Concept
The Basic Rule
Unconstitutional Conditions
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
The Basic Rule
A government may not condition a benefit on the recipient’s surrender of a constitutional right, especially a First Amendment right.1 A television station that receives public funds, for example, cannot be forced to refrain from endorsing political candidates.2
That principle displaced an older view, epitomized by Justice Holmes’s remark that a policeman “may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”3 The modern cases have long since rejected the dictum. Because constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or “chilling,” effect of governmental efforts that fall short of a direct prohibition, the government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech,” even if he has no entitlement to that benefit, citing Perry v. Sindermann.4 The Court has also held that government workers are protected from dismissal for refusing to take an oath regarding their political affiliation.5
The paradigm case is Sherbert v. Verner. South Carolina denied unemployment compensation to an otherwise eligible Seventh-Day Adventist because she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath of her faith.6 The state did not forbid her to observe the Sabbath. It withheld a payment, so the burden on her religion was indirect. The Court rejected the formalistic distinction between direct and indirect burdens and called the indirectness “only the beginning not the end” of the analysis.7 What came next was demanding: the government had to demonstrate a “compelling state interest” and that “no alternative forms of regulation” would suffice. Granting South Carolina an interest in avoiding fraudulent claims by people feigning a religious objection to Saturday work, the Court still found no showing that alternative forms of regulation were unavailable to combat such abuse. We now call that exacting analysis strict scrutiny.8
The benefit need not be something the government owed. Speiser v. Randall struck down a condition that limited a tax exemption to members of the exempted class who affirmed their loyalty to the state government granting it.9 The state was under no obligation to afford the exemption, yet a condition on even a gratuitous benefit inevitably deters or discourages the exercise of First Amendment rights and so threatens to “produce a result which the State could not command directly.”10 That phrase carries the doctrine’s logic. The test looks to what the condition threatens to accomplish, and if the result is one the state could not command, its freedom to withhold the benefit altogether does not save the condition. Calling the benefit a “privilege” therefore settles nothing. The word has other meanings in law (an excise tax, for example, is a tax imposed on an activity or the exercise of a privilege),11 but here it records only that the government could have withheld the benefit entirely, and Speiser shows that the power to withhold is not a power to condition on the surrender of a right.
Two questions mark the doctrine’s reach: did the person exercise a constitutional right, and did the government deny or condition the benefit because of that exercise? Courts state the principle in nearly those words, citing Perry: the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right.12 Consider two claimants who each refuse suitable work and apply for unemployment benefits. One refuses Saturday work because her faith forbids it. The other refuses for a personal reason unconnected to conscience or religion. Sherbert noted that unavailability for work for such personal reasons has been held a basis of disqualification. The claimant’s argument was that the Free Exercise Clause bars the state from treating the “personal reason” she gives, a matter of religious conscience, like those. The Court declined to conclude that every “personal reason” supports disqualification where the consequence so directly affects First Amendment rights, absent explicit language to that effect in the statute or state decisions.13 The second claimant’s refusal implicates no constitutional right, and no unconstitutional conditions question arises.
Even where a right is in play, unequal treatment does not automatically demand a special justification. In McRae, the Court acknowledged that a government program distributed public benefits unequally based solely on how a woman exercised her basic constitutional right of procreative choice. It nonetheless concluded that the federal Constitution required no special justification for that treatment so long as the program placed no new obstacles in the path of the woman seeking to exercise her right.14 A court applying McRae accordingly rejected the argument that the case before it fit the Speiser-Perry model. Later sections follow the doctrine into settings where the required justification varies, from funding conditions to land-use permits (see Koontz) and benefits tied to fundamental rights (see Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County).