Concept
Choosing the Right Test
Takings
Choosing the Right Test
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council gave courts the starting point for sorting takings claims. It identified two categories of regulatory action that are compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest behind the restraint: regulation that compels the owner to suffer a physical invasion, and regulation that denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.1 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. later restated the map. It treated those two as the per se categories, set land-use exactions apart as a context with a standard of their own, and left every remaining regulatory claim to the Penn Central factors.2 A problem is solved, then, by deciding which test the government's conduct calls for before any balancing begins. The categorical tests work without the weighing that the residual test performs, so a court must rule them in or out first.
Each test answers a different risk that government conduct creates for the owner. When the government acquires property, occupies it, or authorizes others to enter it, the owner loses the right to exclude, the injury is the same whatever the size of the intrusion, and the government must pay for what it takes.3 A regulation that leaves land with no productive use works, from the owner's side, like a direct appropriation, and the ordinary assumption that burdens and benefits even out across many owners has nothing left to rest on.4 An ordinary use restriction presents a question of degree, so a court weighs how heavily it falls on this owner against the government's power to adjust the benefits and burdens of economic life for the common good.5 A permit condition that demands property poses a different risk again. The government holds a discretionary benefit the applicant wants and can use that leverage to extract what it would otherwise have to buy. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission therefore requires an essential nexus, and Dolan v. City of Tigard adds rough proportionality.6
Classification looks to what the government did, and the label on the measure does not control the answer. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid involved a regulation, and Horne v. Department of Agriculture involved a marketing program, yet the Court treated each as a physical taking. The first authorized entry onto private property; the second required growers to hand over part of their crop. The steps below turn that substance-first approach into a sequence that runs on any fact pattern, one government act at a time.
The order of the steps follows how much each test leaves open to argument. The physical rule comes first because the facts that would matter later, such as the size of the intrusion, its duration, and the weight of the public purpose, bear only on the amount owed and never on whether compensation is owed. The permit-demand question comes before the total-loss question because an exaction raises the leverage problem whatever the demand does to the value of the rest of the land, and the government's discretion over the permit is what the closer scrutiny polices.11 Balancing comes last because it governs only the claims that fit none of the narrow categories, so an answer that opens by weighing the three factors has skipped the questions that could end the analysis sooner.12 That placement also explains why owners' lawyers work to fit their facts into the physical or total-loss categories: governments rarely lose when the court weighs the factors.13
A single variable often moves a claim from one test to another, and the first is permanence. In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the agency barred virtually all development on much of the Lake Tahoe basin for 32 months while it devised a regional plan. The Court held that the moratoria were not per se takings, because a permanent deprivation of all use takes the parcel as a whole, while a temporary restriction that diminishes value does not, since the property recovers its value when the prohibition is lifted.14 The statute in Lucas barred any permanent habitable structure on two beachfront lots, and the trial court found the lots valueless, so that owner reached the categorical rule.15 Neither owner could build while the restriction lasted, so the loss of use during the restriction did not separate the cases. Permanence did, and the temporary claim moved on to the fourth step, where the length of the freeze, the government's good faith, the owners' expectations, and the effect on value are weighed together.
The second variable is whether strangers gained a right to enter or something changed hands. In Cedar Point the regulation gave union organizers recurring but intermittent access to agricultural employers' property, and the Court held that appropriating that right to invade was a per se physical taking despite the intermittent schedule. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the landmark restrictions on Grand Central Terminal admitted no one and transferred nothing, and the Court upheld them after weighing the factors.16 The track depended on what the government took or authorized, not on how much the owner lost: the Cedar Point owners won on the right to enter, while the Penn Central claim was weighed and failed.
Two refinements keep a student from leaving the exactions track too early. The test applies when the government denies the permit because the applicant refuses the demand, as well as when it approves the permit on condition, and it applies to a demand for money linked to a specific parcel as well as to a demand for land.17 An exaction is also not itself a per se taking, because the owner sought the permit voluntarily. The Court nonetheless requires a clear justification, meaning a close connection to the problems the project creates and a showing by the government that the demand is roughly proportional in nature and extent to the projected impact.18 A single episode can raise more than one question, as when a permit is approved subject to both a height limit and a demand for an easement. Classify each government act separately: the height limit goes to the balancing, and the easement goes to the exactions test.
Two qualifications attach to the third step. The loss is measured against the parcel as a whole, so an owner cannot manufacture a total loss by pointing to the restricted slice. When an owner holds several lots, Murr v. Wisconsin directs courts to consider how state and local law treat the land, its physical characteristics, and the prospective value of the regulated land.19 And even a permanent total deprivation requires compensation only if the state cannot show that background principles of its property and nuisance law already barred the intended use. If it can, the regulation takes nothing the owner held.20 A loss that falls short of total, however steep, returns the claim to the fourth step, where a taking can still be found on the complex of factors.21