taxes while shippers of other states' waste pay the full cost. The scheme therefore had shippers of out-of-state waste paying the full cost of in-state disposal while shippers of Oregon waste paid less, so that two shippers delivering identical loads to the same landfill paid different prices and the only difference was where the load came from. The Court saw no distinction between that contention and a claim that the state has an interest in reducing the costs of handling in-state waste. Its cases condemn as illegitimate any governmental interest that is not “unrelated to economic protectionism,” and regulating interstate commerce so as to give the handlers of domestic articles a cost advantage over competitors handling similar items from elsewhere is such protectionism. Calling the scheme benign cost spreading could not hide the protectionist objective it necessarily incorporates.61 The Court left open whether Oregon could accomplish its limited cost spreading through the market participant doctrine, or through other means unrelated to any regulation of interstate commerce.62
Oregon then recast the surcharge as resource protectionism, since discouraging out-of-state waste would conserve landfill space for Oregon waste. The recharacterization did not help. Even assuming landfill space is a natural resource, “a State may not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of access over consumers in other States to natural resources located within its borders.”63 The principle is the one behind the export bans discussed above, applied to access to a landfill instead of to a minnow. Sporhase, a case about water, gives Oregon no support for erecting a financial barrier to the flow of waste, and however serious the shortage in landfill space, “[n]o State may attempt to isolate itself from a problem common to the several States by raising barriers to the free flow of interstate trade.”64
The dissent read the charge as a fee for the privilege of using Oregon's landfills. Under the user-fee cases it invoked, a toll based on some fair approximation of use or privilege of use, neither discriminatory against interstate commerce nor excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit conferred, passes constitutional muster even though another formula might reflect use more exactly.65 Oregon was not prohibiting the export of its neighbors' waste, the dissent said, but only asking them to pay a fair share, and nothing in the Clause compels less densely populated states to serve as low-cost dumping grounds.66 The majority's answer begins with the user-fee formula itself, which requires that the toll not discriminate against interstate commerce, and a charge that turns on a waste's origin does. It adds the settled rule that the degree of a differential measures only the extent of the discrimination and is of no relevance to whether a state has discriminated at all.67 One question remained open: roughly 80 percent of landfills receiving municipal solid waste are state or locally owned, and the Court expected to face the question of publicly owned facilities directly in the future.68 The processing-mandate cases below show where that question led.
A fact pattern that charges out-of-state waste more than local waste runs in a fixed order. The statute's trigger decides whether the fee discriminates, so the cost-recovery label and the size of the gap do not matter at that step. The state then must supply a reason apart from origin, which means proof that out-of-state waste actually costs more to handle or carries a health or safety risk unique to it. A compensatory-tax defense needs an identified intrastate charge, an interstate charge that does not exceed it, and substantially equivalent taxable events, and outside the sales-and-use setting it almost never works. Cost spreading and resource protectionism are themselves forms of protectionism, and a user-fee label cannot rescue a charge that discriminates.
Local Processing Mandates
A local processing mandate requires one step of a business operation, such as inspecting, packing, or sorting, to be performed inside the enacting jurisdiction. A town that sends all of its trash to one designated facility has drawn such a line, and out-of-state processors cannot cross it. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown held that an ordinance requiring locally produced solid waste to be processed at a designated in-state facility before leaving the municipality is unconstitutional, because it discriminates against interstate commerce and erects a protectionist trade barrier against out-of-state waste processors.71 A five-Justice majority found the flow control ordinance facially discriminatory and struck it down under the Philadelphia v. New Jersey test.72
The Court's suspicion of such mandates predates Carbone. The Court has viewed with particular suspicion state laws requiring business operations to be performed in the home state that could be performed more efficiently elsewhere. In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., Arizona ordered a grower of high-quality cantaloupes, who packed them at nearby California facilities, to pack them in Arizona and to identify them as coming from an Arizona packer. Compliance would have required a capital outlay of $200,000 to pack a $700,000 crop.73
Every such law bars the import of the processing service. A processing step is itself a service that someone sells, and every unit of the local resource must pass through it. Once the law says the step must happen inside the border, the resource becomes a captive customer base for local processors, and an outside processor can compete only by relocating or duplicating its operation, as the Arizona grower would have had to build a plant it did not need. Evenhanded laws at least burden some people who are represented in the political process.74 A mandate that hands a market to local processors burdens outsiders who are not.
The Carbone facts show how a town can arrive at such a mandate for reasons that have little to do with trade. Clarkstown agreed to close its landfill and build a new transfer station. A private contractor agreed to build and operate it and, after five years, to sell it to the town for $1, and the town guaranteed the contractor a minimum flow of waste. To meet the guarantee, the town adopted a flow control ordinance requiring all nonhazardous solid waste in town to be deposited at the station. Carbone, a private recycler that sorted waste at its own Clarkstown facility, wanted to ship the nonrecyclable residue to cheaper processors outside the state, and the ordinance forced it to pay the station's fee even for waste it had already sorted.
The ordinance covered every hauler in town and mentioned no state line, yet the Court held that it discriminated against interstate commerce and erected a protectionist barrier against out-of-state processors.75 The doctrine measures discrimination by who gains a market advantage, and here the advantage ran to a single operator, the only business permitted to process the town's waste. In-town competitors lost access alongside outsiders, but their loss handed outsiders nothing, and favoring one local proprietor only sharpened the protectionist effect. If sweeping in a few local competitors could cure a barrier, a legislature could draft any protectionist rule that way and defend it as evenhanded.
Once the ordinance was found discriminatory, the town carried the justification burden: it had to show a legitimate local interest that no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternative could serve.76 Clarkstown pointed to health and environmental goals, but uniform safety regulations, enacted with no object to discriminate, would serve those goals. What the ordinance added was a profit guarantee, since it ensured that the station would earn enough to repay the contractor. The Court called the ordinance a financing measure and held that revenue generation is not a local interest that can justify discrimination against interstate commerce, because otherwise states could impose discriminatory taxes on out-of-state waste. If the facility needed special financing, the town could subsidize it through general taxes or municipal bonds.77 The difference between those alternatives and the ordinance is who pays. A subsidy puts the project's cost on the town's own taxpayers, who vote in Clarkstown, while the ordinance raised the same money by compelling every hauler to use the station and closing the market to cheaper outside processors. The same logic condemned Oregon's cost spreading, since a scheme that gives local handlers a cost advantage over their out-of-state competitors is protectionism.78
States and towns have other tools for favoring local processing. In a case about Alaska timber, a dissenting Justice complained that the state could reach the same result in any number of ways: by selling its timber only to companies that maintain primary-processing plants in Alaska, by subsidizing the in-state processing industry directly, or by paying to have the logs processed and entering the market only to sell processed logs. He thought it unduly formalistic to forbid the one path the state chose.79 The complaint sets up a later section. A state that acts as buyer or seller may escape the Clause, while a state that regulates cannot.
Only five Justices found the Clarkstown ordinance facially discriminatory, so the label was contestable. An answer on a close variant should say so, especially when a law sorts by the identity of a favored operator instead of by state of origin.
A different result followed when the favored facility was public. In United Haulers Association, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, the ordinances resembled Clarkstown's, but haulers had to bring waste to facilities owned and operated by a state-created public benefit corporation. The Court held that laws favoring the government in a traditional government activity, while treating every private business exactly the same whether in-state or out-of-state, do not discriminate against interstate commerce. A nondiscriminatory law meets a presumption in favor of validity and falls only if its burdens on interstate commerce outweigh its benefits, and the Court upheld the ordinances under that balancing test.80 Carbone's facility was private, so the question of public facilities had not been decided there. The exceptions below return to the public-facility rule.