Concept
Public Employment and Contracting
Unconstitutional Conditions
Public Employment and Contracting
The funding cases asked what a condition does to a recipient who stands at some distance from the government. This section asks the same question about people who work for the government or sell to it, and the answer shifts with the closeness of the relationship. Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr maps the range by describing the Court’s unconstitutional conditions precedents as a spectrum. At one end sit government employees, whose close relationship with the government requires a balancing of important free speech and government interests. At the other end sit claimants for tax exemptions, as in Speiser v. Randall, users of public facilities, and recipients of small subsidies, as in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California. These claimants depend much less on the government and resemble ordinary citizens whose views on public matters the government has no legitimate interest in repressing.1
Placement on the spectrum fixes how much weight the government’s own interests carry. A taxpayer seeking an exemption deals with the government at arm’s length, so the government has little stake in what that person believes. An employee is part of the machinery through which the government does its work, so the government has a legitimate interest, as employer, in how that machinery runs, and that interest turns the analysis into a balance and not a flat bar. Two lines of authority follow. When the government acts because of party affiliation, the cases running from Elrod v. Burns through Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois ask whether affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the job. When it acts because of speech, the Court applies the balancing test from Pickering v. Board of Education.2 The affiliation cases belong to the larger subject of government patronage, which treatments of political-party regulation take up as an issue implicating the parties’ dual public and private nature.3
Distance also bears on whether a condition coerces anyone at all. One critic of the Court’s funding decisions objected that a condition attached to federal money, in the circumstances of that case, is “no compulsion at all” but “the reasonable price of admission.”4 Whatever force that objection has against a grantee, it has less against a person who loses a job or a contract for refusing political support, and the cases below treat that loss as a penalty. The section on coercion and voluntary exchange returns to the disagreement.
The first subsection takes up employees and job applicants, where affiliation claims and speech claims follow different tests. The second turns to independent contractors, where the Court found it far from clear that the government’s interests weigh more heavily than they do for employees. In any stem about a government job or contract, first locate the claimant on the spectrum, then ask why the government acted. The reason selects the test.
Employees and Job Applicants
The patronage cases apply a principle older than any of them. In Speiser the Court struck down a condition that limited a tax exemption to members of the exempted class who affirmed their loyalty to the state granting it. The State had no obligation to offer the exemption, yet attaching such a condition even to a gratuitous benefit inevitably deterred or discouraged First Amendment expression and threatened to “produce a result which the State could not command directly.”5
By the time of Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, the Court could state the rule for public jobs in general terms. Patronage practices that penalize the exercise of First Amendment rights are invalid unless narrowly tailored to further vital government interests, a standard drawn from Elrod v. Burns and Branti v. Finkel.6 That demanding standard explains why the exception is narrow. The two opinions supporting the Elrod judgment recognized that party affiliation may sometimes be an acceptable basis for dismissing a public employee, and Branti reformulated the standard: “the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label ‘policymaker’ or ‘confidential’ fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.”7
The functional wording matters. A label can attach to almost any job, so a test that asked only about the label would let the government shield its patronage by retitling positions. Asking what the position requires puts the burden on the hiring authority and directs attention to the duties of the post. In O’Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, the Court described Elrod and Branti as cases in which the raw test of political affiliation sufficed, with no inquiry more detailed than whether the requirement was appropriate for the employment in question. That confinement has an advantage: a person’s beliefs and allegiances ought not to be subject to probing or testing by the government.8
Rutan tested the rule on decisions short of dismissal: promotion, transfer, recall after layoff, and hiring. Respondents argued that employees have no entitlement to those benefits. The Court answered with a point from Perry v. Sindermann: the absence of any legal right to a benefit is immaterial when the government withholds it on a basis that infringes protected interests. Respondents also argued that such decisions are not punitive and chill nothing, and the Court looked to working life for the reply. Employees stuck in dead-end positions because of their political backgrounds feel obliged to support their superiors’ politics in order to advance. Employees denied a transfer to a reasonable commute feel daily pressure to join and work for the party. Laid-off employees feel compelled to do whatever political work will restore their paychecks.9 These are “significant penalties” imposed for the exercise of First Amendment rights, and unless the practices are narrowly tailored to further vital government interests, they impermissibly encroach on those rights.10
The same reasoning governs hiring. The Court held that conditioning hiring on political belief and association plainly imposes an unconstitutional condition unless the government has a vital interest in doing so, and it found no such interest for the reasons that defeated patronage promotions, transfers, and recalls.11 The lower court had asked whether a refusal to hire is the substantial equivalent of a dismissal. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether going unhired is less burdensome than being fired, because the patronage question is whether the government, without sufficient justification, is pressuring people to give up the free exercise of their First Amendment rights.12 A rule that scaled protection to the severity of the penalty would let the government move its pressure to whichever step the rule left uncovered. An applicant who knows that jobs go to party supporters has the same incentive to profess support as a sitting employee.
Speech claims follow a different but related path. When a government employer acts against an employee or service provider on account of speech, courts apply the balancing test from Pickering v. Board of Education and do not ask the affiliation question.13 The test weighs the employee’s interest as a citizen in commenting on matters of public concern against the state’s interest as employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.14
The balance has threshold steps and a defense around it. The employee must prove that the conduct was constitutionally protected and that it was a substantial or motivating factor in the termination. The government can then escape liability by showing it would have taken the same action without the protected conduct, and even a termination because of protected speech may be justified when legitimate countervailing government interests are strong enough.15 The scale also tilts toward the government. Its interest in achieving its goals efficiently rises from relatively subordinate when it acts as sovereign to significant when it acts as employer, so the Court gives greater deference to the government’s predictions of harm from employee speech than to predictions of harm from the speech of the public at large.16 The two tests differ because speech varies in content and in how much it disrupts a workplace, which calls for weighing in each case, while party affiliation is a single fact whose fit with a job can be assessed directly. The tests meet when the facts do. Where specific instances of speech are intermixed with an affiliation requirement, the balancing that Pickering mandates becomes inevitable.17
The steps screen out the errors that exam stems invite most often. A stem that stresses at-will status or a missing contract right answers nothing, since the doctrine reaches benefits the person has no entitlement to hold. A stem that describes a refusal to hire or a denied transfer instead of a firing describes the same constitutional problem. A stem that mixes a letter to a newspaper into a patronage dispute calls for the balance, because the speech is no longer a bare question of affiliation.
Independent Contractors
Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr presented a question the Court had never decided: whether and to what extent the First Amendment limits a government’s freedom to end its relationship with an independent contractor because of the contractor’s speech. The Court turned to the employee cases, because the two relationships resemble each other on the points that matter. A government needs freedom to end either relationship for poor performance, to improve the efficiency, efficacy, and responsiveness of service to the public, and to prevent the appearance of corruption. Unless a contract, statute, or constitutional provision restricts it, the government is free to end either relationship without giving a reason.20
Both relationships also deliver a financial benefit, and the threat of losing it can chill speech. A hauler or towing operator who depends on county work weighs each public remark against the chance of losing the next contract. That is the pressure the employee cases identified, and it explains where the Court placed contractors on the spectrum. Independent contractors appear to lie between government employees and the Court’s other unconstitutional conditions precedents, and it is far from clear that the balance of interests favors the government more in contractor cases than in employee cases.21 The Court rejected the dissent’s fear of excessive litigation as a ground for a special exception. It also rejected the dissent’s claim of a long and unbroken tradition of patronage contracting, because tradition does not legitimize patronage contracting.22
On the speech track, the contractor’s claim runs through the balance familiar from the employee cases. In O’Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, a companion to Umbehr, the Court said that a different, though related, inquiry applies where a government employer takes adverse action on account of an employee or service provider’s right of free speech, and that the Pickering balancing test governs there.23 On the government’s side of the scale sit the interests Umbehr identified: ending poor performance, improving efficient and responsive service, and avoiding the appearance of corruption.24 Those same interests mark the doctrine’s limits. It polices the government’s reasons for ending a contract and creates no duty to renew one, so the government remains free to drop a contractor who is not performing.
The affiliation track appears in O’Hare itself. The Court began from the employee baseline. Had Gratzianna been a public employee whose job was to operate tow trucks, the city could not have discharged him for refusing to contribute to Paxson’s campaign or for supporting his opponent, because Branti treated it as settled that firing an employee as a penalty for refusing a request for political and financial support imposes an unconstitutional condition on government employment.25 The respondents argued that an independent contractor’s First Amendment rights, unlike an employee’s, must yield to the government’s interest in sustaining a patronage system. The Court could not accept that people who perform the government’s work outside the formal employment relationship are subject to so direct and specific an abridgment of those rights. The respondents offered no justification beyond their claimed right to condition a continuing relationship on political fealty, and the Court held that the complaint stated an actionable First Amendment claim.26
The Court added two observations. If Paxson or his backers had solicited the contribution as a quid pro quo for not terminating O’Hare’s arrangement with the city, they might have violated criminal bribery statutes. Steering clear of criminal liability does little to diminish the attempted coercion of political association enforced by a tangible punishment, and the government may not coerce support in this manner unless it has some justification beyond dislike of the individual’s political association.27 The Court also marked what the complaint did not describe. O’Hare was not part of a constituency that must take its chance of being favored or ignored in the larger political process, as when a business resides or operates in a region the government rewards or spurns in building public works. Gratzianna was instead targeted with a specific demand for political support.28 A stem in which an official asks one contractor for money or votes and punishes the refusal fits the coercion the Court condemned. A stem in which a county merely steers work toward its allies describes the constituency situation the opinion distinguishes.
The government’s broader claim is that an independent contractor is simply not an employee. The Court saw no reason why the constitutional claim should turn on that distinction, which is, in the main, a creature of the common law of agency and torts. It added that recognizing the distinction would invite manipulation, since the government could avoid constitutional liability by attaching different labels to particular jobs.29 A county that wanted to reward loyalty could move its tow operators off the payroll and onto service agreements, and if the label controlled, paperwork would satisfy the First Amendment. The interference is the same whether or not the victim is classified as an employee. Lefkowitz v. Turley points the same way: contractor status did not allow the government to demand a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege, because there is no difference of constitutional magnitude between the threat of job loss to an employee and the threat of lost contracts to a contractor.30
Umbehr and O’Hare together give a contractor two possible routes, and the government’s reason for acting selects between them. When the government acts because of the contractor’s speech, the Pickering balance governs. When it acts because of political affiliation, the Elrod and Branti inquiry applies, which asks whether the requirement is appropriate to the work and not whether a label such as policymaker fits.31 O’Hare kept the affiliation inquiry narrow because beliefs and allegiances ought not to be probed or tested by the government, while acknowledging that the question is whether the requirement is a reasonable one, so some case-by-case adjudication is inevitable. That process lets courts weigh the discretion the government needs in awarding contracts across the range of public works and the delivery of services.32 The Court decided O’Hare on the affiliation terms the court of appeals had used, though it disagreed with that court’s conclusion that an outside contractor has no constitutional protection.33
An exam stem about a hauler, a towing operator, or a consultant who lost government work invites two mistakes. One is to treat the words independent contractor as the end of the analysis, which the label cannot be. The other is to apply the employee test without first asking why the government acted. The sequence that works begins with the reason: speech triggers the balance, a demand for political support or a punishment for refusing it triggers the affiliation inquiry, and a termination for poor performance, or for no reason where no contract, statute, or constitutional provision restricts it, triggers neither.