Concept
The Secondary Effects Doctrine
Content-neutral regulation of protected expression
The Secondary Effects Doctrine
An ordinance that reaches only adult theaters sorts speech by subject. An official cannot tell whether a theater is covered without learning what its films show. Under the facial rule taught earlier in this chapter, that feature alone makes a law content-based. A content-based law is presumed invalid unless the government shows narrowly tailored means to a compelling interest, while other regulations receive a more forgiving form of balancing.1 The secondary effects doctrine nonetheless admits some ordinances of this kind to the content-neutral track. When a city's concern is the crime, falling property values, and neighborhood decline that accompany adult businesses, and not the messages their films convey, the Court analyzes the ordinance as a time, place, and manner regulation.2 The leading decision is City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.
The doctrine grew out of the regulation of sexually oriented businesses, and that setting explains its shape. The First Amendment does not protect obscenity, but it does protect sexually oriented speech that is not obscene, and singling out adult uses for special treatment raises free speech concerns that ordinary zoning does not.3 The Court has treated that residual category as speech of low value, which gives government latitude to regulate it.4 The boundary with obscenity is itself hard to draw. Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinion in Roth, concluded in dissent in Miller that the concept of obscenity was inherently vague, which produced a lack of fair notice and a chill on protected speech.5
Three questions organize the discussion. First, what rule governs an ordinance of this kind once a court accepts that it targets secondary effects? Renton answers that question. Second, what must a city show to establish that the effects are real and that the ordinance addresses them? Third, where does the doctrine stop, and what do critics say about the room it gives government to regulate disfavored speech under a neutral label? Because the doctrine is tested almost always through adult-use zoning, read each part with a zoning ordinance in mind.
Renton's Rule
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. supplies the working rule. Renton's ordinance, like the Detroit ordinance in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., did not ban adult theaters. It provided only that they could not locate within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school.6 Because the ordinance regulated where adult theaters could operate and not whether, the Court analyzed it as a time, place, and manner regulation.7 The plaintiffs had bought two theaters to show adult films, and the Court upheld the ordinance as content-neutral.8
Mini Theatres supplied the precedent but not a single rationale. Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, concluded that Detroit could distinguish adult theaters from other theaters without violating the government's obligation of neutrality.9 He began from the premise that the First Amendment will not tolerate total suppression of erotic materials with some arguably artistic value.10 He then argued that society's interest in protecting that expression is “of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude” than its interest in untrammeled political debate.11 Political oratory or philosophical discussion may move us to applaud or to despise what is said, the plurality observed, yet every schoolchild can understand why the duty to defend the right to speak remains the same.12 That reasoning ranks protected speech by its value and lets a city treat the lower-ranked speech differently.13
Not every Justice accepts such rankings. In a different case, one Justice wrote separately because he did not subscribe to the theory that the Justices may decide, on the basis of content, which protected speech is most “valuable” and so most deserving of protection.14 Renton went another way. When the Court next considered a land use regulation controlling where adult theaters may locate, Justice Powell's content-neutral time, place, and manner approach prevailed.15 The Court read Mini Theatres as holding that, at least for businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials, zoning ordinances designed to combat undesirable secondary effects are reviewed under the standards for content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations.16
Calling the ordinance a time, place, and manner regulation was only the first step. Regulations enacted to restrain speech because of its content are presumptively invalid, and Renton's ordinance treated adult theaters differently from other theaters.17 The Court nevertheless held that the ordinance was aimed not at the content of the films but at the secondary effects of adult theaters on the surrounding community.18 A secondary effect, as the Court uses the term, is a side effect of a business, such as crime, that happens to accompany some content but could in principle accompany other kinds of speech or business. An audience's offense at the message does not qualify.19 The district court had found that the city council's predominant concerns were with those effects, and the Court treated that finding as enough to make the ordinance “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”20
The court of appeals had asked a different question: whether a motivating factor in the council's decision was to restrict the theaters' expression, however small that factor was. The Supreme Court rejected that test. Its own precedent in United States v. O'Brien refuses to strike down an otherwise constitutional statute because of an alleged illicit legislative motive.21 The Court also gave a practical reason. What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are too high for guesswork.22 Renton therefore substitutes a question a court can answer from the record, which is the council's predominant concern. A single hostile remark at a hearing ordinarily does not change that answer when the whole record points elsewhere.
The ordinance's stated purposes supported the finding of a neutral purpose. The city aimed to prevent crime, protect its retail trade, maintain property values, and preserve the quality of its neighborhoods and of urban life, not to suppress the expression of unpopular views.23 Its form pointed the same way. The ordinance governed only location and banned nothing,24 so the films stayed available at the permitted sites and any burden on the message followed from the land-use goal and not from hostility to what the films said. That is also why the ordinance did not offend the principle behind the content-based presumption, that government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable and deny it to those with less favored views.25
Once the ordinance is classified as content-neutral, the question becomes whether it is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and allows reasonable alternative avenues of communication.26 This is the second track described at the start of the chapter. Renton's interest in the quality of urban life qualified. The Mini Theatres opinions had accorded that interest high respect and had called the interests served by Detroit's ordinance important and substantial, and the Court found exactly the same vital interests at stake in Renton.27 Urban amenity of this kind is a familiar object of the police power, and architects critical of modern planning have observed that courts treat even beauty as an amenity to be pursued through regulatory measures.28 How courts measure the avenues left open to speakers is taken up with the intermediate-scrutiny test later in this chapter.
Renton's ordinance did not ban adult theaters, and that matters. A total ban differs in kind from a location rule, as Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim shows. There a borough banned live entertainment, including nude dancing, throughout its territory, and the Court invalidated the ordinance. A relocation rule leaves the expression available at other sites, while a ban removes it from the whole community.
Justice Brennan dissented on the classification itself. In his view the ordinance selectively limited where a movie theater could locate based exclusively on the content of the films shown there, so the standards for content-neutral time, place, and manner rules were the wrong ones to apply. Even if the ordinance were content-neutral, he would have held it unconstitutional.29 Harmful land-use effects, he added, may arguably give a city a compelling reason to regulate adult theaters, but that does not make the regulation content-neutral. He declined to accept the city's claim that the ordinance was not designed to suppress the content of adult movies.30 He also discounted the council's record. Before the amendment, nothing indicated that the ordinance was meant to address the secondary effects of a single adult theater, and the timing of the amendment was suspiciously coincidental. Many of the stated reasons, as the court of appeals had observed, were no more than expressions of dislike for the subject matter, and residents' offense at the content of films cannot support regulation of speech.31 The dissent replays the choice taught earlier between reading the text and crediting the justification. Justice Brennan treated the ordinance's face and selectivity as decisive, while the majority treated a finding of predominant purpose as sufficient.
The Court framed its rule narrowly. Its analysis speaks of businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials, and Justice Brennan noted that it does not affect holdings in cases involving state regulation of other kinds of speech.32 An ordinance that singles out some other subject matter therefore cannot assume Renton's treatment, and the facial inquiry taught earlier, under which a benign motive does not rescue a facially content-based law, is the safer starting point.
Proving Secondary Effects
Treating an adult-use ordinance as content-neutral rests on the city's claim that it is fighting crime and neighborhood decline, so the next question is how much proof the city owes. Renton answered first by rejecting the burden the court of appeals had imposed. That court reasoned that because the ordinance was enacted without studies specific to Renton's own problems, the city's justifications were “conclusory and speculative.” The Supreme Court called that demand “an unnecessarily rigid burden of proof.”34 The record showed that Renton had relied heavily on Seattle's experience, and the Washington Supreme Court opinion describing that experience was before the council when it acted.35
The resulting standard reaches beyond Seattle. A city need not conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of what other cities have generated, so long as the evidence it relies on is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem the city addresses.36 Each half of that standard has its own logic. Reliance on other cities' experience spares a small city the expense of commissioning research, and it costs little, because a study of a comparable neighborhood elsewhere tells a council about as much as a local study would. The reasonable-belief limit keeps the convenience from becoming a loophole. A council that borrowed evidence about a different harm, or about places unlike its own, could not reasonably believe that evidence relevant.
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc. applied the same reasoning to a city that relied on an older study. Los Angeles first barred adult uses from clustering within 1,000 feet of one another and from locating within 500 feet of a religious institution, school, or public park. That ordinance left a gap, because several adult businesses could still operate under one roof, so the city amended it to close the gap. Two adult bookstores in a single establishment sued. Throughout, the city had relied on a 1977 study associating concentrations of adult uses with higher rates of certain crimes in surrounding areas.37 The court of appeals discounted the study because it measured the concentration of separate establishments and not operations inside one building. The plurality held that burden too high. A city may rely on any evidence reasonably believed to be relevant to show a connection between speech and a substantial, independent governmental interest, and the leap from this study to the amended ordinance was reasonable. A concentration of adult operations in one place draws more adult consumers, a high density of consumers attracts or generates crime, and so reducing the concentration, whether across establishments or within one, can be expected to reduce crime.38
Alameda Books also allocated the burden. The city must show a reasonable relationship between the ordinance and the secondary effects, and it need not show that no other approach would serve its interest. A challenger may respond either by showing that the city's evidence does not support its rationale or by offering evidence that disputes the city's factual findings. If the challenger casts genuine doubt on the rationale, the burden returns to the city to supplement the record.39
The doctrine still demands some proof, and the reason lies in what the classification does. A city that proves nothing asks the court to take its word that the rule targets crime and property values and not a disfavored message. Because the neutral label lowers the scrutiny, the evidence is the main check on the label, and singling out adult uses for special treatment raises free speech concerns that a bare recital cannot dispel.40 The burden is real but modest. The city must connect the regulated business to the claimed effects with evidence, and shoddy data or reasoning will not carry it, yet the showing falls well short of what strict scrutiny requires.
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment in Alameda Books, added a condition about what the ordinance does to speech. A city may not cut secondary effects by cutting speech in the same proportion, because a content-based tax could achieve that and would be invalid. The premise must be that the businesses will mostly disperse and not shut down. He found the city's inference credible on that score, since two adult businesses under one roof are no better for a neighborhood than two next door, so dispersal was likely to reduce secondary effects while reducing speech very little. The proof therefore has two links: that concentration produces the harm, and that the remedy reduces the harm without suppressing expression.
The Renton dissent shows what a skeptic sees in this standard. Justice Brennan argued that a municipality can nearly always find other cities' ordinances to cite, so the Court's approach largely immunizes such measures from judicial scrutiny and lets a city retrospectively justify special zoning of adult theaters.41 The majority answered that evidence reasonably believed relevant is enough, and Alameda Books later gave challengers a way to force a supplemented record. Critics still say these safeguards leave a city little to prove, a debate taken up in the next subsection.
This subsection concerns only the proof of harm. Whether the ordinance leaves reasonable alternative avenues of communication is a separate element of the test, and it is taken up with the intermediate-scrutiny standard later in this chapter.
Criticism and Limits
The Court itself drew the outer boundary of the doctrine in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, where it rejected the argument that the Communications Decency Act could be defended like a zoning ordinance. Renton's ordinance, the Court explained, was aimed at the “secondary effects” of adult theaters, such as crime and deteriorating property values, and not at the content of the films. The Act's purpose was to protect children from the “primary effects” of indecent and patently offensive speech. It was therefore a content-based blanket restriction that could not be analyzed as a time, place, and manner regulation.43 Reno drew the line from two earlier decisions. Boos v. Barry had said that regulations focusing on “the direct impact of speech on its audience” are not properly analyzed under Renton, and Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement had said that “[l]isteners' reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation.”44
The two labels describe different causal routes. A secondary effect is a side effect of a business, such as crime or declining property values, that happens to accompany some content but could in principle accompany other kinds of speech. A primary effect is harm that exists because an audience perceives what the speech says and reacts to it.45 Offense at a message therefore cannot qualify as a secondary effect, because the offense is the response to the speech itself, and a restriction justified by it draws the strict scrutiny taught earlier in this chapter. The distinction matters for a structural reason. Strict scrutiny exists because a message-based line can mask an attempt to suppress ideas. The secondary-effects label lowers that scrutiny on the strength of findings the government itself supplies, and the primary-effects limit keeps the label from swallowing the rule.
Renton and Texas v. Johnson sit on opposite sides of the line. In Renton the city's concerns were crime, retail trade, property values, and the quality of neighborhoods, harms that attach to where and how adult theaters operate and that other businesses drawing the same crowds could produce.46 In Johnson the state defended its flag-burning statute by citing the flag's value as a symbol of national unity, and the Court held that this interest was related to the suppression of expression, because such concerns “blossom only when a person's treatment of the flag communicates some message.” The harm Texas invoked flowed from the speech, so the law was content-based and failed strict scrutiny. Boos produced the same result for political signs. The District of Columbia barred signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy that tended to bring the foreign government into public odium or disrepute, and the Court distinguished Renton, rejected the argument that preventing secondary effects made the law content-neutral, and invalidated the ban.47
The Court applied the same boundary to sexual speech itself in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, which struck down, 5-4 and under strict scrutiny, a federal law requiring cable operators either to scramble sexually explicit programming fully or to confine it to late-night hours. The zoning cases were “irrelevant,” the Court said, because the lesser scrutiny afforded regulations targeting the secondary effects of crime or declining property values “has no application to content-based regulations targeting the primary effects of protected speech.” The harm Congress targeted, children's exposure to the programming, came from what the programming showed, so the zoning rationale had nothing to attach to.
The sharper objection runs the other way: the boundary is easy to cross by relabeling. A finding of secondary effects moves a law from strict scrutiny, with its presumption of invalidity, to a more forgiving review.48 A court that wishes to avoid the consequences of a content-based classification can therefore describe the burden on speech as incidental and the harm as a secondary effect, and almost any restriction on unpopular speech can be paired with a recital of crime, disorder, or lost property value. Critics argue that Renton “permits an end run around the First Amendment: The government can always point to some neutral, nonspeech justification for its actions.” Justice Brennan rejected the idea that an otherwise content-based restriction becomes content-neutral because it aims at secondary effects, and he warned that such effects “offer countless excuses for content-based suppression of political speech.”49 His Renton dissent supplied the mechanism. The Court allowed the city to conceal illicit motives by pointing to similar restrictions in other communities, and he would have required the city, like any proponent of a content-based restriction, to show a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling interest.50
A related objection is conceptual. The Renton ordinance applied only to theaters showing sexually explicit films, so it was content-based by its terms. Critics say the approach confuses whether a law is content-based with whether a sufficient purpose justifies it. The ordinance may have been properly upheld as needed to combat crime and the secondary effects of adult theaters, but it was still content-based.51 Justice Brennan framed the point this way: harmful land-use effects may give a city a compelling reason to regulate adult theaters, and that does not make the regulation content-neutral.52 Renton in effect defined content neutrality by the legislature's predominant purpose and not by the terms of the law. That sits uneasily beside the facial rule taught earlier, under which a benign justification cannot rescue a law that is content-based on its face.
Even the Justices who apply the doctrine disagree about what to call it. In City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., Justice O'Connor's plurality treated the one-adult-business-per-building ordinance as a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation subject to intermediate scrutiny. Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, agreed that intermediate scrutiny was correct for zoning aimed at secondary effects but called the content-neutral label a legal fiction, because the law described the regulated speech by its content. For exam purposes, the doctrine yields an intermediate-scrutiny law whose text nonetheless sorts speech by content, and a good answer names that tension.
Whether the doctrine will stay confined to sexually oriented speech or will reach other facially content-based laws is uncertain, and the Court has not said. It has never defined the contours of the sexual-speech category in which the doctrine operates, though the category clearly involves sexually explicit material.53 Confinement would shrink the risk of manipulation, because the label would be available only for a category the Court has already recognized. Reno, Playboy, and Boos limit the doctrine by the kind of harm invoked, but none decides whether a subject outside the sexually oriented business setting can ever qualify.
The doctrine reached furthest in the nude-dancing cases, which carried it from the location of businesses to the regulation of expressive conduct. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. a divided Court, without a majority opinion, upheld an Indiana statute requiring dancers to wear pasties and G-strings. The plurality rested on the state's interest in societal order and morality, while Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment, relied on the state's interest in preventing secondary effects such as prostitution and sexual assault. In City of Erie v. Pap's A.M. the secondary-effects rationale carried a plurality. Justice O'Connor rejected any reading of the Erie ordinance as content-based. She found it aimed at combating the negative secondary effects associated with nude dancing establishments, such as violence, public intoxication, prostitution, and other serious criminal activity.54 Relying on Renton and Mini Theatres, she accepted that even one adult entertainment business in a neighborhood is likely to produce those effects, and she held that the effects satisfied the substantial-interest prong of the O'Brien test.55 She found the justification sufficient even without a specific evidentiary record of such effects.56
The dissenters saw in Pap's the danger the objection describes. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment on a different ground, that a law not targeted at expressive conduct and generally applicable is subject to no First Amendment scrutiny at all. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, protested the plurality's use of the doctrine. He pointed out that it had been used only to justify regulating where indecent entertainment businesses may locate and was now used to justify a total ban on the dancing itself.57 The concern has force because secondary-effects reasoning is most credible when the remedy relocates a business and leaves the expression available, since dispersal can reduce crime without reducing speech. A ban removes the expression itself, so the link between the claimed harm and the remedy is harder to credit.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul recognizes a secondary-effects justification outside zoning, in a setting where the government may already proscribe a category of speech. The Court struck down an ordinance that reached only fighting words addressed to race, color, creed, religion, or gender, because the First Amendment does not permit special prohibitions on speakers who express views on disfavored subjects. The Court nonetheless identified legitimate reasons to treat one subclass differently. When the basis for the distinction is the very reason the whole class is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists, and a State might therefore prohibit only the obscenity that is most patently offensive in its prurience.58 A second valid basis is that the subclass is associated with particular secondary effects, so that the regulation is justified without reference to the content of the speech. The opinion states the limit on all such selectivity in a way that frames the whole debate over Renton: the distinction passes so long as there is “no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.”59 The objection to the secondary-effects doctrine is that a recital of crime and property values can hide exactly that possibility, and its defenders answer that location rules aimed at those harms do not carry it.