Concept
Benefits and Fundamental Rights
Unconstitutional Conditions
Benefits and Fundamental Rights
The doctrine bites hardest when a state ties a benefit to the exercise of a right the Court already protects, as in the right-to-travel cases. In Shapiro v. Thompson the Court held that a state may not condition welfare benefits on one year's residence, and Zobel v. Williams carried the same reasoning to Alaska's dividend program, whose residency requirement penalized the plaintiffs for exercising the right to travel.1 A family weighing a move across state lines feels that penalty at once, because the move costs it a year of assistance. The mechanism is the one that decided Sherbert earlier in this chapter: a waiting period works like a fine on migration.
Outside such cases the Court has been slower to find a penalty. It has hesitated to hold that withholding subsistence benefits impinges on a fundamental liberty, and that hesitation gives the government room to use its control over welfare and medical care to buy up rights by conditioning benefits on their surrender. Where the Court finds no impingement, it reviews the denial under the rational basis standard and often upholds it.2 Recent decisions suggest the Court may be taking a more hospitable view of the doctrine, and the land-use and funding sections above reflect that shift, but the benefit-and-liberty cases below remain at its narrow end.3
The Court asks one question before it chooses a standard of review: does the government penalize the exercise of a right, or does it merely decline to subsidize it? Strict scrutiny follows only if the denial of a benefit impinges on the right, so a court that calls a denial a mere refusal to pay never reaches the compelling-interest inquiry. The funding cases drew the same line. The two subsections below test it against medical care for the poor and against welfare payments conditioned on a home visit.
Selective Funding and Abortion
Harris v. McRae tests that line where the benefit is publicly funded medical care and the right is a woman's liberty to end a pregnancy. The federal Medicaid program, through the Hyde Amendment, paid for medically necessary care generally but excluded abortion, even where the abortion was medically necessary.4 The five-justice majority acknowledged that the program treated recipients unequally solely according to how a woman exercised her procreative choice. It held nonetheless that the Constitution demanded no special justification so long as the program placed no new obstacle in her path.5 Strict scrutiny, which demands a compelling government interest, therefore did not apply. The Court upheld the eligibility rule under rational basis review, which asks only whether a rule is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.6
The majority's reasoning rests on a baseline, the starting point against which a burden is measured. In the majority's words, as a dissent quotes them, the constraints on an indigent woman's choice "are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency."7 Measured from that baseline, a poor woman who cannot pay for an abortion stands where she would stand if the government funded no medical care at all. The government has left her choice as hard as it found it and has only declined to make it easier. The majority put the point as a distinction between a limitation on governmental power and an affirmative funding obligation,8 and that distinction settles the standard of review. A selective denial may push an indigent woman toward childbirth, the Court said, yet it neither infringes nor penalizes her exercise of the liberty.9
The dissenters read the same program from the other end. One dissent agreed that indigency constrains the woman but called that observation "only half the picture." What interferes with her choice, it said, is "the combination of her own poverty and the Government's unequal subsidization of abortion and childbirth."10 By paying every expense of childbirth and none of the expenses of ending a pregnancy, the government "literally makes an offer that the indigent woman cannot afford to refuse," and the dissent saw no difference between a carrot and a stick.11 Many poor women will carry a pregnancy to term only because the government pays for that course, even though they would have chosen abortion had the government paid for neither procedure or stayed out of the picture altogether.12
A second dissent put the program beside the benefit cases of this chapter. As in Sherbert, it said, the government withholds financial benefits in a way that discourages the exercise of a due process liberty, because the woman who asserts her right to an abortion can do so only by sacrificing health-care benefits she would otherwise receive. The dissent could find no way to distinguish Medicaid from the other schemes that unconstitutionally burdened fundamental rights.13
A third dissent argued in equal protection terms and used Maher v. Roe as its foil. Medicaid in Maher covered only medically necessary procedures, so those plaintiffs sought a benefit unavailable to others similarly situated. The McRae plaintiffs, in this dissent's account, were excluded from a benefit available to everyone else similarly situated, because the program funds essentially all necessary medical treatment for the poor and omits only the treatment that involves a fundamental right.14 They lost a benefit for which they were otherwise eligible solely because they sought to exercise a constitutional right, and the purpose of the rule was to discourage that exercise. For that reason the dissent concluded that the Hyde Amendment failed even rational basis review.15
The two sides disagree about how to describe the benefit, and each description carries its own standard of review. The majority treats the program as paying for a defined set of services with abortion left off the list, which makes the Hyde Amendment a refusal to subsidize. The dissenters treat it as comprehensive care from which the government has subtracted one treatment because it involves a protected choice, which makes the Hyde Amendment a penalty.
The California Supreme Court refused to follow the federal analysis when it reviewed a comparable restriction on its own Medi-Cal program in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers. California cases, it said, demand special scrutiny of a discriminatory benefit program whether or not the program erects a new obstacle to the exercise of a constitutional right.16 The record in that case showed what the exclusion meant in practice. One declaration described a woman with multiple sclerosis whose physician warned that a full-term pregnancy would seriously endanger her health. The 1978 restrictions prevented her from obtaining a Medi-Cal-funded abortion, and after the birth she suffered a severe relapse that left her nearly totally paralyzed.17
The McRae majority also marked where its own reasoning stops. In a footnote it observed that "[a] substantial constitutional question would arise if Congress had attempted to withhold all Medicaid benefits from an otherwise eligible candidate simply because that candidate had exercised her constitutionally protected freedom to terminate her pregnancy by abortion."18 The caveat shows what the selective-funding holding depends on. The Hyde Amendment defines what the program will pay for, and a recipient who obtains an abortion with her own money keeps everything else the program provides. A forfeiture of unrelated benefits because the recipient exercised the right is the situation of Sherbert, where the claimant lost her unemployment payments because of how she exercised a protected liberty. It also falls on the far side of the funding cases' distinction between defining a program and reaching past it to burden what the recipient does elsewhere.
An exam fact pattern on this topic usually supplies a fundamental right, a poor claimant, and a genuine medical need, and the temptation is to treat those facts as enough for strict scrutiny. Under the majority's approach none of them is enough, because the controlling question is whether the government penalized the exercise of the right or only declined to pay for it. A fact pattern that stops at a program paying for childbirth and excluding medically necessary abortions calls for rational basis review and points toward upholding the exclusion, with the dissenters' offer-that-cannot-be-refused argument as the contrary view. A fact pattern in which the recipient forfeits unrelated benefits calls for the Sherbert analysis instead. State constitutions can add another layer, because the California court in Myers applied its own stricter test, which a later section of this chapter takes up.19
Welfare Benefits and Home Visits
Wyman v. James produced a result less protective than the doctrine's general statement would predict. Barbara James, a welfare recipient, objected to a caseworker's entry into her home, and her objection cost her the benefits. As Justice Douglas put it in dissent, but for the assertion of her constitutional right she would have received the benefit.21 The California Supreme Court later described the holding: the Supreme Court gave an intrusion on the rights of welfare recipients a lesser degree of scrutiny than California applies, and it upheld the government policy.22 California had gone the other way in Parrish v. Civil Service Commission, which tested a practice of conditioning welfare benefits on a waiver of the privacy right in the home under the Bagley standard and held the practice unconstitutional because the government could not satisfy that standard.23 The reasoning that follows comes from the dissents. It is the doctrine-based critique of the result and not the majority's rationale.
The dissents treat the case as an ordinary application of the decisions this chapter began with. Justice Douglas set the home visit beside Sherbert v. Verner and Speiser v. Randall, and he quoted Sherbert for the proposition that it is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by denying a benefit or placing conditions on it.24 On that view James's lack of any entitlement to welfare answered nothing. The loss of largesse, he said, merely rephrases the problem, and the real question is whether the government, by force of its largesse, may buy up rights the Constitution guarantees.25 Almost every beneficiary, rich or poor, rural or urban, has a house the Fourth Amendment protects, so a rule that receiving benefits opens the home to inspection would reach every beneficiary and not only welfare mothers.26
A second dissent replied to the Court's description of the recipient's choice. The majority had treated the choice between being searched and losing benefits as entirely hers and as raising nothing of constitutional magnitude, and the dissent answered that this merely restates the issue.27 The reply exposes a circularity. Calling the choice the recipient's presupposes that it is free, and whether a choice made under the threat of losing support is free is the very question the unconstitutional conditions cases ask. The dissent added that Sherbert did not reason that aid merely ceases and no religious freedom is abridged, and Speiser did not reason that the tax is simply increased and no one is compelled to give up speech.28 It also noted that the preceding Term had reaffirmed in Goldberg v. Kelly that the same constitutional restraints apply to withdrawing public assistance as to disqualification from unemployment compensation, denial of a tax exemption, or discharge from public employment.29
The doctrine reaches the Fourth Amendment through a rule the Court had stated long before: the right to continue exercising a privilege granted by the state cannot depend on the grantee's submission to a condition hostile to the federal Constitution.30 Douglas argued that the rule applies to the Fourth Amendment as well as the First. He conceded that the Fourth speaks of unreasonable searches while the First is written in absolute terms, but he thought the privacy the Fourth protects is perhaps as vivid in our lives as the expression the First protects.31 The textual difference does give a defender of the home visit something to say, since a search offends the Fourth Amendment only if it is unreasonable. The dissents answered with the reasons that follow.
The central reason is that consent obtained by threat is not consent. The second dissent said that surely the majority could not believe that valid Fourth Amendment consent can be given under the threat of the loss of one's sole means of support, and it found no support in the Court's decisions for using welfare benefits as a wedge to coerce waiver of Fourth Amendment rights.32 Consent excuses the absence of a warrant because the person could have refused. A person who would lose rent and food money by refusing may well agree, because the benefit is worth more than the privacy to someone with no other income, and her voluntariness is then a matter of form. The dissent concluded that had the Court squarely faced whether a state may condition welfare payments on the waiver of clear constitutional rights, the answer would be plain.33
The same dissent attacked the state interests offered for the visit. The analogy to a taxpayer who must document a deduction failed, in its account, because James had offered to be interviewed anywhere but in her home, to answer any questions, and to provide any documentation, and the agency curtly refused every offer.34 The fitting comparison was an Internal Revenue Service rule requiring a taxpayer to admit a specially trained agent to the home to question the occupants before claiming a dependency exemption, and the dissent was sure that such a proposal would draw unanimous cries of constitutional outrage.35 The claim that the visit aims to rehabilitate and aid the recipient fared no better, because the notion that constitutional rights may be violated so long as the State is helping the citizen is, in the dissent's words, "alien to our Nation's philosophy."36 The dissent also read the majority as alternating between two accounts of the state's purpose. If the purpose is benevolent, the majority said, no search is involved, and if the purpose is to prevent child abuse and misappropriated funds, the need justifies dispensing with the warrant. Considering all the purposes at once, the dissent concluded that the home visit is a search and that, without a warrant, the search is unreasonable.37
The sharpest contrast is with the Court's own administrative-search cases. In Camara v. Municipal Court and v. City of Seattle, the Court held the Fourth Amendment applicable to administrative searches of homes and of businesses, and See added that a businessman, like a resident, has a right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries.38 Douglas found not the slightest hint in See that the government could condition a business license on the licensee's consent to such searches. He called it "a strange jurisprudence" that safeguards the businessman at work and denies protection to a mother in her home.39 The comparison works as a test of the condition itself. A warrantless-entry condition that the Court's cases would not let the government attach to a license is no easier to justify when attached to welfare, since the pressure and the right at stake are the same. Douglas added Judge Skelly Wright's observation that society spends large sums policing welfare and none policing subsidies to farmers, airlines, and steamship companies, a double standard for aid to business and aid to the poor.40
The California court offered Wyman and Parrish as the first of several illustrations that, for at least a decade, federal decisions in this area have not reliably tracked California's constitutional principles.41 The forum therefore decides the analysis. A fact pattern set in federal court calls for the lesser scrutiny and for upholding the condition. One set in California calls for the Bagley standard, under which a comparable condition fell in Parrish, and a later section of this chapter takes up that standard. Either way, the dissents' arguments belong in an answer only as the doctrine-based critique, labeled as dissent, so that the answer does not credit the majority with reasoning it did not adopt.