Concept
True Threats
Regulation of unprotected expression
True Threats
True threats stand with incitement and fighting words on the list of categories the First Amendment leaves unprotected, and Virginia v. Black holds that the list includes cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate. The case combines two ideas from earlier in this chapter. It asks what counts as a threat, and it asks whether a state that singles out one kind of threat violates the R.A.V. rule against using a category to disfavor particular ideas.
A state may punish a threat for what it does to its target, not for the idea it carries. The target fears violence and changes where they go, whom they trust, and how they live, and that fear and the disruption it causes injure the target whether or not the speaker ever means to act. Because the injury has nothing to do with the speaker's viewpoint, punishing threats takes little from public debate. The same reasoning keeps the category narrow. Menacing words are often political exaggeration, protest, or a joke, and a rule that reached every alarming statement would sweep in expression that the incitement cases protect when it is read in context. The line must follow what the speaker meant to communicate and what the speaker understood, because a test keyed only to the listener's fear would let the most easily alarmed hearer decide what may be said.
The subsections below follow the order of Black's analysis. The first defines the category and the mental state it requires. The second explains why a state may single out cross burning done with intent to intimidate without offending the R.A.V. limit on selectivity within a category. The third explains why the Virginia statute nonetheless failed as interpreted: it made any cross burning prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate, which left no room for an expressive, non-threatening purpose. The two holdings drew different support. A majority upheld the basic ban, and only a plurality condemned the prima facie provision, so each subsection marks which kind of authority a statement rests on.
Defining True Threats
Black defines true threats as statements “where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” 1 Each phrase screens out a different kind of speech. Serious removes jests, exaggeration, and heated rhetoric. Unlawful violence removes statements about lawful acts or merely unpleasant ones. A particular individual or group removes general advocacy of violence, which the incitement cases govern under their own standard. What remains is a message telling an identifiable target that violence is coming. As with incitement, the line the Court draws runs between concrete criminality and political advocacy. 2
The speaker need not intend to carry out the threat. The prohibition protects individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to protecting them from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur. 3 A person who learns that someone means to shoot them changes where they go, whom they trust, and how they live, and that injury is complete when the message arrives, whether or not the sender owns a weapon. For the same reason, the category asks nothing about the probability that the threat will succeed or about the speaker's means of carrying it out. 4 Here true threats part from the two categories studied earlier. Incitement reaches speech likely to produce imminent lawless action by an audience, and fighting words reach words that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. 5 A true threat inflicts a different harm: the fear that violence will follow.
Violent words aimed at a named person do not end the inquiry, as Watts v. United States shows. At a public rally in Washington, Watts said he would not report for his draft physical and added that if the government ever made him carry a rifle, the first man he wanted in his sights was President Johnson. 6 He was convicted under a federal statute against knowingly and willfully threatening the President's life, and the Court reversed. The remark was expressly conditional on being drafted, and the listeners laughed, so in context it could only be read as crude political opposition. 7 The Court called it “political hyperbole,” not a true threat, and Black cites Watts for exactly that point. 8 Watts's words satisfied two of the definition's three elements, since they spoke of shooting and named a particular person. What failed was seriousness, and the Court reached that conclusion by reading the words in their setting. The Court's 2023 decision in Counterman v. Colorado, discussed below, later described the word true as separating threats from jests, hyperbole, and other statements that in context do not convey a real possibility that violence will follow. 9
The tenant's note and Watts's remark differ in the facts that bear on seriousness. The note is unconditional, private, and meant to frighten; the rally remark was a conditional protest made to an audience that laughed. A student who stops at the violent vocabulary and the named target skips the question that decides the category: how the statement reads, in context, to a person who hears it.
Intimidation is the subset of true threats that matters most for the rest of this unit. In the constitutionally proscribable sense, it is a type of true threat in which a speaker directs a threat to a person or group with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death. 10 The definition of a threat looks to what the statement conveys, and intimidation adds the speaker's purpose to frighten. That added element does real work in the cross-burning cases, because Virginia's statute made intent to intimidate an element of the offense, and the next subsections show how the element separates a burning cross that threatens from one that expresses an ideology.
Black did not say what mental state the First Amendment requires of a person prosecuted for a threat, and Counterman v. Colorado answered the question in 2023. 11 A stranger sent a singer hundreds of Facebook messages over two years, some urging her to die, and she stopped walking alone and canceled performances. 12 The Court held that the State must prove the defendant had some subjective understanding of the threatening nature of the statements, and that recklessness suffices: the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk that the communications would be viewed as threatening violence. 13 Whether a statement is a threat still depends on what it conveys to the person who receives it. The speaker's state of mind enters as a separate constitutional safeguard. 14
The safeguard protects speakers who cannot tell which side of the line a remark falls on. A speaker who fears that the legal system will err may fall silent and steer wide of the unlawful zone, so a test keyed only to how a reasonable listener would hear the words would deter speech that is no threat at all. 15 Recklessness balances the competing concerns. A reckless speaker has done more than make a mistake: the speaker has consciously accepted a substantial risk of serious harm, and a more demanding standard would shield real threats and make prosecutions harder to prove. 16 In the threats setting, a reckless speaker is aware that others could regard the statement as threatening violence and delivers it anyway. 17 Purpose and knowledge sit above recklessness on the ladder of mental states, and the First Amendment demands neither.
Cross Burning and Virulence
The First Amendment permits a state to outlaw cross burning done with the intent to intimidate, the Court held in Virginia v. Black, because a burning cross is “a particularly virulent form of intimidation.” 23 Virulent means especially harmful, and the decision turns on why a burning cross earns the word. Virginia's statute made it a crime to burn a cross with the intent of intimidating a person or group of persons, and it reached burnings on another's property, on a highway, or in a public place. 24
Two incidents produced the case. Barry Black led a Ku Klux Klan rally on private property in Carroll County, with the owner's permission. Twenty-five to thirty people gathered, speakers explained what the group believed, and at the close the crowd circled a cross that was set on fire. 25 Richard Elliott and Jonathan O'Mara drove onto the property of their African-American neighbor in Virginia Beach, planted a cross, and burned it. 26 One burning ended a gathering of like-minded people; the other targeted a single household. The majority noted that it was unclear whether Elliott and O'Mara acted from racial animus at all, because a dissenting state judge observed that they were angry over their neighbor's complaint about a firearm shooting range in their yard. 27
The Supreme Court of Virginia had struck the statute down under R.A.V., reasoning that the statute discriminates on the basis of content and so is unconstitutional. 28 The majority conceded part of that premise. A burning cross is symbolic expression: the Klan burns one at its rallies, and individuals place one on another's lawn, because the cross carries a message in an effective and dramatic way. 29 The concession did not decide the case. 30 Two questions did. The first is whether the expression falls in a proscribable category, and intimidation does, because it is a type of true threat and respondents did not contest that some cross burnings fit within it. 31 The second is whether a statute that bans only one kind of intimidating message discriminates within the category. The government may not discriminate within a category of otherwise proscribable speech to favor some viewpoints or ideas over others, unless the discrimination is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest. 32 But R.A.V. never held that the First Amendment prohibits all content discrimination within a proscribable area of speech. 33
R.A.V. itself explained when selectivity inside a category is permissible. When the basis for the distinction consists entirely of the very reason the whole class is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists, because a reason neutral enough to remove the class from protection is neutral enough to sort within it. 34 Threats fall outside the First Amendment to protect people from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear causes, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur. Those reasons have special force when applied to the President, so the Federal Government may criminalize only threats against the President. It may not criminalize only those threats against the President that mention his policy on aid to inner cities, because that line follows a message and not the danger. 35
Virginia's statute sits on the permitted side, and its text shows why. It makes no difference whether the burner means to intimidate because of the victim's race, gender, or religion or because of the victim's “political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality,” so no disfavored topic defines the offense. 36 Cross burners also do not aim their intimidation only at racial or religious minorities: the Court cited burnings directed at union members and one defendant who burned a cross in the yard of the lawyer who was prosecuting him. 37 A statute that reaches the lawyer's yard and the neighbor's lawn alike draws its line at intimidation.
That leaves the question why a state may pick cross burning out of all intimidating messages. The majority answered with history: Virginia may regulate this subset of intimidating messages in light of cross burning's long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence. 38 The history matters because of what threats are punished for. A threat is punishable for the fear it produces, and a symbol tied to a record of arson, beatings, and killings produces more fear, and a more credible prospect of violence, than most hostile words. 39 Because the possibility of injury or death behind a burning cross is not hypothetical, few messages are more powerful than a cross burned to intimidate. 40 A statute that singles out the threats most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm therefore draws its line inside the reason the category exists. The majority offered a comparison from R.A.V.: a state may prohibit only the obscenity that is most patently offensive in its prurience, and likewise only the forms of intimidation most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm. 41 The comparison answers the worry behind R.A.V. A subcategory chosen for a reason unrelated to the category's danger suggests that the government is aiming at ideas, and a subcategory chosen for the category's own danger leaves little room for that suspicion. 42
The holding does not make every burning cross a threat. A burning cross can broadcast threat and ideology together, ideology alone, or threat alone, and Elliott and O'Mara apparently chose the last. 43 Directed at a particular person who is not a Klan member, a burning cross often works as a message of intimidation meant to inspire fear of bodily harm, while at a rally it can express Klan ideology and unity; in either setting it remains a symbol of hate. 44 The statute's intent element separates the two uses. A cross burned to convey an ideological message is protected, however repugnant, and a cross burned with the intent to put a target in fear is a true threat the state may punish. 45 Two shortcuts therefore fail: reading Black as declaring all cross burning unprotected skips the intent element, and reading R.A.V. as forbidding every selective statute skips the exception.
Three Justices disagreed on the basic ban. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, agreed with the majority that the statute makes a content-based distinction within the category of punishable intimidation, the kind of distinction R.A.V. addressed, but he denied that any exception saves it. 46 In his view the legislature may have chosen the cross for its special power to threaten, but it may equally have singled it out because it disapproved of its message of white supremacy, either because it thought the doctrine pernicious or because it found public espousal of it a civic embarrassment. 47 Singling out one manner of expression risks suppressing the ideas themselves. 48 He tested the majority's exception against R.A.V.'s own examples and found no kinship. The prurience example and the President example select special risks, not messages, since threats against the President are not tied to any one subject or viewpoint, while cross burning is generally associated with a particular message. 49 A content-based ban on it may therefore be a subtle effort to suppress the message of white supremacy that even a nonthreatening burning broadcasts, and he read the majority as applying the virulence exception more flexibly and pragmatically than R.A.V.'s examples suggested. 50
The disagreement is over what explains the legislature's choice of this symbol, the threat it carries or the message it expresses. The majority read the history of cross burning as a signal of impending violence, a reason tied to the danger and not to the message. Justice Thomas, who agreed that the ban was valid, rejected the premise that the statute regulates expression at all: the legislature wrote out any expressive value by banning only intimidating conduct undertaken by a particular means, so the statute “prohibits only conduct, not expression.” 51 He also found it hard to believe that a legislature that had enacted a litany of segregationist laws meant to squelch the segregationist message. 52 Because the intent element carries the entire difference between threat and ideology, how a statute lets a jury find that element decides whether the ban can be enforced without punishing protected expression. That is the subject of the next subsection.
The Prima Facie Provision
Virginia's statute made it a crime to burn a cross with the intent to intimidate, and it added a rule about proof: “[a]ny such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.” 54 Prima facie evidence is evidence that suffices to establish a fact so long as nothing rebuts it. 55 The Commonwealth added the provision in 1968, and the Supreme Court of Virginia had read it to mean that the act of burning a cross alone, with no evidence of intent to intimidate, would suffice for arrest and prosecution and would insulate the Commonwealth from a motion to strike the evidence at the end of its case-in-chief. 56 At Barry Black's trial, the judge told the jury, following Virginia's model instruction, that “[t]he burning of a cross, by itself, is sufficient evidence from which you may infer the required intent.” 57 The previous subsection upheld the basic ban. A plurality of the Court then held this provision, as the instruction interpreted it, facially invalid, meaning invalid in itself, whatever the facts of any particular prosecution. 58
A cross burned to express an ideology is protected, and a cross burned to put a target in fear is a true threat the state may punish, so intent to intimidate is the fact that sorts one from the other. 59 A rule that lets the jury take the act as proof of the intent therefore weakens the one element that justifies the ban. The plurality said so directly: as the jury instruction construed it, the provision “strips away the very reason why a State may ban cross burning with the intent to intimidate.” 60 If the burning alone supports an inference of intent, a prosecutor who proves the burning has come close to proving the crime. The plurality observed that the provision permits a jury to convict in every cross-burning case in which the defendants exercise their constitutional right not to put on a defense, and that even when a defendant such as Black does present a defense, it makes a finding of intent more likely whatever the particular facts. 61
The act that triggers the inference is ambiguous, and that ambiguity drives the plurality's analysis. Burning a cross may mean that a person is engaged in constitutionally proscribable intimidation, or it may mean only that the person is engaged in core political speech. 62 History explains why. A burning cross is sometimes a statement of ideology or a symbol of group solidarity, a ritual used at Klan gatherings and used to represent the Klan itself, and occasionally the burner intends neither, as when a cross burns in a film such as Mississippi Burning or in a stage adaptation of Sir Walter Scott's The Lady of the Lake. 63 The provision made no effort to separate these uses. The plurality listed the distinctions it erased: 64
- a burning meant to create anger or resentment and a burning meant to threaten or intimidate a victim;
- a burning at a public rally and a burning on a neighbor's lawn;
- a burning directed at one individual and a burning directed at a group of like-minded believers;
- a burning on another's property with the owner's acquiescence and a burning on another's property without the owner's permission.
Black's own rally shows how many of these differences can sit inside one case. It took place on private property with the owner's permission, twenty-five to thirty people attended, and the cross was burned at the close of the gathering. 65 The instruction told his jury that the burning by itself was sufficient evidence of intent, so the jury could reach that finding without weighing any of those circumstances. 66 The harm extends beyond defendants like Black. A speaker deciding whether to burn a cross at a gathering of fellow believers, or a director staging a scene, must reckon with a reading of the statute under which the act alone supports arrest and prosecution. The plurality described the resulting chill as arising from the possibility that the Commonwealth will prosecute, and potentially convict, someone engaged only in lawful political speech at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect, and it concluded that “[t]he First Amendment does not permit such a shortcut.” 67
Two limits keep this part of the opinion from being overread. First, Justice O'Connor's discussion of the provision spoke for only four Justices, a plurality short of a majority. 68 Second, the plurality held the provision invalid only as the jury instruction interpreted it, and the Court observed that the Supreme Court of Virginia had not ruled on the provision's meaning. 69 Respondents argued only that the provision was invalid on its face and did not claim it was invalid as applied to any of them, so the question was the provision's reach as the instruction construed it. 70 A student who writes that every prima facie provision is unconstitutional has turned a narrow ruling into a broad one. The plurality's reasoning rests on the ambiguity of the cross-burning act and on an instruction that ignored context, and it gives no reason to condemn a statute that leaves the jury to weigh context.
The dispositions track the instruction. Black's jury had received it, and the Court held that his conviction could not stand, affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia in his case. 71 Elliott's jury received no instruction on the provision, and O'Mara pleaded guilty, so the provision was never at issue in either case, and the Supreme Court of Virginia had not decided whether it could be severed from the rest of the statute. 72 The Court therefore vacated that court's judgment as to Elliott and O'Mara and remanded for further proceedings. 73 The pattern looks odd, because the Court upheld the basic ban and still left standing the ruling against the Commonwealth in Black's case. The plurality's logic explains it: the defect lay in how the jury was told it could find intent, and only Black's trial contained that defect.
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, would have gone further and held the whole statute invalid. He treated the provision as a clue to the statute's purpose, and the clue pointed toward suppression of ideas: it works as a mechanism for bringing within the statute some expression that is doubtfully threatening though certainly distasteful, and it is apparently unnecessary to a legitimate prosecution, because an intimidation case involving a cross burning is easy to prove when any circumstances suggest intimidation. 74 That conclusion disqualified the statute from any exception to the rule of R.A.V., so the content-based statute could survive only if narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, and a content-neutral ban on intimidation would serve the same object. 75 Severing the provision later could not cure a statute that was already invalid when the defendants acted, so he would have affirmed as to all three respondents, concurring in the judgment as to Black and dissenting as to Elliott and O'Mara. 76
Two Justices answered that the provision deserved no such treatment. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, saw no justification for invalidating it on its face, and he reasoned that prima facie evidence supports an inference only until the defendant comes forward with some evidence in rebuttal, so the provision made the burning evidence of intent without making it conclusive. 77 He read the plurality as holding the provision overbroad, although Justice O'Connor did not expressly use that label, and he argued that overbreadth turns on whether people engaged in protected speech can be convicted under the law, and a possibility that they may be arrested and prosecuted does not suffice. 78 Justice Thomas, in his own dissent, called the provision an inference and not an irrebuttable presumption, and he thought it reasonable to presume intent to intimidate from the act itself, given the horrific effect cross burning has on its victims. 79 The plurality's reply rests on how the provision worked in practice. A rebuttable inference still carried the prosecution past a motion to strike on the act alone, and it permitted conviction whenever the defendant chose not to put on a defense, a choice the Constitution protects. 80 The plurality also adopted Justice Souter's observation that the provision can skew jury deliberations toward conviction where the evidence of intent is relatively weak and arguably consistent with a solely ideological reason for burning. 81 The opinions therefore divide over whether a risk of prosecution and a tilt toward conviction is enough to condemn a provision on its face, and over the remedy: the plurality invalidated the provision as interpreted and left the basic ban standing, while Justice Souter would have taken down the whole statute.