Concept
Bargain Versus Gift
Consideration (bargained-for exchange)
Bargain Versus Gift
Consideration doctrine separates promises made as part of an exchange from promises made as gifts. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71(2) supplies the working definition: a performance or return promise is bargained for if the promisor sought it in exchange for the promise and the promisee gave it in exchange for that promise.1 At the poles the test is easy. A seller who names a price for a piano seeks payment, and an aunt who promises her young nephew a gift with no thought of getting anything back, as in Dougherty v. Salt, seeks nothing.2 Most disputes fall between the poles, where the promisee's conduct and the promise sit side by side and the observer is tempted to assume an exchange. Section 71(2) asks a narrower question: whether each side's contribution was sought as the reason for the other's.
Three recurring situations test that line. In the first, the promisee must do something to collect the promised benefit, and the question is whether the act is the price of the promise or only the way a gift is delivered. In the second, the promisor has more than one reason for promising, and the question is how much work each side's inducement must do. In the third, the promisee's valuable act came before the promise, and the question is whether a later promise can reach back to it.
A finding that a promise was a gift ends the consideration analysis but not necessarily the promisee's case. Promissory estoppel can hold a promisor to a promise without consideration when all its elements are satisfied, and a court may enforce the promise either to the same extent as if a contract had been made or to the extent needed to remedy the unfair result of reliance.3 The cases below ask only whether a bargain exists. A finding that none does leaves that other route open.
Conditions of a Gift
Nearly every gift requires something of the recipient: walking to a porch, signing a form, showing up at a house. Such an act usually counts as a legal detriment in the thin sense the cases use, because the recipient gave up the legal right not to do it.4 That detriment is present whether the act is a price or merely the means of collecting, so it cannot sort the two. Purpose does the sorting. An act is the price of a promise when the promisor sought it, and it is a condition of a gift when the recipient must perform it only to take delivery.5
The line matters because conditions attach to gifts constantly. If every act performed to collect a benefit counted as consideration, any gift that required a pickup or a visit would harden into a contract, and the rule against enforcing gratuitous promises would protect only gifts that arrive without effort. The courts' answer is that the very same conduct may be consideration or a condition to a gift, depending on how the parties treat it.6 A useful, though not conclusive, aid is to ask whether the occurrence of the condition would benefit the promisor. If it would, it is a fair inference that the occurrence was requested as consideration. If it benefits no one but the promisee, who merely receives a gift, the occurrence is not properly construed as consideration, even though the promisee brought it about in reliance on the promise.7 Intent to exchange is judged objectively, from the terms of the transaction reasonably interpreted in context, so the question is what the words and circumstances show the promisor to have wanted.8
Williston's overcoat hypothetical states the problem in its simplest form. A benevolent man tells a tramp that if he goes around the corner to the clothing shop he may buy an overcoat on the man's credit. No reasonable person would understand the short walk to have been requested as the consideration for the promise; the understanding would be that if the tramp went, the promisor would make him a gift.9 The identical walk can be a price. Suppose the promisor owns a restaurant and the homeless person has camped out in front of it. Those facts support a finding that the promisor's motive was to move the person away from the restaurant, so he bargained for the walk. A promisor with no such interest who makes the same offer simply because he is a generous person has made a gift promise, and the walk remains the trip to pick up the gift.10 The walk is the same in both versions. What differs is whether it serves the promisor.
A box of records shows the same split in a modern setting. Phil tells his friend Benny that the records in his attic are Benny's if he wants them and that Benny can collect them from the porch sometime this week. Benny's trip is a legal detriment, but only an incidental one: nothing suggests Phil bargained for the pickup, which is simply the step needed to take delivery.11 Give Phil a tangible reason to want the pickup, such as a space he needs cleared, and the argument that he bargained for it strengthens, because a tangible gain to a party bolsters the claim that the party bargained for the detriment the other suffered.12 Where the promisor plainly sought the act, the benefit to him need not be economic. Uncle William Story promised his nephew $5,000 if the nephew refrained from drinking, using tobacco, swearing, and playing cards or billiards for money until he turned 21. The court enforced the promise against the uncle's estate, because the nephew's abstention was the abandonment of legal rights and the legal benefit to the uncle did not need to be economic.13
In Pennsy Supply, the trial court held that the disposal costs Pennsy incurred were not consideration for any promise by American Ash, because they were a mere condition of American Ash's gift of AggRite to Pennsy. The appellate court rejected that conclusion and invoked Williston's overcoat to illustrate the distinction.14 The label carried real consequences. Had the court accepted American Ash's contention that it made only a conditional gift, Pennsy could not have recovered on its warranty theories, though a claim for promissory estoppel might still have been open. (This court also treated the presence of consideration as a question of law; other jurisdictions might leave it to the jury.)15 The benefit-to-promisor inquiry shows why the question could go either way. If a supplier gives its material away because it would otherwise bear the cost of disposing of it, the recipient's disposal spares the supplier that cost, which supports reading the disposal as the price of the promise and not a condition of a gift.16
Commercial promotions follow the same logic. In Gottlieb v. Tropicana Hotel and Casino, the court found a bargain in the steps a patron took to qualify for a casino's prize drawing, reasoning that the casino had a commercial interest in those steps.
Ordinary correspondence leaves the question open as often as it settles it. In Kirksey v. Kirksey, the plaintiff broke up her household and moved sixty miles to the defendant's on his promise of a house and land to cultivate until she could raise her family. The court treated the promise as a mere gratuity, though one judge's inclination was that her loss and inconvenience in moving were consideration enough.17 The case sits on the line because her move can be read either as the price of his promise or as the way she took up a gift. Results of that kind struck later courts as unfair, and they eventually adapted an existing doctrine to enforce promises on the strength of reliance alone.18
Charitable pledges present the question in its sharpest form. A donor often attaches a stipulation about how the money will be used or what the gift will be called, and it is hard to say whether the stipulation is a term of a deal or a wish attached to a gift. The difficulty is the subtle line between an act or promise that is a bargained-for exchange and one that is merely incident to receiving the gift, or an undertaking to use the gift for the purposes for which it was given. Sometimes a court resolves the ambiguity by finding that the promisee suffered some detriment, so that the promise can be enforced as a contract. Where no basis for consideration exists, the pledge may still be enforced under promissory estoppel if the donee can establish its elements.19
In Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, Judge Cardozo held that when the college accepted the donor's $1,000 it assumed the duty “to perpetuate the name of the founder of the memorial,” which was “sufficient in itself” to support the promise.20 Whether the donor extracted the use of her name as the price of her promise or only hoped for it was the whole question, and the college's acceptance of the duty answered it.
Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo comes out the other way. A donor pledged $25,000 to a synagogue that planned to convert a storage room into a library named for him, but he attached no conditions and the synagogue promised him nothing about the use of the money or the naming. The court found no consideration, because the synagogue had neither promised nor suffered anything in exchange for the pledge.21 A donee's private plan to honor its donor shows what the donee hoped to do and nothing about what the donor sought.
When the stipulation is explicit and the donee agrees to it, the bargain reading strengthens. Suppose a donor promises $3 million toward an MRI machine and stipulates that the hospital rename the MRI room in her honor, and the hospital agrees and buys the machine. A court could well find a contract through ordinary consideration, with the $3 million exchanged for the renaming, or through promissory estoppel based on the hospital's reliance.22 Policy can push in the same direction. One reading of King v. Trustees of Boston University is that the court's underlying motivation was its belief that the charitable pledge should be upheld as a matter of public policy, and that it strained to fit the facts into a theory of recovery even though they give little support to either consideration or promissory estoppel.23 Outcomes therefore vary. A court that sees a public interest in charitable giving may find a bargain where a stricter court would find only a gift.
Motive and Inducement
The previous subsection asked whether the promisor sought the act at all. This one asks how dominant the motives on each side must be, and where some inducement is required whatever the motives. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 81 answers in two halves. Subsection (1) provides that the fact that what is bargained for does not of itself induce the making of a promise does not prevent it from being consideration. Subsection (2) says the same of a promise that does not of itself induce the performance or return promise.25 The words “of itself” carry the meaning of both halves. What the promisor bargains to receive may be only one of many motives for the promise, even an insignificant one, and the promise likewise need not be the only cause of the performance.26
The promisor's half of the rule reflects how real deals work. A promisor who is partly generous and partly self-interested has still bargained if the performance was one of the things sought. A dominant-motive test would be unworkable. Courts would have to rank a promisor's motives after the fact, a promisee would have to investigate the promisor's inner reasons before relying on the deal, and a promisor who regretted a promise could escape it by testifying that the performance mattered little to him. Reading inducement from what the parties manifested avoids all three problems. Intent to exchange is judged objectively, so it does not matter whether a party acted from kindly concern or from a taste for interfering, although a tangible gain the performance brings the promisor is evidence that it was sought.27
The pretense qualification is real. A mere pretence of bargain does not suffice, as where there is a false recital of consideration or where the purported consideration is merely nominal. In such cases there is no consideration, and the promise is enforced, if at all, as a promise binding without consideration.28 A later section on sham and nominal consideration develops the point.
The promisee's half works the same way from the other direction. Restatement § 72 states the general rule: apart from the exceptions in §§ 73 and 74, any performance that is bargained for is consideration.29 Section 81(2) then removes any argument that the performance must have been prompted mainly by the promise.30 A wealthy person who would teach contracts for the pleasure of it, and who agrees to teach for a stated salary, supplies consideration for the school's promise to pay even though pay was not her main reason. The school asked for the teaching and received it, and by agreeing to teach on those terms she manifested that the salary was part of what she was responding to. That she would have taught unpaid is a private counterfactual about her state of mind. Treating it as decisive would let a school keep the teaching and withhold the salary whenever the teacher happened to enjoy the work.
Section 81 relaxes the requirement that inducement be exclusive and leaves in place the requirement that some inducement run in each direction. It is not enough that the promise induces the promisee's conduct, or that the conduct induces the making of the promise. Both elements must be present, or there is no bargain.31 The limit appears when the performance would have occurred anyway and the promise played no part in producing it. An uncle who strongly wants his nephew to quit smoking and promises $2,000 if he does has made an offer that, without more, looks enforceable once the nephew quits. If the nephew had already quit on a doctor's advice two months before the promise, unknown to the uncle, the promise is unenforceable, because it induced nothing the nephew did.32 The uncle's wish and the nephew's abstention are both real, but the abstention was settled before the uncle spoke, so the promise bought nothing and remains a gratuitous promise.
What separates the nephew from the teacher is the role the promise played. The teacher accepted an offer of pay and taught under it, so the promise took part in producing the teaching, however small a part. The nephew's abstention was settled before the uncle spoke, so the promise took no part at all. The strength of the promisee's other reason decides nothing in either case. Adding a doctor to the smoking facts changes the result only if it changes the sequence.
Past Consideration
A promise can induce only what has not yet happened. The definition in § 71(2) therefore carries a timing requirement: a performance the promisee completed before the promise existed cannot have been given in exchange for the promise.34 A detriment incurred before the promise is made is sometimes called past consideration, a phrase that contradicts itself, since an act already finished was never the price of anything.35 The corollary is that a later promise made out of gratitude for what the promisee already did is a gift promise, and consideration doctrine does not enforce gift promises.
The leading illustration is Moore v. Elmer. The plaintiff had rendered services at the defendant's request, and the defendant later signed a writing promising payment and reciting that it was made in consideration of those services. Chief Justice Holmes held that there was no consideration, because nothing showed an understanding at the time that the services would be paid for. They were a completed performance, and a completed performance does not support a promise made later.36 The recital did not repair the defect, since calling a past act consideration does not make it the price of the promise.
The case carries a qualification that exam facts about services rendered at the promisor's request test directly. Authority that services rendered on request can support a promise is confined to cases where the request implies an undertaking to pay, and it does not mean that a favor can be converted into consideration afterward because someone asked for it.37 The qualification follows from the same sequence. Where the request carried an understanding that the services would be paid for, the exchange was struck when the services were requested, and the later writing confirms a bargain that already existed. Where the services were a mere favor, nothing was bought when they were given, and a promise made afterward has no exchange to attach to.
Dougherty v. Salt shows the same sequence in a family setting, with gratitude as the motive. Helena's promise to her eight-year-old nephew came after anything he might have done for her. It is hard to see what a child that age could have done, but even if he had performed real services, her subsequent promise would not have been enforceable, because she did not make it with the motive of extracting something from him in return.38 A promisor who thanks someone for past help is stating a motive and asking for nothing.
The rule rests on the order of events and applies whatever the past act was worth. A rescuer who was crippled saving the promisor's life gave something enormous, and a neighbor who watered a lawn gave something small, yet both fail for the same reason: the promise did not exist when the act occurred, so it could not have induced the act. The sequence also tells a court what the promisor was doing. A promisor who speaks before the act is asking for it, while one who speaks afterward is responding to something already received. Courts have gone further and refused to let a moral obligation arising from past service stand in for consideration, unless the moral duty was also a legal one.39
The first scene leaves a seriously injured rescuer without a contract claim, and that result pushed courts and the Restatement toward narrow exceptions. The older exception concerns a promise to pay a debt that was once legally owed. Some authorities allow a moral obligation to support a later promise only where a prior legal or equitable obligation existed and has since become unenforceable, and a promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations or discharged in bankruptcy is the standard example.40 The new promise rests on an obligation that really existed, which is why it differs from a bare promise of thanks.
The broader exception is the material-benefit rule, which holds that if a person receives a material benefit from another, other than gratuitously, a later promise to compensate for the benefit is enforceable.41 The rule is associated with Webb v. McGowin, where a rescuer who had conferred a benefit on the promisor was promised payment afterward and the promisor kept paying until his death. Applying the past-consideration rule strictly would have been very unjust in those circumstances, so the court deemed the detriment contemporaneous with the promise.42 Its stated reasoning was that a promise to pay for a material benefit received affirms the services and carries a presumption that they had been requested.43 Critics call that a fiction. The court could have enforced the promise directly as a distinct obligation, arising whenever a promisee materially benefits a promisor without intending a gift and the promisor then promises to pay.44 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 86 now states the principle openly: “A promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice.”45