Concept
Elements of Unconscionability
Unconscionability
Elements of Unconscionability
UCC § 2-302(1) and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 say what a court may do about an unconscionable contract or term: refuse to enforce the contract, enforce it without the offending term, or limit the term’s application to avoid an unconscionable result. Both measure unconscionability at the time of making, and neither defines the word.1 The official comment to § 2-302 supplies only a principle, the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise, and courts built their working test around it.2
The test answers a specific problem. Unequal bargaining power sometimes produces an agreement that appears extremely unfair, yet no defensive doctrine squarely applies, and a court must decide whether to enforce it like any ordinary contract.3 The established defenses fall into two groups. Some, like fraud and duress, address the process of contracting; others, like illegality, address the content of the resulting contract.4 Unconscionability reaches both. It denies enforcement to a contract or term found oppressive, and it joins concerns about the bargaining process to a substantive dimension directed at the inequality of the exchange.5
This section follows that two-part structure. It starts with Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., the decision that anchors the modern test. It then takes up each element, the way courts combine them, the courts that depart from the usual framework, and a statutory claim aimed at the bargaining process alone.
The Williams Formulation
Walker-Thomas Furniture Company ran a retail store in the District of Columbia, and between 1957 and 1962 each appellant in Williams bought household goods there on installment. Each purchase came with a printed form that purported to lease the item for a stipulated monthly rent, kept title with the store until the payments equaled the item’s stated value, and allowed the store to repossess the item if any installment went unpaid.6
The same form carried the clause that made the case. The installment on each new lease was inclusive of, and not in addition to, the installments owed on earlier leases, bills, and accounts, and every payment was credited pro rata across all outstanding balances. The court called this a “rather obscure provision.” Its effect was to keep a balance due on every item until the balance on all items, whenever bought, was paid off, so each new purchase became secured by the right to repossess everything the buyer had bought before.7
Mrs. Williams’s account shows the clause at work. When she bought a $514 stereo set, her account already showed $164 owing on earlier purchases, and the store knew her circumstances: the reverse of the stereo contract listed her social worker and her $218 monthly government stipend, on which she had to support herself and seven children.8 Over the years in question her purchases totaled $1,800 and her payments $1,400.9 When she defaulted on the stereo installments, the store pointed out that she still owed three cents on one item and twenty-five cents on another, and it sought to take back everything it had ever sold her.10 Used furniture and household goods were probably worth too little to settle the debt, so the clause’s real function was to raise the stakes of default and pressure customers to keep paying.11
The lower courts saw no way to help her. The trial court reluctantly held for the store. It found no legislative authority for an unconscionability defense, because the UCC and its § 2-302 had not yet been made applicable in the District of Columbia, though it did not hesitate to criticize the store’s aims and methods.12 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed. It wrote that it could not condemn the store’s conduct too strongly, since the conduct raised serious questions of sharp practice and irresponsible business dealings, but it found no ground in the District’s legislation and decisions for declaring the contracts contrary to public policy, and it urged Congress to consider corrective legislation.13
The D.C. Circuit rejected the premise that a court lacks the power to refuse enforcement. Other jurisdictions already held, as a matter of common law, that unconscionable contracts are not enforceable, and although no decision of the D.C. Circuit had so held, the notion that an unconscionable bargain should not receive full enforcement was by no means novel.14 Finding no prior authority on the point, the court treated congressional adoption of § 2-302 as persuasive authority for following the rationale of the cases from which that section derives. It held that where unconscionability is present when a contract is made, the contract should not be enforced.15
The court’s test has two components. Unconscionability, it said, has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one party together with contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other.16 The first component concerns how the contract was made; the second concerns what it says. Professor Leff labeled the two kinds of unconscionability procedural and substantive, and many authorities have adopted his terminology, although the opinion itself uses neither label.17
Whether a meaningful choice was present can be determined only from all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. The court pointed to three considerations:
- a gross inequality of bargaining power, which in many cases negates the meaningfulness of the choice;
- whether each party, considering education or the lack of it, had a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms; and
- whether important terms were hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices.18
These considerations track the reason the ordinary rule gives way. Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its terms is held to assume the risk of a one-sided bargain. But when a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that the party consented to all the terms. The court then sets aside the usual rule that terms are not to be questioned and asks whether they are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.19
The inequality factor reflects how standardized forms operate. In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., on which Williams relied, the New Jersey court described the standardized mass contract as the instrument of enterprises with strong bargaining power. The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, frequently cannot shop for better terms, either because the drafter holds a monopoly or because all competitors use the same clauses.20 In the automobile setting before it, the same court concluded that courts must examine purchase agreements closely to see whether consumer and public interests are treated fairly.21
Mrs. Williams’s case lies near the other pole. The store knew she supported seven children on a $218 monthly stipend, and the clause controlling her account was one the court itself called obscure. Those facts raised the question whether a signature should bind her to the add-on clause, and that is the question the test exists to ask.
The second component looks to the terms. The court’s primary concern is with the terms considered in light of the circumstances existing when the contract was made, and it cautioned that the test is not simple and cannot be applied mechanically.22 Terms are measured against the general commercial background and the needs of the particular trade or case, and the court endorsed asking whether they are so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and business practices of the time and place. It said that formulation correctly states the test for cases in which no meaningful choice was exercised on entering the contract.23 Later courts took the formulation over. Barnes v. Helfenbein, an Oklahoma Supreme Court decision, called Williams an excellent discussion of the concept and restated the basic inquiry as whether, under the circumstances existing when the contract was made and in light of the general commercial background and commercial needs of the case, clauses are so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise one of the parties.24 That wording matches the official comment’s test, and it shows how Williams’s two components and the comment’s oppression and unfair surprise came to be read together.
Pairing a process defect with a substance defect keeps the doctrine from reaching bargains that are merely hard or merely hasty. A fair contract signed without reading gives the court nothing to correct, and a harsh bargain freely and knowingly accepted is the kind freedom of contract exists to protect. Requiring both limits review to cases where the usual reason for binding the signer has failed and the result is one-sided as well. The components also inform each other, because a one-sided bargain is itself evidence of inequality between the bargaining parties, an idea the sliding scale later develops.25
Williams ends with a remand. The lower courts had not believed that enforcement could be refused, so no findings were made on the possible unconscionability of the contracts, and the record was insufficient for the circuit to decide the issue as a matter of law.26 The case therefore establishes the power to refuse enforcement and supplies the two-part inquiry, but it leaves open whether these contracts were in fact unconscionable. A common exam error is to cite Williams as holding the add-on clause unconscionable.
Procedural Unconscionability
Procedural unconscionability asks how the contract came to be made: who set its terms, how they were presented, and whether the weaker party had a fair chance to understand and refuse them.28 Courts describe two forms of defect, oppression and surprise.29 Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power that leaves no real negotiation and no meaningful choice for the weaker party. Surprise is the extent to which the supposedly agreed terms are hidden in a dense printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them.30
These defects matter because of what a signature normally proves. The law ordinarily binds a signer to terms the signer did not read, on the assumption that the signer could have read them, asked about them, or gone elsewhere.31 The assumption fails when the terms were concealed in a way that would have prevented a reader from recognizing their existence or effect, through language calculated to confuse, misleading headings, or fine print.32 It weakens when a drafter with time and expert advice presents a standardized form to a party who has no real opportunity to scrutinize it and often no real means to understand it.33 It fails as well when the weaker party cannot shop for better terms because the drafter holds a monopoly or every competitor uses the same clauses.34 In each setting the assent behind the signature is thinner than the signature suggests, and that thin assent is what the procedural element measures.
Courts weigh a recurring set of factors:
- the relative bargaining power of the parties, including whether any term could realistically be negotiated;
- the sophistication, education, and experience of the party resisting the term;
- whether terms were hidden or unduly complex;
- the pressure on the signer and the time and opportunity to read the document or ask questions;
- language barriers, illiteracy, or similar limits on the signer’s ability to understand the writing; and
- whether the contract is one of adhesion, meaning a standardized contract drafted by the stronger party and offered take-it-or-leave-it.35
The Restatement adds the stronger party’s knowledge. It counts as a factor when the stronger party knew that the weaker party could not reasonably protect its own interests because of physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, or inability to understand the agreement’s language.36 No factor works as a score to be tallied. Each is evidence on whether oppression or unfair surprise occurred, and Higgins v. Superior Court shows several of them at work on one set of facts.
The petitioners in Higgins were young siblings who had recently lost both parents. Television producers who knew of their situation gave them a lengthy, single-spaced agreement with directions to flip through the pages and sign, and the agreement came back within five to ten minutes after a producer said it must be signed as a condition of further participation in the program.37 The arbitration clause was one of twelve numbered paragraphs in a section headed Miscellaneous, in plain type, and unlike six other paragraphs it had no box for initials.38 The court classified the agreement as adhesive, since the party with far greater bargaining power presented it take-it-or-leave-it and would not negotiate. It then relied on the inconspicuous placement, the urging to sign quickly, and the petitioners’ youth and inexperience to find procedural unconscionability.39
The trial court had reasoned that the petitioners could read the agreement before signing it. The appellate court agreed that the opportunity to read bears on procedural unconscionability, but it found no authority for a rule that a party who read an agreement cannot call it unconscionable, and it said such a rule would seriously undermine the defense.40 The petitioners kept their dispute out of arbitration.41
The surprise must be unfair surprise, and that qualification cuts the other way. A signer who never read the contract was surprised, but if reading would have revealed the term, the surprise traces to the failure to read and not to anything the drafter did. Concealment changes the answer, because fine print, misleading headings, or language calculated to confuse may make the failure to discover a term excusable.42 The opposite pole appears where nothing was hidden. In Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., a challenge to a mobile-phone carrier’s form agreement, the court found no surprise because the arbitration provision was not disguised and the carrier made affirmative efforts to draw it to customers’ attention, including a sticker on the handset shipping box.43 An opportunity to read therefore counts against the challenger without ending the claim, and a failure to read does not prove surprise without more.
The element has three boundaries. It does not cover every standardized contract. It does not cover every contract between unequal parties. And it does cover pressure that falls short of fraud or duress.
The first boundary concerns adhesion. Calling a contract adhesive says nothing yet about its legal effect, because the label marks the beginning of the enforceability analysis, and an adhesive contract is enforced according to its terms unless other factors make it otherwise.44 Standard terms are commonplace, in travel conditions and software licenses among much else, and a drafter may favor its own interests. The nondrafter must therefore show that the drafter took unfair advantage of its dominant bargaining power to impose unfairly one-sided terms.45 Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. marks the failing side of the line. A nonnegotiable arbitration provision in an employment contract was held not procedurally unconscionable merely because it was adhesive, there being no indication of oppression or surprise in the bargaining context, and the provision was not substantively unconscionable because the procedure was fair and applied to claims by both parties.46 The Higgins petitioners signed the same kind of form, plus the hurry, the buried clause, and their own youth and inexperience.
Jurisdictions differ on how much more than adhesion is needed. A number of California decisions have held that adhesion is enough of itself to render a contract procedurally unconscionable, while other California decisions and decisions elsewhere require something more, such as a lack of market alternatives or a showing of surprise. The California Supreme Court has said that adhesion calls for close examination of possible substantive unconscionability, and that even more scrutiny is warranted when surprise or sharp practices are present.47 Where adhesion alone satisfies the element, the case remains borderline, so a strong degree of substantive unfairness must make up for the weak procedural showing.48 An answer that relies on adhesion should therefore also identify surprise, the absence of alternatives, or abuse of power, so that it satisfies the element under either approach.
Market alternatives enter at this point. In the carrier dispute, the court agreed that competing carriers lessen the degree of procedural unconscionability but held that they do not erase the oppression of a clause presented take-it-or-leave-it.49 A dissenting judge would have given alternatives more weight in that consumer setting, while recognizing that a pre-employment arbitration clause stands between a worker and necessary work, so the pressure is greater there.50
The second boundary is that mere disparity in bargaining power does not make a contract unconscionable, even when the disparity leaves the weaker party carrying more of the risk.51 The doctrine does not exist to correct an imbalance in market advantage, sophistication, or resources. Relative strength still matters, because a dominant party often behaves unfairly only by way of a disparity in power, and gross inequality joined with unreasonably favorable terms may show that the weaker party had no meaningful choice.52 The question is whether the stronger party abused its power to impose its will on the weaker one.53
Two disputes between businesses show how that question sorts cases. The Ninth Circuit refused to let Continental Airlines invoke the doctrine against Goodyear, because a party so sophisticated could not claim unconscionability in a contract so laboriously negotiated. A Michigan court, by contrast, upheld a finding that a cancellation clause was unconscionable where large garment-industry firms imposed such clauses on small independent manufacturers.54 Both disputes involved businesses. What separates them is how the term arrived: negotiated at length by a sophisticated party in the first, imposed by a dominant firm on a weaker one in the second. Courts also apply the doctrine more readily in consumer cases, where sophistication and bargaining power are more often lacking.55
The third boundary runs the other way. Procedural unconscionability reaches pressure, deception, or unfair persuasion that does not meet the narrower requirements of duress, fraud, or undue influence.56 A policing defense may be harder to prove, or the conduct may fall short of misrepresentation or duress while the court still believes the sum total of it should not be condoned.57 In Shubin v. William Lyon Homes, Inc., an office manager said and did things to hurry an employee into signing documents without time to read them and with no realistic opportunity to suggest changes, and procedural unconscionability was established.58 Samaniego v. Empire Today, LLC adds a language barrier. Installers who could not read English well were given English-only forms, refused a Spanish translation, handed no copy, and told that they had to sign to keep working. The arbitration clause sat in the thirty-sixth of thirty-seven sections of an eleven-page, single-spaced document in small print riddled with complex legal terminology.59
A finding of procedural unconscionability does not by itself send the contract to the scrap heap. It opens the substantive terms to scrutiny, to see whether they are manifestly unfair or one-sided.60 That scrutiny is the substantive element, taken up next.
Substantive Unconscionability
Substantive unconscionability asks what the contract says rather than how it was formed. Restatement § 208 and UCC § 2-302(1) both let a court act on a single unconscionable term, and a particular term may be unconscionable whether or not the contract as a whole is.62 Some kinds of terms, such as unreasonably large liquidated damages or limits on a debtor’s right to redeem collateral, go unenforced regardless of context.63 The label covers contracts or portions of contracts that are oppressive or overly harsh.64 The official comment supplies the yardstick: in light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses must be so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing when the contract was made.65
The yardstick is relative by design. Nearly every term in a drafter’s form favors the drafter, so the question is whether the term favors that side more than should reasonably be expected in the commercial context.66 The same clause may therefore pass in one trade and fail in another. Courts describe the threshold as a gross imbalance that justifies refusing enforcement as written, or as a burden so gross that it shocks the conscience.67 The term usually traces back to the process, because a drafter who behaves unfairly at formation can impose a term that no one bargaining freely would accept.68 That link explains why successful claims of substantive unconscionability so often contain some procedural weakness, and it sets up the sliding scale taken up next.
Courts searching for substantive unfairness look for four recurring signals:
- provisions that substantially deprive one party of the benefits of the agreement or leave that party without a remedy for the other side’s nonperformance;
- provisions that bear no reasonable relation to the business risk involved;
- provisions that substantially disadvantage one party without producing a commensurate benefit for the other; and
- an excessively large gap between cost and selling price with no objective justification.69
Price and interest terms come first because they are the easiest to measure against a market. Inadequacy of consideration does not of itself invalidate a bargain, but a gross disparity in the values exchanged may be an important factor in finding a contract unconscionable and may corroborate defects in the bargaining process.70 Courts therefore decline to audit every exchange for equivalence, yet an enormous gap invites a closer look at how the deal was made. In Jones v. Star Credit Corp., welfare recipients agreed to buy a freezer for $900 that had a retail value of about $300, and the court held the contract unconscionable.71 In Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, a refrigerator-freezer that cost the seller $348 was sold at a price several times higher after negotiations in Spanish and a contract written in English, and the sale was held unconscionable.72
Comparison is the usual proof of excess, since a price well above what is charged for comparable goods is evidence of price unconscionability, but the comparison proves less than it appears to. A door-to-door sale may carry benefits, such as in-home shopping, credit, or return rights, that a retail price does not include.73 Risk can also justify a high price. A significant risk of default may justify terms that reflect the higher risk,74 and a price is not excessive, for instance, when the buyer is a serious credit risk, the seller’s net profit is reasonable, and similarly situated sellers charge a comparable amount.75 A court therefore asks whether the commercial setting explains the price, and a gap that nothing explains is what carries the claim.
Default penalties and remedy limits make up the second family of terms. Section 2-718(1) voids a term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages as a penalty. Applying § 2-302, one court dismissed a car dealer’s suit for liquidated damages equal to twenty percent of the contract price, partly because most car dealers impose similar clauses and so eliminate the buyer’s freedom of choice.76 Section 2-719(3) supplies the Code’s own illustration of a remedy limit that may be unconscionable. Consequential damages, which are losses beyond the value of the goods themselves, may be limited or excluded unless the limitation is unconscionable. A limitation of consequential damages for personal injury in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable, while a limitation where the loss is commercial is not.77 The words prima facie shift the burden: outside the consumer personal-injury setting, the buyer must prove that the exclusion is unconscionable.
Two truck sales show both poles. A buyer who buys a pickup for fishing trips on a printed form excluding consequential damages, and who is injured when the truck explodes on the way home, benefits from the presumption, so the seller must come forward with evidence rebutting it. A buyer who buys the truck to deliver groceries from the buyer’s store, and whose only loss is to the truck and the groceries aboard, must prove that the exclusion is unconscionable.78 The line follows who is positioned to manage the risk. In relatively competitive markets a buyer who accepts an exclusion is typically compensated through a lower price, and courts usually uphold these clauses between business persons.79
Arbitration clauses supply the third family, and one-sidedness usually hides in the mechanics. Prasad v. Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC tests several of those mechanics against one employer-drafted agreement. The agreement shortened the limitations period to one year for employees only, and the court held the term substantively unconscionable because it bound only employees and the employer offered no reason why a unilateral reduction was required. The employee had filed within the year, which did not matter, because the agreement is assessed as of the time it was made.80
The agreement also required employees to pay a filing fee to the employer. The court held the fee unconscionable, as the Ninth Circuit had in Ingle, because it required employees to pay the very entity against which they sought redress, an expense they would not bear in court.81 The principle comes from Armendariz: when an employer imposes mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment, the arbitration agreement or process cannot generally require the employee to bear any type of expense the employee would not bear in court.82 A cost-sharing provision was likewise unconscionable, though the court found only a modicum of unconscionability in it, and the agreement’s unilateral right to modify or terminate its terms drew the same attack, which Ingle had accepted despite a notice requirement.83 Each of these terms shifted a cost or a deadline onto the employee that a court action would not have imposed, and that shift is the typical substantive flaw in arbitration mechanics.
The same agreement shows where the line falls. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Epic, the employee conceded that the agreement’s concerted-action waiver could not support a finding of unconscionability, and the court upheld the confidentiality provision as much narrower than the one-sided gag the Ninth Circuit condemned in Pokorny.84
Bilaterality is the other recurring question. An arbitration clause lacks a modicum of bilaterality when it requires arbitration of only the weaker party’s claims while leaving the stronger party free to choose its forum.85 In Higgins the clause bound only the program participants, only the producer could seek equitable relief in court, only the participants were barred from seeking appellate review of the arbitrator’s decision, and the rules split costs equally. The producer argued that either side could move to compel arbitration, and the court answered that this missed the point that only one side had agreed to arbitrate. The clause’s one-sided harshness, combined with the procedural flaws, made it unenforceable.86 In Samaniego the court weighed several one-sided terms together: a shortened limitations period, which counted for more because the Labor Code gave employees three or four years to assert the statutory wage claims at issue; a one-way requirement that the installers pay the employer’s attorneys’ fees; and a carve-out letting the employer sue on the claims employers typically bring while every installer claim went to arbitration.87 The court accepted that not every lack of mutuality invalidates an adhesive arbitration agreement, but the several one-sided provisions considered together supported its finding of strong indicia of substantive unconscionability.88
Class-action bans show the same inquiry in a consumer setting. In Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., a buyer whose damages did not exceed $20 was bound by terms requiring individual arbitration, and the New Mexico Supreme Court held the class ban substantively unconscionable. Consumers with small claims cannot afford individual litigation, so the ban effectively exempted the seller from the state’s consumer protection statutes, and the court rested its decision on substantive unconscionability alone.89 That reasoning must be read with a later development. The Supreme Court held in Concepcion that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a categorical rule treating class waivers in adhesive consumer arbitration agreements as unconscionable, although it left generally applicable unconscionability defenses available.90
The last family collects terms that take value the stated bargain seemed to leave in place, with no commercial purpose tied to the deal. A barely literate Laotian couple bought a chicken farm for an apparently fair price of about $120,000. The contract also contained a clause, inserted without prior discussion, requiring them to transfer to the seller without compensation all the chicken litter their operation produced for thirty years.91 On the seller’s own figures the litter from routine cleaning alone was worth about $216,000 over that period, so the seller stood to receive roughly double the stated price for the land.92 The appellate court affirmed the finding that the clause was unconscionable as a matter of law. The clause burdened the buyers while solely benefiting the seller, it imposed costs in the hundreds of thousands unrelated to the land, and the buyers, because of language and education, could not understand the nature of the contract.93
A price comparison would have found nothing wrong in that case, because the stated price was fair and the unfairness lay in a separate clause that extracted a second payment in kind. The court looked at what the clause did, which was to give the seller a large added payment unconnected to the land. That framing matches the question courts ask about justification: whether a term performs a reasonable function in the transaction. A term that subverts a party’s purpose in contracting, and that the drafter cannot defend as protecting its own needs, is substantively unconscionable.94
The same question marks the first limit on the element, because a one-sided term survives when the stronger party can defend it. A frequent mistake is to answer the substantive prong by observing that a term favors the drafter, which describes nearly every standardized form. A cross-collateral clause like the one in Williams, for instance, may not be unconscionable if most sellers in comparable contexts use it and the buyer is a large credit risk, at least where the clause is comprehensible, which the clause in Williams was not.95 A forum clause that lets the drafter litigate at home is not substantively unconscionable merely because it favors the drafter, and courts generally uphold it unless the nondrafter shows extraordinary circumstances that make it particularly burdensome or unfair.96 The shortened limitations period in Prasad failed because the employer offered no reason why only employees needed a shorter period.97 Because justification is a matter of proof, the parties are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on the contract’s commercial setting, purpose, and effect, a right taken up in its own section below.98
A price that is merely high is usually not enough either. A court will not ordinarily invalidate or adjust a contract because a party overpaid, underbid, or otherwise made a disadvantageous deal, and unless unfair bargaining caused the unequal exchange, the parties are held to the agreement they manifested.99 The Restatement adds that an unconscionable contract ordinarily involves other factors as well as overall imbalance.100 A price is excessive when the market cannot account for it at the time of contracting. It is merely high when the buyer later wishes it were lower.
Receiving more than expected is not harsh treatment, and the point is easy to miss. A borrower who refinances a home for more than the home is worth might sound like a victim of overreach, yet in McFarland v. Wells Fargo Bank a federal appeals court applying West Virginia law held that the size of the loan did not make it substantively unconscionable.101 The state standard asks whether a term is both one-sided and overly harsh toward the disadvantaged party, and receiving too much money from a bank is not what is generally meant by overly harsh treatment. An under-collateralized loan typically disadvantages the lender.102
The Sliding Scale
Most courts require the party resisting enforcement to show both procedural and substantive unconscionability, but they do not demand the two in equal measure.104 As the New Jersey Supreme Court put it in Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, courts “generally have applied a sliding-scale approach to determine overall unconscionability, considering the relative levels of both procedural and substantive unconscionability.”105 The scale answers the question the two elements leave open: how much of each a claimant needs.
California supplied the formulation that other courts most often borrow. In Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., the California Supreme Court described the prevailing view that the two elements “must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability,” and it added that “they need not be present in the same degree.” It then stated the working rule: “the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.”106 Tacoma Boatbuilding Co. v. Delta Fishing Co. put the same idea in terms of bargaining conduct: “[t]he harsher the clause, the less ‘bargaining naughtiness’ that is required to show unconscionability.”107 Both statements are rules of thumb. Several courts invoke a mathematical metaphor, yet no formula converts a degree of unfair process into a degree of harsh substance, and courts weigh the two with considerable flexibility.108
The scale rests on how the two elements relate. Each is a way of asking whether the stronger party used its position to obtain something a fair process would not have produced, and the two are linked as cause and effect, because a drafter who behaves unfairly during formation can impose a term that no one bargaining freely would accept.109 Evidence on one element therefore supports an inference about the other. A mildly one-sided term has many innocent explanations, since nearly every form favors its drafter somewhat, so a court wants real proof of a defective process before it infers overreaching. A grossly oppressive term has few innocent explanations, and a court can infer from the term itself that the process was unfair. The earlier subsections explained why both elements must appear at all, and this link explains why they can appear in different amounts.
The scale works most visibly on standardized forms. Adhesion supplies a floor of procedural unfairness: in Gatton, the court held that, absent unusual circumstances, use of a contract of adhesion establishes a minimal degree of procedural unconscionability even when the customer could have chosen another carrier.110 A minimal floor meant the plaintiffs had to make a strong showing of substantive unconscionability, and they did. The class-action waiver fell within the holding of Discover Bank v. Superior Court and so carried a high degree of substantive unconscionability, which the court found strong enough to tip the scale even though the procedural evidence was limited.111 The categorical class-waiver rule behind that finding has since been limited, as the preceding subsection explained, so the case is useful here for its method of weighing and not for its result.
Marin Storage v. Benco Contracting & Engineering, Inc. involved a crane rental company’s form subcontract. The form was adhesive, but the general contractor was sophisticated and had real alternatives, so the procedural unfairness was low, and the indemnification clause was not overly one-sided in its commercial context. The court concluded that the low level of procedural unfairness called for a greater degree of substantive unfairness than had been shown.112 Both contracts were adhesive and both sat low on the procedural axis, so the substantive side separates them: a highly one-sided class waiver in Gatton, and an indemnity clause that held up under commercial scrutiny in Marin Storage.
Employment forms sit higher on the procedural axis. In Prasad v. Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC the court found some procedural unconscionability in an employer-imposed arbitration agreement, which moved the contract away from the freely negotiated end of the spectrum and into the range where its terms get a closer look. The terms described in the preceding subsection, among them a one-year limitations period binding only employees and a filing fee payable to the employer, supplied the substantive one-sidedness that this moderate showing required.113 Higgins v. Superior Court sits further toward the procedural end. The hurried signing, the buried clause, and the young signers described earlier were joined by an arbitration clause binding only one side, and the court held that the clause’s harsh, one-sided nature combined with those procedural elements made it unenforceable.114
The scale lowers what a claimant needs on one element without removing the need for the other, and two limits follow. First, a finding of procedural unconscionability opens the door to scrutiny of the terms and goes no further.115 At one end of the procedural spectrum are contracts freely negotiated by roughly equal parties, which carry none, and ordinary adhesion contracts, though widely enforced, carry some.116 When the procedural showing is only minimal, the challenged provision must be highly one-sided to fail: “If the challenged provision does not have a high degree of substantive unconscionability, it should be enforced.”117
Second, a high degree of procedural unfairness cannot excuse a complete absence of substantive unfairness. Even courts that apply a sliding scale insist that the claimant demonstrate a substantively unconscionable contract or provision.118
Put the same pressure behind a form with a one-sided arbitration clause or an unexplained price premium, and the process evidence would be joined by terms that call for an explanation, which is the combination the scale rewards.
The two-element requirement is the majority view, not a universal one. A Michigan appellate court suggested that both substantive and procedural unconscionability must be present, and the Sixth Circuit, applying Michigan law in Whirlpool Corp. v. Grigoleit Co., concluded that substantive unconscionability alone does not suffice.119 Other courts accept an overwhelming substantive showing by itself, as the New Mexico Supreme Court did in Fiser when it held a class-action ban unconscionable on substantive grounds alone, and the next subsection takes up those jurisdictions.120
Gross substantive unfairness can also do work on the procedural side. Where bargaining power is unequal, great unfairness in the terms can itself support the conclusion that the party who benefits took unfair advantage of its dominance and so engaged in procedurally unconscionable conduct. Some courts have even gone so far as to dispense with proof of one element if the other is powerfully shown.121 That inference ties back to the earlier question whether the stronger party abused its power, since a term that no one in the weaker party’s position would freely accept is evidence from which abuse can be inferred. It depends on a disparity of power in the first place, which is why a harsh term in a contract laboriously negotiated between sophisticated parties, as in the Continental Airlines dispute, supports no such conclusion.122
Answers usually go wrong at the fourth step in one of two ways. Some treat an adhesive form as the whole case, which overlooks that a minimal procedural showing demands strong substantive unfairness. Others describe a harsh term and skip the process step, which overlooks that most courts require some procedural unfairness.
Alternative Formulations
The two-element framework is a gloss that courts added to a statute asking one question, whether the contract or term was unconscionable when made, and most courts that use it require the party resisting enforcement to show both elements.124 Because the framework is judge-made, courts remain free to depart from it, and they do so in several ways. Some accept an overwhelming showing of substance alone, some weigh a list of factors in place of two elements, and some have rejected an older formula for unconscionability that still turns up in opinions. The doctrine’s vagueness also draws objections that bear on how confidently any formulation can be applied.
The disagreements trace to a question about what the doctrine protects. If it protects genuine consent, process must matter, since a court has reason to look behind a signature only when something went wrong in the bargaining that produced it. If it works as a standard that polices oppressive terms, in the way public policy refuses enforcement to certain bargains, then a term can be harsh enough that how it was reached stops mattering. The statutory text favors neither view, because it speaks only of unconscionability at the time of making. Some cases hold that the defense cannot be invoked unless the contract is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, but nothing in the text of the statute requires that conclusion, and cases of purely substantive unconscionability exist.125 The mirror image can also be imagined: a contracting process so devoid of consent that even a fair term within it would go unenforced.126
Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp. shows substance carrying a claim. A buyer purchased a computer on Dell’s website under terms that required individual arbitration and barred class actions, and the buyer’s damages did not exceed $20.127 The New Mexico Supreme Court reasoned that consumers with small claims cannot afford to invoke the state’s consumer protection laws when the cost of litigating far exceeds any recovery, so the ban effectively exempted the seller from those statutes. The court rested its decision on an overwhelming showing of substantive unconscionability and did not rule on the procedural question.128 The reasoning has a public-policy character, because the injury the court identified was to the state’s scheme of consumer remedies, which is why the buyer’s own consent mattered little. The Supreme Court has since limited categorical class-waiver rules, so the result on Fiser’s facts is now contestable, yet the case still marks the point that some courts will reach unconscionability through substance alone.
Other jurisdictions have said something similar. An Arizona decision agreed with the courts that accept substantive unconscionability alone as sufficient and left open whether procedural unconscionability alone would be enough, and a Hawaii decision held that an impermissibly one-sided agreement may be unconscionable even without unfair surprise or procedural unconscionability.129 The Sixth Circuit, applying Michigan law in Whirlpool, went the other way and concluded that substantive unconscionability alone does not suffice.130 When the facts show an oppressive term and an unremarkable signing process, the outcome therefore depends on the governing jurisdiction. Under the New Mexico approach in Fiser the claim can proceed on the term alone, and under the Sixth Circuit’s reading of Michigan law it fails at the threshold.
A second departure replaces the two elements with a pool of factors weighed together. Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 5.108 directs a court to consider whether the seller believes the consumer is likely to default, whether the consumer will receive substantial benefit from the transaction, whether the contract price grossly exceeds the market price, and whether the seller knowingly took advantage of a consumer’s bargaining disadvantage from mental impairment, lack of education, or similar causes.131 The Kansas Supreme Court adopted a balancing test in Wille v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. that weighs the use of a standard form, limits on remedies for breach, inconspicuous or incomprehensible terms, overall imbalance in the bargain, exploitation of a party’s inexperience or lack of education, and inequality of bargaining or economic power.132 Both lists put process facts and substance facts into one pool instead of sorting them into elements. That design avoids classifying a fact such as a gross price gap as procedural or substantive before using it, and it resembles the sliding scale carried one step further, because no single factor is required and enough weight on some can make up for little on others.
The third departure concerns an older formula that describes an unconscionable bargain as one that no person in his senses and not under delusion would make, and that no fair and honest person would accept. In Barnes v. Helfenbein the Oklahoma Supreme Court recited the formula in the same passage as the Williams test and the official comment’s one-sided-clauses test, treating it as one description of the concept among several.133 The New Mexico court in Cordova v. World Financial Co. of New Mexico disapproved the formula as a controlling standard. Applied literally, it reasoned, the formula would be inconsistent with all the New Mexico cases that struck down contracts and with most from other jurisdictions, and it is enough that the provision is grossly unreasonable and against public policy.134 The two decisions differ in the formula’s role: Barnes carried it as a description, and Cordova refused to let it control. A test that required the claimant to be a fool would turn away the consumers whose contracts courts actually strike down, who are ordinarily people under pressure or lacking information rather than people who could be called deluded.
The last disagreement asks whether so open a doctrine can be applied reliably. The standards for both elements are vague, since the line between a gross inequality of bargaining power, which counts as a procedural flaw, and mere inequality, which does not, is hard to draw, and so is the line between a term that unfairly favors one party and a term that simply favors the drafter. Courts also have limited access to information such as market structure and the parties’ cognitive capacities, so results can look arbitrary.135 Two proposals follow. One is to turn first to fraud, duress, undue influence, and similar doctrines whenever they fit, because they are more specific, which would confine unconscionability to extreme cases that shock the conscience.136 The other is to test clauses for their economic effect. An add-on clause like the one in Williams may promote efficiency by lowering transaction costs, yet the doctrine can serve a useful economic purpose where coercive conduct was likely but hard to prove.137
The drafters of the Code accepted the open texture deliberately. Supporters of the open standard argued that if the power to knock out clauses that get too stiff to make sense is brought into the open, courts will develop a body of principles of construction in place of principles of misconstruction, and precedents will build up.138 As Professor Farnsworth observed, the term’s incapacity for precise definition is a source of both strength and weakness: it lets a court reach overreaching that no rule anticipated, and it makes outcomes harder to predict.139
A problem governed by a particular state’s law should therefore begin by identifying which formulation that state’s courts use. Where the jurisdiction is unspecified, the safe answer applies the majority framework, argues both elements on a sliding scale, and notes that some courts accept substance alone or balance factors instead.
Unconscionable Inducement
UCC § 2-302(1) and Restatement § 208 ask only whether the contract or a term was unconscionable at the time of making, and neither makes the way a party was induced to assent a separate ground for refusing enforcement.141 Some statutes add one. UCC § 2A-108(2), which governs consumer leases of goods, lets a court refuse enforcement of a lease or clause “induced by unconscionable conduct.”142 Section 2-302 has no counterpart. A 1996 draft of revisions to Article 2 would have added the phrase to § 2-302, but no state adopted those amendments, and the language is not part of current § 2-302.143 This subsection therefore teaches a statutory variant that applies only when the governing statute contains the inducement language, and it sits beside the two-element test rather than inside it.
The variant changes what a claimant must prove. Under the framework in the preceding subsections, unfair process opens the door to scrutiny of the terms, and most courts still require some substantive unfairness before they refuse enforcement. An inducement clause supplies a second route that does not pass through the terms. The court may refuse enforcement because of the conduct that produced assent, even when every term would survive on its own.
The leading illustration comes from West Virginia’s consumer statute. In McFarland v. Wells Fargo Bank, the case used earlier for the point that a borrower who receives too large a loan has not been treated harshly, the borrower made a second argument: that the loan was induced by misrepresentations, focusing on what he alleged to be a vastly inflated appraisal of his home in 2006.144 The statute, W. Va. Code § 46A-2-121(1)(a), authorizes a court to refuse enforcement of an agreement that was “unconscionable at the time it was made, or . . . induced by unconscionable conduct.”145 The Fourth Circuit treated the word “or” as creating two separate claims. The claim that the loan was itself unconscionable still required substantive unconscionability, and the borrower could not show it, so that claim failed.146 The inducement claim fared differently, because the court predicted that West Virginia’s highest court would read the statute to authorize a stand-alone claim that may rest entirely on evidence of the process leading to the contract and requires no showing of substantive unfairness.147 The court conceded that the point was not fully settled, since the state decision it leaned on, Quicken Loans, sustained findings of unconscionability in the inducement on a false promise of refinancing, a balloon payment introduced suddenly at closing, and a negligently conducted appraisal review, but involved a loan that also had substantively unconscionable terms. The case went back so the borrower could pursue the inducement claim. The Fourth Circuit recognized the claim without deciding that it had been proved.148
The statute describes the qualifying conduct by example: affirmative misrepresentations, active deceit, or concealment of a material fact.149 That list sets the claim apart from ordinary procedural unconscionability, which looks to circumstances such as relative bargaining power, sophistication, hidden terms, and adhesion, and which can be satisfied without any deception by the stronger party. The higher demand has a structural reason. In the ordinary test, harsh terms check that the process complaint amounts to more than a complaint about being the weaker party. The inducement route removes that check, and a claim that required neither harsh terms nor deceit could reach almost any standardized deal with a stronger counterparty. Requiring affirmative deception keeps the claim aimed at conduct that corrupts assent and leaves ordinary dealing alone. The case for having the claim at all runs the other way: an agreement can look fair on its face and still be one the party would never have made without the deceit, and letting the creditor or lessor keep the benefit of it would reward the conduct the policy against unconscionable contracts condemns.
A claim that fails shows where the line falls. In Oden v. Vanguard Car Rental, a consumer sued under § 2A-108(2) over a refueling charge. The charge was disclosed in a lease she had received a copy of and initialed, and she did not allege fraud, so the court dismissed the claim because the circumstances were not grossly unfair.150 Nothing in those facts involved a misstatement or a concealment, and a charge printed in a document the consumer initialed leaves no deceit to point to. The commentary to the lease provision describes conduct that does qualify. A lessor makes a statement to induce a consumer to lease goods while expecting to invoke an integration clause to exclude the statement later, and the lease may be refused enforcement as induced by unconscionable conduct even if its terms are not themselves unfair.151 An integration clause recites that the writing is the complete agreement and displaces earlier statements, so it is ordinarily how a party protects itself against claims built on talk before signing. A lessor who plans from the start to rely on the clause uses the writing as a shield for its own inducement, and that is why the target is the conduct and not the lease’s price.
Because misrepresentation and active deceit are also the raw material of fraud, the inducement claim overlaps with it, and a student may fairly ask what the claim adds. The answer is that the two have different requirements. Unconscionability expands the court’s power to give relief for unfair bargaining that the narrower requirements of fraud, duress, and undue influence would not reach, so a party may be unable to prove fraud and still show conduct that unfairly induced assent.152 A problem on these facts should plead both and argue in the alternative, a choice the later subsection on related doctrines develops.
On an exam, the inducement ground belongs only where the governing statute contains it. A buyer in a sale of goods who says the seller’s representative misdescribed the deal has no inducement claim under § 2-302, because the text asks only whether the contract or clause was unconscionable when made, and those facts go to fraud or to the procedural element of the ordinary test.153 The McFarland ruling rests on a state consumer statute and gives no basis for reading an inducement claim into § 2-302 or § 208.