Concept
Afroyim's Facts and Posture
Citizenship
Afroyim's Facts and Posture
Beys Afroyim's passport renewal was refused because he had voted in a foreign election, and his case became the vehicle for the holding that Congress has no power under the Constitution to divest a person of citizenship without that person's assent, a holding that overruled Perez v. Brownell.1 The reasoning behind that holding is the work of the next sections. This one tells the case in order, because the holding answers a specific set of facts: a naturalized citizen, a single act abroad, a statute that treated the act as enough to end his nationality, and two lower courts that upheld the statute on the authority of a decision the Supreme Court had come to doubt.
Afroyim, a native-born Pole, immigrated to the United States in 1912 and became a naturalized citizen in 1926. He lived here until 1950, when he went to Israel and became an Israeli citizen. In 1951 he voluntarily voted in an election for the Knesset, Israel's legislature.2 Statelessness was not part of the case. As the District Court noted, there was no claim that the loss of his American citizenship would render him a stateless person.3
In 1960 Afroyim applied to renew his United States passport, and the State Department refused on the sole ground that he had lost his American citizenship by voting in a foreign election.4 The provision the Department relied on began as § 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940 and was re-enacted as § 349(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.5 In its 1952 form, it says that a person who is a national of the United States, "whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by . . . (5) voting in a political election in a foreign state or in an election of a foreign state."6 The text makes the vote itself the operative event, and nothing in it asks what the voter meant to do. The Government accordingly took the position that the provision lets it terminate citizenship without the citizen's voluntary renunciation, and the lower courts held that Afroyim had lost his citizenship regardless of his intention not to give it up.7
The vocabulary of voluntary renunciation runs through the litigation for that reason. A citizen who gives up nationality by choice has consented to the loss, and the question whether Congress may impose a loss on an unwilling citizen never arises. Afroyim's position was that he had made no such choice. Because neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision expressly gives Congress the power to take citizenship away once it has been acquired, he contended, only his own renunciation could end it.8 Because the Government's theory made his state of mind irrelevant, the case was not a dispute over how to prove what Afroyim intended. The question was whether Congress could dispense with his assent altogether. How intent is proved comes later in this chapter, but a later case shows why it matters. In Kahane v. Shultz (E.D.N.Y. 1987), the State Department claimed that a citizen had committed an expatriating act under INA § 349(a)(4), accepting an office under a foreign government, even though he had told the Department several times that he did not intend to give up his citizenship. The court rejected the claim, because a person who declares his intent to remain a citizen at the time of the expatriating act automatically preserves his citizenship.9
Afroyim sued in federal district court for a declaratory judgment, a ruling that declares the parties' legal rights without awarding damages, here that he was still a United States citizen.10 He alleged that the statute violated both the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.11 The District Court granted the Government's motion for summary judgment, a ruling without a trial that is available when the material facts are not in dispute, and it did so on the basis of Perez. The Court of Appeals affirmed.12 Both courts rejected Afroyim's argument and held that Congress's implied power to regulate foreign affairs authorized it to take citizenship away from a person who votes in a foreign country.13 The question that reached the Supreme Court was therefore one of law, which the Court framed as "whether Congress can consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment enact a law stripping an American of his citizenship which he has never voluntarily renounced or given up."14
Perez explains why the Court took that question up again. The decision had come down by a 5-4 vote almost ten years earlier and had been a source of controversy and confusion ever since, as the opinions of all the judges who heard Afroyim's case below recognized.15 In the meantime the Court had been invalidating other involuntary expatriation statutes, meaning laws that end a person's nationality through government action rather than the person's own choice. It had done so case by case, on various grounds, and it had refused to hold that citizens can be expatriated without voluntary renunciation.16 Trop v. Dulles and Nishikawa v. Dulles were decided together with Perez.17 Later decisions such as Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez and Schneider v. Rusk continued the pattern. Each of these rulings reached only the statute then before the Court, and the Court's discussion of those cases comes in the section on limits to the consent rule. Here the pattern matters for a narrower reason. These cases and many commentators had cast great doubt on the soundness of Perez, yet it was still the authority on which both lower courts rested.18
The Court granted certiorari, its discretionary decision to review a case, in order to reconsider Perez. It observed that the many recent opinions and dissents had already discussed the issues comprehensively, so the subject needed no lengthy treatment.19 Reconsidering the precedent let the Court answer the underlying question directly, instead of adding another statute-by-statute ruling, and the next sections develop that answer.