Concept
Related Retroactivity Limits
Ex Post Facto Laws
Related Retroactivity Limits
The Ex Post Facto Clauses answer one kind of retroactive burden, and the Constitution leaves the other kinds to other provisions. Article I, § 9 bars Congress from passing a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law, and § 10 imposes the same two bars on the states and adds a third, a bar on laws impairing the obligation of contracts.1 Courts have long distrusted retroactive legislation because it tends to create instability and because a legislature can help or hurt disfavored classes more easily by looking backward than by looking forward.2 The unfairness is concrete: a law that reaches back can deprive people of legitimate expectations and upset transactions they believed were settled.3
No single rule answers all of that, so the first step in any retroactivity problem is to identify the burden the law imposes and the person who bears it. Five provisions or doctrines divide the field:
- The Ex Post Facto Clauses apply only to criminal matters, and their typical target is a law that raises the punishment for a crime already committed.4
- The Contracts Clause stops the states from impairing the obligation of contracts.5
- Retroactive civil statutes have sometimes been held unconstitutional on other grounds, usually as a taking of property rights without due process of law.6
- The attainder prohibitions reach legislation that singles out named or easily ascertainable persons for punishment without a judicial trial.7
- Due process governs the remaining retroactive economic legislation and asks only for a rational legislative purpose.8
The Court's own side-by-side survey of these limits appears in Bank Markazi v. Peterson. The rest of this unit takes the civil, contract, property, and attainder provisions in turn and shows how each differs from the Clause.
Civil Legislation and Due Process
A retroactive law that imposes no penalty falls outside the Ex Post Facto Clauses, because they apply only to criminal matters.9 A challenger must find another ground, and the usual one is that the statute takes property rights without due process of law.10
The two tools answer different dangers. The Clause secures fair warning, restrains arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation, and reserves the stigmatizing penalties of the criminal law for cases where their deterrent purpose could actually be served.11 A civil statute that shifts a tax deduction or a financial obligation raises a different danger, the disruption of settled expectations, and so due process asks only whether the legislature had a rational reason for looking backward.
Retroactive economic legislation receives the same deferential review that applies to enactments in that sphere generally.12 It does face a burden that purely prospective legislation does not, but the burden is met simply by showing that the retroactive application is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose.13
United States v. Carlton shows the test at work. Congress amended an estate tax deduction in 1987 and applied the limit retroactively, although the decedent's executor had relied on the earlier law and the decedent had had no notice of the change. Justice Blackmun found that neither the lack of notice nor the reliance made the retroactive application a due process violation, because Congress's purpose was neither illegitimate nor arbitrary.14 The retroactive effect reached back only a little more than a year, and it was rationally related to Congress's aim of keeping revenues from falling through deductions granted for purely tax-motivated stock transfers.15
The criminal analogue comes out the other way. If a statute that punished grand theft with one to five years is amended to impose two to ten, the amendment is ex post facto as applied to a theft committed before it took effect.16 The Clause forbids that application, and the question is whether the law increases the punishment for an offense already committed, not whether the legislature had a good reason. The word "retroactive" therefore never wins a civil challenge by itself. The challenger needs a specific provision, or a showing that the retroactive application serves no rational legislative purpose.17
Contracts and Takings Clauses
The Contracts Clause forbids the states, though not Congress, to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, so it addresses laws that rewrite existing private agreements.18 An early opinion drew the contrast with penal legislation. No one supposes, it observed, that a state legislature is restricted in declaring acts criminal prospectively, and the same rule of construction should apply to the other provision relating to the rights of property.19 Each ban therefore has its own field. The ex post facto prohibition covers criminal matters, and the Contracts Clause covers state interference with property rights under existing agreements.20
Retroactive civil statutes have also fallen as takings of property rights without due process of law.21 Eastern's challenge to the Coal Act shows the kind of burden that invites that analysis. The Act's allocation scheme reached back 30 to 50 years to impose liability on Eastern for its activities between 1946 and 1965, and although it required only future health benefits, it attached new legal consequences to an employment relationship completed before its enactment. The opinion found that this substantially interfered with Eastern's reasonable investment-backed expectations.22 Nothing in that inquiry asks whether the law is criminal, which is why it sits outside the Ex Post Facto Clauses.
Bills of Attainder
A bill of attainder is a legislative act that applies to named individuals, or to easily ascertainable members of a group, in a way that inflicts punishment on them without a judicial trial.23 The Constitution bars it in the same two sections as the Ex Post Facto Clauses, to Congress in § 9 and to the states in § 10.24 The two prohibitions overlap to some extent, but they do not always mean the same thing.25
The overlap is natural. In Stogner v. California the Court described the vice that mattered to Justice Chase's purpose: laws of this kind, like the California law at issue there, enabled punishment where it was not otherwise available "in the ordinary course of law."26 The attainder prohibition aims at a legislature that punishes without the ordinary process of a trial, so the two prohibitions attack related abuses.
Cummings v. Missouri shows both concerns in a single enactment. Missouri's constitution required an expurgatory oath, and its framers knew that whole classes of individuals could not take it. The provisions were aimed at past acts, not future ones, and they operated on persons who had aided or sympathized with the Rebellion by depriving them of the right to hold certain offices and trusts and to pursue their ordinary avocations.27 The Court called that deprivation punishment and said the oath did not make it any less so. Making a right depend on an impossible condition, it reasoned, equals an absolute denial of the right, and a denial enforced for a past act "is nothing less than punishment imposed for that act."28 The same opinion defined an ex post facto law as one that "imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed," imposes additional punishment, or changes the rules of evidence so that less or different testimony will convict.29
A statute that names individuals, or an identifiable group, and fines or imprisons them for something the legislature disliked but the law had not made criminal is both a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law.30 The overlap is partial because each prohibition asks for something the other does not. Attainder requires specificity and the absence of a trial. The Clause requires a penal law applied backward to the accused's disadvantage, and it says nothing about whom the law names.
The second step does the sorting, because the Ex Post Facto Clauses apply only to penal laws, and the other provisions guard different interests with different tests.