Concept
Purposes of the Prohibition
Ex Post Facto Laws
Purposes of the Prohibition
The Supreme Court has tied the ex post facto prohibition to two purposes and sometimes adds a third. The prohibition serves “to assure that legislative acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.” It also “restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.” A third basis, stated less often, is that it “assures the legislature can make recourse to stigmatizing penalties of the criminal law only when its core purpose of deterrence could thereby possibly be served.”1 The third basis is easy to see in practice, because a penalty added after the conduct is complete cannot deter it.
The text binds both governments. Section 9 provides that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed, and § 10 forbids any state to pass a bill of attainder, an ex post facto law, or a law impairing the obligation of contracts.2 What the Clause bars is the retroactive application of the enactments it covers.3
Early opinions condemned retrospective penal laws in strong terms. One in Ogden v. Saunders called laws of this character “oppressive, unjust, and tyrannical,” said that civilized people universally condemn them, and located their injustice altogether in their retrospective operation. That vice, it added, applies with equal force, though not exclusively, to bills of attainder.4
The purposes also mark the prohibition's limits. They are substantially the same as those behind the void-for-vagueness doctrine, namely fair notice to the defendant and prevention of arbitrary government action, so the prohibition does not apply to changes in the law that favor the defendant.5 A retroactive statute likewise escapes the Clause when the confinement it imposes is not punishment, and a statute that operates only prospectively does not offend it at all.6 The two sections below take the first two purposes in turn.
Fair Warning
Fair warning has two halves that work at different moments. Warning matters when a person decides what to do, because the law as written should say what the act will cost. Reliance matters afterward, when the person has acted on that law and expects it to govern the consequences. A retroactive penal law defeats both. A rule that does not yet exist cannot warn anyone, and a person who relied on the law as it stood finds its consequences rewritten after the fact. The protection runs only “until explicitly changed,” so the legislature keeps its power to alter the rule for conduct that has not yet occurred.7
The same value drives the void-for-vagueness doctrine, whose aims of fair notice and prevention of arbitrary action the ex post facto prohibitions share.8 The failures differ in kind. A vague statute is on the books but does not say what it forbids, while a retroactive penal law says nothing at the time the person acts because it has not yet been enacted. In either case the defendant is punished for crossing a line that was not visible when he crossed it.
Dobbert v. Florida supplies the contrast. Dobbert made three claims under the prohibition, and one rested on his contention that no valid death penalty statute was in effect in Florida when he acted.9 Florida's earlier statute had been invalidated after Furman v. Georgia, and a new statute governed by the time he was tried. The Court called his argument sophistic and said it mocked the substance of the Clause. Whether or not the old statute would withstand constitutional attack, it clearly showed Florida's view of the severity of murder and the degree of punishment the legislature wished to impose. The statute was intended to provide maximum deterrence, and its place on the books gave fair warning of the culpability the State ascribed to murder.10 The Court also drew on an earlier decision for the point that a statute's actual existence before it is invalidated is an “operative fact” with consequences that cannot justly be ignored.11
What separates the two situations is the message the earlier law sent. In the limitations hypothetical, the earlier law told Anna she was safe, and the later law retracted that message after she acted on it. In Dobbert, the earlier statute told the defendant that murder carried the state's gravest penalty, and the replacement left that message in place while changing how the sentence was imposed.12 Dobbert's choices were never shaped by a promise the State later broke. The useful question on an exam is what the earlier law communicated and whether the later law retracts it.
The dissent in Dobbert shows why a student should not treat fair warning as the whole inquiry. It pointed out that none of the hundreds of prisoners on death row when the earlier statute was struck down was resentenced to death, although each had precisely the same “fair warning” as Dobbert. State courts and legislatures, it said, uniformly acted on the assumption that none of them could be executed under a subsequently enacted statute.13 The dissent used that history to question whether the old statute's existence justified the new sentence. Its other target, arbitrary lawmaking, is the second purpose of the Clause and the subject of the next subsection.
Checking Arbitrary Legislation
Fair warning looks at the person who acted, and the second purpose looks at the body that wrote the law. The Court has described the prohibition as restricting “governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.”16 The mechanism turns on what a legislature knows when it writes.
A legislature that defines a penalty before any offense occurs cannot tell who will be the first to violate the rule. The person caught may be an ally or an enemy, popular or despised, so the sensible course is a rule that treats everyone alike. After the offense, that ignorance is gone. The legislature can then choose the penalty, its reach, and its effective date with the accused in view. A commentator quoted in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel made the point when he wrote that a retroactive law “may be passed with an exact knowledge of who will benefit from it.” The opinion added that retroactive lawmaking is a particular concern because of the legislative “tempt[ation] to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals.”17 The passage speaks of retroactive laws in general and of property rights in particular, but the temptation it describes is the one the prohibition targets. Because the danger lies in the opportunity, the Court's word is “potentially” vindictive.
The danger persists even when the defendant had full warning. An opinion in James v. United States explained that, aside from problems of warning and specific intent, the policy of the prohibition rests on the apprehension that a legislature imposing penalties on past conduct may be acting “with a purpose not to prevent dangerous conduct generally but to impose by legislation a penalty against specific persons or classes of persons.” That apprehension holds even when the conduct could properly have been made criminal and the defendant believed he was doing wrong, as when a penalty on an existing crime is raised retroactively.18 An analysis that stops at notice will therefore miss the penalty-increase cases. The accused knew the act was a crime, and the policy still reaches the later enactment because it may have been shaped around who the accused was.
The history behind the prohibition shows the same fear. Justice Chase, writing just a few years after the Constitution was adopted, stated that the Clause was probably a result of the ex post facto laws and bills of attainder passed in England. With very few exceptions, he observed, the advocates of such laws were stimulated by “ambition, or personal resentment, and vindictive malice.”19 Fletcher v. Peck described the fear from the framers' side. They viewed “with some apprehension, the violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the moment,” and the people, in adopting the Constitution, manifested a determination to shield themselves and their property from “those sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed.” The restrictions on state legislative power, the Court said, are founded in that sentiment.20 A statute passed in the heat of public feeling over a known offense is the form that danger takes, because the passion has a target and the legislature has the power to reach it.
The Court has described the vice of the English laws in similar terms. In Stogner v. California it explained that such laws, like the California law before it, enabled punishment where it was not otherwise available “in the ordinary course of law,” and that this vice was relevant to Chase's purpose.21 The description focuses on what the legislature does. The law does not simply define conduct for the future. It makes punishment available where the ordinary course of law would not have.
Both concerns fall away when the law looks forward. Even an opinion in Kansas v. Hendricks that would have found a violation accepted that a statute operating prospectively does not offend the Clause. It also accepted that a state may sentence offenders to the fully authorized sentence, seek consecutive sentences, or invoke recidivism statutes to lengthen imprisonment.22 A legislature writing prospectively remains ignorant of whom its rule will reach, so the condition that keeps lawmaking general is still in place.
The Dobbert dissent offered a further illustration of arbitrary results. Miller's trial was delayed because he was incompetent to stand trial, and by the time his capacity was restored Florida had enacted its new death penalty statute. Had it not been for his fortuitous illness, the dissent observed, he would have been tried promptly and escaped the death penalty. Because of a delay over which he had no control, the new statute entitled the State to put him to death.23 The arbitrariness comes from timing, since a delay no one chose decided who could face the heavier penalty. The Court in Dobbert rejected the ex post facto claim, so the example shows how an advocate can press the point and not what the Court held.