Concept
Material Alteration
Additional terms in an acceptance
Material Alteration
Section 2-207(2)(b) keeps an additional term out of the contract when the term materially alters it.1 The exclusion works only after a contract exists. At common law, a reply that varied the offer's terms was a counteroffer that rejected the offer,2 and under Article 2 a reply may still fail to count as an acceptance if it differs radically from the offer, particularly on dickered terms such as price.3 Paragraph (b) governs the additions that leave a formed contract in place.
Subsection (2) supplies the rule for those additions. Between merchants, persons with specialized knowledge of the goods, of business practices, or of both,4 additional terms are proposals that become part of the contract unless an exclusion applies.5 Merchants who trade on standard forms seldom read every line of the reply, and a rule that admitted whatever the offeree printed would let boilerplate reallocate risks that no one bargained over. Paragraph (b) answers that danger by testing the term itself.
The other two exclusions turn on the offeror's conduct. Paragraph (a) applies only if the offer expressly limited acceptance to its own terms,6 and paragraph (c) applies only if the offeror gave notice of objection in advance or within a reasonable time after learning of the term.7 An offeror whose form was silent about limits and who never objected keeps paragraph (b), because it looks to the term and not to anything the offeror said or did.
A finding of material alteration has a narrow effect. The contract formed under subsection (1) stays in place, and the material term never enters it, because it remains a proposal the offeror has not accepted.8 Comment 3 sends the question whether additional or different terms become part of the agreement to subsection (2),9 and it adds that a term which materially alters the original bargain is not included unless the other party expressly agrees to it.10 Four questions follow, each taken up below: what makes a term material, who must prove it, how courts have sorted common clauses, and how trade usage and the parties' own dealings change the answer.
The Surprise Test
The statute does not say what “materially” means.11 Article 2 defines no “material alteration,” and Official Comments 4 and 5 are illustrative only, so courts have built the test from the comments' examples and from the reason the exclusion exists.12
Comment 4 lists clauses that would normally materially alter the contract and so cause unreasonable surprise or hardship if incorporated without the other party's express awareness.13 Comment 5 lists clauses that involve no unreasonable surprise and so enter unless the other party objects in time.14 The two lists pair up. A complaint period materially shorter than customary or reasonable appears on the first, and a period within customary limits on the second. A seller's power to cancel when the buyer misses any invoice appears on the first, and interest on overdue invoices within trade practice on the second.15 In each pair, the variable is how far the term departs from what a merchant in that trade would expect to find in the deal.
Courts disagree about how the comment's two words relate, because “or” can make either one enough. Surprise is measured against reasonable expectations in light of common practice and usage, so a party that has reason to expect a widely used term cannot claim surprise at it. Hardship is an unbargained-for burden, financial or otherwise, on the other party, or a significant detraction from that party's reasonable expectations.16 The two usually travel together, because a term that burdens a party in a way no one bargained for is usually a term the party did not expect. The Eighth Circuit found both in Marvin Lumber and Cedar Co. v. PPG Industries, Inc., holding that enforcing the seller's damages limitation would have worked hardship and surprise on the buyer.17
The Seventh Circuit reduced the inquiry to one question. In Union Carbide Corp. v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., Judge Posner wrote that an alteration is material if consent to it cannot be presumed. He called that his own gloss on cases that more commonly speak of “unreasonable surprise,” and he said the two come to the same thing: what a merchant would expect is unsurprising and enters, and what it would not expect does not.18 Hardship, on his reading, is a consequence of material alteration and not a criterion for it, because Comment 4 says the listed clauses would materially alter the contract “and so” result in surprise or hardship. A party cannot walk away from a bargain it can fairly be deemed to have made because performance turns out to be burdensome; relief of that kind lies in impossibility and related excuse doctrines, which carry requirements of their own.19
The facts show the test at work. Oscar Mayer had paid, without complaint, every sales tax that appeared on Union Carbide's invoices, so a tax line on an invoice was an expected part of the deal. Union Carbide then read a clause on the back of those invoices, which made the buyer liable for taxes the seller “may be required” to pay, as an indemnity for back taxes assessed long afterward. A buyer facing a taxed invoice could pay it or switch suppliers, but an open-ended and incalculable liability for past taxes was a different obligation. So read, the clause materially altered the contract, and because it was at best ambiguous about indemnity, consent could not realistically be inferred from Oscar Mayer's silence across a succession of invoices that contained it.20
A Florida appellate court reached the opposite result by the same route in Paul Gottlieb & Co., Inc. v. Alps South Corp. Following Union Carbide, it required the party resisting the term to show that, under the circumstances, a reasonable merchant would not have consented to it. The contract was the sixth in a series between the same merchants, each carrying the same limitation-of-liability term on its face, and the buyer's only evidence of surprise was that it had not read the form before the dispute arose. Florida has never excused a party from a contract for failing to read it, and Comment 5 names reasonable remedy limits among the terms that carry no unreasonable surprise, so the court found no surprise and no hardship flowing from surprise.21 What separates the two cases is what each term asked of the buyer. The tax clause as read reached beyond anything the parties' practice had contemplated, while the damages limit sat in a category the comments treat as ordinary and had appeared in contract after contract. An unread form says nothing about what a reasonable merchant would expect, which is why a buyer who argues only that no one read the clause has not shown surprise.
Not every court treats hardship as only a consequence. The comment's wording leads some to treat hardship as a ground that can stand alone, and the Indiana Court of Appeals took that view in Maxon Corp. v. Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. It held that even if the buyer was not surprised by the indemnity clause in the seller's invoice, the clause was material if including it without the buyer's express awareness would impose hardship, and that a clause shifting liability from a negligent party to an innocent one imposes hardship by its nature.22
The first court follows Union Carbide, the second Maxon. The two approaches usually agree, as they did on the invoice indemnities in those cases, and part company only on a term that is expected but heavy. The split reflects a choice about what silence concedes: the surprise-only view treats an expected term as accepted however much it later costs, while the broader view will not bind a party to a heavy burden it never noticed. On an exam, state the surprise formulation first, note that hardship tends to follow from surprise, and raise the minority view only when the facts present a customary term with a heavy burden.
Materiality asks one question: whether consent can be presumed from the term itself. Judge Posner stressed that the doctrine is an aid to interpretation, so even a material term enters if the offeror in fact consented, expressly or by silence against a course of dealings that makes the inference reasonable.23 The proof divides accordingly. If the term is not material, silence is consent. If it is material, the party proposing it needs evidence beyond the term, usually evidence of prior dealings, that reading the offeror's silence as agreement was reasonable. The section on usage and course of dealing takes up that showing, and the next section addresses who must prove the alteration.
Burden of Proof
Section 2-207(2)(b) excludes a term that materially alters the contract, but it never says who must prove the alteration.25 The answer comes from the structure of the subsection, whose second sentence makes inclusion the result between merchants unless one of three listed exclusions applies.26 In Bayway Refining Co. v. Oxygenated Marketing & Trading A.G. the Second Circuit held that the party opposing inclusion of an additional term must prove that the term works a material alteration, and it noted that this joins almost every court to consider the question.27 The dispute began after Bayway delivered the gasoline blendstock MTBE and learned that OMT was not registered with the Internal Revenue Service for the tax exemption. The sale created a tax liability of $464,035.12, which Bayway paid and then tried to shift to OMT through a Tax Clause in the terms its confirmation referenced.28
The court began from the statutory default. The merchant rule is a presumption about what the parties intended, so if neither side had offered evidence the Tax Clause would have entered by the plain language of the statute, and the burden of proving materiality had to rest on the party opposing inclusion in order to give the presumption effect.29 Ordinary practice points the same way. A party who invokes an exception to a rule ordinarily proves it, and the resisting party holds the best evidence of its own past dealings and of what it expected in this trade. A rule that made the proponent disprove material alteration would empty the default, since the proponent would have to rebut an alteration before the presumption did any work.
The allocation reaches all three exclusions, since each is an exception to the same default. As the First Circuit put it in JOM, Inc. v. Adell Plastics, Inc., where both parties are merchants the party opposing the presumption of inclusion must show that one of the three preconditions in § 2-207(2) is met; a buyer who invokes paragraph (b), for example, must show that the seller's damages-limitation clause would work a material alteration.30 A buyer who relies on paragraph (c) must likewise prove that notification of objection was given in advance or within a reasonable time after notice of the term.31 The Florida court in Paul Gottlieb applied the same allocation to material alteration, aligning Florida with the majority of courts.
A buyer resisting a clause often assumes that proof of its own astonishment will do, so the useful question is what kind of surprise counts. Surprise has a subjective element, what a party actually knew, and an objective element, what a reasonable party should have known.32 OMT's executives called the Tax Clause “contract by ambush” and a “sleight-of-hand proposal,” and the court accepted that testimony as proof of subjective surprise.33 OMT still lost, because it alleged no facts and offered no evidence that a reasonable petroleum merchant would be surprised, had no contrary prior course of dealing with Bayway, and said nothing about trade custom. In the court's words, “[a] profession of surprise and raised eyebrows are not enough”; the resisting party must show that, under the circumstances, it cannot be presumed that a reasonable merchant would have consented to the term.34
The objective focus follows from what the default rests on. The standard is the reasonable merchant, a person with specialized knowledge of the goods, of business practices, or of both,35 and inclusion between merchants assumes that such people expect fine print on the other side's forms. The test of that assumption is what merchants in this trade expect, and one party's private reaction cannot answer it. If sincere astonishment were enough, any resisting party could carry its burden by testimony alone, and the presumption of inclusion would give way whenever someone was willing to say a term came as a shock. The question is the one the Seventh Circuit framed in Union Carbide: whether consent to the term can be presumed.
The evidence that proves objective surprise concerns the transaction and its trade. Bayway pointed to the parties' prior course of dealing and the number of confirmations they exchanged, to industry custom, and to the conspicuousness of the term. A federal district court in New Jersey applying the same standard in Rocheux International of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Financial Group lists the factors it weighs:36
- the parties' prior course of dealing;
- industry custom;
- how clearly the additional term was marked in the confirmation;
- whether the term appeared in the parties' standard forms.
That court also asks, on the hardship side, whether the clause would impose substantial economic hardship on the non-assenting party, and it repeats that the non-assenting party bears the burden of proving surprise or hardship.37
The resisting party can meet its burden without that evidence when the clause belongs to a category courts treat as material in itself. Bayway noted that an arbitration clause is per se material in New York, because New York law requires an express agreement to commit disputes to arbitration, and that the Official Comment lists warranty disclaimers and a seller's power to cancel on any missed invoice among the clauses that would normally be material.38 OMT argued that the Tax Clause was a broad indemnity of that kind, and the court rejected the analogy because the clause allocated only the tax payable on one specific sale, so it was limited, discrete, and subject to no special protection. OMT therefore had to prove surprise or hardship on the facts, and it could not.
The contrasting result came in Maxon Corp. v. Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc., where the Indiana Court of Appeals held an indemnification clause in the seller's invoice to be a material alteration as a matter of law, because a clause that shifts liability from a negligent party to an innocent one imposes hardship by its nature.39 The court also observed that Maxon never argued that Tyler, the buyer, had expressly agreed to the invoice terms. Maxon's position was that the terms entered by operation of law because they were not a material alteration, so Tyler had no burden to prove it had not expressly agreed.40 What separates the two cases is the clause. A tax clause confined to one sale left the resisting party to its evidence, while an indemnity was material by its nature.
Whether materiality is a question of law or of fact varies by jurisdiction, and the label affects what the resisting party must produce. Courts that have defined materiality under paragraph (b) often describe it as a question of fact to be resolved on the circumstances of each case, and some caution against deciding it on summary judgment because the inquiry helps ascertain the parties' bargaining intent.41 In Palmer G. Lewis Co. v. ARCO Chemical Co., the Alaska Supreme Court cited authority that places the burden on the party who will benefit from the exclusion. When the underlying facts are undisputed, the label may make no difference. In Marvin Lumber, the Eighth Circuit declined to decide whether to review the district court's ruling as fact or law because the result would be the same either way; it found that enforcing the damages limitation would produce both hardship and surprise.42 A resisting party should therefore expect to come with evidence of custom, dealings, and conspicuousness, unless the clause is of a type courts already treat as material.
Clauses Courts Treat as Material
The statute names no clause that counts as a material alteration.44 The working map comes from Official Comments 4 and 5, which set a list of clauses that would normally materially alter the contract beside a list of clauses that involve no unreasonable surprise and so enter unless the other side objects in time.45 Decided cases then sort real clauses against those lists, and the surprise test governs any clause the lists omit. This section collects the typical results, so that you can place a clause in its likely category and then test the placement against the facts.
The sorting follows what a clause does to the other side's position. A clause the comments treat as material takes away something the law or the bargain already gave that side, such as the implied warranties, a remedy, or a reasonable time to complain, or it adds a burden nobody priced. A clause treated as routine fills out the deal where trade practice or the Code's defaults already speak, so a merchant reading the other side's form would expect to find it. Because a material alteration is one to which consent cannot be presumed, the first group stays out unless the other party in fact agrees, and the second enters by default.
The comments' examples, together with the decisions applying them, sort into two working groups.46 The first group usually materially alters the contract and stays out:
- a disclaimer of the implied warranties of merchantability or fitness where they ordinarily attach;
- a limit or exclusion of damages that removes a large exposure the seller knew the buyer faced;
- a broad indemnity or fee-shifting clause that no one discussed and trade practice does not supply;
- a complaint period materially shorter than customary or reasonable;
- a seller's power to cancel on any missed invoice;
- a delivery guaranty that departs from trade leeway;
- an arbitration or forum clause, in some jurisdictions and on some facts.
The second group usually enters unless the other side objects in time:
- interest on overdue invoices and standard credit terms within trade practice;
- freight charges allocated to the buyer;
- a reasonable formula excusing the seller after supervening causes;
- a complaint period within customary limits;
- a reasonable limit on rejection or on remedies within customary tolerances;
- a payment deadline no harsher than the Code's default.
The warranty disclaimer is the clearest material clause. Comment 4 names a clause negating the standard warranties of merchantability or fitness where they normally attach, and Article 2 itself makes such an exclusion demanding by requiring language that mentions merchantability and, in a writing, is conspicuous.47 Article 2's gap-fillers on warranty, price, and delivery enter a formed contract without help from § 2-207, so a buyer whose order is silent on warranties is relying on the implied warranties the Code supplies.48 A disclaimer in the seller's reply would strip that protection without anyone having discussed it, which is why, absent a contrary course of dealing or usage, it materially alters the contract.
In Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology the Third Circuit held that a software producer's box-top license should have been treated as a written confirmation containing additional terms, and that, assuming the warranties were part of the original agreement, adding the license's warranty disclaimer and limitation of remedies would as a matter of law substantially alter the distribution of risk between the parties.49 The parties' conduct in shipping, receiving, and paying for the product showed that a contract existed, and the license was a proposal for additional terms that required the purchaser's express agreement.50 The vendor had twice asked the purchaser to sign agreements containing similar terms, the purchaser had refused, and the vendor kept selling.51
A disclaimer comes out the other way when it matches what the parties actually negotiated. In St. Charles Cable TV, Inc. v. Eagle Comtronics, Inc. the only substantive warranty the parties had discussed was the seller's replace-or-repair warranty, the seller's sales manager testified credibly that he and the buyer's representative had negotiated an extension of it, and the buyer repeatedly acted under it by returning descramblers for repair or replacement.52 The court held that the limited warranty and its disclaimer were part of the contract, because excluding them would have changed the negotiated deal, and the buyer could claim neither surprise nor hardship. The category sets the presumption; negotiation and performance under the term can overcome it.
Limits on damages produce the widest divergence, because Comment 5 treats a clause limiting remedy in a reasonable manner as routine, while a clause that erases a large loss looks like the warranty disclaimer in another form.53 The Wisconsin Supreme Court took the second view in Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc.: Comment 4 treats a warranty disclaimer as material, and there was no good reason to let a disclaimer that eliminated millions of dollars in damages become part of the contract by operation of law.54 In Marvin Lumber, the seller's unsigned acknowledgments carried, in fine print on the back, a clause capping damages at the purchase price. The seller invoked Comment 5, and the Eighth Circuit nonetheless found that enforcing the cap would produce both hardship and surprise.55 Paul Gottlieb, discussed above, shows the same kind of clause entering, because the limitation had appeared in a series of contracts and the buyer's only proof of surprise was that it had not read the form.56
One federal decision shows how fine the sorting can be. In C.A.I., Inc. v. Vitex Packaging Group, Inc. a Massachusetts federal court held a clause limiting damages to the cost of the product and excluding consequential damages not material, while holding a clause excluding all express and implied warranties material. The label “remedy limit” therefore decides little. Courts ask whether the limit is reasonable on the facts, and a seller's knowledge that the buyer could incur substantial liability if the goods fail pushes the clause toward material.57
Indemnity and fee-shifting clauses are treated as material when they move onto the buyer a liability the seller would otherwise bear. In Maxon, the Indiana Court of Appeals held an indemnity clause in the seller's invoice material as a matter of law, because a clause that shifts liability from a negligent party to an innocent one imposes hardship by its nature.58 St. Charles excluded the seller's indemnity and attorney-fee provisions for similar reasons: nothing showed that the buyer had considered them, and the seller offered no evidence that sellers customarily shift the risk of every dispute to buyers. A clause with narrow reach comes out differently. Bayway Refining rejected the analogy between a broad indemnity and a tax clause that allocated the tax payable on one specific sale, calling the tax clause limited and discrete.59 Fee clauses can also enter when the parties' history supports them. In Rocheux, a New Jersey federal court let in a service charge on overdue balances plus collection costs and attorney's fees, because the term was prominent in multiple acknowledgments over an extensive course of dealing and was not uncommon in such transactions, and the large sum due did not by itself create hardship.60 The fee decisions differ in what the clause covered and in what the parties had seen. The Rocheux charge attached to the buyer's own unpaid balance after repeated prominent notice, while the St. Charles clauses loaded the cost of every dispute onto the buyer with no sign that anyone had considered them.
Time limits for complaints show the Comment 4 and Comment 5 pairing in miniature. A period materially shorter than customary or reasonable is material, and a period within customary limits is routine.61 In St. Charles, the seller's clause waiving claims made more than fifteen days after delivery conflicted with the one-and-one-half-year warranty the parties had agreed to, so the court found unfair surprise and hardship and excluded it. A clause that quietly cuts back a term the parties actually bargained over is the paradigm of what consent cannot be presumed to cover. A short window that matches trade custom and contradicts no bargained term stands on different footing under Comment 5.
Arbitration is the clause on which the jurisdictions split most openly, and neither comment lists it. In Marlene Industries, the New York Court of Appeals held that including an arbitration agreement materially alters a contract for the sale of goods, so the clause does not enter unless both parties explicitly agree to it. A party that agrees to arbitrate gives up in large part many of its normal procedural and substantive rights, it would be unfair to infer so large a waiver from anything less than a clear indication of intent, and an agreement to arbitrate should not depend on conflicting boilerplate in forms the parties never reconciled. Bayway Refining treats the clause as per se material in New York for the same reason, namely that New York law requires an express agreement to commit disputes to arbitration.62
Other courts reach the question without a per se rule. In Dorton, the Sixth Circuit held that whether the arbitration provision materially altered the buyer's oral offer could be resolved only by the district court on further findings of fact, and that if it did, the clause could not become part of the contract unless the buyer expressly agreed to it.63 A federal court in California went further in Shaney Co. v. Crain Walnut Shelling, Inc., holding that an arbitration provision in a walnut seller's order confirmation was not material, because such provisions were common enough in the industry to defeat a claim of surprise and hardship, even though nothing in the dealings or negotiations had alerted the buyer to it.64 The two approaches ask different questions. The New York rule asks what arbitration does to a party's rights, and the fact-based approach asks what merchants in this trade expect.
Forum-selection clauses raise a threshold problem as well. An order that says nothing about forum is usually read by implication to allow suit in any appropriate state, so a clause naming one forum may be a “different” term and not merely an additional one.65 On materiality, courts divide much as they do for arbitration. In Ridgelawn Cemetery Ass'n v. Granite Resources Corp., a federal court in Indiana held that a forum-selection clause materially altered the offer, because the buyer had no forewarning of it and would bear the expense and inconvenience of litigating in a distant forum. A proponent answers that these clauses are common enough that a reasonable merchant should not be surprised, and that the inconvenience of a distant court, absent special circumstances, falls short of hardship. A proponent who expects that argument should be ready with evidence of trade practice.
At the routine end, courts let in terms that fill out ordinary commercial practice. In St. Charles, charging interest on an unpaid bill created no surprise or hardship, and a freight clause entered because buyers generally pay freight under § 2-308(a).66 In Sethness-Greenleaf, both parties were merchants, the buyer had ordered concentrate without specifying a time for payment, and the Seventh Circuit held that invoice terms requiring payment in ten days were not so surprising as to materially alter the arrangement, because the Code's own default under § 2-310(a) demanded payment on delivery.67 Other codifications of the default are to the same effect: unless otherwise agreed, payment is due when and where the buyer receives the goods, and Minnesota's version, for one, gives the buyer no right to withhold part of the price absent express agreement.68 A term no harsher than the default the law would supply takes nothing from the other side, which is why the payment-deadline cases favor the proponent.
When the reply's term conflicts with a term in the offer instead of adding to it, some courts never reach material alteration. A Minnesota buyer argued that the seller's retainage term was a material term the buyer never accepted, so that the buyer's own 10% retainage term became part of the agreement. The court disagreed and let the conflicting retainage terms cancel out,69 a result the discussion of different terms and the knockout rule takes up below.
The comments' lists are illustrations, and results vary with the transaction. Warranty disclaimers, remedy limits, fee clauses, and arbitration clauses each came out both ways in the decisions above. A sound answer names the comment the clause resembles and tests it against the actual transaction, including the trade usage and course of dealing taken up next.
Usage and Course of Dealing
Section 2-207(2)(b) excludes an additional term that materially alters the contract,71 and courts decide materiality by asking whether a reasonable merchant would have expected the term. The answer therefore depends on the background against which these parties bargained, and two parts of that background carry most of the weight: the customs of the trade and the history between the parties. The Code treats both as part of the agreement itself. A course of dealing between the parties and any usage of trade in their field give particular meaning to the agreement's terms and supplement or qualify them, and a course of performance accepted without objection by a party with an opportunity to object is relevant to what the agreement means.72 The surprise test does not read the exchanged forms in a vacuum, so the question here is what these two sources can prove about whether a term was expected.
In everyday terms, a usage of trade is a practice that merchants in a field regularly follow, a course of dealing is the sequence of earlier transactions between these same parties, and a course of performance is how the parties have acted under the very contract in dispute. Surprise is judged objectively, by what a reasonable merchant in this trade, dealing with this counterparty, would expect, a merchant being a person with specialized knowledge of the goods, of business practices, or of both.73 Custom shows what merchants generally expect, and dealing shows what these two have come to expect from each other.
The South Carolina court in Weisz Graphics v. Peck Indus. Inc. explained why the Code looks past the forms to that background. Merchants who trade on preprinted forms often omit terms that both sides understand from past dealings or from the customs of their business, and requiring the forms to mirror each other would defeat the parties' intention to be bound by the bargain they plainly made.74 The parties there disagreed about delivery: Weisz claimed a twelve-month release period, and Peck contended that delivery should come within a reasonable time.75 Their forms said nothing about release dates, specific letters and numbers, or typeface.76 The court found that these missing terms were part of the contract, supplied by prior course of dealing,77 and confirmed by Weisz's course of performance, to which Peck never objected.78 A term that rests on a shared background of that kind is already part of what both sides expect, so it cannot be an unwelcome surprise.
Trade custom does the same work across an entire industry. Bayway Refining lists industry custom alongside the parties' prior dealings and the conspicuousness of the term as evidence that can prove objective surprise.79 On the record there, which showed unrebutted universal practice, allocating the federal excise tax to the buyer was the custom in the petroleum industry, so the buyer could not be objectively surprised by a confirmation clause that reflected it. The court also gave a reason the practice was believable: the tax falls on sales to unregistered buyers, so the buyer controls whether liability arises, and a trade practice that rationally allocates incentives places the burden on the party able to avoid it.80 The burden-of-proof discussion showed this case from the other side, because the buyer lost there for offering nothing about custom. The point here is that a seller who proves custom gives the court the reason to find that consent can be presumed. The same reasoning reaches a clause type that courts otherwise watch closely. Where binding arbitration is common in the parties' industry, it is no surprise,81 although a jurisdiction that treats an arbitration clause as material in itself, as New York does, never reaches custom.82
The parties' own history is the second source, and what it proves depends on what the record shows. In Rocheux, the seller had sent the buyer hundreds of invoices and credit memos between 2000 and 2006 bearing the same interest and attorney's-fee terms. The forms carried the buyer's own bates stamps, many were stamped “Ok to pay,” and the terms appeared as a clearly marked final line or under a prominent heading.83 The court treated that record as a course of dealing that defeated the claim of surprise. It gave no weight to the buyer's assertion that it had told the seller at the outset that it accepted no additional terms, because that statement described the buyer's expectations and the buyer had never rejected the terms once they were proposed. Where the non-assenting party does not respond to additional terms, Comment 6 makes it fair and commercially sound to assume that their inclusion has been assented to.84 The Seventh Circuit reached a comparable result in Sethness-Greenleaf. The buyer received more than 200 invoices and did not plead ignorance of their contents, and the court held that the documents the parties exchanged establish their terms, so that silent acceptance of the invoices completed the contract on those terms and the parties' course of dealing was of no help to the buyer.85
Repetition alone stands on different footing. In Maxon, the record showed no facts indicating that a Tyler employee had ever read an identical invoice, or that an earlier dispute had drawn Tyler's attention to the indemnity clause. The Indiana court held that facts identical to the exchange of forms that produced the suit permit no reasonable inference of awareness, since such forms are all too often never read.86 The same court would not infer a seller's awareness of the buyer's objection from the buyer's repeated use of order forms banning conflicting terms, so the reasoning runs against buyers as well.87 The Third Circuit's decision in Step-Saver states the broader proposition: sending the same writing with standard terms again and again, without any action on the issues those terms address, is not a course of dealing that can bring in a term otherwise excluded under § 2-207. The cases reconcile by what else the record contained. The Rocheux buyer's own stamps and the prominence of the terms were facts about awareness that a bare stack of identical forms lacks. Dealing that shows awareness can answer a claim of surprise, but repetition alone neither defeats the claim nor brings in a term that § 2-207 excludes.
A course of dealing is a sequence of conduct fairly regarded as establishing a “common basis of understanding” between the parties.88 A form that is sent again and again but never read communicates nothing to the other side, so it cannot establish any understanding, common or otherwise. Treating repetition as assent would also let a seller who mailed the same boilerplate with every invoice win its terms by volume alone, a result at odds with § 2-207's treatment of additional terms as mere proposals.89 Courts therefore ask for facts showing that the term was actually noticed or customary, and they do not accept proof that it was printed once more.
History also matters at the second step of the analysis, where a material term can still enter if the offeror in fact consented, expressly or by silence against the background of a course of dealings.90 Silence persuades only as far as the dealing it rests on reaches. In Union Carbide, Oscar Mayer had paid every sales tax that appeared on the seller's invoices, so a tax line was an expected part of the deal. The Seventh Circuit nonetheless held that the same history did not carry a clause read as an indemnity for back taxes assessed years afterward. Paying taxes shown on individual invoices differs from taking an open-ended, incalculable liability, and because the clause was at best ambiguous about indemnity, consent could not realistically be inferred from silence across a succession of invoices that contained it.91