Concept
Text and Competing Readings
Second Amendment
The Right to Bear Arms
Text and Competing Readings
The Second Amendment is a single sentence: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”1 In District of Columbia v. Heller the Court observed that this sentence divides naturally into a prefatory clause, which announces a purpose, and an operative clause, which commands that the right of the people not be infringed. The prefatory clause does not limit the operative clause grammatically. The Amendment could be rephrased, “Because a well regulated Militia is necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.”2
No other rights provision is built this way. The First Amendment says only that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech; it does not open by explaining that public debate is necessary to a democratic society. The Second Amendment both enumerates a right and explains why the right is enumerated.3 Founding-era state constitutions often began individual-rights provisions with a statement of purpose, but the Court called the structure unique in the federal Constitution.4 A preface so placed cannot simply be ignored. Logic demands a link between a stated purpose and the command it introduces, and Heller made the point by imagining the militia preface followed by the right to petition for redress of grievances, a version that would be nonsensical.5 The dispute is over how much work the preface does.
Heller itself described the two positions. Petitioners and the dissenting Justices believed the Amendment protects only the right to possess and carry a firearm in connection with militia service. The respondent argued that it protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use it for traditionally lawful purposes such as self-defense within the home.6 Commentators call these the standard or collective interpretation and the individual rights interpretation.7 The first treats the preface as stating the scope of the right. The second treats it as stating a purpose, but not the scope.8 The sections below take the collective reading first and then the individual reading that prevailed.
Before 2008 the question was open. Concurring in Printz v. United States, Justice Thomas noted that the Court had had no recent occasion to consider the nature of the right. If the Amendment confers a personal right, he said, a colorable argument existed that a federal regulatory scheme, at least as it reached the purely intrastate sale or possession of firearms, ran afoul of it.9 His footnote added that a growing body of scholarship, marshaling an impressive array of historical evidence, indicated that the right to keep and bear arms is a personal right.10 The text alone did not decide the matter, because the prefatory clause supports the collective model while the phrase “a right of the people” supports the individual model.11 From 1791 until 2008 the Supreme Court did not strike down a single federal, state, or local gun regulation.12
Collective Rights Reading
The collective reading holds that the Second Amendment protects only arms-bearing connected with service in a well regulated militia. Justice Stevens defended that view in his Heller dissent, and the majority rejected it.13 In his account the Amendment was adopted to protect the right of the people of each State to maintain a well-regulated militia. It answered concerns raised during ratification that Congress’s power to disarm the state militias and to create a national standing army, a permanent professional force, posed an intolerable threat to the sovereignty of the States.14 Neither the text of the Amendment nor the arguments of its proponents, he found, showed the slightest interest in limiting any legislature’s authority to regulate private civilian uses of firearms.15
Proponents of this standard interpretation treat the Second Amendment as a federalism provision that ensures state governments will control state militias.16 The Constitution supplies the premise. Article I, §8 gives Congress the power to call forth, organize, arm, and discipline the militia, but the States keep the right to appoint its officers and to train it under the discipline Congress prescribes.17 The state share in controlling the militia would mean little if Congress could disarm the people who fill its ranks, and on this view the Amendment guards against that. A later opinion criticizing Heller put the point this way: even with the preamble discounted, the Amendment “still serves the structural function of protecting the States from encroachment by an overreaching Federal Government.”18 Even the Heller majority agreed that the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason this right, unlike some other English rights, was written into the Constitution.19 The two sides part over what follows. On the standard interpretation, the Constitution may grant a person a right to serve in the state militia, if one exists, but no one has a constitutional right to bear arms for self-defense or hunting.20
The words of the Amendment supply further support. Standing alone, “bear arms” is a familiar idiom meaning “to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight,” and it derives from the Latin arma ferre, to bear war equipment.21 Pennsylvania’s 1776 declaration of rights and Vermont’s of 1777 protected a right “to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state,” and Pennsylvania separately guaranteed the liberty to fowl and hunt. The Second Amendment contains neither provision, and the contrast reinforces the statement of purpose in its preamble.22 The words “the people” also refer back to the preamble. They remind us that the text directly protects the collective action of individuals with a duty to serve in the militia, and that the Amendment’s ultimate purpose was to protect the States’ share of the divided sovereignty the Constitution created.23 The reading has difficulties, however. “A right of the people” points toward an individual right, and neither the federal text nor the state constitutions ratified in the late eighteenth century conclusively settles the debate.24
The decision most often cited for the collective reading is United States v. Miller. It upheld, against a Second Amendment challenge, the federal indictment of two men for transporting an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in interstate commerce in violation of the National Firearms Act.25 The Court reasoned that, without evidence that possessing or using a shotgun with a barrel under eighteen inches has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, it could not say the Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.26 Virtually all twentieth-century commentators read Miller as limiting the right to militia service.27 Stevens read it the same way: the Amendment protects keeping and bearing arms for certain military purposes but does not curtail the legislature’s power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons.28
Miller also supports a second, narrower reading, and the two should be kept apart. On the militia-service reading the owner is what matters, and only a person using arms in connection with a militia is protected. On the narrower reading the weapon is what matters, and the Amendment protects a weapon that might be used for militia service even when its owner puts it to other uses.29 The Heller majority read Miller the second way. Had the Miller Court thought the Amendment protects only those serving in the militia, the majority reasoned, it would have been odd to examine the character of the weapon rather than simply note that the defendants were not militiamen.30 Stevens answered that Miller turned on the basic difference between military and nonmilitary use and possession of guns, not on the difference between muskets and sawed-off shotguns, and the majority replied that the words of the opinion prove otherwise.31 Miller is therefore ambiguous authority for the collective reading.
Two claimants show how the collective reading sorts cases.
What moves the result is the link to the militia, whether it appears in the owner’s service or in the weapon’s military character. The individual rights reading, taken up next, denies the premise behind that sorting.
Individual Rights Reading
The individual rights reading accepts the same two-part division of the Amendment but gives the first part a smaller job. The prefatory clause states why the right was written into the Constitution; the operative clause fixes who holds the right and what it covers.34 On this view citizens have a constitutional right to keep guns for self-defense, and perhaps for hunting, even when those activities have no connection to a state militia.35
Heller supported that division with a rule about prefaces. A prefatory clause may resolve an ambiguity in the operative clause. In “The separation of church and state being an important objective, the teachings of canons shall have no place in our jurisprudence,” the preface shows that “canons” means clergymen, not canons of interpretation. Apart from that clarifying function, a prefatory clause neither limits nor expands the operative clause.36 The Court added that it is nothing unusual for the enacting part of a law to go beyond its preamble, because a remedy often extends beyond the particular mischief that first suggested the law. It therefore began with the operative clause and returned to the preface only to check that its reading was consistent with the announced purpose.37
The operative clause supplies the textual case for a personal right. It codifies a “right of the people,” a phrase that also appears in the First Amendment’s Assembly-and-Petition Clause and the Fourth Amendment’s Search-and-Seizure Clause, and the Ninth Amendment uses very similar terminology. Heller found that all three instances unambiguously refer to individual rights, not to rights that may be exercised only through participation in some corporate body.38 The militia named in the preface is a narrower group. In colonial America it was a subset of the people, the males who were able-bodied and within a certain age range, so a right held by “the people” fits poorly with a guarantee confined to an organized militia.39 The phrase thus pulls toward the individual reading while the preface pulls toward the collective one, which is why the text alone leaves the question open.40
The verbs point the same way. At the founding, as now, to “bear” meant to “carry,” and when used with “arms” the term refers to carrying for a particular purpose, confrontation.41 The idiom the dissent relied on, “to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight,” was real, but it unequivocally carried that meaning only when “bear arms” was followed by “against” and the target of the hostilities.42 The majority also turned the dissent’s analysis of qualifying phrases against it. A purposive qualifier cannot contradict the phrase it modifies. If “bear arms” means simply carrying arms, a modifier can limit the purpose of the carriage, as in “for the purpose of self-defense” or “to make war against the King.” If it means carrying arms only for military purposes, one cannot add “for the purpose of killing game,” and a right “to carry arms in the militia for the purpose of killing game” is, the majority said, “worthy of the mad hatter.”43
The individual reading must still explain the preface, and it does so by separating the reason for codifying the right from the reasons Americans valued it. The prefatory clause announces the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the militia. It does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right, since most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense and hunting. The threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason the right, unlike some other English rights, was written into a Constitution.44 On this account the preface explains the right without confining it.
History did not close the gap. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought freed persons of color had a right to bear arms, but whether they meant a specific right for former slaves or only the same right white persons held is not certain.45 The second possibility settles little, because the content of the right white persons held was the very point in dispute. The Supreme Court ended the debate in 2008. In Heller a 5–4 majority adopted the individual rights interpretation.46 Justice Scalia wrote for the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, and began with the Amendment’s text and history.47 The four dissenters, Justice Stevens among them, would have kept the collective reading.
The parties’ own facts show what the shift changes. Dick Heller, a D.C. special police officer authorized to carry a handgun on duty at the Federal Judicial Center, applied to register a handgun he wished to keep at home, and the District refused. He sued on Second Amendment grounds.48 Nothing in his claim depended on membership in a militia.
The bank-robbery example marks the limit that survives the shift. The Second Amendment plainly does not protect the right to use a gun to rob a bank, and it is equally clear that it protects using weapons for certain military purposes. The question was whether it also protects possessing and using guns outside that setting.49 The individual reading removes the militia requirement and keeps the lawful-purpose requirement. The next section shows the Court applying it, holding that a ban on an entire class of arms overwhelmingly chosen for lawful self-defense, extended to the home, could not survive under any standard of scrutiny the Court has applied to enumerated rights.50