Concept
Private Plaintiffs After Gertz
Freedom of the press
Private Plaintiffs After Gertz
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. decided what the Constitution requires when the plaintiff is neither a public official nor a public figure. The Court held that, so long as the states do not impose liability without fault, they may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory falsehood that injures a private individual.1 That holding gives the states real room to protect reputation, and it sets a floor beneath them: a private plaintiff must prove fault, and may not recover presumed or punitive damages without proving knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.2 A third question, whether the speech involves a matter of public concern, marks where the floor stops. This section takes the three in turn.
The path to Gertz runs through Sullivan, which reached the Court after a Montgomery County jury awarded the plaintiff $500,000, the full amount claimed, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.3 The Court responded by adding a scienter element to the claimant’s burden when the plaintiff is a public figure: proof that the false statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.4 Gertz asked whether a plaintiff with no public role must carry the same burden.
In Gertz itself, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the district court then concluded that the New York Times standard governed even though he was neither an official nor a public figure. It accepted the publisher’s contention that the privilege protects discussion of any public issue, whatever the status of the person defamed, and entered judgment for the publisher notwithstanding the verdict, a conclusion that anticipated the reasoning of a plurality in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc..5 The Supreme Court did not follow it. A subject-matter test would force state and federal judges to decide, publication by publication, which address issues of general or public interest, and the Court doubted the wisdom of committing that task to the conscience of judges. Nor did the Constitution require it to draw so thin a line between the drastic alternatives of the New York Times privilege and the common law of strict liability for defamatory error.6
The Court struck its balance by recognizing the strength of the state’s interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation while shielding the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability.7 Two safeguards carry that balance into doctrine. States cannot impose liability without fault. And they may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, so that where the libel involves speech of public concern, even a private plaintiff must prove “actual injury.”8 These rules govern only matters of public concern “at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection,”9 which is why the boundary of that category matters as much as the rules themselves. The fault requirement comes first.
The Fault Requirement
Gertz does two things about fault. It sets a floor, because a publisher cannot be held liable merely because a statement proved false and damaging. And it hands everything above the floor back to the states, since the constitutional elements are only minimum protections for speech and the states remain free to restrict tort liability further.10 This subsection explains what the floor displaced, why the Court set it there, and where its edges remain uncertain.
The floor displaced the common-law default. At common law a defendant could be liable for defamation without any fault. Liability turned on the meaning the communication carried for those who saw or heard it, not on what the defendant intended, so a publisher could be liable without intending to defame, without intending the meaning readers took, without intending a false meaning, and even without intending to refer to the plaintiff.11 The plaintiff did not have to prove fault, falsity, or actual damages; the Constitution now requires each of those elements, sometimes all of them, in some cases.12
Sullivan had already explained why such a regime deters speech. A defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred.13 A rule of strict liability that compels a publisher to guarantee the accuracy of every factual assertion may lead to intolerable self-censorship, and the First Amendment requires that some falsehood be protected in order to protect speech that matters.14 A fault requirement answers that concern. It shields the careful publisher from the rigors of strict liability, and a private person injured by a careless falsehood keeps his remedy.15
The Court nevertheless stopped short of extending actual malice to private plaintiffs, allowing the states instead to impose liability on a less demanding showing than New York Times requires.16 It gave two reasons that do different work. The first is practical. The first remedy of any defamation victim is self-help, using available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error, and public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication than private individuals do. Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.17 The second reason is normative and does not depend on access to the press. A private person has not accepted public office or assumed an “influential role in ordering society,” and he has relinquished no part of his interest in his good name. He has a more compelling call on the courts for redress, and he is not only more vulnerable than an official or public figure but also more deserving of recovery.18 The Court admitted that these are generalizations. Case-by-case balancing would produce unpredictable results and make its duty to supervise the lower courts unmanageable, so it laid down broad rules that treat alike cases that differ, and not every consideration behind a rule will hold in every case.19
A dissent attacked the compromise from the other side. Before Gertz, it observed, the law put the risk of falsehood on the publisher where the victim was a private citizen; the Court would now shift that risk to a victim who had done nothing to invite the calumny and was wholly innocent of fault. The dissenter doubted that jurisprudential resistance to liability without fault justified using the First Amendment to revolutionize the law of libel, and saw no realistic threat to the press in the existing rules.20
Gertz leaves the choice of standard to the states, but the plaintiff must prove either knowing or reckless falsehood or something like negligence with respect to the truth.21 Negligence, or something like it, is thus the constitutional minimum for private plaintiffs. Courts treat industry practice as relevant to whether a publisher was negligent, and the usual decision is that a paper cannot be found negligent for printing, without independent verification, a report from a reputable wire service, because it has no duty to verify such reports.22 The holding was also framed around statements whose substance “makes substantial danger to reputation apparent.” The Court reserved the case of a state that conditioned liability on a factual misstatement whose content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory potential.23
The fault that counts is fault about the truth, not ill will. Under the constitutional decisions, a defendant’s subjective motives are of no interest so long as he believed, or sometimes reasonably believed, that he was publishing the truth.24 The Court has said much the same in public debate about public figures: recalling Garrison v. Louisiana, it held that a speaker motivated by hatred or ill will is still protected, and that while a bad motive may control in other areas of tort law, the First Amendment prohibits that result there.25 For a private plaintiff the question is therefore what the publisher knew or failed to check, not what it felt.26
A state that requires only negligence asks whether the publisher was careless; a state that chooses a heavier standard for private plaintiffs asks what the publisher knew. The difference can decide a case in which the checking was sloppy but the belief was honest. Suppose a paper investigated little or nothing before printing a source’s story. The thin investigation may support an inference that the paper doubted the source and did not want its doubts verified, but that inference, standing alone, is not clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. If the plaintiff can prove that the paper was aware of facts tending to discredit the source and failed to pursue obvious leads, the case for actual malice becomes much stronger.27 Where the New York Times requirement of clear and convincing evidence applies, summary judgment turns on whether the evidence is such that a jury applying that standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant.28 Justices Brennan and Rehnquist dissented in the decision that stated this rule.29
The two papers printed equally false statements. What separates them is the care each took, and falsity, which is present in both, tells a court nothing about fault. A stem that describes a false and damaging report about a private person invites the answer that the plaintiff wins, but the analysis must go on to ask what level of fault the state requires and whether the plaintiff proved it.
Who is bound by the floor remains unsettled. The cases imposing the fault requirement have so far involved public statements in the press, media, and books, and opinions vary on whether, and how far, the requirement reaches other forms of communication; most decisions do not distinguish between media and non-media defendants.30 In Dun & Bradstreet, the plurality said the critical distinction was not whether the defendant was a media defendant.31 A second uncertainty, whether the fault rule survives when the speech involves no matter of public concern, arises from that same case and appears in the third subsection.
Actual Injury Damages
The fault requirement settles whether a private plaintiff can recover at all. The damages rule settles how much a plaintiff who has proved only modest fault may collect. The Court allowed states to impose liability on a less demanding showing than New York Times required, but it did not rest that choice on a belief that the considerations behind the New York Times privilege are wholly inapplicable to private individuals. It rested it on the strong and legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation, and that interest “extends no further than compensation for actual injury.”33 For that reason states may not permit recovery of presumed damages, which a jury awards on the assumption that harm occurred, or of punitive damages, which punish instead of compensate, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.34
The common-law rule shows what the limit is aimed at. Defamation law is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss: under the traditional rules for libel, the existence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication.35 The Court objected on three grounds. Juries may award substantial sums for supposed damage to reputation without any proof that harm occurred, and that largely uncontrolled discretion compounds the tendency of any liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Presumed damages also invite juries to punish unpopular opinion instead of compensating injury from a false fact. And the states have no substantial interest in securing gratuitous awards far in excess of actual injury.36
Actual injury is what remains. The Court declined to define it formally, observing that trial courts have wide experience framing jury instructions in tort actions, but it said that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss and that the customary types of actual harm include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.37 Two cautions come with the definition. Juries must be limited by appropriate instructions, and every award must be supported by competent evidence of the injury, though no evidence need assign a dollar value to it.38 And the breadth of the definition blurs the line it draws. Because it includes humiliation and mental anguish, a plaintiff probably can recover for mental distress even if it is not shown to flow from reputational harm, and the ambiguity invites damages for embarrassment and presumed damages generally to be awarded under the guise of compensation.39
The restriction is conditional. The Court limited it to cases in which liability is not based on knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, and the rule that follows is that a private figure suing on a matter of public interest must prove actual malice to collect punitive damages.40 Proof of actual malice lifts the constitutional limit, but it does not entitle the plaintiff to the damages: the constitutional elements are minimum protections, so state law decides whether presumed or punitive damages exist and may restrict them further.41 What lifts the limit is the publisher’s knowledge about the truth, not its spite, because the constitutional inquiry looks to what the defendant believed and not to why he published.42
A stem that reports a libel verdict supported by no lost income invites two opposite errors. One is to conclude that the verdict must fall because the plaintiff proved no pecuniary loss, when actual injury covers reputational harm and mental anguish proved with competent evidence. The other is to carry over the old rule that libel damages are presumed, when the plaintiff is private, the speech concerns a matter of public concern, and the proof stops at negligence, so that nothing in the record supports a presumption. Both errors disappear once you ask what level of fault the plaintiff actually proved.
Both Gertz limits are tied to speech on matters of public concern, and the next subsection takes up where they stop applying.43
Matters of Public Concern
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. marks the point where the Gertz limits stop. The Court decided there that Gertz’s limitation of damages did not apply “when the defamatory statements do not involve matters of public concern,” so a plaintiff could be awarded presumed and punitive damages without proof that the defendant published with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for it.45 According to the plurality, the critical issue was whether the communication involved a matter of public concern, not whether the defendant was a media defendant, and the Gertz rules apply only to matters of public concern “at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.” A credit rating of a construction company, communicated only to a very small group of people, was not such a matter.46
The case stands alone. It is the only decision so far to consider private figures defamed by speech not of public concern, and it held that in this category presumed and punitive damages do not require actual malice.47 The plurality did not address whether a state could also abandon other safeguards, such as imposing strict liability or placing the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff, although its emphasis on the diminished First Amendment significance of private speech arguably supports a broader effect.48 The fault question arose at once. Because the damages limit fell away, courts asked whether the other Gertz rule, no liability without fault, fell away too. Justice White’s concurring opinion read that result into the principal opinion, and some lower courts have agreed, but state defamation law has not seen a major resurgence of liability without fault, and a number of cases expressly retain the fault requirement.49 States remain free to apply the old strict-liability standard where no official, figure, or matter of public interest is involved, yet many have moved to negligence.50
The Court’s fullest statement of the public-concern test comes from Snyder v. Phelps, a case outside defamation. The Court observed that “the boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined,” and said that speech deals with matters of public concern when it can “be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,” or when it “is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.” The inquiry examines the “content, form, and context” of the speech “as revealed by the whole record.”51 In Snyder, religious protesters at a military funeral displayed hateful and outrageously offensive signs attacking the deceased soldier and his family. The Court deemed the speech a matter of public concern, so the family could not recover for the intentional infliction of emotional harm.52 Offensiveness, in other words, did not turn that speech into private speech.
The criterion has an awkward lineage. Gertz declined to make general or public interest the trigger for the New York Times privilege because it doubted the wisdom of committing the sorting of publications, case by case, to the conscience of judges.53 Dun & Bradstreet reintroduces public concern as the dividing line, now for damages, and courts must define it. If it is defined by the public’s actual interest, the media’s decision to publish is strong evidence of it; if it is defined from an objective viewpoint, courts decide what people, in their enlightened best interest, should want to know, a judgment that is troubling under the First Amendment.54 The test also reaches new media: the contents of a web site might not involve a matter of public concern even if intended to inform or influence the general public.55
A stem that describes the defendant as an information service instead of a newspaper invites the conclusion that none of the Gertz limits apply. The plurality rejected media status as the controlling question and asked instead whether the communication involved a matter of public concern.56 The opposite error treats every commercial subject as private concern, when what the plurality actually relied on was a rating communicated only to a very small group.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps supplies the Court’s own summary of how these pieces fit together. A newspaper there ran a series of articles linking the owner of a chain of stores to organized crime, and the state court had put the burden of proving truth on the defendant because the plaintiff was neither a public official nor a public figure. The Court held that “the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern.”57 It framed the analysis as a two-step sequence: first, is the plaintiff a public official or a public figure; second, is the speech itself a matter of public concern?58 The answers produce three operative rules.
- A public official or public figure suing over speech of public concern must prove both actual malice, meaning a false statement made with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, and falsity.59
- A private figure suing over speech of public concern must prove at least negligence and falsity, and may recover punitive damages only on proof of actual malice.60
- A private figure suing over speech not of public concern may recover presumed and punitive damages without proof of actual malice, and otherwise state tort law controls.61
Hepps itself was limited to speech of public concern, so a court may have to decide whether a statement involved a matter of public concern twice: once to apply the damages limits and once to allocate the burden of proving falsity.62 Even these rules inhibit most, but not all, libel suits; some prominent businesses and persons have sued simply because they expect the expense of defending to force their critics to retract or settle.63
Gertz and its successors fix what a private plaintiff must prove and may collect, but two neighboring questions remain for the units that follow. The first is falsity: a statement phrased as opinion can still carry a false assertion of fact if it depends on unstated facts that are false or incomplete, or if it expressly relies on another defamatory statement that turns out to be untrue.65 The second concerns the press outside defamation, where a reporter claimed a First Amendment privilege to protect confidential informants and refused a grand jury’s questions about what he had seen and heard inside a group’s headquarters.66