Concept
Goldberg and Welfare Benefits
Procedural due process
Goldberg and Welfare Benefits
Goldberg v. Kelly tested how much the Fourteenth Amendment demands when a state stops a welfare payment. The Amendment forbids any State to “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” and the Court had to say what that command requires before a recipient’s aid ends.1 Earlier sections borrowed single propositions from the case: welfare benefits are property, notice must state reasons, a written submission can fail a recipient, and the decisionmaker must be impartial. This section reads the opinion whole. The Court held that an eligible recipient has a property interest in continued benefits, and that due process requires an evidentiary hearing before those benefits are terminated.2
The plaintiffs were New York City residents who received aid under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or under New York State’s Home Relief program. They alleged that state and city officials had ended, or were about to end, their aid without prior notice or hearing.3 When the suits were filed, no notice or hearing of any kind was required. The State and city adopted procedures only after the suits began, and the plaintiffs then attacked the constitutional adequacy of those procedures.4
The city’s procedure, No. 68-18, worked in stages. A caseworker who doubted a recipient’s eligibility first discussed the doubts with the recipient. If still convinced, the caseworker recommended termination to a unit supervisor. A supervisor who concurred sent the recipient a letter stating the reasons for the proposed termination and giving seven days to ask a higher official to review the record, supported by a written statement the recipient prepared personally or with the help of an attorney or another person. If the reviewing official affirmed the determination, aid stopped immediately, and a second letter told the recipient why.5
What the procedure left out explains the lawsuit. A recipient could not appear personally, with or without counsel, before the official who finally decided eligibility, and so could not present evidence orally or confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The Court called those omissions fatal.6 New York also provided a post-termination “fair hearing,” so the dispute concerned timing and not whether a hearing existed. The District Court held that only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing would satisfy due process, and it rejected the argument that the informal pre-termination review, together with the later fair hearing, answered every claim.7 The Supreme Court framed the issue as the narrow one whether the Due Process Clause requires an evidentiary hearing before benefits are terminated, and it agreed with the District Court.8
The two subsections that follow track the Court’s own order of reasoning. The first explains why the hearing must come before the aid stops. The second lists what the hearing must contain. Both rest on a weighing of the recipient’s loss against the government’s interests. Mathews v. Eldridge later applied the same three criteria, and the Court had already invoked each of them in Goldberg.9 Goldberg therefore sits at the demanding end of the range of process, and keeping that position in mind makes the later cases easier to place.
Why a Prior Hearing
The question was whether New York could end a recipient’s aid and offer a hearing afterward, or had to hold an evidentiary hearing first.10 The opinion answers in three steps. It establishes that due process applies, identifies the two interests to be weighed, and shows that the weighing favors the recipient. Learn the steps in that order, because the same method returns in Mathews.
The State did not contend that procedural due process was inapplicable to the termination of welfare benefits, and the Court would not have accepted the contention. Welfare benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them, and ending them is state action that adjudicates important rights.11 Calling aid a “privilege” and not a “right” therefore answered nothing. The same constitutional restraints apply to the withdrawal of public assistance as to disqualification for unemployment compensation, denial of a tax exemption, and discharge from public employment.12 Goldberg thus ended the distinction between rights and privileges: continued receipt of welfare benefits is property whose deprivation triggers the protections of the Due Process Clause.13
Applying the clause was only the first step, because the Court still had to decide how much process the recipient was owed. The extent of required process is influenced by the extent to which the recipient may be “condemned to suffer grievous loss.”14 The Court began, as it had in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, by identifying the precise nature of the government function involved and of the private interest affected.15 It then set the recipient’s interest in avoiding that loss against the government’s interest in summary adjudication, which means stopping payments promptly once there is reason to believe a recipient is no longer eligible.16
Start with the recipient. The crucial factor, the Court said, is that terminating aid while an eligibility dispute is pending may deprive an eligible recipient of “the very means by which to live while he waits.” The harm builds in two steps. A recipient without independent resources is at once in desperate circumstances, and the need to find the means of daily subsistence then weakens the ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy.17 The cutoff thus inflicts the loss and also impairs the capacity to contest it, which is why a hearing offered afterward is a poor substitute. The District Court in Kelly v. Wyman said as much: “While post-termination review is relevant, there is one overpowering fact which controls here,” and to cut off a welfare recipient in the face of “brutal need” without a prior hearing of some sort is “unconscionable, unless overwhelming considerations justify it.”18 The word eligible matters. The hearing exists to sort eligible recipients from ineligible ones, so until it occurs no one can tell whose loss is a mistake.
Goldberg itself shows how specific this reasoning is. The Court described the crucial factor as absent for the blacklisted government contractor, the discharged government employee, the taxpayer denied a tax exemption, and virtually anyone else whose governmental entitlements are ended.19 A reader who takes the case to guarantee a pre-termination evidentiary hearing for every benefit has separated the holding from its stated reason, which is the recipient’s dependence on aid for subsistence.
The government’s side of the ledger holds two interests, and the first favors the recipient. Public assistance, the Court said, is “not mere charity, but a means to ‘promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.’” The same governmental interests that counsel providing welfare counsel providing it without interruption to those eligible, and pre-termination evidentiary hearings are indispensable to that end.20
The second interest is fiscal and administrative, and the State pressed it as the reason to hold any evidentiary hearing only after payments stopped. Summary adjudication protects the public fisc by halting payments promptly once there is reason to believe a recipient is no longer eligible. Because most terminations are accepted without challenge, it also saves money and administrative time by reducing the number of evidentiary hearings actually held.21 The Court weighed that concern and found it outweighed. The eligible recipient’s interest in uninterrupted aid, coupled with the State’s own interest that payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs the State’s competing concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and administrative burdens. The State, in other words, has a stake in accuracy as well as in thrift. In the District Court’s words, which the Supreme Court adopted, “the stakes are simply too high for the welfare recipient, and the possibility for honest error or irritable misjudgment too great, to allow termination of aid without giving the recipient a chance, if he so desires, to be fully informed of the case against him so that he may contest its basis and produce evidence in rebuttal.”22
A dissent saw the costs differently. It argued that the ever-changing lists of recipients impose a constant administrative burden on government, which could not reasonably have anticipated that the burden would include “the additional procedural expense imposed by the Court today.”23 That objection restates the State’s fiscal and administrative interest, which the majority had already weighed and found outweighed.
The weighing did not disappear from the law. The three criteria that Mathews v. Eldridge later placed at the center of administrative due process were hardly new, since the Court had invoked each of them in Goldberg. Mathews used those familiar criteria to largely reverse Goldberg’s requirement of a trial-type hearing before the government ends an individual’s entitlement to public assistance.24 The Mathews sections below return to that comparison.
Required Hearing Elements
Once Goldberg established that welfare benefits are protected property, the next question was what the required hearing must contain. The Court answered with a short list, not a procedural code. It agreed with the District Court that the pre-termination hearing need not be a judicial or quasi-judicial trial, because the statutory “fair hearing” that follows gives the recipient a full administrative review.26
The hearing stays limited because of its job. Given the later review, it has one function only: to produce an initial determination of whether the welfare department’s grounds for stopping payments are valid, so that the recipient is protected against an erroneous termination in the meantime.27 That job accounts for what the Court left out. A complete record and a comprehensive opinion serve primarily to facilitate judicial review and to guide future decisions, so neither need exist before payments stop.28 The Court also considered the setting. Welfare authorities and recipients share an interest in relatively speedy resolution of eligibility questions, they are used to dealing with each other informally, and some departments carry very burdensome caseloads. Those facts justified limiting the hearing to minimum procedural safeguards adapted to welfare recipients and to the limited nature of the controversies, and the Court disclaimed any intent to impose requirements beyond those demanded by rudimentary due process.29 Each required element therefore answers a specific way that an initial determination can go wrong.
Two elements were treated in earlier sections, and a reminder shows where they fit. The hearing must come “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” In this setting that means timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by presenting arguments and evidence orally.30 Both matter because recipients challenge terminations as resting on incorrect or misleading factual premises or on a misapplication of rules or policies to the facts of their cases, and a charge that is never spelled out cannot be answered.31
Many eligibility disputes turn on facts, and facts reach the decisionmaker through people. The Court therefore required that the recipient be able to confront and cross-examine the department’s witnesses: “Welfare recipients must therefore be given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses relied on by the department.”32 The Court grounded that conclusion in the principle, taken from Greene v. McElroy, that when government action seriously injures an individual and its reasonableness depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the government’s case must be disclosed so that the individual can show it is untrue.33 A hearing that lets the recipient speak but keeps the department’s witnesses out of reach leaves the department’s version untested, and the initial check then checks nothing.
The recipient must also be allowed to retain an attorney, although the state need not furnish one. The Court did not say that counsel must be provided at the pre-termination hearing, only that the recipient must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires.34 The reasons show what a lawyer adds to an informal proceeding. Counsel can delineate the issues, present the factual contentions in an orderly manner, conduct cross-examination, and generally safeguard the recipient’s interests, and the Court did not expect this help to prolong or encumber the hearing.35 The rule stops short of appointment. A recipient who cannot obtain a lawyer has no claim under Goldberg to one paid for by the state, a limit the later section on counsel follows through the Court’s other decisions.
The last group of elements concerns the decision itself. The decisionmaker’s conclusion about eligibility must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing. To show compliance, the decisionmaker should state the reasons for the determination and indicate the evidence relied on, though the statement need not amount to a full opinion or even formal findings of fact and conclusions of law.36 The logic runs in a chain. Oral argument and cross-examination matter only if what happens at the hearing is what decides the case, and a statement of reasons that names the evidence lets the recipient and any later reviewer see that the hearing did the work. The decisionmaker must also be impartial, as the earlier section on neutrality explained. Prior involvement in some aspects of a case does not necessarily bar a welfare official from deciding it, but the official should not have participated in making the determination under review.37
A recipient who appears personally, tells her side, cross-examines the department’s witnesses, and brings a retained lawyer before a decisionmaker who had no part in proposing the termination, and who then states the reasons and the evidence relied on, has received what Goldberg requires before aid stops.38 The hearing still passes if the state appoints no counsel for her and the decisionmaker issues a short statement of reasons in place of a full opinion or formal findings, because the Court expressly left those items out.39 The only basic requirements the Court omitted were a complete record or comprehensive opinion, assigned counsel, and a formal finding of fact or opinion. What it did guarantee comes very close to an administrative trial, which is why Goldberg marks the demanding end of the range of process.40
Exam answers go wrong in both directions. Some assert that Goldberg demanded a full trial with appointed counsel and a written opinion, and the opinion disclaims each of those. Others treat any informal conference with the caseworker as enough, although the Court held New York’s letter, conference, and written review inadequate because the recipient could not appear before the final decisionmaker or confront the witnesses.41