Concept
Section 89 Framework
Common-law modification of an executory contract
Section 89 Framework
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89 lets a party enforce a promised modification of an unfinished contract without showing new consideration, provided the modification fits one of three grounds.1 The section states its scope and its grounds together:
A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on either side is binding
(a) if the modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made; or
(b) to the extent provided by statute; or
(c) to the extent that justice requires enforcement in view of material change of position in reliance on the promise.2
The grounds are alternatives. A modification that satisfies any one of them binds, and the party seeking enforcement need not satisfy the others. Ground (a) looks to what the parties failed to anticipate,3 ground (b) defers to the legislature,4 and ground (c) looks to the promisee’s reliance.5 Because (b) and (c) apply only “to the extent” their rationale reaches, they can support a modification in part.
This approach improves on the preexisting duty rule by removing the focus on consideration, and many courts have followed it, although some still apply the older rule.6 Courts have also enforced such deals through a fiction. In Schwartzreich, an employee hired as a coat designer for a fixed period was promised a raise after he reported a rival firm’s higher offer. The parties tore up the old contract and signed a new one, and the New York Court of Appeals upheld the raise as a mutual rescission followed by a new contract. Comment b to § 89 calls that rationale “fictitious” when the rescission and the new contract are simultaneous.7 Section 89 asks directly whether the modification deserves enforcement, so it needs no such device.
The threshold requirement comes first, because it governs all three grounds: § 89 reaches only contracts that remain executory. Each ground then receives its own treatment.
Executory Contracts Only
Section 89 reaches only a promise modifying a duty under a contract “not fully performed on either side,” so both parties must still have performance outstanding.8 A contractor with work left to finish and an owner with a price left to pay satisfy that requirement. Once one side has completed its performance, a later promise to pay more adjusts no continuing exchange, and the promise must find its footing outside § 89.
The limit follows from what a modification is: a revision of a continuing exchange. When parties revise a live deal, they already have a contract, so the danger that casual promissory language will be mistaken for an intention to be legally bound is slight.9
An excavator hired to clear a lot for a building project discovers a substantial amount of previously unknown hazardous waste shortly after beginning, and the developer promises $50,000 more to complete the work.10 The digging was underway when the parties adjusted the deal, so the contract was still executory.
Both scenes involve digging and a promise of more money, and timing alone separates them. In the first, performance was outstanding on both sides when the parties adjusted the deal. In the second, the exchange had ended, and the promise to pay more for finished work has to find some other basis for enforcement.
Unanticipated Circumstances
Section 89(a) binds a modification that is “fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made.”12 That phrase imposes two requirements. This section takes the first, whether something unanticipated prompted the change; the next section takes the second, whether the new term is fair and equitable.
A lead-paint job shows the first requirement at work. Painter P contracts to scrape, sand, and repaint an office for $9,000. After starting, P discovers that the old paint is lead-based, a surprise to both sides, and the added work will cost P at least $2,000 on the contract. Owner O agrees to pay $2,200 more if P finishes on time, and P does.13 P was already bound to do the work, so P gave nothing new for O’s promise, which is why the preexisting duty rule would let O refuse to pay. Section 89(a) removes that obstacle without asking for new consideration. The modification responds to a circumstance neither side anticipated, and the parties met it by agreement while the job was underway.
The same reasoning covers other construction disputes. When hazardous waste surprised the excavator and the developer alike, the developer’s promise of $50,000 was binding because the parties had not anticipated the waste and the amount was fair, notwithstanding the legal duty rule.14 One court faced substantial rubble that neither party had expected, which required excavation beyond the depths in the plans and whose removal the contract price did not include. It held the later oral agreement to remove the rubble for additional compensation to be a new, distinct contract supported by valid consideration, and it cited the draft of the Restatement rule.15 A builder C who contracted to build a road for O and met unforeseen difficulties presents the same question. If O promised $150,000 more, § 89(a) lets C enforce the promise when the modification is fair and equitable.16
The reasoning extends beyond construction. A carrier hired to deliver a manufacturer’s radar sets may see its fuel costs skyrocket after a severe and unexpected disturbance in the market. If the carrier persuades the manufacturer to pay more without threatening to breach, the modification may be upheld even though the carrier gave nothing new.17 The Wyoming decision in Roussalis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc. points the same way: it indicates that a modification enlarging a promised medical building would be enforceable without added consideration because it resolved unforeseen safety concerns that the original architect’s plans had not addressed.
Unanticipated does not mean severe enough to excuse performance. Impracticability serves a party who has obtained no modification and asks to be excused; the modification rule serves a party who has obtained an agreed change.18 Section 89(a) asks only whether the circumstance was unanticipated, so an event that falls short of excusing performance can still support an agreed change.
The word unanticipated also marks the limit of the ground, because § 89(a) does not enforce every voluntary modification. By requiring “circumstances not anticipated,” the rule discourages enforcement of many modifications the parties freely agreed to.19 Alice’s promise to pay $50 more after the seller realizes the true market value of the piano is $500 arguably did not arise from unanticipated circumstances, because the market value never changed and only the seller’s awareness did.
Compare a painter whose demand rests on nothing unanticipated. After an owner and painter contract for completion by June 12, the painter, without justification, announces that the work will not be done on time unless the owner pays $2,000 more. The owner, liable to incoming tenants and unable to find another painter, agrees.20 Nothing unforeseen changed what the work requires, so § 89(a) gives the painter no footing.
In each failing scene, the party seeking more money points to something that existed, or had been named, when the contract was made. The inquiry compares what the parties assumed at formation with what happened afterward, and the surprise must lie on the later side of that line. A modification that fails this ground can still rest on § 89(b) or (c), or on the routes covered later in this chapter.
Fair and Equitable Terms
Surprise opens the door to a modification without validating whatever term comes through it. Section 89(a) also requires that the modification be “fair and equitable,”22 and fairness has two parts: the added amount must be reasonable under the circumstances, and the agreement should be one the parties reached freely, not one extracted by a threat.
A separate check matters because a genuine surprise hands the burdened party leverage. Continuing at the old price may mean a loss, and the other side wants the job finished. If surprise alone sufficed, any real difficulty, however small, would justify any demand.
Courts that enforce these modifications limit enforcement to additional amounts that are reasonable under the circumstances.23 The enforced examples show amounts that track the burden. The painter facing at least $2,000 in unexpected cost who obtains $2,200 more has an increase just above the loss it offsets.24 The developer’s $50,000 for removing unforeseen hazardous waste is described as a fair amount, and the promise binds because the waste was unanticipated and the amount was fair.25 In Bailey v. Breetwor, a subcontractor discovered wet clay whose removal the subcontract did not cover but the city building code required. He orally agreed to remove it for costs plus 10 percent, and the court treated the agreement as a separate, binding contract because the work lay beyond the original scope.26 Costs plus a modest margin is a price that rises and falls with the burden itself. Because the test is reasonableness under the circumstances, the comparison runs against the added burden, and a large multiple of the original unit price can still be reasonable for the new work.
The unexpected rock is real in the hypothetical, and a real surprise is still not enough. What decides the case is the relation between the price and the burden, and the way the price was reached.
The second part of fairness looks at how the agreement came about. Suppose the carrier whose fuel costs skyrocketed persuades its customer to pay more for freight without threatening to breach. That modification may be upheld even though the carrier gave nothing new, and the absence of a threat supports its fairness.27 The painter who announces without justification that the work will be late unless the owner pays $2,000 more supplies the opposite picture: the owner, exposed to liability to incoming tenants and unable to find a substitute, agreed under pressure.28 Economic duress, such as a threat to discharge an employee unless she releases a valid claim, can vitiate a contract, though the contract is likely to be voidable at the victim’s option rather than void at inception.29 The next section takes up coercion and bad faith.
A fact pattern may settle one part of the inquiry and leave the other open. In the road-building problem, C met unforeseen difficulties and O promised $150,000 more. The analysis finds case-law support for enforcement but leaves open whether the extra $150,000 is reasonable, because the facts do not say enough to decide.30 A student who finds the surprise and stops has skipped the proportion question.
Statutory Modifications
The second ground, § 89(b), makes a modification binding “to the extent provided by statute.”32 Unlike the other two grounds, it supplies no test of its own. It hands the question to the legislature, and the statute’s own conditions mark the limits of enforcement.
The statute that matters most is UCC § 2-209(1), which declares that an agreement modifying a contract within Article 2 “needs no consideration to be binding.”33 For a sale of goods, the common-law result reverses: a seller who promises nothing new can hold the buyer to a promised price increase, where at common law a promise to do what one already owes would leave the increase unenforceable. The Code’s stated policy is to protect and make effective all necessary and desirable modifications of sales contracts without regard to technicalities such as the preexisting duty rule that hampered such adjustments at common law.34
Dropping consideration leaves good faith as the screen. The important limitation Article 2 recognizes is that the modification be made in good faith.35 A market shift may provide a good-faith reason, but extortion of a modification without legitimate commercial reason violates the duty of good faith, and even a technical consideration, such as a cigar added to the delivery, will not support a modification made in bad faith.36 Good faith is Article 2’s counterweight to its general liberality about formation: a contract for the sale of goods may be formed in any manner sufficient to show agreement, and open terms do not defeat it if there is a reasonably certain basis for a remedy, UCC § 2-204(1), (3). Even a party who specifies particulars of performance must act in good faith and in accordance with commercial standards, UCC § 2-311(1).37
The two scenes begin with the same duty and the same request for more money. They differ in the reason behind the request, and under Article 2 that reason decides the case.
The Code test therefore differs in focus from the common-law ground. Section 89(a) asks whether circumstances were unanticipated when the contract was made, while under Article 2 an unexpected price increase is only one factor in deciding whether the modification was made in good faith.38 The question becomes why the change was sought.
Article 2 adds formal requirements aimed at false claims of oral modification. A signed agreement that excludes modification except by a signed writing is enforceable, and the contract as modified must satisfy the statute of frauds, so a modification leaving the contract at goods of $500 or more needs a writing.39 A non-merchant held to such a clause in a form supplied by a merchant must have signed it separately.40 Proof of an oral term that qualifies a signed writing carries hurdles of its own: the proponent must first persuade the judge to admit the evidence and then persuade the jury that the term was in fact agreed to.41 An oral modification that fails for want of a writing is nevertheless enforceable when material reliance has occurred and retraction would be unjust, UCC § 2-209(4), (5).42
The Code is not the only statute § 89(b) contemplates. Some states have a general statute that dispenses with the consideration requirement for modifications that are in writing.43 The logic is that when a modification is written, the policies behind consideration apply with much attenuated strength: the parties already have a contract, and a written promise is harder to fabricate.44 Conditions differ from state to state, so a problem that invokes such a statute should be answered from its own terms.
Section 89(b) helps only when a statute actually covers the contract. Services and construction contracts fall outside Article 2, so the common-law analysis continues for them: the legal duty rule demands new consideration, and § 89(a) and (c) remain the common-law grounds for enforcing a one-sided modification.45
The first question on any modification problem is what kind of contract it involves. The same cost-driven request that succeeds for a goods seller under the Code can fail for a contractor selling services.
Reliance on the Promise
The third ground, § 89(c), binds a modification “to the extent that justice requires enforcement in view of material change of position in reliance on the promise.”47 It is one of several Restatement provisions that give the principle of § 90 a more focused application to a particular problem,48 and promissory estoppel may enforce a modification fully or only in part.49 The ground matters most when the other two give no help. A services contract falls outside UCC Article 2, so § 89(b) has no statute to draw on, and a request for more money that rests on no unforeseen circumstance cannot satisfy § 89(a). The promisee must then show that the promise, though it lacked consideration when made, has since been acted upon in a way that makes disowning it unjust.
Reliance can supply what consideration cannot because the two ask different questions. Consideration asks what the promisor received for the promise, and in a one-sided modification the answer is nothing new. Reliance asks what the promisee lost by trusting the promise. A promisor who offers a modification invites the promisee to arrange its affairs around the new term, and withdrawing the promise afterward would leave the promisee with a loss the promisor’s own assurance caused.
The promisee must show a foreseeable and reasonable “material” change of position in reliance on the promise.50 Foreseeability ties the change to what the promisor should have expected the promise to produce, reasonableness screens out responses the circumstances did not invite, and materiality keeps trivial steps from making every casual promise binding.
The words “to the extent” make the ground a measure of recovery as well as a trigger. The remedy may be limited to the amount necessary to prevent injustice.51 Restatement commentary on reliance adds that relief may be limited to restitution or to damages or specific relief measured by the extent of the promisee’s reliance rather than by the terms of the promise.52 The aim is to undo the harm of trusting the promise, and a recovery larger than that harm would hand the promisee a windfall the reliance cannot justify.
Reliance doctrine also protects steps short of formal performance. Where an offeree merely prepares to perform an offer for a unilateral contract, § 45 does not protect against revocation, yet promissory estoppel may make the offer irrevocable.53 Section 89(c) reflects the same instinct: it protects a promisee who has acted on a promise when the formal route to enforcement is closed.
The reduced-rent lease is the classic reliance pattern, associated with Central London Property Trust v. High Trees House. A lessor agrees to cut a lessee’s rent in half, and the lessee pays the reduced rent for five years. The lessor then demands the full rent again. The reduction changed only the lessor’s side of the bargain, so it lacks consideration, yet the lessee’s reliance is real. Reliance binds the lessor to the reduction for the period it covered. If the lessor retracts the promise in a timely manner, the original terms may be reinstated for the future, unless doing so would be unjust to the lessee because of its change of position.54
The two scenes differ in what the promisee did before the retraction arrived. A modification that binds through reliance binds only as far as the reliance reaches.
The hardest question under § 89(c) arises when the promisee’s only response is to do what the original contract already required. Take the builder C who contracted to build a road for O and, after encountering unforeseen difficulties, obtained O’s promise of $150,000 more. One analysis holds that promissory estoppel does not apply, because by doing what he was already obligated to do, C has not changed position to his detriment.55 Another view notes that § 89 aims to liberalize the consideration requirement for modifications and suggests that simply performing as originally promised might satisfy § 89(c); the comments and illustrations do not settle the point.56 C’s better route on those facts is § 89(a), because the difficulties were unanticipated.57 An answer that must rely on § 89(c) should state both views and rest its conclusion on facts showing something more than ordinary performance.