Concept
Evidence Outside the Rule
Parol evidence
Evidence Outside the Rule
Every bar taught so far in this chapter targets one kind of offer: testimony that adds a term to an integrated writing or contradicts one. Section 214 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts lists the other purposes for which agreements and negotiations made before or at the adoption of a writing remain admissible. None of them asks the factfinder to add to the writing or to contradict it.1
- that the writing is or is not an integrated agreement;2
- that the integrated agreement, if any, is completely or partially integrated;3
- the meaning of the writing, whether or not integrated;4
- illegality, fraud, duress, mistake, lack of consideration, or another invalidating cause;5
- grounds for granting or denying rescission, reformation, specific performance, or another remedy.6
The first two purposes did their work in the completeness cases, where a judge deciding whether a writing is a final and complete expression may consider all the background facts and circumstances.7 This unit takes up the other three, then two related claims: that a signed paper was never meant to operate, or was to operate only if some event occurred.
The two groups of rules rest on different premises. The bars on contradiction and supplementation protect the terms of the parties’ deal. Parties reach terms through preliminary negotiations and then adopt a writing as their final word, and that writing displaces earlier agreements and proposals.8 Testimony offering a different promise asks the factfinder to undo the parties’ choice. Evidence offered for the purposes above asks for something else: what words already in the writing mean, whether assent produced an enforceable contract at all, or what remedy a court should grant for the agreement it finds. Most of these exceptions concern the threshold question whether a valid agreement exists,9 and the rule presupposes one.10 Proof that the agreement is invalid, or that the writing misrecords it, leaves the writing’s finality untouched.
The exceptions carry a cost. Evidence offered to show mistake or misconduct may itself be perjured, which defeats the rule’s purpose of protecting the integrity of a final writing. Courts accept that risk so the rule cannot defeat a party’s right to avoidance.11 The exceptions are numerous and collectively broad enough that the rule, even more than the statute of frauds, can be understood only in light of them.12
A finding that the writing is integrated therefore settles only the first of two questions. The second asks what the evidence is offered to show.
Meaning of the Writing
A completely integrated writing can be neither contradicted nor supplemented, yet it may still be explained by evidence of what the parties said and exchanged before they signed.13 Section 214(c) admits that evidence to establish the meaning of the writing, whether or not the writing is integrated.14 The reason lies in what the bars protect. They guard the terms the parties adopted as their final word, and an offer of meaning asks for neither a new term nor a different one. It asks what a term already in the writing means. Everything therefore turns on what the offer is for. Supplementing tries to add an agreement the writing does not contain, which raises the question whether the writing is a total or a partial integration. Explaining raises only the meaning of words already there.15
Thompson v. Libbey illustrates the explaining side. Evidence of the parties’ agreement about which periods of time the phrase “winters of 1882 and 1883” was meant to include, or about what they meant by “boom scale,” would have served merely to explain their agreement, and evidence of trade usage might have been relevant as well.16 Courts differ, however, on how far this explanatory exception reaches.17
The judge decides first, outside the jury’s presence, whether the evidence is barred. If it is not, the trier of fact hears it and determines its validity and significance.18 Once the judge finds the terms ambiguous, extrinsic evidence comes in to aid interpretation, but ambiguous is itself a slippery word. The law traditionally gave it a narrow sense, reserving it for language that standard rules of interpretation could not make clear and not extending it to every passage open to more than one reading.19
Words carry no fixed meaning apart from the setting in which their users chose them. A rule that excludes testimony that might contradict the judge’s own linguistic background rests on a belief in the possibility of perfect verbal expression,20 and the next example shows why that belief fails.
Courts split on how readily to hear such evidence. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co. states the liberal view: the test of admissibility is not whether the language appears plain and unambiguous to the court on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language is reasonably susceptible.21 The Restatement takes the same position. Classical courts generally admitted evidence for explanatory purposes only if the writing appeared ambiguous on its face, while modern courts are more likely to admit evidence showing that the language has a special meaning even when the writing does not appear unclear on inspection.22 The contrast recalls patent and latent ambiguity.23 Taylor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. applied the same approach to a release, asking whether its language was reasonably susceptible to the reading the insured urged in light of the evidence about the parties’ intent.
The plain-meaning rule reverses the sequence. If a writing or a term is plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning is determined from the four corners of the instrument without extrinsic evidence of any kind.24 One court explains that when the language is clear, it presumes the parties intended what they expressed, even if the expression differs from their intentions when they created the contract.25 The rule has variations, and even a plain-meaning jurisdiction will admit evidence to define terms of art that, though unambiguous, are not generally understood. Evidence may be taken, for example, of the meaning of “Amacid Blue Black KN.”26
The two inquiries feed each other. The rule restricts evidence outside the written contract, but a court often needs that very evidence to decide whether the writing should exclude it, so interpretation determines the reach of the rule that governs interpretation.27 Courts navigate the circle by balancing the parties’ reasonable expectations arising from the language of the writing against their reasonable expectations arising from the context in which it was formed.28
The liberal approach has a price. In Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., the court confronted the question whether parties in California can ever draft a contract that is proof against parol evidence, and answered no.29 That result is the case for the plain-meaning gate, which gives the parties to a clear writing a stable basis for planning. The case for the liberal approach is that words cannot be read without their setting, so a gate that never looks at the setting will sometimes enforce a meaning neither party shared.
Because the line between explaining and adding is hard to see, a party often presents a proposed additional term as an interpretation. A written contract for “all cotton planted on 400 acres” seems to raise an interpretation question if one side says the parties meant acres planted solid and the other says acres however planted. If the seller instead says the parties agreed to the however-planted term and offers that in evidence, the offer adds a term, and it is to the proponent’s advantage to couch the proof as both supplying an additional term and interpreting the writing.30 The danger is plain. A party clever enough to find a word or phrase that touches the disputed issue can put evidence before the jury by claiming only to show its meaning, and taken to its extreme that approach guts the rule.31 A judge therefore asks what the evidence would do to the writing, whatever label the proponent gives it. If it adds a term, the question becomes one of supplementation. Under §2-202, a consistent additional term may supplement the writing unless the judge finds that the term, if agreed upon, would certainly have been included in it.32
The Detroit evidence and Alice’s testimony both begin with a party saying that a written word meant something other than what a judge would read. What separates them is whether the setting gave the language a second sense. The buyer’s statement points to a meaning the word dollar actually carried in that deal, while nothing about a price of five hundred dollars can carry the meaning of three hundred. The reasonably-susceptible limit therefore does two jobs. It keeps evidence of meaning from becoming a back door for changing the terms of an integrated writing, and the contradiction bar, which applies to every binding integration, then governs the offers that remain.33
For sales of goods, §2-202 provides that terms set forth in a writing intended as a final expression may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented.34 Evidence of course of performance, course of dealing, and trade usage is admissible to supplement any integration, whether total or partial.35 The UCC section later in this chapter develops those rules, and the canons that guide how a court reads the words once the evidence is in belong to the separate treatment of contract interpretation.
The second step does the real work, since an offer described as interpretation can still be a supplement or a contradiction. Where a problem leaves the jurisdiction unstated, state both gates and say how the facts come out under each. The Detroit evidence would come in under Pacific Gas, and a court confined to the face of the writing would hear it only if it found the word ambiguous.
Fraud and Misrepresentation
Fraud collides with the bars more often than any other invalidating cause. A party deceived into signing usually holds only an oral statement, and the writing the deceiver prepared says something else. Section 214(d) admits the evidence anyway.38 Two reasons support that result. The rule protects the terms of a valid contract, and proof of deception attacks validity, so the evidence falls outside what the rule guards.39 And a party may not invoke the rule to shield his or her own fraud.40 A deceiver who could rely on the writing would find the lie safest exactly where the paper was most complete.
In Riversisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Assn., borrowers who had fallen behind on their loan payments signed a written agreement under which the lender extended the loan for three months in exchange for additional collateral. The lender’s representative told them the agreement extended the loan for two years. The court held evidence of the misrepresentation admissible under the fraud exception, but pointed out that the borrowers would still have to establish fraud and might have trouble proving justifiable reliance, given their failure to read the written agreement.41
America's Directories, Inc. v. Stellhorn One Hour Photo, Inc. shows how far the exception reaches. Stellhorn signed written advertising contracts that stated they could not be canceled and contained a merger clause excluding outside agreements, after being assured orally that he could cancel after one year. An Indiana appellate court admitted the evidence of the oral assurance because it indicated that the publisher never intended to allow cancellation. Every feature that would defeat an ordinary side promise was present: the writing was integrated, the oral term contradicted it, and the clause disclaimed outside statements. None of it mattered, because the evidence went to how Stellhorn’s assent was obtained.
Courts disagree about whether a merger clause changes the result. The traditional theory holds that the rule presupposes a valid written agreement, so fraud upsets that presumption and makes all evidence admissible to determine the parties’ rights, and a second theory adds that fraud generates rights in tort.42 Proof of fraud in the inducement may therefore be offered to avoid the writing even against a merger clause, and even if the evidence specifically contradicts the writing or the clause.43 A substantial majority of jurisdictions follow this approach and treat the rule as inapplicable to fraudulent inducement even when the contract is fully integrated, as Poeppel v. Lester, 827 N.W.2d 580 (S.D. 2013), states.44 Some courts refuse to admit the evidence, stressing that a party should not sign a merger clause in an agreement that includes terms inconsistent with the party’s oral agreement.45 Others exclude the claim only where the writing includes a specific disclaimer of the very representation later alleged as the foundation for rescission.46 A merger clause does its ordinary work against a party who claims no fraud. A Texas lessee who offered a salesman’s oral assurance of an option to terminate a freezer lease lost against a writing that stated there were no conditions beyond those it expressed.47
Promissory fraud tests the exception hardest, because the false statement is a promise, and promises are what the rule polices. Promissory fraud occurs when a party makes a promise intending not to perform it. A majority of jurisdictions now treat it as a misrepresentation of fact and therefore as fraud in the inducement, which can support an action for deceit, avoidance of the contract, or reformation. Whether the promise may be shown against a total integration is another matter, and the cases are in utter confusion. The question comes down to weighing the policy behind the rule against the policy of suppressing fraud, and that weighing should favor suppression.48 The result can look odd, since a promise the rule would otherwise extinguish supports liability because the promisor never meant to keep it. Fraud liability does not enforce the promise, however. The plaintiff collects for damage caused by relying on it.49 The oral cancellation promise in America’s Directories had this shape.
A signer who did not read the paper raises a further question. One view holds that failure to read precludes the evidence. The modern view reaches the opposite conclusion on the theory that fraud is a greater evil than the failure to read.50 The modern view is sounder, because a rule that charged the signer with the contents of an unread paper would reward the deceiver for exploiting the very trust the deception created. Courts accordingly admit evidence of deceit that induced a signature.51 In DeArmitt v. New York Life Insurance Co., a Pennsylvania court let the plaintiffs offer evidence that an agent had misrepresented the product they were buying.
Admission settles less than the proponent hopes. It lets the factfinder hear the account, and the proponent must still persuade the jury that the statement was made.52 The plaintiff must then prove the elements of fraud, and justifiable reliance is the one that most often fails, as the Riversisland borrowers’ failure to read their agreement shows.53 In Psenicska v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the plaintiffs agreed to appear in what they believed was a documentary, and the finished film was a satire in documentary style. The court held that their written consent covered the film and rejected the fraud theory because the consent waived reliance on statements about the film’s nature. The two decisions do not conflict, because they sit at different stages. America’s Directories decided whether the jury could hear the evidence, and Psenicska decided whether the plaintiffs could win with it. Courts that take the minority approach decide the question at the first stage and exclude the evidence where the writing specifically disclaims the representation alleged.54
Sales of goods follow the same course. The common-law exceptions to the rule remain good law under the Code through §1-103, except insofar as the wording of §2-202 makes one redundant, and fraud is the most important of them.55 Suppose Barney buys a used car after a salesman says it gets thirty miles to the gallon, and he signs a contract that is complete and exclusive. Barney’s route around the writing is to argue that the salesman’s statement fraudulently induced him to sign, which a substantial majority of jurisdictions permit even where the contract is fully integrated.56 The express-warranty side of that problem returns in the sales-law section later in this chapter.
The exception stops at fraud. In a state that requires scienter, the judge should not invoke it to admit extrinsic evidence where the judge concludes that a misrepresentation is wholly innocent.57 A negligent or innocent misrepresentation is less morally reprehensible than a fraudulent one, and relief for it turns on a closer balancing of the parties’ culpability, the misrepresentation’s materiality, and the victim’s duty to verify the facts.58 That placement tracks the general tort pattern, in which fault ordinarily grounds liability,59 although tort law does impose strict liability in some kinds of cases.60 The exception exists to keep a deceiver from using the writing as a shield, and a speaker who honestly believed the statement has no deception to hide.
The fourth step is where answers lose points. Admitting the evidence proves neither the lie nor the conversation, so an answer that treats admission as victory skips the contest over reliance that decides most of these cases.
Other Invalidating Causes
The remaining invalidating causes in §214(d) follow the logic of fraud.63 Evidence that a party was coerced, that both parties shared an error, that the bargain is illegal or unconscionable, or that nothing was given for a promise goes to whether an enforceable contract exists, and the rule protects only the terms of a valid agreement.64 Even against a merger clause, parol evidence is admissible to show that the agreement is void or voidable.65 This subsection asks only why the evidence gets past the rule and where the edges lie. The elements of each defense belong to the material on defenses.
Duress shows the exception most plainly, because the signature on the writing is the very thing the evidence attacks. A party may show that she was coerced into signing an integrated writing.66
Mistake is a second judge-made exception, and it covers unilateral as well as mutual mistake, because a valid mistake defense may leave no valid agreement for the rule to protect.67 If a mistake recognized in law induced the agreement, the agreement is ordinarily voidable, and the rule does not prevent a party from showing that a contract is void or voidable.68 A party who says instead that the writing misstates what the parties agreed may seek reformation, which the rule does not bar either, and the next subsection takes it up.69
Illegality and unconscionability rest on the same footing. Section 214(d) names illegality.70 A clause may be excised from an agreement because it is unconscionable, and the rule will not deter a court from receiving parol evidence to show oppression or the lack of true assent.71
Lack of consideration raises a recital problem. A written promise recites that it is given in consideration of a sum paid and acknowledged, and the promisor says the money never changed hands. The recital seems to say one thing and the evidence another, yet a majority of cases allow the recital to be contradicted, on the theory that the rule does not bar contradiction of recitals of fact. A minority holds the parties estopped from contradicting the writing, or reads the recital to give rise to an implied promise to pay, and applies that view primarily in option and guaranty cases.72
The majority result follows from what a recital is. A recital reports a past event, namely that payment occurred, and it is not one of the promises that fix what the parties owe each other. Showing that the event never happened leaves every term of the deal as written and corrects only an assertion about history. Because the identity of the contracting parties and the authority of an agent are factual questions, parol evidence is also admissible to show them.73 If the parties mutually agreed that a promise was never meant to be performed, the writing is a sham, the subject of the last subsection of this unit.74
These grounds apply to sales of goods as well. Except insofar as the wording of §2-202 makes an exception redundant, each common-law exception remains good law under the Code through §1-103.75
The list in §214(d) is not a password. A party admitted under it may prove the defect and nothing else, so a party who remembers a different oral price has offered a different price term, and the contradiction bar still governs the offer.76 The usual exam error is to answer that mistake or consideration evidence is always admissible, when the real inquiry is what the evidence is offered to show.
Reformation and Remedies
Reformation shows most clearly why the rule cannot reach every kind of evidence. The claim is that the parties agreed to one thing, the writing says another, and the gap is a recording error. Every element of that claim is evidence of an earlier agreement, the very material the rule otherwise screens out. When a suit is a direct attack to set aside, modify, or reform a writing, parol evidence is freely admitted, because the issue is whether the instrument as prepared reflects the parties’ true intent, and answering it requires comparing the intent shown by outside evidence with the writing.79 The rule is therefore not a defense to reformation,80 and it does not bar reformation even though the result is enforcement of the alleged oral agreement.81 Section 214(e) admits the evidence for that reason, and for the same reason it admits agreements and negotiations as grounds for granting or denying rescission or specific performance.82
The rule steps aside because its premise is missing. It prefers a writing to testimony on the assumption that the writing records the parties’ final word accurately, and a reformation claimant says it does not. A claimant offering a consistent additional term against a completely integrated writing asks the court to add to a document the parties accepted as accurate. A reformation claimant asks the court to find the document inaccurate, so a recital in that same document that it states the entire agreement is part of what the claimant attacks.
Because reformation lets one party rewrite a signed document on testimony about an earlier understanding, courts surround it with safeguards. The claim is easy to invent and hard to refute. In Kimmel & Silverman, P.C. v. Porro, the court allowed extrinsic evidence of what the parties intended a settlement to release, but said that a claim of mutual mistake in drafting must still be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The heightened standard replaces the protection the rule would otherwise give. Once the writing’s exclusionary force is lifted, the burden of proof keeps a convenient memory from rewriting a signed contract.
The variance between the original agreement and the record may take any one of an infinity of forms. Typically it is the insertion of an incorrect description of the subject matter, such as street numbers, survey numbers, or boundary lines. Computational errors are frequent, and sometimes the name of a stranger to the transaction is inserted by mistake. Drafters also copy language from similar documents that is inappropriate for the present one.85 A mistake about the legal effect of the record qualifies too, when the agreement called for one legal result and the record, if enforced, produces a different one.86
Parties who leave a term out on purpose receive no such relief. They often do so for reasons that turn out to be unsound. Reformation is unavailable for an intentional omission because there was no agreement to put the term into the record, and it is unavailable if the parties intentionally misstate a term.87 The claimant refused reformation also faces a second danger. A court asked to hear the omitted term in an ordinary action at law may classify the writing as a total integration and bar the evidence, unless the writing is not a total integration, in which case the rule will not bar the term and reformation is unnecessary.88 If the parties agreed instead that the record would be inoperative, a declaratory judgment that the agreement is a sham may be available, the subject of the next subsection.89
Reformation and interpretation are different claims that often arrive in the same complaint. When the parties dispute what a record means, the plaintiff may argue that the plaintiff’s reading is correct and, if it is not, that the record should be reformed. Modern practice generally permits that pleading in the alternative. Parol evidence is freely admitted on the reformation count, but evidence offered on the interpretation count must satisfy the rules for admitting evidence of meaning discussed earlier in this unit.90 The line between the claims runs through what the claimant concedes. Interpretation says the writing is accurate and asks what its words mean, while reformation says the words are wrong and asks the court to change them.
Conditions and Sham Writings
A writing that looks final may be attacked on a ground different from any above: the parties never meant it to operate, or meant it to operate only if a stated event occurred. A paper the parties signed while understanding together that it would carry no legal force is a sham writing. An event the parties agreed must occur before the contract binds is an oral condition precedent. Courts treat both claims as showing that no operative contract exists, and that premise explains the exception and its limits.93
The premise comes from what the rule protects. The rule shields the terms of a valid, binding agreement. A sham is not a contract, and an agreement that is not to take effect until a condition occurs leaves nothing to add to or contradict until then.94 Where the parties agree that a condition precedent must occur before the contract is effective, the failure of the condition may be shown despite a writing that would otherwise be a total integration, because finality is absent. Even against a merger clause, a party may show that the instrument was handed over with an oral condition attached to delivery.95
The exception costs the rule something it was built to deliver. A party who has decided to commit perjury may testify falsely that the whole agreement was a sham instead of testifying falsely to an extra contradictory term, and if the jury believes the story, the rule’s protective shield is pierced. Here the analytic rationale, that a sham leaves no contract to protect, collides with the policy of guarding against fabricated testimony, and the analytic rationale prevails.96
Pym v. Campbell is the standard illustration of a condition on effectiveness. The parties agreed to buy and sell a patent, with the sale orally conditioned on the purchaser’s engineer approving the patent. The court admitted the oral condition, because until the condition occurred no binding contract existed.97 A Maine decision, Brown Development Corp. v. Hemond, applied the same idea to land. The seller alleged that the buyer’s acquisition of an additional lot from a third party was an oral condition precedent to the seller’s obligation to transfer the land. The court reversed summary judgment for the buyer, because the contract was not fully integrated and the alleged oral condition did not contradict the written terms.98
Two facts carry the result in the duplex sale and in Brown Development alike. The writing is silent on the condition, and the condition suspends the duty to perform without denying anything the writing says. If either fact changes, the analysis changes with it.
The exception therefore has a limit that decides most disputes: the alleged condition or sham may not contradict a specific term of the writing. Courts that accept the exception generally decline to apply it where the claimed condition precedent contradicts a specific term, and some go further and exclude an oral condition where the writing already sets out its own conditions, on a theory of implied contradiction.99 Torres v. D'Alesso states the limit for a broad merger clause: the oral condition precedent exception will not be applied where the agreement contains a broad merger clause and the asserted condition would contradict the language of the written agreement.100 The limit protects the writing against the very claim the rule was built to screen. Without it, an apparently absolute obligation could become a conditional one by testimony alone, simply by describing the oral term as a condition on effectiveness.
The First National City Bank decision applied the same limit to a written instrument. Evidence of an oral agreement offered to set up a different agreement that would alter, vary, or contradict the language of the instrument is not admissible. Yet a series of cases admit asserted oral agreements as defenses where they create a condition precedent to enforceability and do not contradict the instrument, and presumably a clause, similar to a merger clause, stipulating that no condition precedent to enforceability was agreed upon would foreclose that escape.101 How broadly a court reads the word contradict decides many of these disputes. The narrower test of inconsistency lets the claimant go to trial and try to persuade the jury that the oral agreement was made, while a wider view lets the court dispose of the case summarily.102
The doctrine also invites a logical objection that shows how much depends on characterization. A contract subject to a condition precedent is still a contract. The parties mutually agreed, and the condition can be read as a condition on performance and not on formation. On that reading the oral condition is a term of the overall agreement, arguably subject to the rule, and a case like Pym should have been decided under the rules for admitting additional oral terms to supplement a written contract. Holdings of the Pym type nonetheless recur with some frequency.103 The label therefore matters. A condition on effectiveness escapes the integration analysis, while a condition on performance is a term, which a completely integrated writing excludes even when it contradicts nothing. An answer should state the exception and then say how the opposing characterization would change the result.