Concept
Recognizing Unenumerated Rights
Other rights and interests
Recognizing Unenumerated Rights
The liberty that the Due Process Clause protects reaches beyond freedom from bodily restraint.1 In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court listed the fundamental rights and liberty interests that earlier decisions had recognized: the rights to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion.2 Almost none of those rights appears in the constitutional text, so each raises the question that the two tiers of review leave open: how does a court decide that an unnamed liberty is fundamental, so that the government must prove a burdening law necessary to a compelling purpose?3 A few fundamental rights, voting among them, do have textual references scattered through the Constitution. The rights examined here have none.4
The Court has added to the list cautiously. Its precedents insist that judges “exercise the utmost care” in identifying implied fundamental rights, “lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court.”5 The Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices supply the “guide posts for responsible decisionmaking” that direct and restrain the Court's exposition of the Clause.6
One item on the Glucksberg list has since fallen. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization held that the Constitution confers no right to obtain an abortion, and in the course of doing so it restated the structure of the doctrine: the Due Process Clause protects rights guaranteed by the first eight Amendments, which the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates against the states, and a select list of fundamental rights mentioned nowhere in the Constitution.7 A claimant in the second category must show that the right is deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.8 Because the list can change, a student needs the method that decides what belongs on it. Older decisions appear here for what they teach about how liberty is identified, and abortion doctrine itself lies outside this chapter. The three subsections below take up where unenumerated liberty comes from, how history and tradition test it, and how the claimed right must be described.
Liberty Beyond the Text
The Due Process Clause forbids depriving any person of liberty without due process of law but never says what liberty includes, so the Court has given the word content case by case. Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut gathered the early decisions, beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska, which read liberty to denote “not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also” the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children.”9 Meyer held that a Nebraska law materially interfered with the calling of modern-language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control their children's education.10 Pierce v. Society of Sisters followed, striking down an Oregon act that forbade parents to send their children to private schools because it “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”11 Skinner v. Oklahoma added a second kind of case: the Court invalidated a statute authorizing sterilization of some convicts because it classified people arbitrarily in terms of a fundamental right.12 The parental right still generates challenges. One court has held that a visitation statute unconstitutionally infringes the fundamental right of parents to rear their children, because it let a court order visitation without according the parent any deference or requiring a showing that the parent was unfit.13
Those decisions left a question open: if the text does not name a liberty, where does a court find it? The opinions in Griswold gave three answers.
In Griswold the Court held unconstitutional a Connecticut statute that forbade the use of contraceptives. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, found the right of privacy in the “penumbras” of several Bill of Rights guarantees,14 among them the Fourth Amendment's assurance that the people shall be secure in their “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”15 The theory had a gap. Douglas identified some arguably related provisions but gave no indication how to search their penumbras for other fundamental guarantees, so the theory could not say which unlisted rights might emerge next.16 The Court has since set the penumbras-and-emanations explanation aside, as it did in Whalen v. Roe (discussed under informational privacy below), and it now describes its task as giving meaning to the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty.17
Three separate opinions from a majority of the Court's members took a different route, and each relied expressly on due process: Justice Goldberg's (joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Brennan), Justice Harlan's, and Justice White's.18 Goldberg agreed that the liberty protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments, and he drew support from the Ninth Amendment, which provides that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”19 In his view, the language and history of that Amendment show that the Framers believed in additional fundamental rights alongside those the first eight amendments name.20 Because the Fourteenth Amendment now bars the states from abridging fundamental personal liberties, the Ninth Amendment bears on a state law as well.21
The Amendment's job in this reasoning is confirmation. It supports the view that Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment liberty is not limited to enumerated rights, but it creates no right of its own. It is generally treated as a textual justification for protecting nontextual rights, so an answer that names a “Ninth Amendment right” misdescribes how the Amendment works.22 Goldberg also met the objection that unenumerated liberty leaves judges free to roam. Judges, he wrote, must look to the “traditions and [collective] conscience of our people” to decide whether a principle is “so rooted [there] . . . as to be ranked as fundamental.”23
Justice Harlan cut the tie to the Bill of Rights altogether. The Due Process Clause, he wrote, “stands . . . on its own bottom,” and the proper question is whether the Connecticut statute violates basic values “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” whether or not it offends the letter or a penumbra of the Bill of Rights.24 The three routes therefore differ in where the right comes from. Douglas drew it out of specific guarantees, Goldberg drew it from liberty and used the Ninth Amendment as confirmation, and Harlan drew it from liberty alone.
Justice Black's dissent shows the position that all of those opinions rejected. He liked his privacy as much as anyone, he said, but he concluded that government may invade it unless some specific constitutional provision prohibits the invasion.25 The Justices in the majority disagreed about the route and still agreed on the premise that the Court may protect liberty interests found nowhere in the constitutional text.26 What continues to divide the Justices is which sources to consult and how to read them, including how much weight history and tradition deserve and at what level of generality to measure them.27
The Court later confirmed that liberty is confined neither to the Bill of Rights nor to historic practices. Planned Parenthood v. Casey described the Due Process Clause as containing a substantive component and refused two tempting ways to curb judicial discretion by shrinking liberty. One would limit liberty to the rights the first eight Amendments already guarantee, a view the Court has never accepted. The other would protect only those practices, defined at the most specific level, that other rules of law protected when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.28 Loving v. Virginia exposes the flaw in the second. Marriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights, and interracial marriage was illegal in most states in the nineteenth century, yet the Court rightly found it protected by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.29 Casey concluded that neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of the states when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty.30 It also quoted Justice Harlan's description of that liberty as “a rational continuum” that includes freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, and not “a series of isolated points” pricked out in the specific guarantees.31 Only that account of what liberty means is used here, and the abortion holding in Casey lies outside this chapter.
Casey did not treat its conclusion as a license to roam. It quoted Harlan's reminder that the tradition is “a living thing”: a decision that radically departs from it could not long survive, while a decision that builds on what has survived is likely to be sound, and no formula can substitute for judgment and restraint.32
Liberty beyond the text does not, however, protect every weighty personal decision. In Glucksberg, terminally ill patients claimed a right to decide how they die, and the Court answered that the many protected liberties that sound in personal autonomy do not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are protected.33 The difference lay in the right's pedigree. The right to refuse unwanted treatment that the Court assumed in Cruzan rested on the common-law rule that forced medication is a battery and on a long legal tradition protecting the refusal. Assisted suicide, by contrast, “has never enjoyed similar legal protection,” and the Court noted that most states outlawed it and even more do today.34
Griswold belongs to a line of decisions about freedom of choice in childbearing, alongside decisions on parental authority over child rearing and education such as Meyer and Pierce.35 The decision in Glucksberg was just as personal and profound, but no comparable line of legal protection stood behind it.36 The intimacy of the choice was constant in both cases, so the legal and historical grounding of the interest decided the result. An answer that treats a choice as protected because it is deeply personal skips the step that decides the question.
History and Tradition
The first feature of the Court's method for testing an unlisted liberty is a demand for history. The Due Process Clause, Glucksberg said, specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties that are, objectively, “deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”39 The two phrases ask different questions. Deep rootedness looks backward and asks whether the country's laws and practices have long honored the interest, while ordered liberty asks whether the interest is so basic that a free society could not do without it. The word “objectively” directs the court to evidence outside its own convictions: the Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices.
The requirement answers two concerns. The first is the judge. A court asked to recognize a liberty that the text never names has little outside its own sense of what matters to consult, and the Court has warned that the protected liberty could then be subtly transformed into the Justices' policy preferences.40 Tradition supplies a check from outside the bench. Justice Harlan wrote that judicial self-restraint will be achieved “only by continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society,” and wise application of federalism and separation of powers.41 The second concern is cost. A fundamental right triggers strict scrutiny, which requires the government to prove that its action is necessary to a compelling purpose.42 The Court adds that a threshold requirement, that the challenged action implicate a fundamental right before the government must justify it by more than a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest, spares courts the complex balancing of competing interests in every case, and that the whole approach “tends to rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due process judicial review.”43
Moore v. City of East Cleveland shows tradition supporting a claim. East Cleveland's ordinance forced residents into narrowly defined family patterns44 and reached a grandmother who lived with her grandsons.45 The city argued that no decision “gives grandmothers any fundamental rights with respect to grandsons” and that any right to live together as a family extends only to the nuclear family, essentially a couple and their dependent children.46 Justice Powell answered with history. The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family because the institution is deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition, and the tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.47 The nuclear family was therefore an arbitrary stopping point, because appropriate limits on substantive due process come “not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from ‘careful respect for the teachings of history.’”48 And because the ordinance intruded on family living arrangements, the Court examined carefully the importance of the city's interests and how well the ordinance served them. Preventing overcrowding and minimizing traffic and parking congestion were legitimate interests, but the ordinance served them “marginally, at best.”49
Moore's protection stops where the family tradition stops. The ordinance in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas limited the number of unrelated people who could live together in one home, and the Court sustained it over Justice Marshall's dissent. Marshall argued that the ordinance impinged on fundamental personal rights and could stand only on a clear showing that it was necessary to a compelling and substantial governmental interest,50 but the Court did not adopt that position. Justice Powell later explained in Moore that Belle Terre had affected only unrelated individuals,51 and the family-living interest that Moore recognized protects persons related by blood or marriage.52 The line falls at kinship, where the legal tradition of protection runs.
What does the inquiry produce when the tradition points the other way? In Glucksberg, terminally ill patients challenged Washington's statute against aiding another person to attempt suicide.53 The Court asked whether liberty includes a right to commit suicide that itself includes a right to assistance, and it found “a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today, even for terminally ill, mentally competent adults.”54 Washington's own law illustrates that tradition. The state enacted its ban in 1975, and four years later its Natural Death Act provided that withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment “shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide.”55 The Court regarded refusing treatment and assisting suicide as acts that are widely and reasonably seen as quite distinct.56 To hold for the patients, it said, would require reversing centuries of legal doctrine and practice and striking down the considered policy choice of almost every state.57 With no fundamental right at stake, the ban needed only a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest. The interest in refusing unwanted treatment fared differently because it rests on the common-law tradition that forced medical treatment is a battery.58 Because the inquiry asks about legal protection, age alone does not help a claimant. The history of assisted suicide is long, but it is a history of rejection.
Tradition does not settle every case, because the Justices disagree about how to read it. Some would interpret traditions in light of the fundamental principles that best explain and justify them. On that view, if the best justification for the right to marry is that people may marry the persons of their choice, same-sex couples hold the right even though the American people had not previously recognized it.60 The question reached the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, and a dissent answered with Glucksberg's insistence that judges “exercise the utmost care” in identifying implied fundamental rights.61 The Glucksberg method, with its demand for objectively deep roots and a careful description of the right, remains the baseline against which both views are measured.62 How specifically the liberty must be described before any of this history is consulted is the second feature of the method, and it comes next.
Careful Description of the Right
Washington v. Glucksberg names two primary features of the Court's method, and the second is a requirement of a “careful description” of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.64 In the order of analysis, the description comes before the history. A court cannot ask whether the Nation's laws have protected an interest until it has decided what the interest is, so the description selects the history the court will examine, and a careless one can decide the case before any history is read. The Court added that it has a tradition of carefully formulating the interest at stake in these cases.65
The Court of Appeals in Glucksberg had asked whether there is a “right to die,” and the respondents described their claim as a “liberty to choose how to die,” a right to “control of one's final days,” “the right to choose a humane, dignified death,” and “the liberty to shape death.”66 The Court declined each label. Washington's statute prohibited “aid[ing] another person to attempt suicide,” so the question was whether liberty includes a right to commit suicide that itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.67 The Court took Cruzan as its model. Although that case is often called a “right to die” decision, the Court there was more precise and assumed only a “constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”68
Two reasons support the requirement, and they work differently. The first is fit. The description ties the constitutional question to the state action under review: Washington's law reached assistance in suicide, so a claim framed around death in general would have asked the Court to rule on a subject broader than the one the statute touched. The second is restraint. Labels such as dignity, control, and a humane death name broad values, and a judge asked which of them the Constitution protects has little but personal conviction to consult. Describing the interest concretely and comparing it with concrete examples from the legal tradition “tends to rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due process judicial review.”69 The requirement thus serves the concern about judicial preference that drives the tradition test, and it serves it at the stage where a broad label would otherwise let that preference in.
Reframing the claim changes the analysis because the two descriptions draw on different traditions. The right the Court assumed in Cruzan rested on the common-law rule that forced medication is a battery and on a long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted treatment.70 A claim described broadly as a right to die can borrow that tradition, since refusing treatment and seeking assistance both concern how a life ends. Described carefully as a right to assistance in committing suicide, the claim must stand on its own history, and the Court found that most states had outlawed assisted suicide and that even more do today.71 The Court regarded the two acts as quite distinct and gave no intimation that the right to refuse treatment could be transmuted into a right to assistance.72
A problem that quotes a claimant's language about dignity or autonomy offers a label, and the answer should translate it into the act the law restricts before consulting any tradition. Autonomy language cannot substitute for that step, because the many protected liberties that sound in personal autonomy do not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are protected.73
Careful description has a limit, and the limit comes from the opposite error. If a court shrinks the claim until it matches only the practices the law already protected, the tradition test can recognize nothing new, and a right that tradition honors at a higher level is lost whenever a government finds a new way to restrict it. Casey used Loving to reject the supposition that the Due Process Clause protects only those practices, defined at the most specific level, that other rules of law protected when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.74 Marriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial marriage was illegal in most states in the nineteenth century, yet the Court was correct to find it an aspect of liberty protected by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.75 Described as a right to interracial marriage, the claim meets a tradition of prohibition and fails. Described as the right to marry, it meets a tradition of protection and succeeds. The same couple and the same ban yield opposite answers depending on the description, which is why choosing it is the central analytic task.
The Justices have not agreed on how specific the description should be. Casey tied the most-specific-level approach to Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D. and rejected it as inconsistent with the Court's law.76 Other Justices read traditions in light of the principles that best explain and justify them, an approach that lets a right reach people whom earlier practice left out.77 This chapter does not resolve the dispute, and an answer need not. It should identify the level of description at which the result would change.
The third step is where Glucksberg and Loving meet. The claim in Glucksberg resembled the refusal-of-treatment right only in subject matter, so the Court tested assisted suicide against its own history. The claim in Loving was the recognized right to marry applied to couples the states had excluded, so the exclusion did not define the right.