Concept
Licensing Schemes
Prior restraint
Licensing Schemes
A licensing scheme is the prior restraint in its plainest form: speech waits on an official's approval. In practice, most prior restraints are either an administrative rule requiring a license or permit before anyone may speak or a judicial order forbidding the speech.1 In Lovell v. City of Griffin, the Court concluded that licensing schemes are the quintessential form of prior restraint and struck down a permit requirement as invalid on its face.2
The suspicion has a simple source. A licensing system puts an official between the speaker and the audience, and the official can approve the speech the government likes while withholding approval from the speech it dislikes. A speaker who must ask first cannot tell in advance whether the answer will turn on the message.3
Licensing is not forbidden outright, but a licensing scheme, like any prior restraint, comes to court under a heavy presumption against its validity that the government must overcome.4 A permit system is allowed only if the government has an important reason for requiring a license, if clear criteria leave almost no discretion to the licensing authority, and if the system provides procedural safeguards, namely a prompt decision and judicial review of denials.5
Which side of that line a scheme falls on also decides what a speaker may do about it. The first subsection takes up schemes that give the licensor unbridled discretion; the second takes up content-neutral systems the Court has upheld. The procedural safeguards get their own section, so the question here is whether the design of the licensing law is permissible.
Unbridled Discretion
Lovell v. City of Griffin sets the pattern for the whole line of cases. Griffin's ordinance prohibited distributing leaflets or circulars without a permit from the city manager and stated no standards for granting or refusing one.6 The Court held the ordinance invalid on its face, which means a court can declare a law unconstitutional by reading its text, without asking how it was applied to anyone. Whatever motive produced the ordinance, it struck at the foundation of press freedom by subjecting the press to license and censorship. And because the ordinance was void on its face, the defendant did not need to seek a permit; she could contest its validity in answer to the charge against her.7
Two rules come out of that decision. A law that gives an official unbridled discretion, meaning power to grant or refuse permission to speak without explicit limits on the grounds for decision, is invalid on its face. And a person subject to such a law may challenge it without first applying for a permit. The challenger need not show that the official abused the power or that any particular protected speech was curtailed, because courts invalidate laws granting excessive discretion out of concern for the risk of abuse.8
The reason a court need not wait for proof of abuse appears in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. Lakewood allowed newsracks on public property only with an annual permit from the mayor, who could deny it for stated reasons that included “other terms and conditions deemed necessary and reasonable by the Mayor.”9 Justice Brennan's opinion identified two First Amendment risks in unbridled licensing schemes: “self-censorship by speakers in order to avoid being denied a license to speak,” and the difficulty of detecting, reviewing, and correcting content-based censorship as applied when no standards exist by which to measure the licensor's action.10 When those risks are present to a significant degree, courts must entertain an immediate facial attack, and the challenge lies whenever a licensing law gives an official or agency substantial power to discriminate based on the content or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked speakers.11
The first risk operates before the official does anything. A publisher whose newsracks depend on the mayor's yearly permit, and who knows the mayor may refuse for reasons that no standard confines, has a motive to avoid printing what the mayor dislikes. The adjustment happens without any denial being issued, so the official's power works through the speaker's anticipation, and a record of fair treatment cannot remove the harm.
The second risk concerns what a court can do afterward. Without express standards, the licensor can supply a rationale after the fact or shift criteria from one applicant to the next, and a court reviewing a single denial cannot tell whether favored speech is being permitted and disfavored speech suppressed.12 The usual remedy for an abusive denial, an as-applied challenge, therefore fails exactly where it is needed, because it assumes a standard against which the denial can be judged. A facial challenge answers that gap by requiring the law itself to supply the measure.
The same reasoning explains why the speaker need not apply first. An applicant has entered the very system whose design is the objection, and the denial that follows is again a decision no standard measures. In Shuttlesworth, the Court said that a person faced with a facially invalid licensing law “may ignore it, and engage with impunity in the exercise of the right of free expression for which the law purports to require a license.” That freedom belongs to the speaker facing a law invalid on its face. A speaker facing a permit law that is valid on its face but applied unconstitutionally must instead seek judicial review of the administrative action before taking to the streets, as Poulos v. New Hampshire held.13
Lakewood adds that the limits must appear in the law itself. The city asked the Court to presume that the mayor would deny permits only for reasons related to the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens. That presumption assumes the mayor will act in good faith and follow standards absent from the law's face, which is the very assumption the doctrine against unbridled discretion disallows.14 Limits the city calls implicit must be made explicit by textual incorporation, binding judicial or administrative construction, or well established practice, and the Court will not write nonbinding limits into a silent law.15 A speaker deciding what to say today cannot rely on a promise made by a lawyer in litigation, and a court cannot measure a denial against a limit that binds no one.
The decisions show the defect in two forms. In the first, the text is silent. Lovell's ordinance named no ground for decision, and Kunz v. New York struck down an ordinance that prohibited a religious meeting on a public street without a permit, holding that government “cannot vest restraining control over the right to speak . . . in an administrative official where there are no appropriate standards to guide his action.”16 Saia v. New York reached the same result, 5-4, for a Lockport ordinance that barred amplification devices without the police chief's permission. Justice Douglas found it unconstitutional on its face as a standardless previous restraint and wrote that “[a]nnoyance at ideas can be cloaked in annoyance at sound.”17
In the second form, the text states grounds, but they are too elastic to confine anyone. Birmingham's ordinance in Shuttlesworth directed that a parade permit issue unless the administrator determined that “the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience require that it be refused,” which the Court said vested “virtually unbridled and absolute power” in the administrator.18 In Hague v. CIO, a Jersey City ordinance let officials refuse a permit on the mere opinion of the head of the police that refusal would prevent riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblage, and the Court held it void on its face because it could become an instrument of arbitrary suppression of views.19 Both forms share one defect, the absence of a guidepost that limits the decision. In the first the guidepost is missing, and in the second the stated grounds are so broad that any denial fits them, which is why standards a law supplies must be clear and precise.20
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement applied the rule to the price of a permit. A county ordinance required demonstrators on public property to pay a fee of up to $1,000 a day to cover public costs beyond the usual and normal cost of law enforcement, and the county administrator set the amount according to the expense of maintaining public order.21 The Nationalist Movement, which proposed a demonstration opposing the federal holiday for Martin Luther King, Jr., was assessed $100. The Court held the ordinance facially invalid because “[t]here are no articulated standards either in the ordinance or in the county's established practice.” The administrator did not have to rely on objective factors or explain the decision, and the decision could not be reviewed. A security-cost fee also measures the administrator's estimate of how much hostility the message will provoke, so the price of speaking tracks the audience's reaction to the content. The Court reasoned that “[s]peech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob,” and it held that the $1,000 cap did not help, since “a tax based on the content of speech does not become more constitutional because it is a small tax.”22
An exam stem on this topic usually adds a reassurance about how the official behaves, and that reassurance invites the good-faith assumption Lakewood rejected.
Step 3 is where most answers go wrong. The facts usually include a reassurance about the official's past behavior, and the doctrine treats that reassurance as irrelevant to facial validity.
Content-Neutral Permit Systems
A permit requirement survives when its design is the opposite of Griffin's. The government may license speech in a public forum if it has an important reason for requiring a license, if clear criteria leave almost no discretion to the licensing authority, and if the system provides procedural safeguards, namely a prompt decision and judicial review of denials.24 Cox v. New Hampshire is the model: the Court upheld an ordinance that required a permit for a parade or demonstration and allowed denial only if the area was already in use by another group.25 The next section develops the procedural safeguards, so this subsection concentrates on the reason for licensing, the criteria, and what a speaker must do when a scheme has all three features.
The important reason in Cox was practical. The government needed a permit requirement to make sure that only one demonstration occupied a place at a time.26 A city that learns of a march only when the crowd assembles cannot station officers or reroute traffic, and two groups sent to the same street at the same hour produce the disorder a permit is meant to prevent. Professor Harry Kalven called this “Robert's Rules of Order” for the public forum.27 The interest also has nothing to do with the message, since the need for notice and a calendar is the same whether the marchers plan to praise the mayor or denounce the mayor.
A good reason is not enough by itself, because a sound requirement can still be misused if the official applying it may refuse for any reason. The criteria must therefore be clear and content-neutral enough to leave almost no room for judgment about the speaker's views. The Court stressed that the licensing board in Cox “was not vested with arbitrary power or unfettered discretion.”28 The criterion there, whether another group already held the spot, is a fact about the calendar. An applicant can read it in advance and predict the answer, and a court can test any denial by asking whether the spot was in fact taken. The two dangers from the last subsection, self-censorship by speakers who court the official's favor and the difficulty of detecting content-based abuse when nothing measures the official's choice, have little to feed on.
Louisville offers two outcomes for the same applicant. When the Ku Klux Klan sought a permit to march on Derby Day, the city's parade ordinance did not let it refuse the permit simply because it disliked the Klan's message.29 It could and did refuse on content-neutral time, place, and manner grounds instead: tens of thousands of visitors converge on the city for the race, police are diverted to Churchill Downs for crowd control, and a march that day would add to the congestion and strain police resources.30 The city could not, however, bar the Klan from marching on every day, and it could not deny the permit because it disliked the message. What separates the valid denial from the invalid one is whether the reason would have applied to any group requesting that date. Derby Day congestion would defeat a church procession as surely as it defeated the Klan, while a denial resting on the message would target only the Klan. The key is whether the city has articulated content-neutral time, place, and manner criteria in advance and is in fact judging each request by them.31
Leafleting is protected expression and falls within the general rule against prior restraints, but it can still be subject to content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. Louisville, for example, requires a permit to distribute leaflets to motorists at busy intersections, a rule designed to promote traffic safety by limiting the number of leafleters to a manageable level and imposing other safety restrictions, and such a restriction is probably valid if applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.32 The permit responds to how many people stand in traffic, and it says nothing about what any leaflet says.
A speaker facing a system with these features cannot treat it as optional. Licensing offers speakers something that after-the-fact punishment does not: a specific decision on the proposed expression, usually reached after some administrative or judicial process.33 A speaker who skips that process gives up the argument. In Poulos v. New Hampshire, the Court affirmed the conviction of a speaker who held a religious service in a public park without the required license, because the licensing system was valid on its face and he went ahead without a license instead of challenging the denial.34 The decision likely remains good law, so a speaker who bypasses the procedures of a facially valid system, or fails to pursue the available administrative and judicial challenges to a denial, cannot later claim that the speech was protected.35
The two rules look opposed, but they share one logic. A speaker facing an unbridled-discretion law may ignore it, because no process can cure a missing standard. A valid system supplies a neutral standard and a route to review before the speech is lost, so the speaker gives up little by using the process, and the city gets an orderly way to settle disputes over who uses the street. The first question on any problem is therefore which kind of law the speaker faces, and the answer comes from reading the face of the law.
Step 3 does the real work on most fact patterns, because a facially neutral ordinance can still be applied for a censorial reason. A denial that cites a neutral ground on paper while the official grants the same date to favored speakers shows a city that is not judging requests by its own criteria.