Concept
The Presumption of Invalidity
Content-based regulation of protected expression
Content-Based Speech Regulation
The Presumption of Invalidity
Free-speech review starts with a presumption against the government. Reed v. Town of Gilbert states the rule: a government, including a municipal government vested with state authority, “has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”1 Laws that target speech because of its communicative content are presumptively unconstitutional, and the government can justify one only by proving that it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.2
The rule binds towns and cities because of incorporation. The First Amendment's text forbids only Congress to abridge the freedom of speech, and it probably was not meant to reach the states. In 1925, however, the Supreme Court declared that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects freedom of expression against state infringement.3 State and municipal speech regulations are therefore measured against the same presumption.4
The presumption does two jobs: it places the burden on the government, and it sets the standard the government must meet. Where it applies, a court uses strict scrutiny, and the government must justify its regulation by demonstrating narrowly tailored or necessary means to achieve a compelling interest.5 In other cases courts employ a more deferential form of balancing.6 Content is what sorts a law into one mode or the other. In Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, the Court explained that content-based restrictions generally must meet strict scrutiny, while content-neutral laws need meet only intermediate scrutiny, because regulations unrelated to the content of speech in most cases pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.7 The two tiers ask different things of the government:
- Strict scrutiny governs content-based laws. As Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission put it for political speech, the government must prove that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”8
- Intermediate scrutiny governs content-neutral laws. In the time, place, and manner setting, the government must show that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant interest and leaves open “ample alternative channels of communication.”9
The presumption attaches to content because a message-based rule is dangerous even in well-meaning hands. Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented by a facially content-based statute, since future officials may one day wield it to suppress disfavored speech.10 For that reason the First Amendment targets the operation of laws, the “abridg[ment] of speech,” rather than merely the motives of those who enacted them.11 A passage Reed quotes states the point: “The vice of content-based legislation . . . is not that it is always used for invidious, thought-control purposes, but that it lends itself to use for those purposes.”12
Reed shows the presumption operating on a rule that looked like ordinary land-use regulation. Gilbert's Sign Code defined “Temporary Directional Signs” by whether a sign conveyed the message of directing the public to a church or some other “qualifying event.” It defined “Political Signs” by whether a sign's message was “designed to influence the outcome of an election,” and “Ideological Signs” by whether a sign “communicat[es] a message or ideas” that fit no other category. It then subjected each category to different restrictions.13 A church that posted temporary directional signs was cited twice, first for exceeding the time limits on those signs and then for the same violation plus the omission of the event date.14
Every restriction in the code depended on what a sign communicated, so the code was content based on its face, and that fact alone fixed the tier. A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of “animus toward the ideas contained” in the regulated speech.15
Once in the strict tier, the Town lost. It offered only two interests, preserving its aesthetic appeal and traffic safety, and the Court assumed for the sake of argument that both were compelling. The code's distinctions nonetheless failed as hopelessly underinclusive, because the Town could not claim that strict limits on temporary directional signs were necessary to beautify the Town while allowing unlimited numbers of other signs that create the same problem.16
The presumption does not depend on a law's taking sides among viewpoints. In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board, a state law burdened income from works describing the author's crime, and the Court applied strict scrutiny to that content-based law even though it did not discriminate by viewpoint.17
Facial classification is not the only route into the strict tier. Precedent recognizes a separate and additional category of laws that, though facially content neutral, are treated as content based: laws that cannot be “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,” or that were adopted “because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys.” Those laws, like laws that are content based on their face, must also satisfy strict scrutiny.18 The next section takes up how courts identify both kinds.
A presumption can be rebutted. The government prevails by demonstrating narrowly tailored or necessary means to achieve a compelling interest.19 Strict scrutiny is extremely demanding, and a content-based regulation typically can be justified only if it is necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest, but in rare cases a sufficiently powerful justification permits a content-based law to survive.20
The two rules pursue the same ends, but one sorts signs by their message and the other does not, and that difference alone sends them to different tiers.