Concept
Identifying Fundamental Rights
Fundamental rights
Identifying Fundamental Rights
The first step in substantive due process analysis is to decide whether a liberty is fundamental, and the Constitution supplies no list that answers the question. The unenumerated liberties that qualify appear nowhere in the text, yet the Court accepts that it may protect them. The seven Justices in the Griswold majority offered different bases for a right of marital privacy, but all agreed that the Court may protect liberty interests the text never mentions. A majority declined to read the Due Process Clause as covering only liberties spelled out as specifically as the Third Amendment's bar on quartering soldiers in peacetime.1 One Justice made the point directly: the Court “does not subscribe to the simplistic view that constitutional interpretation can possibly be limited to the ‘plain meaning’ of the Constitution’s text or to the subjective intention of the Framers,” because the Constitution announces fundamental principles in value-laden terms that leave ample scope for normative judgment.2
Justices who accept that power still disagree about how to use it, so the live dispute concerns method. Should the Court consult only the Founders' specific intent, or may it also weigh the more general concepts the Founders meant to protect? Are history and tradition legitimate guides and, if so, at what level of generality? How far do the Court's own decisions bind it, and what weight do philosophy, political theory, and sociology deserve?3 Method carries so much weight because an unenumerated right has no text to restrain the judge who recognizes it. The risks follow from that gap. The Court may lose credibility if the public sees it enshrining the personal beliefs of individual Justices, and it may protect values so far from the public's own that people refuse to accept its judgment. Both dangers materialized in the Lochner era, when the Court, in the name of liberty to contract, imposed laissez-faire economics on a nation prostrated by the Depression.4
Scholars and Justices have offered many theories for the job. Strict originalism limits the Court to rights stated in the text or intended by the framers, and moderate originalism follows their general intent. Process theories confine nontextual rights to those that keep the political process working, natural law theories look to moral principle, and a further view relies on a deeply embedded moral consensus in society.5 The Court's own decisions cluster around two approaches, and this section teaches each in turn. The first asks whether the liberty is “deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,” and it insists on describing the claimed right carefully, because at a high level of generality nearly any liberty fits the tradition, while at a very specific level few nontextual rights could.6 The second treats liberty as a continuum assessed by reasoned judgment, with tradition serving as a guide that does not cap the inquiry.
The later sections of this chapter on contraception, private intimacy, marriage, and abortion are best read as applications of these methods or as departures from them. When a decision seems to turn on tradition, ask how narrowly the Court described the right. When it seems to turn on dignity and autonomy, ask whether reasoned judgment is doing the work. The history and tradition test comes first because it supplies the vocabulary that the competing approach answers.
History and Tradition Test
The Court's working method for deciding which unenumerated liberties are fundamental comes from Washington v. Glucksberg, where Chief Justice Rehnquist identified two primary features of substantive due process analysis.7 The first is that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties that are, objectively, “deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”8 The second feature, a careful description of the asserted liberty, has its own section below.
The first feature joins two older phrases. “Deeply rooted” comes from Justice Powell's opinion in Moore v. East Cleveland, and “ordered liberty” from Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut.9 Together they ask what the Nation's law has actually protected over time, and whether the protected liberty is basic enough that a legal system without it could not call itself free.
Each half of the formula does separate work. The history half tells a judge where to look, because the word “liberty” alone gives little guidance. It sends the judge to the Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices, which the Court called the guideposts that direct and restrain its exposition of the Clause.10 A judge who reports what centuries of statutes and common-law decisions show presents evidence that others can check, while a judge who reports what liberty ought to include presents a personal view. The Court chose the history approach for that reason: it tends to rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due process review.11 The ordered-liberty half sets the weight the tradition must carry. Justice Cardozo explained in Palko that a right may have value and importance without being of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty, so a liberty must be more than valuable to qualify.12
The formula also operates as a gate. The Court requires a threshold showing that the challenged state action implicates a fundamental right before the State must justify it by more than a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest, which spares the Court complex balancing of competing interests in every case.13 Because the inquiry rewards liberties that society has long respected, it tends to confirm familiar liberties and to resist new ones. Fundamental status does not end the analysis, either. The right to vote rests on numerous textual references throughout the Constitution and its amendments, yet it exists alongside a compelling government power to regulate elections, and so the holdings go both ways.14
Glucksberg itself applied the method to a claim that looks, at first glance, like a close relative of the right to refuse treatment. The patient in Cruzan sought to reject lifesaving treatment, the patients in Glucksberg sought life-ending medication, and both cases could be said to involve the same liberty interest, a “right to die.”15 The patients and their physicians challenged Washington's ban on causing or aiding a suicide and described the liberty as a right to choose a humane, dignified death.16 The Court framed the question as whether the liberty specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide with another's assistance, and it then asked whether that right had any place in the Nation's traditions. It found “a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today, even for terminally ill, mentally competent adults.”17 Recognizing the right would have meant reversing centuries of legal doctrine and practice and striking down the considered policy choice of almost every State, a step the Court declined to take.18
The right to refuse unwanted lifesaving treatment sits on the other side of the line, even though a patient who refuses treatment and a patient who seeks lethal medication may both face death. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Court assumed that a competent person has a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.19 Glucksberg explained that this assumption did not follow from abstract concepts of personal autonomy. It rested on the common-law rule that forced medication was a battery and on a long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment.20 The difference between the two claims lies in that legal tradition, not in the personal stakes. Glucksberg conceded that a decision to commit suicide with another's assistance “may be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment,” yet it has never enjoyed similar legal protection, and the two acts are widely and reasonably regarded as quite distinct.21
The challengers also argued from Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, which spoke of the heart of liberty as the right to define one's own concept of existence, and from the premise that end-of-life choices are among the most intimate a person can make.22 The Court answered that Casey had described, in a general way, personal activities that earlier cases had already identified as deeply rooted in tradition or fundamental to ordered liberty. That many protected liberties sound in personal autonomy, the Court added, does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that “any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions” are protected.23 Autonomy is thus a feature the recognized rights tend to share, and tradition is the test for admitting a new one. A claimant who argues only that a choice is deeply personal has left the threshold question, whether the tradition protects it, unanswered. A competing approach associated with Obergefell gives dignity and autonomy a more independent role, and a later section of this chapter takes it up.
The same inquiry can protect a liberty as readily as it can withhold one, and Moore v. City of East Cleveland shows the protecting side. East Cleveland limited a dwelling to members of a narrowly defined family, and the ordinance reached Inez Moore, who lived with her son and two grandsons who were cousins rather than brothers. Writing for a plurality, Justice Powell reasoned that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition. He added that the tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household has roots as venerable as those of the nuclear family.24 Justice White's dissent replied that what the deeply rooted traditions are is arguable, and which of them deserve constitutional protection is more debatable still, a worry that returns in the next section.25 Moore and Glucksberg run the identical inquiry and diverge because the history ran in opposite directions: generations of shared extended-family homes in one, centuries of legal prohibition in the other. History is thus a tool that can extend or restrict the reach of a constitutional provision, depending on what the record shows.26
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization confirms that this is the governing framework and applies it to abortion. The Court restated that the Due Process Clause protects two categories of substantive rights, those guaranteed by the first eight Amendments and a select group of fundamental rights not mentioned in the text, and that an unenumerated right belongs to the second group only if it is deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition.27 Its historical survey found that abortion was criminal at common law at least after quickening, and that by 1868 three-quarters of the States had statutes making abortion a crime at any stage of pregnancy, a consensus that persisted until Roe.28 Justice Rehnquist had made a similar argument in his Roe dissent, pointing to more than a century of restrictions in a majority of States as evidence that no tradition of relatively unrestricted abortion existed.29 Dobbs called Roe “egregiously wrong from the start” and faulted its textual and historical reasoning as weak.30 It said Roe “conjured a trimester framework and a viability line with little justification from the Constitution, history, or precedent.”31 Later sections of this chapter address how Dobbs handled precedent; the point here is the method.
A finding that the tradition rejects the claimed liberty also settles the standard of review. Glucksberg held that the asserted right to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest and then required only that Washington's ban be rationally related to legitimate government interests, a requirement the Court found “unquestionably met.”32 The ban served the State's interests in preserving human life, preventing suicide, protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession, shielding vulnerable groups from abuse and mistakes, and guarding against a slide toward euthanasia.33 Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, observing that the majority never called the liberty before it fundamental, spelled out the general structure: only fundamental rights, meaning those deeply rooted in tradition, receive heightened scrutiny, and every other liberty interest may be abridged by a validly enacted law that is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.34 Because rational basis review asks so little of the State, the tradition question usually decides these cases at the threshold.
Run on the assisted-suicide claim, step one yields a right to assistance in committing suicide, step two finds centuries of prohibition, step three finds no liberty basic enough to qualify, and step four sends the ban to rational basis review, where it survived. Run on a competent patient's refusal of lifesaving treatment, step two finds the common-law rule that unconsented touching is a battery, and the claim lands on the protected side of the line.
Careful Description of the Right
The second feature of the method in Washington v. Glucksberg is a demand for a “careful description” of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.36 That demand operates before the history-and-tradition inquiry from the previous section, because a court cannot ask whether the Nation's traditions protect a liberty until it has said which liberty is in question. Glucksberg describes the Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices as the guideposts that direct and restrain the Court's reading of the Due Process Clause, and a guidepost helps only once the court knows what it is looking for.37 The wording of the claim is therefore the first move in the analysis, and it can decide whether the tradition answers yes or no.
The description carries so much weight because the claimant and the State will each describe the right in whatever way wins. Stated at a high level of generality, such as a liberty to make intimate personal choices, nearly any claim fits within the Nation's traditions, while stated at the level of the specific act, few nontextual rights can show a pedigree.38 Each end of that range answers a danger. A narrow description restrains judges, since a broad value such as autonomy has no edge and lets a court fit almost any preference inside it, which is the risk Glucksberg named when it warned that the liberty protected by the Clause could be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Justices.39 A broad description answers the opposite danger. If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, received practice would serve as its own justification, and groups once excluded from a right could never invoke it.40 Because both dangers are real, the Justices have never settled on one level, and the cases below show the dispute at work.
Glucksberg itself shows the narrowing step. The Court of Appeals had asked whether there is a right to die, and the respondents described their claim as a right to choose a humane, dignified death and a liberty to shape death.41 The Chief Justice answered that the Court has a tradition of formulating the interest at stake with care, and he pointed to Cruzan: although often called a right-to-die case, it assumed only that a competent person may refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.42 Washington's statute prohibited aiding another person to attempt suicide, so the Court restated the question as whether liberty includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.43 That restatement settled the case, because each description summons a different body of history. The broad version let the Court of Appeals read Cruzan as recognizing a liberty to hasten one's own death, while the narrow version separated assisted suicide from the refusal of treatment and met a consistent and almost universal tradition rejecting the asserted right.44
Bowers v. Hardwick applied the same narrowing to a different claim, and the result followed from the wording almost automatically. Hardwick was charged under Georgia's sodomy statute for an act with another adult man in the bedroom of his own home, and the Court stated the issue as whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.45 That wording cut the claim off from the earlier privacy decisions, because the Court found that no connection between family, marriage, or procreation and homosexual activity had been demonstrated.46 It also rejected the idea that those decisions insulate any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults from state proscription.47 The wording aimed the history inquiry at sodomy laws as well, and on that question the Court answered that “[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots.”48 Once the claim was a right to perform an act that nearly every State had long forbidden, the tradition could only reject it.
Lawrence v. Texas overruled Bowers and located the mistake in the description itself. The Court said the Bowers statement of the issue disclosed a failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake, and that calling the issue simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct “demeans the claim the individual put forward,” just as it would demean a married couple to say that marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.49 The statutes forbade a particular act, but their consequences reached the most private conduct in the most private of places, the home, and they sought to control a personal relationship that persons are free to choose without being punished as criminals.50 Justice Scalia's dissent defended the Bowers level of description. It argued that whether the old sodomy laws were aimed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter was irrelevant, because the only relevant point was that the conduct had been criminalized, and that sufficed to show it is not deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition.51 The majority and the dissent therefore differed over the object of the historical inquiry: the dissent asked about the practice the law punished, and the majority asked about the liberty of adults to form intimate personal relationships in private, while also questioning the historical premises Bowers had relied on.52
Obergefell v. Hodges met the same objection from the opposite direction. The respondents invoked Glucksberg's call for a careful description and argued that the petitioners sought a new and nonexistent right to same-sex marriage instead of exercising the right to marry.53 The Court acknowledged that Glucksberg insisted liberty be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with central reference to specific historical practices, and it added that this approach may have been appropriate for physician-assisted suicide but is inconsistent with the approach used for other fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy.54 Loving did not ask about a right to interracial marriage, Turner did not ask about a right of inmates to marry, and Zablocki did not ask about a right of fathers with unpaid child support duties to marry. Each case inquired about the right to marry in its comprehensive sense and asked whether there was sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from it.55
Placed side by side, these decisions show how the description chooses the history. Glucksberg and Bowers each described the claim as a right to perform the specific act the statute punished, which sent the inquiry to the long record of laws prohibiting that act and produced a rejection. Obergefell described the claim as the right to marry, which sent the inquiry to a liberty the Court's cases had long treated as fundamental, and the question became whether the State could justify excluding same-sex couples from it.56 Obergefell treats Glucksberg's circumscribed approach as suited to the assisted-suicide claim, while the previous section showed Dobbs restating history and tradition as the governing test, so how far the circumscribed method reaches is a tension this chapter takes up again in the Dobbs sections.
Behind these results lies a standing disagreement about the level of generality, which the Justices fought out in Michael H. v. Gerald D. Michael H. claimed to be the biological father of a child born to Carole D. and her husband, Gerald D.; California presumed that a child born to a married woman is a child of the marriage and allowed that presumption to be rebutted only in limited circumstances, even though blood tests showed a 98.07 percent probability that Michael was the father.57 Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, asked whether persons in Michael's situation had been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices of our society, and he found that those traditions protected the marital family against such a claim.58 A footnote supplied the method: courts should look to “the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”59 His reason was that general traditions give imprecise guidance and so let judges dictate society's views instead of discerning them.60 At the specific level, the relevant tradition concerned adulterous natural fathers, and it denied them protection. Biology alone did not carry the day. The Court had already treated it as insufficient in Lehr v. Robertson, which held that a putative biological father who never established an actual relationship with his child had no constitutional right to notice of the child's adoption, because a parent's liberty interests “do not spring fullblown from the biological connection between parent and child” and “require relationships more enduring.”61
The other Justices in Michael H. rejected that specificity in different degrees. Justice Brennan's dissent charged that the plurality asked about the specific variety of parenthood at stake instead of whether parenthood is an interest that has historically received protection, and it argued that such specificity in earlier cases would have changed the outcomes on contraception for unmarried and married couples and on an unwed father's right to raise his children.62 Justices O'Connor and Kennedy agreed that the Court must look to history and tradition but rejected the imposition of a single mode of historical analysis, preferring to consider traditions at levels of generality that might not be the most specific available.63 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey later called it tempting but inconsistent with the Court's law to suppose that due process protects only practices, defined at the most specific level, that other rules of law protected when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.64 Marriage appears nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial marriage was illegal in most States in the nineteenth century, yet Loving v. Virginia found the freedom to marry protected by the substantive component of due process.65
Step three does most of the work. An earlier case that the Court described at a high level of generality, as Obergefell described Loving, supports the claimant's wording, while an earlier case described narrowly, as Glucksberg described Cruzan, supports the State's. The Court has not announced which level governs every claim, so a complete answer presents both descriptions and the history each one draws in.
Reasoned Judgment Approach
The history-and-tradition test has a rival, and the clearest modern statement of the rival method appears in the majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges. That opinion calls the identification and protection of fundamental rights an enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution, and it says the duty requires courts to exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect.68 History remains part of the inquiry, but the Court said that history and tradition “guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries.”69 Because that sentence refuses to treat the past as the limit of liberty, the method pulls against the Glucksberg formulation taught in the previous two sections. It is best understood as a competing way of reasoning that some opinions follow and others reject, and it has never displaced the first approach.
The method traces to Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, which described the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause as “a rational continuum” that includes freedom from all substantial “arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints” and that also recognizes that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.70 Harlan added that giving content to this concept has been a rational process in which judges have not felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them, because the relevant balance is the one the Nation has struck in light of the traditions from which it developed and the traditions from which it broke, and that tradition, in his words, is “a living thing.”71 The Court adopted his position four Terms later in Griswold v. Connecticut, where Harlan, concurring, explained that the Due Process Clause stands “on its own bottom”: the inquiry may be aided by provisions of the Bill of Rights but does not depend on them.72
Justice Souter's concurrence in Washington v. Glucksberg gives the most systematic account of how the continuum operates, and its two halves correspond to two levels of scrutiny. At the low end, the concept of liberty bars even relatively trivial statutory impositions when they are undeniably irrational, meaning no imaginable rationale supports them, although such cases are rare.73 At the high end, when an interest is important enough to be judged fundamental, the State cannot rest on threshold rationality or a presumption of constitutionality and prevails only by showing an interest compelling enough to place within the realm of the reasonable a refusal to recognize the individual right.74 The sliding scale follows Harlan's suggestion that the kind and degree of justification a sensitive judge demands from a State depends on the importance of the interest the individual asserts.75 Where the two-tier framework from the first section of this chapter sorts liberties into fundamental and nonfundamental, this approach treats importance as a matter of degree, so a court asks little of the State when a trivial liberty is at stake and a great deal when the interest is among those long treated as fundamental.
Weighing contending interests could easily turn into an exercise in judicial preference, so Souter described two constraints on the common-law method. A court must confine the values it recognizes to those deserving constitutional stature, meaning values expressed in the text, exemplified by the traditions from which the Nation developed, or revealed by contrast with the traditions from which it broke.76 The second constraint operates after the weighing: it is no justification for intervention that a court can identify a reasonable resolution of the competing values that differs from the legislature's, and a law gives way only when its justifying principle, critically valued, is so far from commensurate with the individual interest as to be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied.77 The reason for the second limit is that substantive review resembles the legislature's own task of balancing clashing principles, each possibly worthy in itself. A court that swapped one reasonable balance for another would be legislating, so it may displace the balance already struck only when that balance falls outside the realm of the reasonable.78
Souter also treated the description of the claim as part of the method's discipline, though he used it differently than the Glucksberg majority did. He observed that the breadth of the principle a litigant or judge selects can be dispositive, because the broader the attack on a generally accepted principle, the less likely the attack is to succeed.79 In Poe, Harlan therefore treated it as essential that the claimants sought to use contraceptives within the privacy of the marital bedroom. That detail rescued the claim from a breadth that would have threatened all state regulation of contraception or intimate relations, and it let the interest be valued as part of a broader liberty to be free of unreasonable intrusions into the home and family life, a liberty that the Third and Fourth Amendments and earlier decisions exemplified.80 The Glucksberg majority narrowed a claim to ask whether a specific practice had historical protection. This method states the claim with detail in order to find the principle that supports it and to measure that principle's weight.
The method refuses to treat history as a ceiling because a ceiling would let old exclusions justify themselves. If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, the Court reasoned in Obergefell, received practices could serve as their own continued justification and new groups could not invoke rights once denied.81 Casey made a parallel point when it declined to suppose that due process protects only practices, defined at the most specific level, that other rules of law protected when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and when it observed that neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of the States at that time marks the outer limit of protected liberty.82 Lawrence v. Texas supplied the explanation: those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses did not presume to know liberty's manifold possibilities, and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.83 The same opinion described history and tradition as “the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry,” and it gave the most weight to the laws and traditions of the past half century, which showed an emerging awareness that liberty protects adults' decisions about their private lives.84
Obergefell applied the method to marriage. The Court acknowledged that its earlier marriage decisions, Loving, Zablocki, and Turner, all presumed a relationship between opposite-sex partners, and that the Court, like many institutions, had made assumptions defined by the world and time of which it is a part.85 Instead of ending the inquiry with that history, the Court asked whether the basic reasons the right to marry has long been protected apply to same-sex couples, and it concluded that they apply with equal force.86 The method also carries a rule about timing. The Court said that individuals need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right, and that it is of no moment whether advocates of a claim enjoy momentum in the democratic process, because the Constitution withdraws certain subjects from political controversy and fundamental rights depend on the outcome of no elections.87 The mechanism is straightforward: a right that had to wait for legislative approval would depend on the same majority it exists to restrain.
The method does not guarantee the claimant a win, and Souter's own concurrence in Glucksberg shows the other pole. He treated the individual interest in assisted dying as important, within the class of interests that demand careful scrutiny of the State's contrary claim, and he took seriously the respondents' argument from the decriminalization of suicide and from the tradition of medical care when death is imminent.88 He nonetheless concluded that he need not decide whether the interest was fundamental, because the State's interests were serious enough to defeat the claim that its law was arbitrary or purposeless.89 The two outcomes diverge at the last step, the comparison of weights, since the same questions about importance and justification were asked in both settings.
Step four decides the outcome, and Souter stated the consequence directly: only if this standard points against the statute can the claimant be said to have a constitutional right.90 The sequence also shows why this approach and the Glucksberg test can reach different answers on one claim. The history-and-tradition test asks whether the Nation's tradition protected the liberty, while this method asks whether the State's reasons can bear the weight of the individual interest.
Critics ask what keeps reasoned judgment from becoming personal preference. The principal dissent in Obergefell, by Chief Justice Roberts, argued that the majority's aggressive application of substantive due process breaks with decades of precedent and returns the Court to the unprincipled approach of Lochner, and that an approach grounded in history imposes limits on the judiciary more meaningful than any abstract formula.91 The dissent added that a sincere profession of discipline gives no meaningful constraint, because a judge searching for fundamental rights is likely to discover the judge's own values.92 Justice Alito's dissent framed the worry institutionally: the deeply-rooted requirement exists to keep five unelected Justices from imposing their personal vision of liberty on the American people.93 Defenders of the method concede the danger. The Moore plurality acknowledged that the Lochner era gives reason for concern lest the only limits on judicial intervention become the predilections of the sitting Justices, and it concluded that this history counsels caution and restraint but not abandonment.94 Harlan's reply was that specific textual provisions lend themselves to personal interpretation as readily as due process does, and that restraint comes from continual insistence on respect for the teachings of history, the basic values that underlie society, and the roles of federalism and separation of powers.95
No single method commands a majority across these decisions. In Glucksberg itself, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court took the narrow, tradition-bound approach, yet five Justices concurred separately to note their differences with it.96 Obergefell reasoned from the broader method for marriage, with what one account calls a dynamic, evolving conception of tradition, and Dobbs later reapplied the Glucksberg test.97 The Dobbs section below takes up how that opinion treated the decisions built on broader reasoning, which it distinguished rather than overruled.