Concept
Procedural Safeguards
Prior restraint
Procedural Safeguards
Near v. Minnesota set the baseline for this chapter: prior restraints are disfavored, and the government carries a heavy burden to justify one. For most speech, that baseline means the government may not restrain it in advance at all. The earlier sections nevertheless showed that some advance systems survive. A city may require a permit for a march when its criteria are clear and content-neutral, and government may review allegedly obscene films before they are shown. Once a system of that kind is allowed, the question becomes how it must operate, because sound standards cannot save a process that is slow, one-sided, or unreviewable.
The process matters because an advance system works differently from a prosecution. Thomas Emerson’s classic critique observes that such a system shuts off communication before it takes place, invites suppression “by a stroke of the pen” in place of a criminal process, and does not require attention to the safeguards of the criminal process.1 Prior restraints usually do carry some due process in the form of a judicial or administrative hearing, but Freedman v. Maryland made the quality of that hearing a condition of validity. Freedman reviewed a Maryland statute under which films went to a censorship board before exhibition, and it set out procedural safeguards for systems of that kind.2
Two features of licensing explain the safeguards. A censor’s business is to censor, so an official assigned to screen speech tends to be less responsive than a court to free-expression interests, as the earlier discussion of institutional bias showed. And delay can make a licensing decision final in practice, since a speaker who must wait on a slow process may never reach a neutral decision-maker in time.3 The safeguards therefore answer three questions: who must prove that the expression is unprotected, who may impose a final restraint, and how long the speaker can be held in limbo. The subsections below take them in that order and then mark the line between systems that must satisfy the safeguards and systems that need not.
Burden on the Censor
The first safeguard in Freedman fixes who must prove that a film falls outside the First Amendment, and the answer is the censor.4 Maryland’s procedure shows what the safeguard prevents. A board’s disapproval effectively barred exhibition, without any judicial participation, unless and until the exhibitor undertook a time-consuming appeal to the state courts to get the decision reversed.5 The exhibitor had to move and to persuade. A prosecution runs the other way, because the state must come forward and prove its case before any sanction falls, and a censorship system that leaves the burden on the exhibitor inverts that order.
The Court took the allocation from due process doctrine. As it had said in Speiser v. Randall, “Where the transcendent value of speech is involved, due process certainly requires that the State bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appellants engaged in criminal speech.”6 The burden of persuasion is the duty to convince the decision-maker, and the party who carries it loses when the evidence is evenly balanced. Allocating it therefore decides every close call, and it carries into film licensing the heavy burden that Near places on the government.
Close calls are common in this field. The Court has had difficulty defining obscenity and drawing a clear line between obscene and protected material, so advance review always risks error.7 Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinion in Roth, ultimately abandoned the search for a sufficiently clear definition. In his Miller dissent he concluded that the concept is inherently vague, producing a lack of fair notice, a chill on protected speech, and constant institutional stress.8 An exhibitor required to prove that a borderline film is protected would lose every case that came out even.
The reason for placing the burden on the government lies in who the censor is. The Court reasoned that “the censor’s business is to censor,” so the official may well be “less responsive than a court” to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression.9 An official assigned to screen speech has a stake in screening it and tends to resolve doubts against the speaker. If the exhibitor also carried the burden, the official’s inclination and the allocation of proof would push the same way. Moving the burden to the censor reverses that pressure, because the official inclined to restrict must gather evidence and give reasons that a neutral judge will test.
The safeguard does not forbid advance submission. A state may require submission of all films in order to proceed effectively against unprotected ones; it may not make the exhibitor prove that a film is protected.10 A student who says that Maryland’s scheme failed merely because it reviewed films before exhibition has missed the allocation, which is the defect that matters here. The least-restrictive-alternative inquiry associated with Ashcroft v. ACLU is a different question. It asks whether a narrower measure would serve the government’s purpose, not who must prove that expression is unprotected, so an essay can invoke both without conflating them. The safeguards themselves attach to censorship systems that pass judgment on the content of speech, and the final subsection marks where they stop.
Prompt Judicial Review
The second and third Freedman safeguards settle who makes the final decision about a film and how quickly that decision must come. A state may require advance submission of all films so that it can proceed effectively against unprotected ones, but the requirement cannot be administered in a manner that lends “an effect of finality” to the censor’s determination.12 Only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, so only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint.13 An adversary proceeding is a contested hearing before a judge in which each side presents evidence and argument, and it is where the censor’s burden of proof does its work.
The Maryland statute failed this requirement by joining an administrative decision to delay. A disapproved film was effectively barred, with no judge involved, unless and until the exhibitor undertook a time-consuming appeal to the state courts, and the statute set no time limit for completing judicial review.14 The Court explained why delay matters: if seeking judicial review is made unduly onerous, “the censor’s determination may in practice be final.”15 The mechanism is easy to trace. An exhibitor turned away by the board faces the cost of a lawsuit and an open-ended wait for a hearing, and many exhibitors will decide that the film is not worth the fight. The board’s refusal then operates as a ban that no judge ever reviewed. Making a court the final decision-maker answers that problem only if the road to the court is short and the censor, not the exhibitor, has to travel it.
The first requirement puts the duty to move on the censor. An exhibitor who must file suit to obtain a ruling carries the cost and the waiting, while a censor forced to license or sue within a deadline must commit to a position while the film still has an audience.16 The Court asks for a “specified brief period” and sets no number of days, so the question on an exam is whether the scheme contains a deadline short enough to be brief and firm enough to be assured. A scheme that lets the board take as long as it likes contains neither. The bare availability of an appeal does not satisfy the safeguard, since the Maryland exhibitor also had a route to the state courts. What the statute lacked was a time limit and a duty on the censor to take the matter there.
The second requirement accepts that a court may need time and permits an interim restraint, but it confines the restraint. A restraint limited to the status quo holds matters as they stand while the court works, and a fixed period means the end date is known in advance, so the restraint cannot drift into a penalty.17 The third requirement addresses what remains after a temporary restraint expires. The Court recognized that even then an administrative refusal to license, which signals the censor’s view that the film is unprotected, may have a discouraging effect on the exhibitor. The procedure must therefore assure a prompt final judicial decision “to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license.”18 The Maryland statute did not satisfy these criteria, and the Court struck it down. The Court recognized, however, that an appropriately constructed statute could result in an injunction against obscenity.19
An exam stem about a film board usually settles the burden of proof in one sentence and tucks the timing into another, so a complete answer reads both.
Maryland’s statute sat on Dunmore’s side of that line, with the added defect that the exhibitor, not the censor, had to bring the matter to court. The burden-of-proof safeguard cannot rescue a scheme whose timetable lets delay do the censoring, because each safeguard answers a different danger. The time-limit and prompt-review requirements also reach beyond films, since a plurality applied them to invalidate a Dallas licensing ordinance, as the final subsection explains.20
A court order can impose the same delay as a board’s refusal. When the American Nazis announced plans to march through Skokie, Illinois, a predominantly Jewish suburb of Chicago whose population included many survivors of Nazi concentration camps, the village responded by seeking injunctions and announcing new ordinances to prevent such marches. The Nazis contended that these measures offended the First Amendment, and in Collin v. Smith their contentions prevailed.21 The collateral bar rule shows why speed matters in that setting. A person who violates an injunction is ordinarily punishable even if the speech was protected, so the usual way to challenge an order is to obey it while litigating, which may mean a lengthy postponement of the speech.22 A slow review of an order therefore does the censoring just as a slow board does.
When Freedman Applies
The leading decision on where the Freedman safeguards stop is Thomas v. Chicago Park District, in which a unanimous Court held that those requirements did not apply to a park ordinance requiring a permit for large-scale events. The ordinance covered any public assembly, parade, picnic, or other event involving more than fifty people.24 Justice Scalia reasoned that Freedman was inapposite because the scheme was “not subject-matter censorship but content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation of the use of a public forum.”25
The reason lies in what the licensor does with an application. The ordinance, Justice Scalia observed, “does not authorize a licensor to pass judgment on the content of speech,” because none of the grounds for denying a permit “has anything to do with what a speaker might say.”26 It also reaches every activity in a public park, so a picnicker expecting more than fifty guests must apply just as a parade marshal must. Its object is to coordinate competing uses of limited space and to protect the park, and the Court concluded that such a scheme is an ordinary exercise of regulatory authority that raises none of the censorship concerns behind the Freedman safeguards.27
Picture the official on the other side of the desk. A film board reads each picture and decides whether it is protected, and an official whose assignment is to screen speech tends to resolve doubts against it. Placing the burden of proof on the censor, reserving the final decision to a judge, and forcing the censor to license or sue within a brief period correct for that tendency, so they matter wherever the official’s judgment concerns expression. A park official deciding whether the lawn is already booked for Saturday is answering a question about the calendar, and the answer is the same whatever the group plans to say. The bias that the safeguards correct has nothing to work on.
The Maryland board and the Chicago ordinance share an outward form, since each requires permission before expression occurs and works through an official. They differ in what the official examines, and that difference decided whether the extraordinary procedures were required. The first question on any licensing problem is therefore whether the licensor evaluates what the speaker says.
Not every system sorts cleanly into one bin or the other. In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, a plurality led by Justice O’Connor held that an ordinance licensing sexually oriented businesses was an unconstitutional prior restraint, because it contained no effective limit on the time within which the licensor had to decide and provided no avenue for prompt judicial review.28 The same plurality held that the requirement that the licensor go to court and bear the burden of proof did not apply, because the licensing board evaluated the business and not each film or book. A truncated version of Freedman was therefore enough.29 Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia would have upheld the scheme without applying any Freedman requirement. When a licensing scheme gives the licensor no discretion over the content of the publication or movie at issue, the Court has thus been divided on whether all the Freedman requirements must be met.30
The two requirements that survived the truncation share a logic. A business license is a precondition to opening the doors, so an applicant who waits on a licensor with no deadline and no court to turn to can sell or show nothing during the wait, whatever the licensor eventually decides. Delay alone suppresses expression in that setting, which is why a time limit and prompt review travel farther than the other safeguards. The burden of proof and the duty to go to court address a licensor who must decide that particular material is unprotected, and a licensor who checks premises against fixed criteria makes no such decision for a censor to prove.
The Thomas decision removes only the Freedman package, and it does not excuse a content-neutral permit system from the rule against standardless discretion. Licensing schemes that confer excessive discretion on public officials risk selective and content-discriminatory enforcement, and such laws have been invalidated on their face, without any showing that the discretion was in fact abused.31 The Chicago ordinance listed its grounds for denial in advance, and a student who answers a permit problem should check for that feature after concluding that Freedman does not apply.
Step 4 is where an essay should commit to a position while naming the disagreement, because only a plurality supported the truncated version. An answer that treats the Dallas result as a full Freedman holding overstates it, and one that treats it as a holding that nothing applies understates it.