Concept
The O'Brien Test
Regulation of expressive conduct
The O'Brien Test
United States v. O'Brien gave the Court a four-part test for regulations that reach conduct combining speech and nonspeech elements, and the Court used the test to sustain a conviction for burning a draft registration certificate.1 The test picks up where the gatekeeping question leaves off. That question asks whether the government's interest relates to the suppression of expression; the O'Brien test repeats it as the third requirement and, for laws that pass, supplies the standard of review.2
The test has this shape because two risks pull in opposite directions. If every neutral rule that a protester happened to break drew the strictest review, ordinary regulation would become unenforceable against anyone who announced a message. If regulation of conduct drew no review, a legislature could suppress a viewpoint by outlawing the gesture that carries it. O'Brien avoids both outcomes by asking the government for a real interest in the nonspeech element and a reasonable fit between that interest and the burden on expression.3 Commentators therefore read the symbolic speech doctrine as a restatement of the time, place, and manner test, not as a special rule for symbolic speech.4
Courts reconcile the government's legitimate interests with First Amendment values in two ways: by sorting cases into categories, each governed by its own rules, or by balancing the competing interests case by case.5 Four fixed requirements resemble the first method more than the second. The Court also pays close attention to the line between content-based and content-neutral laws, and the third requirement is where that line enters the test.6
The first subsection follows the draft-card prosecution from the burning to the Supreme Court's decision, because each requirement answers a question the facts raised. The next three subsections take the requirements one at a time and give the most space to the third, where the test meets the gatekeeping question.
O'Brien's Draft Card Case
O'Brien burned his Selective Service registration certificate and was prosecuted under a provision that Congress had amended in 1965, so that an offense was committed not only by a person who forges, alters, or in any manner changes a certificate but also by one who “knowingly destroys” or “knowingly mutilates” it.7 He defended on the ground that the burning was protected symbolic speech. In his view the freedom of expression includes all modes of “communication of ideas by conduct,” and he had acted in “demonstration against the war and against the draft.”8
In the District Court, O'Brien argued that the 1965 Amendment was enacted to abridge free speech and served no legitimate legislative purpose. The court rejected both arguments. It held that the statute on its face did not abridge First Amendment rights, that the court was not competent to inquire into Congress's motives, and that the Amendment was a reasonable exercise of Congress's power to raise armies.9 The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on a different ground, treating violation of the nonpossession regulation as a lesser included offense of the crime the Amendment defined.10 The Supreme Court held the Amendment constitutional both as enacted and as applied, vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment, and reinstated the District Court's judgment and sentence.11
The nonpossession regulation raised an objection that returns under the second requirement. Selective Service regulations required registrants to keep both their registration and classification certificates in their personal possession at all times, and the Act made knowing violation of any regulation a felony.12 If the government could already punish a registrant who failed to keep a certificate, what did a separate ban on destroying one add?
The Court began its answer with the statute's wording. The Amendment does not distinguish between public and private destruction, and it does not punish only destruction undertaken to express views.13 A law against destroying Selective Service certificates therefore no more abridges free speech on its face than a motor vehicle law against destroying drivers' licenses or a tax law against destroying books and records.14 Wording matters because it is the first evidence of the interest behind a law: a statute that reached only expressive destruction would define its coverage by the message. Congress wrote the broader prohibition, so a certificate burned privately in a kitchen sink falls under the Amendment just as one burned before a crowd does.
The Court would not accept that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled speech whenever the person engaging in it intends to express an idea.15 It reasoned instead that when speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.16 The burning did two things at once: it carried a message, and it destroyed an item the government needed to keep available. A rule that protected the whole act because of the message would let anyone shield damage to an administrative system by announcing a purpose. A rule that ignored the message would let the government relabel any gesture as conduct and punish it. The Court answered with a test in four parts, all of which the regulation must meet.17
The Court found all four requirements met. It relied on the government's substantial interest in assuring the continuing availability of issued certificates, on the Amendment's being an appropriately narrow means of protecting that interest, and on its condemning only the independent noncommunicative impact of conduct within its reach. It held that the noncommunicative impact of O'Brien's burning frustrated the interest.18
The result does not mean that symbolic speech receives less protection than spoken words. Had the government's reason for punishing O'Brien stemmed from its opposition to his message, the symbolic form of his speech would have given the government no license to punish him.19 Protest alone does not win the case either. Civil rights demonstrators of the fifties and sixties, who attacked Jim Crow legislation through sit-ins, demonstrations, parades, and picketing, usually found successful refuge in the First Amendment when states and cities answered with legislation.20 O'Brien did not, because the interest behind the Amendment lay in the noncommunicative aspect of his act.21 The Court has since observed that the O'Brien test differs little from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions.22
Power and Important Interest
The first two requirements work as thresholds. A regulation that burdens conduct combining speech and nonspeech elements is justified only if it lies within the constitutional power of the government that enacted it and furthers an important or substantial governmental interest.24 The power requirement asks whether the enacting government had authority to regulate the subject at all. The interest requirement asks it to name a real reason for the burden, and the reason must concern the nonspeech element, the part of the conduct the law actually regulates.25
O'Brien tested power only lightly. The District Court had held the Amendment a reasonable exercise of Congress's power to raise armies,26 and the Supreme Court found that it met all four requirements.27 The contest came at the second requirement. The Court has described the interest it demands in many words: compelling, substantial, subordinating, paramount, cogent, strong.28 The O'Brien formulation asks for an interest that is important or substantial.
O'Brien attacked the interest directly. He described the certificates as pieces of paper meant to notify registrants of their registration or classification, to be kept or thrown away at the registrant's convenience, and he noted that most of the information on a registration certificate serves no notification purpose at all.29 The Court agreed that the certificate contains much information the registrant needs no notification of. It still held that issuing certificates is a legitimate and substantial administrative aid to the draft system and that legislation insuring their continuing availability serves a legitimate and substantial purpose.30 The registration certificate proves that the registrant has registered, and a registrant who displays it easily dispels any question whether he is delinquent. Because both certificates are in the nature of receipts, the just and efficient administration of the system calls for their being continually available, for example when a registrant's file is mixed up.31 Each certificate also bears the address of the registrant's local board, which a registrant is unlikely to commit to memory, and so the certificates simplify communication between registrants and boards.32
The sharper objection was that the Amendment added nothing, because federal law already required registrants to possess their certificates.33 The Court nonetheless treated the requirement of a substantial interest as satisfied by the allegation that draft card burning would interfere with the administration of the Selective Service System.34 A possession rule and a destruction ban operate at different points: the first concerns whether a registrant has a certificate, the second whether an issued certificate continues to exist.
The deference is general. Commentators note that the Court's application of the demand for an important or substantial interest had limited independent significance in curbing the government's regulatory power, and they count the deferential approach among the surprises, maybe the disappointments, of the decision.35 Part of the explanation lies in what content-neutral laws pursue. Administrative efficiency, safety, and order are ordinary government business, and a law aimed at them reaches everyone who performs the act, so it rarely looks like a disguised attack on an idea.
These two requirements therefore rarely decide a case. A law with a recognizable source of authority and a genuine administrative, safety, or order rationale clears both with little argument, and the contest comes at the third requirement and, less often, at the fourth.
Unrelated to Suppression
The third requirement asks whether the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.38 The gatekeeping question from the preceding section is asked here, inside the test: a regulation that fails this requirement fails the O'Brien test and must be analyzed within general First Amendment principles.39 In O'Brien the Court sustained the statute only after finding that both the governmental interest and the operation of the Amendment were limited to the noncommunicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct, that is, to preventing harm to the smooth and efficient functioning of the Selective Service System.40 It marked the line by contrasting a case in which the government's interest in regulating conduct arises in some measure because the communication integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful.41
The Court looks to the interest the law serves, as shown by the law's text and operation, and the inquiry sets aside two other candidates. The first is the speaker's motive. O'Brien burned his certificate to express an idea, but the real question is the purpose of the governmental regulation.42 The second is the subjective motive of the legislators who voted for the law. Some members of Congress had urged the Amendment as a way of curbing Vietnam War protest,43 and the Court was asked to void the statute on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. It declined. What motivates one legislator to make a speech is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact a law, and a statute constitutional on its face could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a “wiser” speech about it.44 The District Court had likewise held that it was not competent to inquire into Congress's motives.45 The committee reports pointed the same way. They showed concern with the defiant destruction of cards and with open encouragement of others to destroy theirs, but they traced that concern to an apprehension that unrestrained destruction would disrupt the smooth functioning of the Selective Service System.46
Looking at a law's operation includes asking what it inevitably does. The Court distinguished cases such as Grosjean v. American Press Co. and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, where the inevitable effect of the law was itself unconstitutional. The statute attacked in O'Brien had no such effect, because the destruction of Selective Service certificates is in no respect inevitably or necessarily expressive.47
The statute's text is the first evidence of its interest, and the Court has paid close attention to the distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws for that reason.48 The Amendment covers public and private destruction alike and does not punish only destruction undertaken to express views.49 A law whose coverage tracks the message advertises that the message is its target. A leaf-burning ordinance shows the contrast. An ordinance that prohibits leaf burning only by socialists fails the third part, because the governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression.50 The fire and smoke are the same whoever burns; what changes is that the covered class is defined by the burner's politics, and a fire-safety interest cannot explain a line drawn that way. A regulation neutral on its face may also be content based if its manifest purpose is to regulate speech because of the message it conveys. The flag statute in United States v. Eichman contained no explicit content-based limit, yet the government's asserted interest was related to the suppression of free expression.51
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District supplies a real regulation that fails the requirement. Schools are among the government-operated places where the Court generally sides with the government when it regulates expression,52 yet the school authorities in Tinker singled out one symbol, black armbands worn to show opposition to the nation's involvement in Vietnam. That interest was related to the suppression of free expression, because the prohibition regulated ideas rather than conduct, and the order failed the O'Brien test. The case then had to be resolved under general First Amendment principles, by balancing the students' exercise of First Amendment rights against the rules of school authorities.53 The draft-certificate statute covered every knowing destruction, so nothing in its coverage depended on what the destroyer was saying; the armband order covered one symbol, so its coverage depended on the idea the armband expressed.
Purpose also controls outside the conduct cases. Concurring in a case about books removed from a school library, Justice Blackmun would bar officials from removing books to restrict access to the political ideas or social perspectives in them out of disapproval of those ideas. He would permit an elementary school library to remove a learned treatise criticizing American foreign policy because the students would not understand it.54 The same removal is lawful or unlawful depending on the interest behind it.
The same line sorts other cases. Buckley v. Valeo held that campaign spending limits defended as regulation of conduct could not satisfy the test even if spending were conduct, because the interests behind the limits arose in some measure from the communicative impact of spending. A court may also look to the predominant purpose behind a law. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., the district court found a predominant intent that was more than adequate to show the city's pursuit of its zoning interests unrelated to the suppression of free expression. The ordinance by its terms was designed to prevent crime, protect retail trade, maintain property values, and preserve the quality of neighborhoods, commercial districts, and urban life, not to suppress the expression of unpopular views.55
The first town resembles Congress in O'Brien, where an isolated remark could not overcome a neutral text backed by committee reports. The second resembles the school in Tinker, where the rule itself showed what it was aimed at. A law that satisfies this requirement must still satisfy the fourth, which tests the fit between the restriction and the interest.
No Greater Than Essential
The fourth requirement asks whether the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the government's interest.57 In O'Brien the Court perceived “no alternative means that would more precisely and narrowly assure the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates” than a law prohibiting their willful destruction or mutilation, and it said the Amendment “prohibits such conduct and does nothing more.”58 The wording sounds like the least-restrictive-means demand of strict scrutiny. The Court has not applied it that way.
O'Brien's own application was light. Chief Justice Warren did not require that the government use the means least burdensome on First Amendment values. He recited the conclusion that the Amendment effectively furthered the government's interest, and the requirement can be read to have no teeth.59
Later decisions made the lenient reading explicit. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism the Court held that a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.60 A regulation is not invalid simply because a court concludes that some less speech-restrictive alternative could adequately serve the interest, so long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary, and the Court has never applied strict scrutiny in this context.61 In Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC the Court quoted the O'Brien requirements and said the same of them: a regulation need not be the least speech-restrictive means of advancing the government's interests.62 The Court has also found that a statute passed the O'Brien test, even if it regulated expressive conduct, because the incidental burden on speech was no greater than essential and the statute promoted a substantial interest that would be served less effectively without it. That statute was the Solomon Amendment, and the interest was Congress's ability to raise and support the Armed Forces.63 The requirement is often put in these terms: the means need only directly and effectively further the state's substantial interest.64 The plurality in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. applied the requirement that way to a state's regulation of nude dancing.
The O'Brien standard and the time, place, and manner standard now run close together. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence noted that the O'Brien test differs little from the time, place, or manner standard.65 Clark also held that a ban on sleeping in a park remained a time, place, or manner regulation even if sleeping was expressive, because such regulations normally have the purpose and direct effect of limiting expression but are nevertheless valid.66 Commentators describe the fit inquiry as a familiar means-ends analysis of variable bite, not unlike mid-level scrutiny, whose answer depends on fact-driven considerations such as the nature of the speech activity regulated and the perceived significance of the governmental interest.67 A least-restrictive-means rule would let a challenger defeat nearly any regulation by describing a gentler alternative. Ward asks instead whether the means are substantially broader than necessary.
The requirement still has teeth. Schneider v. State accepted that a city's interest in preventing litter is legitimate and content-neutral and that leafleting creates a risk of litter, yet the Court struck down the leaflet ban, applying a variety of strict scrutiny. Antilitter laws were available as a less restrictive means, and the added cost of cleaning the streets was a cost the First Amendment required the city to bear.68 The difference lies in where the harm sits. Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent upheld a ban on posting signs on public property because the city did no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy. City of Ladue v. Gilleo struck down a ban on nearly all residential signs, even assuming the ban was content-neutral, because it almost completely foreclosed a unique and important means of communication. In Vincent the signs were the clutter. In Ladue the ban reached a homeowner's own window and shut off a medium that many speakers cannot replace.
Justice Harlan's concurrence in O'Brien supplies a further check. He understood the Court's criteria not to foreclose a First Amendment claim in the rare case where an incidental restriction, in practice, entirely prevents a speaker from reaching a significant audience with whom he could not otherwise lawfully communicate. He found no such problem because O'Brien could have conveyed his message in many ways other than by burning his draft card.69
Taken together, these decisions leave the O'Brien test close to the time, place, and manner standard in practice. The interest must be important or substantial, the fit need not be perfect, and the government need not use the least restrictive alternative. Which standard governs depends on the third requirement, which is why the Court pays close attention to the distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws.71 A law whose interest relates to suppression leaves the O'Brien standard, and the flag-burning cases that follow show what happens next.