Concept
Doctrinal Tensions
Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrinal Tensions
Each setting above comes with a test, but the general rule that opened this chapter weakens at its edges, and Justices have said so. Dissenting in Dolan v. City of Tigard, Justice Stevens wrote that the doctrine, for all its long history, “has for just as long suffered from notoriously inconsistent application; it has never been an overarching principle of constitutional law that operates with equal force regardless of the nature of the rights and powers in question.”1 A dissent in Rust v. Sullivan said that the extent to which the government may attach an otherwise unconstitutional condition to a public benefit “implicates a troubled area of our jurisprudence in which a court ought not entangle itself unnecessarily.”2
Neither passage states a holding; each is a dissent and records an argument about the doctrine. Both still matter, because they show where an examiner can build a fact pattern with a defensible answer on each side. Four tensions follow: what a burden is measured against, why results vary from setting to setting, whether a condition must be coercive to offend the doctrine, and whether land-use exactions belong in the doctrine at all.
The Baseline Problem
The hardest unconstitutional-conditions cases turn on whether a denial of a benefit is a penalty or only a refusal to pay, and the answer depends on the starting point from which the loss is measured. In Speiser v. Randall, the Court measured from the exemption itself. It wrote that “[t]o deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech,” and that “[i]ts deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to fine them for this speech.”3 The Court called the opposing argument “plainly mistaken”: that because a tax exemption is a “privilege” or “bounty,” its denial may not infringe speech.4
The two descriptions measure the loss from different places. From the benefit as granted, withholding it from a speaker costs that speaker something others keep, and the loss follows the speech. From a world without the program, the speaker has lost nothing, because nothing was owed. Speiser took the first view and rejected the second as the privilege label. Nothing in either description tells a court which view is right, and the Court’s decisions in this area “appear quite inconsistent” in applying the doctrine.5
One variable cuts across the baseline question: the Court is very sensitive to any hint of ideological bias. It upheld the use of student activity fees to fund student groups, including those taking controversial public positions, as ancillary to the university’s educational program. It nonetheless remanded to determine whether the voting procedure for allocating the funds posed a risk of discrimination in favor of majority viewpoints.6 A stem that hints the government is favoring one viewpoint over another deserves close attention for that reason alone.
A strong answer names the starting point each side assumes before it announces a result. A conclusion drawn from one baseline alone leaves the contrary argument unanswered.
Inconsistent Results Across Settings
Results vary as well as descriptions. Rust v. Sullivan upheld a federal law restricting recipients of federal funds from engaging in abortion-related activities, while Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez invalidated a restriction on legal-services recipients’ challenges to welfare laws.8 Each restriction limited what recipients of federal money could do, and the two cases came out in opposite directions. A student should ask whether a meaningful distinction separates them and whether a single principle explains both. The funding sections above supply the usual sorting: whether the condition pays for the government’s message, defines the program’s limits, or leverages the funds beyond the program.
Justice Stevens’s Dolan dissent offered one reason the doctrine’s force is uneven: it does not weigh the same against every power. He set “[t]he necessary and traditional breadth of municipalities’ power to regulate property development,” together with the absence of “fragile and easily ‘chilled’ constitutional rights such as that of free speech,” against the Court’s claim to be applying settled law. Those two features, he said, “make it quite clear that the Court is really writing on a clean slate rather than merely applying ‘well-settled’ doctrine.”9 The argument ties the doctrine’s force to what a condition threatens, and a rule built to protect rights that chill easily may not carry unchanged to a property dispute. The same footnote cites Posadas, which reasoned that “the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling.”10 That greater-includes-the-lesser logic sits uneasily with the doctrine.
The doctrine’s force has also shifted over time. At one time, any conditioning of governmental benefits on the surrender of a right would have drawn strict scrutiny. The Court later narrowed the doctrine, and discriminatory denials of benefits to those who exercised protected liberties contrary to the government’s wishes were often upheld under rational basis review.11 The Court’s reluctance to find that withholding subsistence benefits impinges on a fundamental liberty interest makes it easy for the government to “buy up” people’s constitutional rights, by conditioning benefits such as welfare and medical care on a recipient’s surrender of them.12
Recent decisions point the other way. Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Management District endorsed, in the land-use permit setting, the “overarching principle, known as the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, that vindicates the Constitution’s enumerated rights by preventing the government from coercing people into giving them up”—the very phrase Justice Stevens had said the doctrine never earned. Velazquez held that a federal law barring attorneys at federally funded legal-services programs from challenging the validity of state or federal welfare statutes violated the First Amendment as an unconstitutional condition.13 These are signs of a more hospitable Court, not a settled return to the older rule, so an answer should describe them as signs and still apply the test of the setting in the question.
Coercion and Voluntary Exchange
A third dispute asks whether the doctrine reaches only coercive offers. Dissenting in Alliance for Open Society, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority “cannot credibly say that this speech condition is coercive, so it does not.” In his words, it “pussyfoots around the lack of coercion” by invalidating the Leadership Act for “requiring recipients to profess a specific belief” and “demanding that funding recipients adopt—as their own—the Government’s view on an issue of public concern.”15 In his view the Government’s “requiring” and “demanding” “have no coercive effect.” Compelling the affirmation of a belief as a condition of federal funding “is no compulsion at all”; it is “the reasonable price of admission” to the funding program.16
The same questions recur where the government funds individuals. Grants conditioned on an individual’s agreement to restrictions on conduct that the government could not constitutionally impose by regulation raise similar questions about coercion and germaneness, meaning how closely the condition relates to the grant.17
The voluntariness theme appears in land-use disputes too. A dissent in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission reasoned that the applicants were on notice that new development would be approved only if provisions were made for lateral beach access. In requesting a new permit, the dissent said, they “could have no reasonable expectation of, and had no entitlement to,” approval without a deed restriction ensuring public access to the ocean.18 The dissent relied on Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., which reasoned that “as long as Monsanto is aware of the conditions under which the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally related to a legitimate Government interest, a voluntary submission of data by an applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a registration can hardly be called a taking.”19 Notice and a free choice to apply turn a condition into a term of a bargain, which is the intuition behind the privilege argument rejected earlier in this chapter. A dissent does not state the law, but a government defendant will make this argument.
Doubts About Exactions
The land-use cases invite a different objection: that the doctrine fits them poorly. Justice Stevens summarized the Court’s theory in Dolan this way: the city’s refusal to grant a discretionary benefit infringes her right to receive just compensation for the property interests she refused to dedicate, “where the property sought has little or no relationship to the benefit.”21 He agreed that “a government cannot deny a benefit on a basis that infringes constitutionally protected interests”—“especially [one’s] interest in freedom of speech.” He still called the application of the “unconstitutional conditions” label to “a mutually beneficial transaction between a property owner and a city” an “even more recent judicial innovation than the regulatory takings doctrine.”22
His objection was that no taking had yet occurred. Dolan “has no right to be compensated for a taking unless the city acquires the property interests that she has refused to surrender,” and “[s]ince no taking has yet occurred, there has not been any infringement of her constitutional right to compensation.”23 The objection presses on the doctrine’s central step. In a speech case the penalty on the speaker is evident, while in a permit case the owner who refuses the demand keeps the land and loses the permit, so the constitutional injury has to be identified. The Court has since applied the framework to denied permits and monetary demands, as the discussion of denials above explains, so the objection is best read as an argument against that extension.
A second doubt concerns how far Koontz carries the doctrine. The majority did not hold, though it appears to have assumed, that the off-site improvements the district proposed would have been a taking had the district imposed them directly as a regulatory requirement.24 The assumption matters because the direct-imposition predicate permits an unconstitutional conditions claim only where the government could not have commanded the thing directly. If the Court assumed that predicate without testing it, the decision may signal an attempt to expand takings doctrine.25 On another reading, the Court meant the holding as a preventive measure, to forestall even the threat of potentially unconstitutional action, which raises the question whether that is an appropriate role for the Court.26
A stem on an exaction should still be answered under Nollan and Dolan as the governing law, with nexus and rough proportionality applied in order. The doubts above belong in the answer as the opposing view when the facts push at the edges, for example where the demand’s status as a direct taking is uncertain or where the owner never accepted the condition.