Concept
Equitable Roots
Unconscionability
Equitable Roots
Courts policed harsh bargains long before the Code gave them a statute, and the commentary to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 identifies two older forms of the policy. At law, a bargain was unconscionable if it was "such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other," and the aggrieved party's damages were limited to what it was "equitably" entitled to receive.1 In equity, a court refused specific performance and similar relief where "the sum total of its provisions drives too hard a bargain for a court of conscience to assist," even though the same contract stayed fully enforceable in an action for damages.2 To see why the doctrine took root in equity, look at what a chancellor was being asked to do.
Equity developed as a court of conscience, and its judges used their discretion to deny relief to a party that had made a harsh contract and then asked the court to enforce it.3 The discretion fit the remedies on offer. A decree of specific performance is an in personam order enforced through contempt of court, which can mean fines or jail for a defendant who disobeys.4 A chancellor who granted that decree put the court's coercive power behind the plaintiff's bargain, and could reasonably decline to do so for a bargain that offended conscience. A court of law, by contrast, simply awarded money for a breach. Law judges enforced rights; equity judges enforced conscience.5 A plaintiff with a valid contract right might therefore be denied specific performance and left to damages, and equity demanded proof that the transaction was fair when made before it granted relief, while legal remedies were historically granted with no such inquiry.6
Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz shows the doctrine at work. After the price of carrots rose to ninety dollars per ton, Wentz sold his crop on the open market instead of delivering it to Campbell at the lower contract price, and Campbell, forced to cover on the open market, sued for specific performance. It argued that the unique quality of these carrots made them particularly suitable for its vegetable soup.7 Wentz defended with unconscionability, and the court agreed that the contract was so one-sided as to be unenforceable in equity, refusing to enforce the entire contract.8 In the court's words, a party who had "offered and succeeded in getting an agreement as tough as this one is" should not ask a chancellor to help enforce its terms.9 The defense barred the decree and, on the orthodox view of equitable defenses, left Campbell free to claim damages or other legal relief.10 The Code's drafters did not forget the case: Comment 1 to § 2-302 cites it and describes the principle as one of preventing "oppression and unfair surprise," not of disturbing the allocation of risks "because of superior bargaining power."11
Courts of law could not turn to a matching doctrine, yet they did not enforce every bargain placed before them. They rarely condemned a contract as unconscionable by name. They reached instead for imaginative flanking devices and found, even where the ordinary rules did not support it, a failure or lack of consideration, a lack of mutual assent, duress or misrepresentation, inadequate pleading, a lack of integration in a written contract, or an ambiguity in language that was nearly clear.12 These approaches produced justice in individual cases but were highly unreliable and unpredictable.13
The unreliability had a structural cause. Because the devices purported to construe contracts while actually avoiding them, they became tools of intentional misconstruction, and they embarrassed later efforts to find the true meaning of legitimate clauses that called for it.14 The net effect was unnecessary confusion and unpredictability, along with an inadequate remedy for the evil that persisted.15 Drafters could also exploit the pattern. A court would say that, had the parties wanted so unbelievable a result, surely they could have made the language clearer. Counsel would then redraft the clause, add "and we mean it," and return to a court that had to strain a second time.16 The remedy proposed was candor: if a court may knock out a clause when it "gets too stiff to make sense," the courts will build "a body of principles of construction instead of principles of misconstruction," and language can be relied on to mean what it says.17
Section 2-302 and Restatement § 208 adopt that candor. A court that finds a contract or term unconscionable at the time it was made may refuse to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder without the offending term, or limit the term's application so as to avoid an unconscionable result.18 The UCC provision makes the finding a question of law for the court.19 The Restatement frames the policy, like the obligation of good faith and fair dealing, as one that reaches a wide variety of conduct and is applied in light of the contract's setting, purpose, and effect.20
The statutes also erased the line between law and equity. The Restatement commentary notes that modern procedural reforms had already blurred the distinction between the two kinds of remedy, and that § 2-302 states its rule without distinguishing them.21 Because § 2-302 adopted the doctrine as a general rule for all contracts for the sale of goods, courts began applying it in actions at law, including those involving contracts other than sales of goods, and Restatement § 208, which follows the UCC's wording closely, bolstered that trend.22 Unconscionability is now a general doctrine of contract law, applicable whether the suit is legal or equitable.23 The common law came to recognize it as a defense only in the latter half of the twentieth century, and then only in some jurisdictions.24
The Code governs sales of goods, so the rest of contract law needed a bridge, and Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. supplied it. The court found no prior authority on the point and treated Congress's adoption of § 2-302 as persuasive authority for following the rationale of the cases from which the section was explicitly derived.26 It then held that where unconscionability is present when a contract is made, the contract should not be enforced.27 The old formula about a bargain no one in his senses would make survived the move: a footnote in the opinion recites it as the traditional test.28 The next section turns to the elements courts now apply in place of that single, demanding formula.