Concept
Neutrality
Free exercise
Neutrality
A free exercise claimant who must live with Smith’s general rule has one dependable way out: proving that the government’s policy is not neutral. Under the Court’s current statement of the framework, a plaintiff can carry the burden of proving a violation by showing that a government entity has burdened his sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not “neutral” or “generally applicable.” Once the plaintiff makes that showing, the Court will find a First Amendment violation unless the government satisfies strict scrutiny by demonstrating a compelling interest and narrow tailoring.1 The showing carries so much weight because the alternatives are weak. Today a neutral law of general applicability draws heightened scrutiny only if the challengers also assert infringement of a separate fundamental right, and Smith put the point bluntly: the Court had never held that religious beliefs excuse a person from complying with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct the State is free to regulate.2 Yoder shows what the older approach looked like. The State there defended its compulsory-education law by arguing that its interest was paramount, and it did not dispute that the Amish way of life was as much a part of their religious belief and practice as baptism, the confessional, or a sabbath.3
The Court defined neutrality in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah. If the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is invalid unless a compelling interest justifies it and it is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.4 The test asks what the law is for and does not ask how heavily it falls. A general Prohibition-era ban on alcohol that left Catholics to use grape juice at communion would have been a neutral law of general applicability that Smith allows, even though it burdened the sacrament. A ban that reached wine only when used for communion would restrict a practice because of its religious motivation.5 The focus on object reflects the history behind the Clause, since it was historical instances of religious persecution and intolerance that gave concern to those who drafted it.6
Lawmakers seldom announce that they mean to suppress a faith, so the Court identifies a law’s object from the evidence the law leaves behind. The inquiry begins with the text, because the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face. It continues past the text, because the Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility that is masked as well as overt.7 The law’s operation, the context of its enactment, and the way officials decide individual claims supply the further evidence, and the four subsections below take them in that order.
The Hialeah ordinances serve as the model for each step. The Court summarized its neutrality finding in four parts. The pattern of events disclosed animosity to Santeria adherents. The ordinances by their own terms targeted this religious exercise. Their texts were gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious killings of animals while excluding almost all secular killings. And they suppressed much more religious conduct than was necessary to achieve the legitimate ends asserted in their defense. The ordinances were therefore not neutral, and the court below committed clear error in concluding otherwise.8
A claimant who cannot prove non-neutrality is not always without recourse. RFRA is enforceable against the federal government, and in the UDV litigation the question the Court answered was whether the federal government’s action substantially burdened the UDV’s sincere exercise of religion. The Court concluded that the UDV had effectively demonstrated that it did.9 The section on statutory responses develops that route. A policy that fails the neutrality inquiry draws strict scrutiny, and a policy that passes it moves on to the test of general applicability.
Facial Neutrality
The First Amendment forbids laws “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion, and the first place a court looks to see whether a law does so is the law’s own wording.10 Lukumi made that instinct the opening step of the inquiry: “To determine the object of a law, we must begin with its text, for the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face.”11
The Hialeah petitioners argued that three of the ordinances failed this test because they used the words “sacrifice” and “ritual,” which carry strong religious connotations. The Court agreed that the words were consistent with the claim of facial discrimination but held the argument not conclusive, because both words have a religious origin and current use also gives them secular meanings.12 That reasoning shows what the facial test asks. A law is facially discriminatory when it refers to a religious practice in terms that have no secular meaning discernible from its language or context. A word that merely sounds religious but has an ordinary secular use cannot carry the argument alone. The ordinance in question defined sacrifice by what happens to the animal and in what setting: unnecessarily killing, tormenting, torturing, or mutilating an animal “in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption.”13 That definition describes conduct and names no religion.
A law that does fail the test announces its own object, so the text alone can decide the case. Smith supplied the standard illustrations. A State would be prohibiting free exercise if it sought to ban acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display, as it would by banning the casting of statues used for worship or by prohibiting bowing down before a golden calf.14 Each of those laws identifies the forbidden act by its religious purpose, so no secular reading is available. Such a law almost never survives strict scrutiny. Government may discriminate against a religious practice only when a compelling interest justifies it, and a compelling interest is hard to find: a government with a compelling reason to ban trumpet playing during a religious ceremony would have the same reason to ban trumpet playing generally.15 A law that bans the act only in the religious setting shows that religion is doing the selecting.
Passing the facial test ends nothing. Lukumi rejected the contention that facial neutrality settles the question: “facial neutrality is not determinative,” and the Free Exercise Clause “protects against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as overt.”16 The reason follows from the drafter’s incentives. A legislature that wants to suppress a practice knows to avoid religious vocabulary, so a rule that stopped at the text would make the constitutional protection only as strong as the drafter’s word choice. The facial test therefore works as a one-way filter. Failing it settles the question, and passing it sends the court on to how the law operates and what produced it.
Courts can also disagree about whether a law singles out religion at all. In the litigation that became Locke v. Davey, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Washington had singled out religion for unfavorable treatment by excluding theology majors from its Promise Scholarship Program, so that under Lukumi the exclusion had to be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.17 The section on benefits and religious schools takes up why.
Neutrality in Operation
The wording of a law is only the first evidence of its object. Apart from the text, “the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.”19 Operation matters because who a law actually reaches, and who it leaves alone, is the evidence least within the drafter’s control. A rule aimed at a real harm reaches that harm wherever it appears, while a rule aimed at a religion reaches the harm only where the religion produces it. The pattern of coverage and exemption shows which kind of rule a court is reading, and in Hialeah the Court called that pattern a gerrymander.20
Adverse impact on a religion does not by itself prove targeting. A social harm may be a legitimate concern of government for reasons quite apart from discrimination. The Court pointed to Reynolds, where criminal laws against polygamy were applied to people whose religion commanded the practice, because laws are made for the government of actions even when they cannot interfere with belief.21 The question in Hialeah was whether the ordinances pursued a harm or pursued Santeria, and their mechanics answered it.
Ordinance 87-71 excluded almost all killings of animals except religious sacrifice, and its primary-purpose requirement narrowed the category further, in particular by exempting kosher slaughter.22 The definition of sacrifice thus worked as two filters. Only a killing in a ritual or ceremony passed the first, and only a killing not for the primary purpose of food consumption passed the second. The net result was that few if any killings of animals were prohibited other than Santeria sacrifice, which was caught because it occurs during a ritual or ceremony and its primary purpose is an offering to the orishas, not food consumption.23 The Court did not decide whether this differential treatment of two religions was itself an independent violation, but it recited the feature as support for its conclusion that Santeria alone was the exclusive legislative concern.24 Across Ordinances 87-40, 87-52, and 87-71, almost the only conduct subject to the ordinances was the religious exercise of Santeria church members.25
Ordinance 87-52 reached the same result by a different route. It prohibited owning or possessing an animal “intending to use such animal for food purposes,” but it applied that prohibition only to a person or group who “kills, slaughters or sacrifices animals for any type of ritual, regardless of whether or not the flesh or blood of the animal is to be consumed.” It also exempted slaughter by “licensed establishments” of animals “specifically raised for food purposes.”26 Tracing conduct through those provisions shows where the gaps lie. A killing without any intent to use the animal for food is not prohibited, but most Santeria sacrifices are accompanied by that intent, so the prohibition reaches them. A killing for food outside any ritual is not prohibited either. A killing for food during a ritual is exempt only when it takes place in a properly zoned and licensed establishment and involves animals specifically raised for food. The burden falls on Santeria adherents and almost no others. As the Court put it, a pattern of exemptions parallels the pattern of narrow prohibitions, and each contributes to the gerrymander.27
A necessity standard can hide the same ranking. The city’s application of the ordinance’s test of necessity devalued religious reasons for killing by judging them to be of lesser import than nonreligious reasons, which singled out religious practice for discriminatory treatment.28 A standard that sends officials to judge whether a reason for killing is important enough invites that ranking, so wording of that kind is neutral only to the extent that officials accept religious reasons as readily as secular ones.
The ordinances also restricted far more religious conduct than their stated aims required, and the Court treated the excess as evidence in its own right. The neutrality of a law is suspect when First Amendment freedoms are curtailed to prevent isolated collateral harms not themselves prohibited by direct regulation. It is not unreasonable to infer, absent persuasive indications to the contrary, that a law visiting “gratuitous restrictions” on religious conduct seeks to suppress the conduct because of its religious motivation and not to effectuate the stated interests.29 The Hialeah record fit the inference. The city’s interests in protecting public health and preventing cruelty to animals could have been served by restrictions stopping far short of a flat prohibition. If improper disposal was the harm, the city could have regulated the disposal of organic garbage, and it did not. Its counsel conceded that the ordinances would make Santeria sacrifices illegal even in licensed, inspected, and zoned slaughterhouses. The interest in humane killing fared no better. Killing by severing the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument, the method of kosher slaughter, was approved as humane under federal and Florida law, and the District Court found the method used in Santeria sacrifice less reliable. If the city really worried about less humane methods, the subject of regulation should have been the method of slaughter, not a religious classification.30
Ordinance 87-72 shows how the Court assesses operation across a group of enactments. It would be implausible to suggest that the three other ordinances, but not 87-72, had the object of suppressing religion. The Court did not decide whether 87-72 could survive scrutiny standing alone, because it invalidated the ordinance for functioning with the rest to suppress Santeria worship.31 A drafter therefore cannot cure a targeting scheme by adding a provision that would be evenhanded by itself.
Operation analysis also depends on reading what the rule actually covers, and that reading can itself be contested. One opinion criticizing a majority’s treatment of a generally applicable nondiscrimination rule objected that the majority relied heavily on an interpretation of a statute and contract provisions the parties had not fully briefed, and warned that the government could alter the law or contract to evade the decision.32 A careful answer states the coverage it is assuming before it draws any conclusion from it.
The Court described this kind of law when it observed that Hialeah could have imposed a general regulation on the disposal of organic garbage, which would have answered the health concern without singling out any religious act.33 Under such a rule the congregation may still bear a cost, but the cost follows from the harm the rule addresses and not from the religious character of the conduct. The Hialeah ordinances inverted that relationship. They exempted nearly every secular killing, ranked religious reasons below secular ones, and prohibited sacrifice even where no health harm could arise.
Context and Official Statements
Text and operation can still leave a court uncertain, because a legislature bent on suppressing a practice has every reason to leave no trace of its aim in the statute book. Lukumi therefore added a third source of evidence and chose its model deliberately. The Court quoted Justice Harlan’s observation, made in an Establishment Clause case, that “[n]eutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis.” It held that, as in equal protection cases, a city council’s object may be determined from both direct and circumstantial evidence, citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.36 The relevant evidence includes, among other things:
- the historical background of the decision under challenge;
- the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question; and
- the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking body.37
Each kind of evidence answers a different question about why the law exists. A government that adopts a rule to cure a harm can be expected to act when the harm appears and to talk about the harm when it does. If the government instead acts only after a religious group announces its plans, and the people voting on the rule talk about the group, the group was the trigger and the harm was only the stated justification. The Court framed the question in equal protection terms: whether the ordinances were enacted “because of,” and not merely “in spite of,” their suppression of Santeria religious practice. It found the answer in the events that preceded enactment.38
The chronology in Hialeah is the first piece of the answer. The city claimed at oral argument that it had suffered significant problems from animal sacrifice within its limits before the Church announced its plans to open. Yet the council made no attempt to address the supposed problem until its meeting in June 1987, just weeks after the Church announced those plans.39 A gap of that kind between the claimed problem and the date of action suggests that the Church was the trigger.
The council’s own session is the second piece. The minutes and taped excerpts of the June 9 session evidence significant hostility exhibited by residents, members of the council, and other city officials toward the Santeria religion and its practice of animal sacrifice. The crowd interrupted council members critical of Santeria with cheers and met the comments of Pichardo with taunts. When Councilman Martinez, a supporter of the ordinances, said that in prerevolution Cuba “people were put in jail for practicing this religion,” the audience applauded.40 The record also contained statements that Santeria and its practices were “abhorrent” and “an abomination to the Lord.”41 From this history the Court concluded that it “discloses the object of the ordinances to target animal sacrifice by Santeria worshippers because of its religious motivation.”42 Chronology shows what set the lawmaking in motion, and statements by the people who voted show what they meant to accomplish.
A record can be even more direct when the government states its own object. In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, the school district’s letter prohibited “any overt actions on Mr. Kennedy’s part, appearing to a reasonable observer to endorse even voluntary, student-initiated prayer,” and the district added that it could not allow “an employee, while still on duty, to engage in religious conduct.” The Court found that the district sought to restrict his actions at least in part because of their religious character, called the prohibition of a religious practice the district’s “unquestioned” object, and noted the district’s concession that its policies were “not neutral” toward religion.43
A neutral-looking ordinance that burdens a minority faith tempts a reader to infer targeting from the burden alone, and the context evidence is what corrects that temptation.
The reliance on council statements carries a limit that exam answers must respect. Justice Kennedy’s opinion spoke for the Court except as to Part II-A-2, and the argument that examines the intent behind a facially neutral law, which parallels equal protection decisions on race discrimination, drew only a plurality.44 The limit does not weaken the Hialeah result. The Court’s summary of its finding rests on four grounds, and only the first, the pattern of animosity, draws on what officials and residents said. The ordinances’ own terms, their gerrymandered texts, and their overbreadth carry the other three.45 An answer that concludes a law is not neutral should therefore rest first on text and operation and use official statements as corroboration.
Hostility in Adjudication
Neutrality binds the officials who apply a law as well as the legislators who write it. According to Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the prohibition on purposeful religious discrimination extends to adjudication, and it categorically forbids the government from acting on the basis of religious animus.48 The rule matters because Smith leaves a gap at the point of enforcement. Free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability,49 so a religious objector’s best hope is often an accommodation, and someone must decide whether to grant it. An official who begins from the premise that the faith is illegitimate or the objection insincere has decided the claim before weighing it. A reviewing court then cannot tell how much of the result comes from the law and how much from the prejudice.
The Colorado Civil Rights Commission had rejected the First Amendment claims of Phillips, a baker, and had found in favor of a same-sex couple under the public accommodation law. The Court said it might not have been improper for the Commission to reach that result. But the Commission had compromised the “neutral and respectful consideration to which Phillips was entitled” by showing “elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection.” The Court relied on two sets of circumstances.50
The first was what commissioners said at the adjudicatory hearings. Two commissioners made comments the Court found problematic, and the Court focused on one who, after alluding to slavery and the Holocaust, said, “to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt others.” The Court read that remark as disparaging Phillips’s faith in two ways. It described his religious beliefs as despicable, comparable even to beliefs supporting slavery and the Holocaust, and it characterized his religion as “merely rhetorical—something insubstantial and even insincere.”51
The second was the Commission’s treatment of other bakers. In recent cases the Commission had permitted socially progressive bakers to refuse a conservative Christian customer’s request for cakes bearing religious images and text disapproving of same-sex marriage, and it found no religious discrimination by those bakers. It reasoned that they were willing to provide other products to their religious customers, yet it dismissed Phillips’s willingness to sell birthday cakes, shower cakes, cookies, and brownies to gay and lesbian customers as irrelevant.52 Comparisons of this kind help only when the cases are truly alike, so they carry the most weight beside direct evidence such as the commissioner’s own words.
The commissioner’s second description did the most damage, because it attacked the premise on which a claim for exemption begins. A claim of burden starts with a sincere religious practice,53 and a decisionmaker who calls the belief a rhetorical device has answered the sincerity question without evidence and has treated the objection as a pretext. The claimant cannot receive neutral and respectful consideration from that decisionmaker.
The Court’s finding of animus eliminated any possible argument that the government could satisfy strict scrutiny by establishing a compelling justification, such as protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination. The Commission’s action was fatally contaminated by bias and hostility, which left it irremediable.54 The consequence stands out against ordinary strict scrutiny, where government sometimes wins. In a 1982 decision the Court accepted that a law significantly burdened an Amish employer’s sincerely held belief but held that denial of the exemption was “essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.”55 The Court held that government had a compelling interest in requiring the employer’s participation in social security, apparently on the theory that allowing any exemptions would unravel the entire system.56 A finding of hostility closes off even that chance to justify the action.
The holding is narrow. Because the Court said it might not have been proper to reject Phillips’s First Amendment claims, the defect lay in the consideration he was owed and not in the result.57 A neutral process that explains why the state’s interest outweighs the burden on the claimant does not violate the Clause for hostility, and whether an exemption follows is a question the hostility doctrine does not answer. The later route to an exemption ran through speech. In 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis the Court provided a more general exemption from anti-discrimination laws under the Free Speech Clause for a website designer who said she would refuse, for religious reasons, to design wedding websites for same-sex couples.58 That fits an older pattern. Smith observed that the decisions barring application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action involved the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press.59
An exam stem in which a business owner loses before an agency invites the quick answer that the statute is neutral and generally applicable, so Smith ends the claim. That answer skips a step, because the agency’s own conduct in deciding the claim is a separate place for neutrality to fail. A loss alone proves nothing about hostility.