Concept
The Substantial Reason Test
Privileges and Immunities Clauses
The Substantial Reason Test
The text of Article IV, § 2 admits no exceptions: the citizens of each state are “entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”1 The Court nonetheless does not treat every distinction between a state’s own citizens and outsiders as forbidden. A challenge under the clause runs in two steps. The first asks whether the state has discriminated against out-of-staters with regard to privileges and immunities that it accords its own citizens; the second asks whether a sufficient justification supports the discrimination. The clause is not absolute, but it creates a strong presumption against state and local laws that discriminate against out-of-staters with regard to fundamental rights or important economic activities.2 A law that discriminates with respect to such a right is therefore not automatically invalid. Its defender gets a chance to show that “there is a ‘substantial reason’ for the difference in treatment.”3
The justification stage exists because residence sometimes legitimately matters. Suffrage, for example, is tied to an individual’s identification with a particular state, and no one would suggest that the clause requires a state to open its polls to a person who declines to claim that state as the only one where he may vote; the same is true of qualification for elective office.4 Some distinctions between residents and nonresidents merely reflect that the Nation is composed of individual States, and they are permitted. Others are prohibited because they hinder the formation, the purpose, or the development of a single Union, and only privileges and immunities bearing on the vitality of the Nation as a single entity require equal treatment.5 The substantial reason test is how a court sorts the permitted distinctions from the prohibited ones once a state defends a law that burdens a protected interest. The scrutiny reflects how deeply personal mobility runs through the constitutional scheme, since the Court has drawn on several provisions, not only the commerce clause, to protect the free movement of persons within the national common market.6
Two simpler rules would each fail. A rule that condemned every discrimination in a protected field would stop a state from answering a real local problem merely because outsiders contribute to it. A rule that accepted any stated goal would drain the clause of force, because a legislature that wants to favor local competitors can always attach a respectable purpose to the favoritism. The Court’s answer is to demand a reason that explains why outsiders are treated differently, beyond the bare fact that they live elsewhere, and a close fit between that reason and the discrimination the state chose.
How hard the state must work depends on what it is doing. When it regulates private activity, the general test applies, and the next subsection teaches it. When the discrimination concerns goods or resources that belong to the state, the clause applies with relaxed strength and the preference is likely to be upheld, which the following subsection develops.7
The General Test
The constitutional text lists no exceptions,8 yet Toomer v. Witsell supplied the working formula for answering it. One of the privileges the clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality with State B’s citizens. But the clause, like many constitutional provisions, is not absolute. It bars discrimination against citizens of other states where there is “no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States,” and it does not preclude different treatment where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it.9 The inquiry in each case asks whether such reasons exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them.10
The state carries the burden on that inquiry: its defense must be made out, and it must be made through a factual record.11 The defense has two parts, and the state must satisfy both.
- A substantial reason for the difference in treatment, which means the state must prove that nonresidents in fact pose the unique evils attributed to them.12
- A close relation between the degree of discrimination and that reason, which invites the question whether a less restrictive means would serve the state’s goal.13
The prongs test different things. The first tests the state’s diagnosis of the problem, and the second tests its choice of cure. A state that wants to favor local competitors can nearly always point to a genuine problem, such as a depleted fishery, costly enforcement, or local unemployment, and propose to solve it by burdening outsiders. If residents contribute to the problem as much as outsiders do, the problem cannot explain why only outsiders bear the cost, and residence is the real reason for the line. The second prong guards the other flank. Even when outsiders do cause a distinct problem, a measure that reaches far beyond it protects locals under cover of solving it.
Toomer shows both prongs at work. South Carolina required a license fee of $25 for each shrimp boat owned by a resident and $2,500 for each boat owned by a nonresident, a hundredfold difference, in a setting where the states’ regulations aimed at nonresident fishing had provoked retaliation until the fishery was “effectively partitioned at the state lines.”14 The record did not support the difference. Nothing indicated that nonresidents used larger boats or different fishing methods than residents, that the cost of enforcing the laws against them was appreciably greater, or that any substantial amount of the state’s general funds was devoted to shrimp conservation.15 The larger-boats rationale shows why proof matters. If residents sometimes use large boats too, the rationale gives no valid reason for treating noncitizens differently. The state would then have to prove instead that noncitizens are actually more likely to ignore its fishing regulations, or that demonstrable extra costs attach to enforcing those regulations against them.16
The Court rested on the second prong as well. Even assuming the state’s factual claims were true, they would not necessarily support a remedy so drastic as to be a near equivalent of total exclusion, and the Court said it would be closing its eyes to reality to find a reasonable relationship between the danger represented by noncitizens as a class and the severe discrimination practiced on them.17 A hypothetical makes the fit requirement concrete. Suppose a state proves that policing nonresident boats costs it extra. A differential sized to that proven cost bears a close relation to the reason offered. A nonresident fee a hundred times the resident fee does not, on the same proof, and it looks like the near-exclusion Toomer refused to sustain even on assumed facts.
United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden shows the same demand for proof in a different setting. The Court concluded that Camden’s ordinance discriminated against a protected privilege, but that conclusion did not end the inquiry, because discrimination is not precluded where a substantial reason exists, and the city contended that its ordinance was necessary to counteract grave economic and social ills.18 The Court could not evaluate that justification on the record before it. No trial had been held, no findings of fact had been made, and the case had come up after brief administrative proceedings that ended with the State Treasurer’s approval of the ordinance.19 It remanded, saying that the state must demonstrate a “substantial reason” through a factual record made in the trial courts, while the Court keeps in mind the clause’s purpose of insuring harmony among the residents of the various states and the vitality of the Nation as a single Union.20 The standard of review on remand was left unclear.21 A city’s description of grave problems is therefore a claim to be proved, and the seriousness of the problem does not tell a court whether nonresidents are its source.
A justification must also square with the clause’s purpose. In Austin v. New Hampshire the Court rejected an argument that had initial appeal because it could not be squared with the underlying policy of comity to which the clause commits the Court.22 For the justification stage, the lesson is that plausibility is not enough: a reason has to survive the test of comity as well as the test of logic.
How demanding is the review? Descriptions vary. The clause creates a strong presumption against discrimination, the standard is fairly strict, and the tests in Camden and Piper are described as intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.23 What the descriptions share is a contrast with the dormant Commerce Clause. A statute survives Article IV analysis if the state shows a “substantial” interest that is “reasonably,” “substantially,” or “closely” related to the discriminatory means.24 Under the dormant Commerce Clause, by contrast, discrimination against interstate commerce in favor of local business is per se invalid unless the state shows, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local interest.25 The substantial reason test is therefore arguably less exacting than dormant Commerce Clause review, though still a demanding standard.26 The Court has used it to invalidate state laws limiting bar admission to bona fide residents, in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman and Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper.27
The less-restrictive-means inquiry has its critics. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Piper, argued that the practice of law differs fundamentally from occupations practiced across state lines without significant variation. He stressed the state’s interest in maximizing the number of resident lawyers to improve the pool from which its lawmakers are drawn, and he warned that less-restrictive-means analysis, carried too far, would strike down almost any statute because a court could think of another, less restrictive way to write it. He considered a tool borrowed from First Amendment jurisprudence out of place under Article IV.28 The majority’s approach controls, so a complete answer on the second prong asks whether a less discriminatory alternative was available.
The review still leaves room for deference. The inquiry must be conducted with due regard for the principle that states should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures.29 That leeway covers which problem a state chooses to address and how it designs the remedy. It ends where the state cannot prove that outsiders cause the problem, or where it has chosen a near-exclusion when a measure sized to the problem would have served.
The substantial reason test belongs to Article IV and applies to discrimination based on state citizenship or residence. A preference built on a different classification is tested elsewhere. A contract set-aside for minority- and women-owned businesses, for example, is reviewed under equal protection, and a minority preference in bidding is unconstitutional there unless there is sufficient evidence of past intentional discrimination.30 The section on alternative constitutional challenges takes up that analysis.
State-Owned Resources
Article IV, § 2 contains no carve-out for a state acting as the owner of what it hands out,32 but the Court has treated the owner differently from the regulator. Where a state discriminates against citizens of other states with respect to goods or resources that belong to the state, the clause applies with relaxed strength, and the discrimination is likely to be upheld.33 Ownership does not take the statute outside the clause. In Hicklin v. Orbeck the Court said that, “rather than placing a statute completely beyond the [Privileges and Immunities] Clause, a state’s ownership of the property with which the statute is concerned is a factor—although often the crucial factor—to be considered in evaluating whether the statute’s discrimination against non-citizens violates the Clause.”34
Each half of that rule has its reason. Ownership counts because a state has a vital interest, important to its people, in preserving and regulating the exploitation of an important resource.35 Ownership is not an exemption because the clause protects interstate harmony. The shrimp fishery in Toomer shows how the cycle runs: state rules aimed at nonresident fishing provoked retaliation until the fishery was effectively partitioned at the state lines.36 The dormant Commerce Clause asks a different question, namely whether state regulation conflicts with federal regulatory authority. The Privileges and Immunities Clause seeks to preserve interstate harmony, a concern that “cuts across the market regulator-market participant distinction that is crucial under the Commerce Clause.”37
That difference explains why a market-participant defense works under one clause and not the other. When a state acts as a market participant, the dormant Commerce Clause is wholly inapplicable, but the Privileges and Immunities Clause continues to play a role, albeit a diminished one.38 The market-participant doctrine is an interpretation of Commerce Clause law, and the Court has declined to recognize any market-participant exception under Article IV.39 Two cases a year apart illustrate the split. In White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc. a city law requiring that 50 percent of those hired for city construction projects be city residents survived the dormant Commerce Clause because of the market-participant exception.40 A year later in Camden, an ordinance requiring that at least 40 percent of the employees of contractors and subcontractors on city construction projects be Camden residents got a different reception. The Court found potential merit in the challenge, rejected the claim of market-participant exemption, and remanded.41 Article IV reaches such an ordinance because it is an effort to bias private employment decisions by pressuring or requiring city contractors to favor resident employees on projects funded in whole or in part by the city or state.42 The state-owned cement plant that sells only to in-state residents, as in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, escapes the dormant Commerce Clause. Article IV still applies to such discrimination by a state acting as a market participant, however, when it concerns a protected privilege like employment by the state or “earning a livelihood.”43
The oldest form of the ownership argument claimed that a state owns the wildlife within its borders. McCready v. Virginia upheld a Virginia law prohibiting all non-Virginia citizens from planting oysters in the tidal waters of a Virginia river, reasoning that the right of Virginians in Virginia waters was a property right similar to planting corn on state-owned land.44 In Toomer the Court noted two important differences between that case and the one before it.45 It also observed that the whole ownership theory is now generally regarded as “but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource.”46 The interest the shorthand expresses is real, yet the Court saw no necessary conflict between it and the command that a state exercise that power, like its other powers, so as not to discriminate without reason against citizens of other states.47 Later decisions in related settings, including Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc. and Hughes v. Oklahoma, are generally read as continuing that refusal to let the ownership fiction justify discrimination against out-of-staters.
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Toomer, read Article IV differently. In his view the clause “does not touch the right of a State to conserve or utilize its resources on behalf of its own citizens, provided it uses these resources within the State and does not attempt a control of the resources as part of a regulation of commerce between the States.”48 The modern formulation follows the majority instead, weighing ownership as a factor, often the crucial one, rather than treating it as the boundary of the clause.49
Breadth decides cases in this area, and the two leading decisions sit at opposite ends of it. The clause allows state and local governments to favor their own citizens over out-of-staters in these settings as long as the breadth of the discrimination is not excessive, and no bright line marks the point where a state crosses into violation. An important consideration is the extent to which the state has tried to impose discriminatory conditions on private transactions in which it is not directly involved: the broader the scope of such discrimination, the greater the chance of a violation.50 Alaska’s resident preference law, Alaska Hire, was so far-reaching that the Court said its breadth “goes far beyond the degree of resident bias Alaska’s ownership of the oil and gas can justifiably support,” and the clause and the substantial reason test applied at full strength.51 Camden’s preference was limited to the contractors and subcontractors who worked directly on city-funded public works projects, and the Court intimated that a preference of that scope did not violate the clause.52 What separates the cases is how far each preference traveled from the state’s own dealings.
Even a narrow preference still receives review. In Camden the Court remanded rather than assess the city’s justification on a record with no trial and no findings, and it required the city to demonstrate a substantial reason through a factual record.53 Relaxed review therefore relaxes the substantial reason test without removing it.