Concept
Tiers of Equal Protection Review
Classifications subject to heightened scrutiny
Classifications Triggering Heightened Scrutiny
Tiers of Equal Protection Review
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids any state to “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” and the Court applies the same guarantee to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, treating equal protection claims against either government alike.1 The command cannot literally require equal treatment, because almost every law burdens or benefits some people and not others.2 The real question is whether the government can justify the line it drew.
Every equal protection case asks whether a sufficient purpose justifies the government’s classification, and how much justification suffices depends entirely on the type of discrimination.3 The Court is extremely suspicious of race discrimination, so the government may use a racial classification only if it proves the classification necessary to a compelling purpose. That test is called strict scrutiny.4 A different test governs a fourteen-year-old denied a driver’s license: she prevails only by proving that the law is not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. That test is called rational basis review.5
Three tiers result. Strict scrutiny requires that a regulation serve compelling governmental interests and be essential to them, meaning the least restrictive means. Intermediate scrutiny requires that a regulation serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to achieving them. Rationality review requires only a rational relationship to legitimate ends.6 The tiers also treat purpose differently: heightened review measures a law by its actual governmental purposes, while rationality review accepts conceivable purposes, even ones hypothesized after the fact.7
The tiers are landmarks on a spectrum, not fixed walls. Rationality review sometimes tightens, especially when animus is at work, and strict scrutiny sometimes relaxes, as it has for affirmative action.8 In a concurring opinion in a land use case, Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, argued that the entire notion of levels of scrutiny was wrong and that one test, rational basis, should govern.9 The tiers nonetheless remain the working vocabulary of the doctrine, and this unit uses them throughout.
This unit answers the second question. It begins with the deferential baseline, explains what lifts a classification above it, and then states the strict and intermediate tests that later sections apply to race, gender, and other classes.
Rational Basis Baseline
Most classifications never leave the default track, where the government needs only a rational relationship between the classification and a legitimate purpose.12 Where nothing justifies elevated scrutiny, equal protection demands neither “mathematical nicety” nor the elimination of all inequality. The practical problems of government may require rough accommodations of interests, and courts respect those accommodations unless no reasonable basis can be found to support them.13
The challenger carries a heavy burden. Legislatures are presumed to act within their constitutional power even when their laws produce some inequality in practice, and a classification “will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”14 In a dispute over cable television regulation, Justice Thomas put the burden this way: those attacking a classification “have the burden to negate every conceivable basis which might support it,” and it is “entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature.”15 A legislative choice, he added, may rest on “rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”16 Because it was at least arguable that cable facilities serving commonly owned buildings did not require regulation, the Court upheld the federal distinction.17 Heightened scrutiny reverses this allocation: there the government must justify its own line.18
The same latitude explains why purpose is judged differently at the baseline. Heightened review measures a law by its actual purposes, but rationality review is satisfied by conceivable purposes, even ones hypothesized after the fact.19 A state that never announced why it drew a line may therefore defend it with a reason first offered in litigation.
A defense is easiest when the challengers themselves accept that some difference calls for different treatment. In litigation over the Transit Authority’s rules for methadone users, the respondents no longer questioned the justification for special rules, and the district court had expressly held it permissible to deny methadone users any employment unless they had been in treatment for at least a year and to keep even the most senior and reliable of them out of the more dangerous jobs.20
Age lines receive this deferential review: the fourteen-year-old denied a license must prove the law irrational,21 and the Court took the same approach to a mandatory retirement age for state police officers in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia.
The baseline’s reach ends where race begins. The Court has refused to uphold racial statutes “if there is any possible basis for concluding that they serve a rational purpose,” and it has distinguished cases that involve no racial discrimination, such as Railway Express Agency v. New York, a challenge to a rule about which kinds of advertising trucks may display in New York City.22
Even rationality review has a floor. It is sometimes heightened, especially when an inappropriate ground of “animus” is at work.23 A law explicable only by hostility toward the group it burdens fails even ordinary review, as Romer v. Evans illustrates. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. shows the floor from another angle. Concluding that people with intellectual disabilities were not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the Court recited the rational basis standard, yet it seemed to apply a form of heightened scrutiny, later dubbed “rational basis with bite,” by placing the burden of proof on the party defending the ordinance, contrary to traditional practice.24 The city had objected to the facility partly because of its location, across the street from a junior high school and in a flood plain, and defending that objection fell to the city.25 A later section returns to Cleburne and to how much protection this floor provides. The next question is what lifts a classification above the baseline in the first place.
Why Classes Become Suspect
The baseline gives way when a classification uses a trait that makes prejudice a likelier explanation than policy. The Court presumes that some classifications are more likely than others to lack a justifying relationship to a legitimate purpose, and the strength of that presumption sets the tier.27 Race draws strict scrutiny; gender draws a heightened but less searching standard.28 Opinions and commentary point to four features that push a trait toward heightened review. Treat them as considerations that reinforce one another, not as a checklist.
The first feature is stereotype. Gender classifications, like classifications by race and national origin, usually rest on stereotypes rather than on important government interests, and many biological differences offered to justify them are stereotypes in disguise, as in the cases that kept women from bartender licenses or from automatic consideration for jury service.29 Differential treatment of the sexes, the Court has observed, “very likely reflect[s] outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women.”30
The second feature is a history of discrimination. In United States v. Virginia, the Court explained that today’s skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex “responds to volumes of history”: women did not count among the voters composing “We the People” until 1920.31 In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., the Court added that it need not decide whether women or racial minorities have suffered more, because “our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination,” a history that warrants the heightened scrutiny afforded all gender-based classifications.32 Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Frontiero drew the comparison most sharply, likening the nineteenth-century position of women, who could not hold office, serve on juries, or sue in their own names, to that of Black people under the slave codes.33
The third feature is immutability. When a trait defines the targeted group and cannot be changed, a legislator’s ability to empathize with the burdened class may shrink: unless the trait is widely shared, most legislators never stood in the group’s shoes and need never fear standing there, so the group’s interests may receive minimal consideration.34 Commentary on gender classifications makes the related point that a strong presumption should run against laws that burden people for traits they did not choose and cannot change, and sex is immediately visible as well as immutable.35 Alienage shows the idea at its limit. A noncitizen may naturalize, so the trait is mutable, but only in one direction, and citizen legislators face no risk of joining the burdened class.36
The fourth feature is exclusion from ordinary politics. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., Justice Stone observed that prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may curtail the political processes ordinarily relied on to protect minorities, and so may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.37 Where prejudice has skewed that process, deference no longer rests on the assumption that the losers received equal justice.38 Noncitizens cannot vote in state or national elections,39 and women, like racial minorities, tend to be significantly underrepresented in the political process.40 The consideration also helps explain why gender sits below race. One dissent argued that racial groups are numerical minorities with a greater need for protection, whereas the population is divided almost equally between men and women.41
The tier follows the trait a law uses, not the history of the particular group it burdens or benefits. Every racial classification imposed by any governmental actor, whether federal, state, or local, must satisfy strict scrutiny.42 In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Court explained why a benign label does not change the answer: without searching inquiry, no one can tell which classifications are “benign” or “remedial” and which reflect notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.43 Gender works the same way at the intermediate level, because a practice that “discriminates against males rather than against females does not exempt it from scrutiny or reduce the standard of review.”44
Not every trait qualifies. After Rodriguez, wealth classifications do not merit heightened scrutiny,45 and age draws only rational basis review.46 The Court has applied the same considerations to withhold suspect status from other groups; in Lyng v. Castillo, for example, it declined to treat close relatives as a suspect class.
Strict Scrutiny Test
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena states the test for racial classifications: whether imposed by a federal, state, or local actor, a racial classification is constitutional only if it is a narrowly tailored measure that furthers a compelling governmental interest.48 To the extent Metro Broadcasting and language in Fullilove were inconsistent with that rule, they were overruled or are no longer controlling.49 The formula has two parts, and the government must satisfy both. The interest must be compelling, a heavier showing than the legitimate purpose that carries a law at the baseline, and the means must be essential to that interest, meaning the least restrictive means.50
Strict scrutiny reverses the baseline’s allocation of burden. Racial classifications are presumptively unconstitutional, and the government must show that the classification is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling interest.51 The inquiry is “searching”: the government must prove that its reasons for any racial classification are “clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate.”52 And even if the interest is important enough to be compelling, the government must show that it was the legislature’s actual purpose.53
The test exists to smoke out illegitimate uses of race. In Croson, the Court explained that the compelling-interest requirement assures that the legislative body pursues a goal important enough to warrant “a highly suspect tool,” and the tailoring requirement assures that the means “fit” that goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.54 Poor fit is the usual sign of a pretext. If a state says it wants English-fluent hospital workers but burdens people of foreign origin, it could have achieved its goal as well or better by requiring every prospective employee to pass an English proficiency exam; the poor tailoring and the available alternative strongly suggest that the health goal is a sham and that the real purpose is to burden people of foreign origin out of prejudice or dislike.55
Strict scrutiny applies even when a statute treats every race alike. In McLaughlin v. Florida, the Court held that a classification is not necessarily reasonable simply because the law applies equally to everyone in the defined class. Florida described its interracial cohabitation statute as protecting sexual decency, but it could not show that illicit intercourse was more likely when the couple was interracial.56 Loving v. Virginia applied the same reasoning to a ban on interracial marriage. The Court rejected the claim that equal application removes racial classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment’s scrutiny and refused to uphold the statutes merely because some rational purpose might be conceived.57 Racial classifications must face “the most rigid scrutiny,” and they survive only if shown necessary to a permissible state objective independent of racial discrimination.58 The defense fails because the classification itself decides the outcome: who could marry depended on one’s race, or the race of one’s partner.59
The test governs only once the challenger shows a racial classification. In Washington v. Davis, the District of Columbia required a test to become a police officer, and Black applicants failed it much more often than white applicants. The Court held that discriminatory impact was not enough to trigger heightened scrutiny; the challenger also had to prove a racially discriminatory purpose.60 A later section develops that requirement of intent.
Strict scrutiny is demanding but not automatically fatal. Government remains free to adopt race-conscious measures when necessary to further a compelling interest, provided the measures are narrowly tailored and temporary.61 The Court has also warned against reading the test as a formality: strict scrutiny must not be “strict in theory, but fatal in fact,” yet “the opposite is also true,” and it must not be “strict in theory but feeble in fact.”62 In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, the Court concluded that the lower courts had not applied the standard as established by earlier cases and remanded for a proper application.63
Korematsu v. United States shows what happens when the standard is recited but not applied. The Court announced that restrictions curtailing the civil rights of a single racial group are “immediately suspect” and must face “the most rigid scrutiny,” that “pressing public necessity” may sometimes justify them but racial antagonism never can, and then found the necessity.64 It sustained a federal law detaining Japanese Americans living in California during World War II on the ground that detaining the whole group was the only means of keeping disloyal citizens from interfering with the war effort.65 The tailoring requirement exists to test exactly that kind of claim, and the decision has since been discredited.66
Intermediate Scrutiny Test
Gender classifications receive intermediate scrutiny, and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan states the government’s burden: it “is met only by showing at least that the classification serves ‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’ are ‘substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’”68 The formula sits between its neighbors. The objective must be more than legitimate but need not be compelling, and the means must fit more closely than a rational relationship requires without having to be the least restrictive.69 The Court also describes the burden as an “exceedingly persuasive justification” that a party defending gender-based action must demonstrate.70
Gender stops short of the strict tier. Justice Brennan’s opinion in Frontiero would have treated sex like race, alienage, and national origin, but only a plurality joined it.71 The Court settled instead on a standard that is heightened but less searching than strict scrutiny,72 though that standard has been strengthened to the point where it often approaches strict scrutiny.73 In more than twenty cases since 1971 the Court has subjected sex classifications to heightened scrutiny, and one opinion, while conceding that the intermediate test associated with Craig v. Boren “may not provide a very clear standard in all instances,” found in the case law “a strong presumption that gender classifications are invalid.”74
Express sex classifications fall without the required showing. The Court has held unconstitutional a community property statute that gave the husband exclusive control over the disposition of community property, because it embodied express gender-based discrimination not shown to be tailored to an important governmental interest.75
The two requirements do different work. The objective requirement asks whether the government’s goal matters, and the fit requirement asks whether sex is a reliable way to reach it. A sex line often works as a proxy for some trait the legislature actually cares about, and Craig shows what happens when the proxy is weak. The state’s statistics did not persuade the Court that sex was “a legitimate, accurate proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving,” and proving broad sociological propositions by statistics, the Court added, is “a dubious business” in tension with the normative philosophy underlying the Equal Protection Clause.76
The standard does not bend with the sex burdened. A practice that discriminates against males rather than females is not exempt from scrutiny, and its standard of review is not reduced.77
Gender is not the only classification that receives heightened review. Classifications based on legitimacy do too, though with the gender standard now often approaching strict scrutiny, the standard applied in legitimacy cases is probably less rigorous.78 Wealth classifications, by contrast, do not merit heightened scrutiny.79
Mind the burden at each step. Conceivable purposes, which satisfy the baseline, will not do here, because heightened scrutiny measures a law by its actual purposes and the government carries the burden of showing them.80