Concept
Why Commercial Speech Is Protected
Regulation of commercial speech
Commercial Speech and the First Amendment
Why Commercial Speech Is Protected
Advertising won First Amendment protection only in the 1970s, and the way it won that protection explains the rest of this chapter. In 1942, Valentine v. Chrestensen held that, although the First Amendment guards against government restriction of speech in most contexts, “the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”1 The case involved a municipal anti-litter ordinance applied to a handbill carrying both political and commercial messages.2 The Court saw the distributor as attempting to “pursue a gainful occupation in the streets,” a matter for legislative judgment that the state did not need to justify by any overriding or compelling interest. If speech was purely commercial, government could regulate it to the same extent and for the same reasons as any other commercial activity.3 Commercial speech therefore received not less protection but none, and the Court never explained the exclusion or defined the term.4
Profit alone never put speech beyond the First Amendment, even under Valentine. New York Times v. Sullivan rejected the argument that a paid “commercial” advertisement falls outside the Amendment, and movies have long been protected although they are made and distributed for profit.5
The exclusion began to weaken in Bigelow v. Virginia (1975), which overturned the conviction of a newspaper editor for publishing an advertisement for abortions. Reasoning that the First Amendment gave commercial speech some protection, the Court weighed the interests of the publisher, the reader, and the consumer against the state’s interest in barring publications that promoted abortions. It held the Virginia statute invalid because Roe v. Wade had made the proscribed activity legal.6 Bigelow still left some room for the old rule. The advertisement did more than propose a commercial transaction, since it contained factual material of clear public interest, and it concerned an activity in which the state could not, at least in some respects, interfere.7 An advertisement lacking both features might still lie outside the Amendment.
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (1976) removed that last room by presenting commercial speech without the Bigelow features. The statute barred pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices.8 Because only a licensed pharmacist may dispense prescription drugs in Virginia, the statute effectively forbade advertising of drug prices altogether, and some pharmacies refused even to quote a price over the telephone. Yet prices varied sharply: in the Newport News-Hampton area, tetracycline cost anywhere from $1.20 to $9.00, a difference of 650%.9 The speech at issue expressed nothing more than the idea “I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price.”10 The challengers were consumers of prescription drugs, not pharmacists, and the Court held that an audience may assert its own First Amendment interest. The protection runs to the communication, its source, and its recipients, so a right to advertise carries a reciprocal right to receive the advertising.11 The question became whether speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction” lacks all protection, and the Court answered that it does not.12
The Court reached that answer by asking whose interests the advertisement touches, and it found a First Amendment stake on each side of the transaction and in the public at large:
- The advertiser’s interest is economic, but that hardly disqualifies the speech. Employers and employees in a labor dispute also have primarily economic interests, yet both are protected when they speak on the merits of the dispute.13
- The consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information may be as keen as, or keener than, the interest in the day’s most urgent political debate. Suppression of price information hits hardest the poor, the sick, and the aged, who spend a disproportionate share of their income on prescription drugs and are least able to shop from one pharmacist to the next.14
- Society has an interest as well. In a predominantly free enterprise economy, resources are allocated through numerous private decisions, and it is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.15
The third interest ties commercial speech to self-government. Information that guides individual purchases also informs opinion about how the economic system ought to be regulated or altered, so even if the First Amendment were primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, the free flow of commercial information would serve that goal.16 Commentators observe that this rationale echoes Meiklejohn’s conception of protected public speech.17
Virginia defended the ban by pointing to professional standards, and the Court’s reply shows what kind of justification the new protection rules out. The ban did not affect professional standards directly. It worked only through the reactions people were assumed to have to price information, and it did nothing to stop a pharmacist inclined to cut corners. Its only effect on such a pharmacist was to insulate him from price competition and open the way to substantial, perhaps excessive, profit on inferior service. It protected the painstaking pharmacist too, but largely through public ignorance.18 In effect, the state took from consumers the information they needed to decide where to shop and what to request, and that pre-emption of individual decision-making is objectionable in a free-market economy.19 The Court put the question plainly: whether a state may completely suppress concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity because it fears that information’s effect on those who disseminate and receive it.20
The same opinion marked the limits of this protection. The First Amendment does not prohibit a state from insuring that the stream of commercial information flows cleanly as well as freely. The transactions advertised were not themselves illegal, and the special problems of the broadcast media were not before the Court.21 Under the framework the Court later built, government may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading.22 The Court also confined its holding to pharmacists, noting that physicians and lawyers render professional services of almost infinite variety, with a greater possibility of confusion and deception if they advertise. One year later it applied the same principles to strike a ban on price advertising for “routine” legal services such as the uncontested divorce.23
The reservation for illegal transactions comes from Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations (1973), which the Court cited in Virginia Pharmacy. There the Court held that a commission’s prohibition on sex-designated help-wanted columns did not violate the First Amendment, because the commission had found those columns to be illegal sex discrimination.24 The two cases mark the line. The drug price lists concerned lawful sales and truthful information, so the state could not suppress them. The hiring practices advertised in Pittsburgh were illegal, so the commercial expression proposing them lost its protection.25
Protected commercial speech still does not receive the protection given to political speech. Later opinions describe it as enjoying “a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,” and as subject to “modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.”26 Critics outside the Court go further. They argue that speech which does nothing more than propose a commercial transaction is almost self-evidently unconcerned with democratic self-governance, and that Virginia Pharmacy resurrects the substantive due process of Lochner v. New York by treating an ordinary piece of economic regulation as a speech problem.27 The Court nevertheless kept the protection and later extended it. It rejected the “greater includes the lesser” argument even for advertising of harmful but lawful products.28 The sections that follow show how the Court drew the line: what counts as commercial speech, why it receives less protection, and the test that governs its regulation.