Concept
Turner Broadcasting: Must-Carry
Content-neutral regulation of protected expression
Turner Broadcasting: Must-Carry
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), held that content-neutral regulations of speech, such as must-carry rules applied to cable operators, receive intermediate scrutiny: the government must show important interests unrelated to the suppression of speech and means narrowly tailored to them.1 Earlier sections borrowed Turner for single points, such as the speaker-based line and the inquiry into a law's manifest purpose. This section follows the case from statute to judgment, because the arguments the Court answered are the ones a student must retrace whenever a problem asks whether a regulation aimed at one medium draws strict scrutiny.
Cable began in the late 1940s as a way to bring clear broadcast signals to remote or mountainous communities. Modern systems carry dozens or hundreds of channels and compete directly with over-the-air broadcasters as an independent source of programming. Operators own the physical transmission facilities and select programming from outside sources.2 Congress concluded that this competition threatened broadcast television, and it enacted must-carry provisions that compel cable operators to offer carriage to a minimum number of full-power broadcast stations. Only systems with fewer than 300 subscribers escape the obligation.3
Cable operators and programmers challenged the provisions under the First Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment to the government, and the Supreme Court produced a splintered result. Justice Kennedy's opinion spoke for a unanimous Court in Part I, for eight Justices in Parts II-A and II-B, for five in the rest of Part II and in Part III-A, and for only four in Part III-B.4 Those four found the record too thin to show that must-carry was narrowly tailored to the government's interests and would have remanded. Justice Stevens supplied a fifth vote to remand even though he would have affirmed the summary judgment for the government.5 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg and in part by Justice Thomas, dissented in part on the ground that the rules are content-based and so call for strict scrutiny.6 Eighteen months of further factfinding followed, the district court again granted summary judgment to the government, and in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (Turner II), the Court affirmed by a vote of 5-4.7
The stakes of classification explain why the challengers pressed so hard. Strict scrutiny presumes a regulation invalid and requires the government to show narrowly tailored or necessary means to a compelling interest.8 The Court first had to decide which standard governs cable at all, because broadcasting is reviewed under a more relaxed standard and the government urged that cable be treated the same way.9 The challengers then offered three routes to strict scrutiny: that the rules are content-based, that they compel cable operators to carry speech they did not choose, and that they single out cable. The subsections below take the medium question and then each route in turn. Together they show how to test a regulation aimed at one medium against every door into the stricter track. The intermediate-scrutiny standard itself, and how it operated on remand, come later in this chapter.
Cable Is Not Broadcast
The must-carry rules burden speech. They interfere with cable operators' editorial discretion by compelling carriage of a minimum number of broadcast stations, and they impose special burdens on cable programmers, so some measure of heightened scrutiny is demanded.10 Yet not every interference with speech triggers the same degree of scrutiny, and the Court had to decide at the outset which level the must-carry provisions called for.11
The government's first answer was to analyze cable regulation under the standard that applies to broadcast television. The argument had a real foundation. The Court has allowed more intrusive regulation of broadcasters, as in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, than of newspapers, as in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, which struck down a state statute giving a political candidate a right of access to a newspaper to reply to personal criticism.12 The Court nonetheless held that the rationale for the less rigorous broadcast standard, whatever its validity in the cases that developed it, does not apply to cable.13
That rationale is scarcity. Where substantially more individuals want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish. Scarcity required some regulatory mechanism to divide the electromagnetic spectrum and assign specific frequencies to particular broadcasters, which is why the Court has called broadcast frequencies a scarce resource that must be portioned out among applicants.14 The relaxed standard therefore follows from a physical limit, and it holds only as long as the limit does.
Cable has no such limit. Cable television does not suffer from the inherent limitations that characterize broadcasting. Given advances in fiber optics and digital compression, soon there may be no practical limit on the number of speakers who can use the medium, and two cable speakers sharing a channel face no danger of physical interference with each other.15 The relaxed Red Lion standard is therefore inapt for cable regulation. The Court left the scarcity rationale intact for broadcasting, declining to question its continuing validity despite long criticism, and refused only to extend it to cable.16
Facts about how cable is built and licensed do not change the analysis. Cable systems depend on municipal franchises, including rights-of-way over streets and utility poles, and they carry broadcast signals, so the government has sometimes argued that cable resembles broadcasting more than print and is therefore more regulable. The cable industry answered that technological scarcity is not an issue on cable systems.17 Franchises and shared programming say nothing about the number of speakers a system can carry or about signal interference, the two features on which broadcast review rests.
The government's second argument tried to move the foundation of broadcast review from physics to economics. The Court agreed that the cable market suffers certain structural impediments, but it found the argument flawed in two respects. First, the special physical characteristics of broadcast transmission, not the economic characteristics of the broadcast market, underlie the broadcast cases. Second, the mere assertion of dysfunction or failure in a speech market, without more, does not shield a speech regulation from the First Amendment standards that apply to nonbroadcast media.18 The second flaw has the larger consequence. A market imperfection can be alleged in almost any speech market, so if the allegation were enough, the government could lower the level of review for nearly any speech regulation by pointing to one.
Rejecting the broadcast standard did not turn cable into a newspaper. The unique physical characteristics of cable transmission should not be ignored when the constitutionality of cable regulation is at stake, but they do not require any alteration of settled First Amendment principles.19 The bottleneck shows how those characteristics matter. A daily newspaper, however secure its local monopoly, cannot obstruct readers' access to competing publications. A cable operator that controls the physical pathway into subscribers' homes can restrict the flow of information and ideas through what it chooses to carry.20 Cable is therefore neither broadcasting nor print. Analogies to other media help only to the extent that the old and new forms of speech share the First Amendment characteristics pertinent to the problem, and otherwise settled principles apply in light of the new medium's special features.21
In Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, the plurality likewise declined to decide whether cable is more like print or more like broadcasting. Categorical analogies, it reasoned, import law developed in very different contexts into a new and changing environment, and they lack the flexibility government needs to respond to serious practical problems without sacrificing the free exchange of ideas. Justice Souter added in concurrence that the relevant characteristics of cable are in technological and regulatory flux.22
Broadcasting itself shows the other side of the line. The scarcity of broadcast frequencies is the fundamental distinguishing characteristic of that medium, and the relaxed standard follows from it.23 Even there the government can run afoul of the First Amendment, as it did in FCC v. League of Women Voters when it prohibited public broadcasting stations from editorializing on public issues.24 Set beside Turner, the two decisions show which fact moves a regulation onto which track. Cable lacks the physical limits behind the broadcast standard, so a rule regulating cable operators, even one that benefits broadcasters, is reviewed under ordinary First Amendment principles, and the Court upheld must-carry only after applying intermediate scrutiny.25
The next subsection takes up the classification step and explains why the must-carry rules were treated as content-neutral.
Why Must-Carry Was Content-Neutral
The Court classified the must-carry rules through two inquiries: what the rules say, and why Congress adopted them. On their face, the rules, insofar as they pertain to the carriage of full-power broadcasters, impose burdens and confer benefits without reference to the content of speech. A neutral face does not end the matter, however, because even a facially neutral regulation may be content-based if its manifest purpose is to regulate speech because of the message it conveys.27 Both inquiries had to come out neutral for the rules to reach intermediate scrutiny.
A regulation depends on content when something the speaker says triggers the burden or lifts it. The Court found no such trigger on either side of the must-carry rules. The rules interfere with operators' editorial discretion, but the extent of the interference does not depend on the content of their programming. The obligation binds every operator except those with fewer than 300 subscribers, whatever programs or stations the operator offers or has offered.28 Tornillo shows the opposite design. A newspaper there could avoid its access obligation by refraining from speech critical of political candidates, so the obligation operated as a price on that speech.29 No change in what a cable operator airs reaches the must-carry obligation, so the rule gives the government nothing to reward or punish.
The benefit side is equally neutral. The rules favor every full-power broadcaster that requests carriage, whether commercial or noncommercial, independent or network affiliated, English or Spanish language, religious or secular, provided only that the broadcaster operates in the same television market as the cable system.30 The line between favored broadcasters and cable programmers separates speakers by the way they transmit, and the earlier discussion of speaker distinctions explains why a line of that kind does not by itself signal a content preference.
The version of the law that the facial inquiry would catch is easy to describe.
Congress's actual rules carry no such qualification. A full-power broadcaster qualifies by requesting carriage and operating in the same television market as the cable system, and the programs it airs play no part. That settles the face of the statute and leaves the second inquiry, which asks whether Congress's purpose nonetheless shows a wish to promote particular programming.
Appellants argued that it did, and the Court rejected the argument after looking to the design of the rules and to Congress's stated aims. Congress granted must-carry privileges because it believed that the broadcast television industry is in economic peril, owing to the physical characteristics of cable transmission and the economic incentives facing the cable industry.31 The provisions are meant to protect broadcast television from what Congress determined to be unfair competition by cable, to preserve the existing structure of the broadcast medium while cable expands, and to keep broadcast television available as a source of video programming for those without cable.32 Justice Kennedy identified three important interests unrelated to the suppression of expression: preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources, and promoting fair competition in the market for television programming. He concluded that the overriding congressional purpose is unrelated to the content of expression disseminated by cable and broadcast speakers.33 The Court had also already treated the protection of noncable households from the loss of regular broadcast service as an important and substantial federal interest in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp.34
The operation of the rules confirmed that reading. They confer must-carry rights on all full-power broadcasters irrespective of their programming. They do not require or prohibit the carriage of particular ideas or points of view. They do not penalize operators or programmers for what they air, compel operators to affirm views they reject, or produce any net decrease in available speech. And they leave operators free to carry whatever they wish on every channel outside the must-carry set.35 Each feature closes a route by which a carriage law could serve as an instrument of content control.
Appellants also pointed to Congress's references to local and educational programming as proof that Congress wanted that content on cable. The Court answered that the operation of the Act undermines the suggestion. The provisions benefit all full-power broadcasters irrespective of what they air, and a cable system required to bump a cable programmer could drop a channel devoted entirely to local or educational programming in favor of a broadcaster offering very little. Appellants did not even contend that broadcast programming is more local or educational than cable programming.36 The majority read Congress's praise as recognition that broadcast services have intrinsic value worth preserving against the threat cable poses, and not as a judgment that broadcast programming outranks cable programming.37
A further argument held that preferring broadcast stations automatically entails content requirements, because broadcast programming, unlike cable programming, is subject to certain limited content restraints. The Court granted the premise and denied the inference. It does not follow that Congress mandated carriage as a means of ensuring that particular programs will be shown, or not shown, on cable systems.38 In a regime where Congress or the FCC exercised more intrusive control over broadcast content, an argument like appellants' might carry greater weight, but in the present regulatory system those concerns are without foundation.39 The inference from preferring broadcasters to preferring content therefore depends on how much content control actually attaches to broadcasters. Appellants' ability to hypothesize a content-based purpose rested on little more than speculation and cast no doubt on the neutral character of must-carry.40
That conclusion did not command the whole Court. Justice O'Connor's dissent concluded that the statute's preference for broadcasters over cable programmers is justified with reference to content, for example by Congress's references to the diversity and local-affairs focus of broadcast programming.41 On that reading, the rules restrict, for reasons related to content, the programming operators may put on their systems, and they require operators to include programming they would rather avoid. She therefore treated them as an impermissible restraint on cable operators' editorial discretion as well as on cable programmers' speech.42 The two sides disagree about what Congress's praise for broadcast programming shows. For the majority it shows that a service has value worth preserving. For the dissent it shows that the preference rests on what the favored speakers say. The majority's finding that the rules carry no content-based trigger or penalty is what places them under intermediate scrutiny and separates them from the access rules in Tornillo and Pacific Gas & Electric, the subject of the next subsection.
The Compelled-Speech Argument
The cable operators offered a second path to strict scrutiny, drawn from the compelled-speech cases. The Court closed it by holding that the access rules struck down in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo and Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California do not control the must-carry provisions.44 The operators argued that must-carry compels them to transmit speech not of their choosing. Relying principally on Tornillo, they said this intrusion on their editorial control amounts to forced speech that, if not invalid per se, can be justified only if narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.45 Answering that argument required the Court to identify what made the earlier access rules unconstitutional, so those two decisions come first.
Tornillo struck down a Florida right-of-access statute that gave a political candidate access to a newspaper to reply to personal criticism.46 The statute did not censor speech in the traditional sense, yet its penalty reached any newspaper that published news or commentary arguably within the statute's reach. Editors, the Court reasoned, might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy, so that political and electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced.47 A duty triggered by the paper's own speech works as a penalty on that speech. An editor who knows that a critical story will bring a reply will weigh that cost before running the story, and the cheapest way to avoid it is to leave the story out.
Pacific Gas & Electric reached the same result by a different route. The access requirement there, unlike the statute in Tornillo, was not triggered by speech of any particular content. The plurality still applied strict scrutiny. The regulation conferred benefits on a speaker based on viewpoint, giving access only to a consumer group opposing the utility's practices, and the utility, to avoid the appearance that it agreed with the group, would feel compelled to respond to the arguments and allegations in the group's messages to its customers.48 Together the two decisions show the dangers a compelled-access rule can create: a content-based trigger, a content-based grant of access, and a forced response from the host.
The Court found none of those dangers in must-carry, and its first reason answers the first two. The must-carry rules are content-neutral in application. No message spoken by a cable operator activates the duty, so no content-based penalty follows. Nor do the rules grant access on the ground that broadcast content will counterbalance the operators' messages, because they confer benefits on all full-power local broadcasters whatever the content of their programming.49 An operator that cannot reduce its carriage duty by changing what it airs has no cost to weigh when it chooses programming, and a guest selected without regard to viewpoint has not been selected to answer the host. The facts that made the rules content-neutral in the classification inquiry therefore decide this argument as well.
The second reason answers the danger of a forced response. In Pacific Gas & Electric, the pressure to answer the consumer group arose from the utility's wish to avoid appearing to agree with it. Must-carry creates no comparable pressure, because it would not force cable operators to alter their own messages to respond to the broadcast programming they must carry.50 Nothing in the provisions would lead an operator or programmer to conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy either, which removes the deterrent that decided Tornillo.51
The third difference explains why the newspaper analogy fails. A daily newspaper, however secure its local monopoly, does not possess the power to obstruct readers' access to competing publications, so its exclusive control over its own news copy keeps no other paper from reaching willing readers in the same locale.52 A cable operator is placed differently. It exercises bottleneck monopoly power over the pathway into subscribers' homes.53 The First Amendment's command that government not impede speech does not disable government from ensuring that private interests do not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the free flow of information and ideas, and the Court cited Associated Press v. United States for that point.54 Must-carry thus protects the ability of other speakers, the broadcasters, to reach viewers whom the gatekeeper could otherwise cut off, which is a different concern from a newspaper's relationship to its readers. The bottleneck answers the newspaper analogy and enters, as the earlier discussion of cable and broadcast explained, as a feature of the medium bearing on settled principles. It does not stand in for the first reason.
The first reason rests on the classification of must-carry as content-neutral, which is why the contrary view matters. Justice O'Connor, who found the preference for broadcasters justified by reference to content, concluded that the rules restrict the programming operators may carry and require programming they would rather avoid, for reasons related to content. In her view that put the case squarely within Pacific Gas & Electric and, by extension, Tornillo.55 Both opinions treat a content-based carriage rule as governed by the access cases, and they part over whether must-carry is content-based. The compelled-speech argument therefore stands or falls with the classification dispute traced in the preceding subsection.
The compelled-speech label is a threshold question, and it does not choose the standard of review by itself. A law that compels speech of a particular content, or compels counterspeech in response to speech of a particular content, as the laws in Tornillo and Pacific Gas & Electric did, is treated as content-based and receives strict scrutiny. A law that compels speech for reasons unrelated to content, as the majority read must-carry, receives at most the intermediate scrutiny of O'Brien and Ward.56 An exam stem describing a law that forces a speaker to carry another's message therefore calls for questions about trigger, beneficiary, forced response, and gatekeeper power. An automatic appeal to Tornillo would skip them.
Singling Out a Medium
The cable operators' last route to strict scrutiny rested on a different line of precedent. They argued that must-carry burdens cable and not other media that transmit video programming, such as MMDS and SMATV, and, relying on decisions invalidating taxes on the press, they contended that this kind of differential treatment invites government abuse.58 The Court rejected the premise that the First Amendment mandates strict scrutiny for any speech regulation that applies to one medium, or a subset of it, and not to others.59 The question is what made the press-tax cases dangerous and whether must-carry shared those features.
The taxes invalidated in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue and Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland targeted a small number of speakers and so threatened to distort the market for ideas. There was no evidence of an illicit governmental motive behind either tax, but both were structured in a way that raised suspicion that suppressing certain ideas was the objective.60 A burden that reaches only a few speakers can change which voices compete without any official stating hostility to a message, so the structure of the burden is the warning sign.
Leathers v. Medlock sits on the other side of the line. The Court there upheld a general state tax applied to cable television services even though the print media and scrambled satellite broadcast services were exempt. The fact that a law singles out a certain medium, or even the press as a whole, is insufficient by itself to raise First Amendment concerns, and such laws are constitutionally suspect only in certain circumstances.61 The tax reached about 100 cable systems offering a wide variety of programming and was not likely to stifle the free exchange of ideas.62 The two lines of cases differ in the shape of the burden. The press taxes landed on a few speakers, while the Leathers tax was a general levy that posed no comparable danger of suppression.
Structure is only one half of the inquiry. Heightened scrutiny is also unwarranted when the differential treatment is justified by some special characteristic of the particular medium being regulated.63 A medium-based line is worrying because it may be a way of picking voices by what they say, and an explanation rooted in a fact about the medium answers that worry, because the line then follows the problem and not the message. For must-carry the special characteristic was the bottleneck monopoly power that cable operators exercise, together with the danger that power poses to the viability of broadcast television. The operators did not argue, and it did not appear, that MMDS and SMATV are subject to bottleneck control or threaten the survival of broadcast television, so it was no surprise that Congress imposed the must-carry obligations on cable operators only.64 The Court reasoned the same way when the cable programmers objected that the rules favor broadcasters over them. Congress granted the privileges because it believed the broadcast industry was in economic peril, and a benefit that follows that rationale does not call for strict scrutiny.65
The breadth of the rules supplied the second answer. The must-carry provisions are broad based, applying to almost all cable systems in the country and exempting only systems with fewer than 300 subscribers, rather than a select few.66 A rule that covers nearly the whole medium gives government little ability to pick winners and losers among cable's speakers, so the provisions lack the dangers of suppression and manipulation presented by the more narrowly targeted taxes in Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Writers' Project.67 With a medium-based justification and a broad reach, the rules were suspect on neither count.
An exam stem that stresses that a law applies to cable, to newspapers, or to magazines and to nothing else describes only where the analysis begins. The questions that decide the track are how many speakers the burden actually reaches and what explains the line between the covered medium and its neighbors. Treating the label as the answer produces the mistake the Court corrected in Turner: equating any medium-specific rule with the press taxes struck down in Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Writers' Project.
With the singling-out argument answered, every route to strict scrutiny the operators offered had closed. Cable operators and programmers are protected speakers, cable lacks the physical scarcity behind the broadcast standard, the rules were content-neutral, they differed from the access rules of the compelled-speech cases, and they did not single out cable in a suspect way. The Court therefore agreed with the District Court that the appropriate standard is the intermediate scrutiny applicable to content-neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech, drawn from Ward v. Rock Against Racism and United States v. O'Brien.68 Later sections in this chapter take that standard apart element by element and show how it operated on the Turner record.