Concept
Terms That Arrive Later
Additional terms in an acceptance
Terms That Arrive Later
Section 2-207(2) assumes a contract already exists. It treats the additional terms in a reply as proposals for addition to that contract and, between merchants, admits them unless one of three exclusions applies.1 Goods sold at a distance strain that assumption. A buyer orders a computer or a software package by phone or website, the seller ships, and the buyer then meets the seller's terms for the first time: a warranty disclaimer, a limit on remedies, an arbitration clause. Three labels recur. Shrink-wrap terms arrive inside the box. Click-wrap terms are assented to by clicking a screen, with or without reading them. Browse-wrap terms sit on a separate webpage and are accepted by continuing to browse the site.2
Everything then depends on when the contract was formed. If the seller's acceptance of the order formed it, the terms in the box are later proposals, and a term that materially alters the contract stays out unless the buyer expressly agrees.3 If the seller may instead postpone formation until the buyer has seen the terms, nothing exists for the terms to be added to. The buyer who keeps the goods then implicitly shows assent under § 2-204, and § 2-207 never applies.4 The Seventh Circuit took that second course in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, starting from § 2-204(1) and not from § 2-207.5 The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits require compliance with the Code, including § 2-207, and uphold terms that come later only on conspicuous notice and an opportunity to review and reject them.6 The controversy over the correct approach continues.7
Timing also marks where § 2-207 stops. The section reaches an acceptance or a written confirmation, so it covers an oral agreement followed by a memorandum that adds terms not discussed.8 How a court treats terms that arrive later therefore depends, at least in part, on whether it finds the contract formed before or after the vendor communicated them.9 At the other edge of the section, where a form follows a bargain already complete, see Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co. The two approaches follow, beginning with the one that treats later terms as proposals.
Terms as Proposals
The first sentence of § 2-207(2) supplies the rule when the bargain comes first: additional terms are proposals for addition to the contract, and between merchants they become part of it unless an exclusion applies.10 Shrink-wrap and click-wrap terms fit that wording whenever buyer and seller struck their deal before the terms appeared, because the terms then ask to be added to a contract that exists. The leading decision is Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology. The Third Circuit there held that the box-top license should have been treated as a written confirmation containing additional terms, and that its warranty disclaimer and limitation of remedies did not become part of the parties' agreement.11
Step-Saver bought copies of TSL's Multilink Advanced program, and at least twelve of Step-Saver's customers later sued it over problems with the multi-user system.12 Step-Saver pressed express and implied warranty claims against TSL, and TSL answered with the box-top license, which disclaimed warranties and limited remedies.13 The parties' conduct settled that a contract existed. A later court summarized the decision this way: shipping, receiving, and paying for the product demonstrated a contract, and the box-top license was a proposal for additional terms under § 2-207, which requires the purchaser's express agreement.14
Because that agreement already existed, the question became whether the added terms would materially alter it, and the court held that they would. Assuming the warranties were part of the original bargain, adding a disclaimer of warranty and a limitation of remedies would, as a matter of law, substantially alter the distribution of risk between Step-Saver and TSL, so neither term became part of the contract.15 Whether the warranties were in fact part of the bargain was a factual question the court left for the district court.16 A term that does not materially alter the contract and escapes the other exclusions enters by default between merchants, because the second sentence of subsection (2) makes inclusion the presumptive result.17 The disclaimer lost in Step-Saver because of what it did to the buyer's position, and not because of where it was printed.
The record held no express agreement of the kind § 2-207 demands. TSL had twice asked Step-Saver to sign agreements with disclaimer and limitation-of-remedy terms like those in the box-top license, Step-Saver refused both times, and TSL kept selling.18 A seller that keeps shipping after the buyer twice declines its terms is poorly placed to say its acceptance depended on them.19 A seller who does mean to make its terms a condition says so. One seller, answering a purchase order that contained an arbitration clause, wrote on its invoice that the document was not an expression of acceptance or confirmation under § 2-207 and that acceptance of any order was “expressly conditional on [Buyer’s] assent to any additional or conflicting terms herein.”20 TSL's conduct looks nothing like that.
When a party is not a merchant, the analysis stops at the first sentence of § 2-207(2). The terms are proposals, and they become part of the contract only if the original offeror expressly agrees, whether or not they are material.21 Klocek v. Gateway, Inc. shows the result. Gateway moved to dismiss on the strength of an arbitration clause in its Standard Terms and argued that the buyer accepted the clause by keeping the computer more than five days after delivery. The Standard Terms purported to work that result, but Gateway offered no evidence that the buyer expressly agreed to them.22
The court reached that result by rejecting two premises of the Seventh Circuit's decisions. It denied that § 2-207 is irrelevant when only one form is involved: by its terms the section covers an acceptance or written confirmation and requires no second form, and Official Comment 1 reaches an agreement made orally and followed by memoranda that add terms not discussed.23 It also denied that the vendor is the master of the offer. The Seventh Circuit gave no explanation for that premise, and in typical consumer transactions the purchaser is the offeror and the vendor the offeree. A vendor can be the offeror, but Gateway offered no facts supporting that finding, so the court assumed the buyer offered to purchase and Gateway accepted by agreeing to ship or by shipping.24 The court in Rogers, whose reasoning another court later quoted, reached the same place on the keeping point: accepting the computers and not returning them is consistent with a contract formed when the orders were placed and cannot be read as acquiescing in the later “Terms and Conditions of Sale” document, whose arbitration provision was only a proposal to add a term.25
Merchant buyers, who engage in repeat transactions, presumably know how to cope with the battle of the forms, so a seller's additional terms are treated as proposals that stay out if they materially alter the contract. Section 2-207 draws no further line between merchants and consumers, other than treating all additional terms as proposals in the case of consumers.26
Terms After Review
Section 2-207(2) screens terms that reach a buyer after a contract exists, and the proposals approach rests on the premise that the order and the seller's acceptance or shipment formed one before anyone opened the box.28 A second line of decisions denies that premise. ProCD begins with § 2-204(1): “A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.”29 A vendor, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct and may propose limits on the conduct that counts, and a buyer accepts by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance.30 ProCD proposed a contract that a buyer would accept by using the software after having an opportunity to read the license at leisure, and the buyer did exactly that.31
On that reading, terms of use are no less a part of the product than the size of the database or the speed with which the software compiles listings, and competition among vendors, not judicial revision of a package's contents, protects consumers.32 The consequence is structural. If the vendor may delay formation, no contract exists when the terms arrive, nothing is added to anything, and subsection (2) has no work to do. If the purchase order is the contract, § 2-207 applies and material terms cannot be added without explicit assent. If the contract is not formed until the purchaser sees the shrinkwrap license, § 2-204 applies and keeping the software implicitly shows assent.33 Courts that reject the review theory treat the enclosed terms as at most a written confirmation under § 2-207(1). The terms then fail under § 2-207(2) if they materially alter the contract formed in the store, by telephone, or on the Internet, and those are the terms sellers care about.34
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. followed ProCD in a case about a computer.35 The court's own caveat shows where the reasoning is thinnest. The Hills might have had a better argument if they had first learned of the bundled terms after opening the box and been discouraged from returning the computer by the cost of shipping. The court left open what the remedy would be in that case, and whether it could exceed the shipping charges.36
DeFontes v. Dell, Inc. put the same choice before the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which quoted the objection that Rogers raised against the review theory. Accepting the computers and not returning them is consistent with a contract formed when the orders were placed, so the terms document, including its arbitration provision, would be only a proposal to add a term under § 2-207.37 ProCD's vendor proposed the conduct that would count as acceptance. A buyer who simply keeps goods has done what a buyer does under a contract formed at the order, so the review theory works only when the seller has told the buyer what keeping them means.
The strongest practical argument for the review theory is that buyers often learn the details only after paying. The ProCD court stressed common sense in pointing out that goods like an airline ticket, an insurance policy, or a concert ticket are bought and paid for before the detailed terms are made known, and a commentator who criticizes the decision agrees that those terms bind and are not mere proposals.38
Critics press three objections. The first is textual. ProCD assumed that a battle of the forms means a clash between the buyer's written order and the seller's written acceptance, yet § 2-207 plainly covers an oral order followed by a written confirmation, and Official Comment 1 says so. One critic reads the opinion as an attempt to avoid § 2-207 by ignoring the statute's commands.39 Klocek made the same point from the statute's wording, and added a second objection: the Seventh Circuit never explained why the vendor is the master of the offer, when the purchaser is typically the offeror.40
The third objection concerns consumers. Section 2-207 treats a seller's added terms as proposals even when the buyer is a consumer, and for consumers the important question is whether the unread conditions are fair.41 If ProCD is followed and § 2-207(2) no longer screens out unread terms, fairness and unconscionability become more urgent and would have to be handled directly, under a separate set of standards.42