Concept
Limits on Gap Filling
Court supplies an omitted essential term
Limits on Gap Filling
Section 204 gives a court power to complete a bargain, and that power has edges. A court may supply a term only when the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract “have not agreed” about an essential term, and the term it supplies must be “reasonable in the circumstances.”1 The first phrase assumes a true gap, a point on which the parties gave no answer of their own. The second assumes a yardstick, such as the purpose of the deal, the practice of the trade, or a market price, against which a court can measure reasonableness. Gaps ordinarily come from lack of foresight, incomplete bargaining, or excessive optimism about performance,2 and § 204 repairs those accidents. Where the parties made a choice, it has nothing to repair.
Three limits follow. In the first, the parties addressed the term by reserving it for their own later agreement, so no silence is left to fill. In the second, they addressed it too vaguely to enforce, which raises a doubt that they ever agreed on it, and a gap-filler cannot answer that doubt. In the third, the only candidate term would contradict what the parties did express, so supplying it would override part of their deal. The default-rule logic of the preceding sections ties the three together: a default fills silence because silent parties may be taken to have deferred to the law, and that justification disappears once the parties have spoken to the point.
These limits press against a strong countertendency. Courts treat voiding an agreement for lack of essential terms as a step for “rare and extreme circumstances,” and a court that finds the parties intended a contract must fill the gaps it reasonably can.3 The limits therefore give no license to retreat whenever a term is missing. They mark the narrow cases in which filling the gap would mean making a contract for the parties, which a court may not do. The first of those cases is the term the parties reserved for their own later agreement.
Agreements to Agree
A clause that leaves price, or any other essential term, “to be agreed” addresses the subject: it assigns the answer to a future meeting of the parties’ minds. Section 204 operates only when the parties “have not agreed,” so a deferral leaves nothing to supply.4 The traditional rule takes the assignment at face value. Where an essential element of a promise is reserved for the future agreement of both parties, no legal obligation arises until that agreement is made.5 A court that filled the term anyway would choose for the parties the very term they said they would choose themselves, and it would turn negotiations they regarded as unfinished into a completed deal. In the words quoted from Autry v. Republic Productions, “[t]he court may not imply what the parties will agree upon.”6
Copeland v. Baskin Robbins shows the rule at work. The parties’ letter fixed how much ice cream Baskin Robbins would buy over three years, but, as the plaintiff candidly admitted, “a variety of complex terms” remained for agreement before the co-packing contract could be completed.7 Courts have grown more liberal about supplying missing terms to find an enforceable contract, the court explained, but they do so only where the “reasonable intentions of the parties” can be ascertained.8 Parties who both regard a variety of complex terms as open have not yet shown what they intend about them. A second difficulty compounds the first. If the parties never agreed on a price, no promise about price exists, so a judge asked whether the buyer breached has nothing against which to measure the buyer’s conduct. The rule thus protects two things at once: the parties’ choice to keep bargaining and the court’s ability to identify a breach.
The rule is narrower than it first sounds, because it bites only when nothing outside the parties’ future agreement can fix the term. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co. illustrates the contrast. The paper buyer there won judgment on the pleadings in the Appellate Division, and the Court of Appeals reversed that order and restored the denial of judgment.9 A separate opinion would have enforced the deal anyway. Failing any other alternative, it argued, the law should apply the rule of reason: hold the seller to deliver its paper and take as the price the Canadian Export Paper Company contract price for a period reasonable in the paper trade.10 That opinion did not carry the day, but it names the variable that matters. A price borrowed from the market is a fact a court can apply, while a price chosen from nothing is an invention.
The common-law cases that resist open-price deals describe the problem as the absence of both a specific price and a definite method of ascertaining one, such as a formula, a designated arbitrator, or an outside market source. When neither exists, there is “a clear case of nonagreement,” and a court that fixed the obligation “is not enforcing the contract but is binding the parties to something they were patently unable to agree to when writing the contract.”11 A method changes the analysis because it moves the term out of the parties’ future will and into an external fact, which a court can apply without implying anything.
The Uniform Commercial Code relaxes the common-law rule for sales of goods. A contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness merely because terms are open, so long as the language, read in context, shows an intent to contract, a basis for finding breach, and a means of providing a remedy.12 Under § 2-204(3), contrary to the common-law approach, a gap-filler is available even though the parties agreed to agree or purported to agree on a term.13 The Code’s open-price rule (§ 2-305), covered earlier in this chapter, applies the same idea to price. It works because merchants often commit to a sale and leave price for later, and the market for goods usually supplies the yardstick that the common-law cases found missing.
Two limits remain. The Code changes the common law only in limited ways and leaves it as the backdrop, so for services, real estate, and other deals outside Article 2, the traditional rule still controls.14 And the Code helps only parties who intended to contract: a dispute over material terms that shows no intention to be bound produces no contract, and a gap-filler has nothing to complete.15
A promise to negotiate stands on different footing from a bare agreement to agree. The Copeland court cited Beck v. American Health Group to illustrate the distinction between the two, and it observed that the decisions refusing to enforce agreements to agree had examined the underlying substantive contract, not whether the promise to negotiate was enforceable in its own right.16 The distinction matters for two reasons. A promise to negotiate is a promise to bargain, so a party performs it by bargaining. If the parties negotiate in good faith and still fail to agree, they have done what they promised, and liability arises only if the failure comes from a refusal to negotiate or from bad-faith bargaining. And enforcing the process requires no court to choose a term, so the objection that a court may not imply what the parties will agree upon has nothing to attach to. Jurisdictions differ on enforcing such promises, so an answer should treat enforcement as a recognized possibility and not as a rule that holds everywhere.
Drafters keep an agreement to agree from being treated as illusory by choosing among three devices: a good-faith bargaining requirement, an objective basis for supplying the terms, or provision for mediation or binding arbitration.17 Each device matches a route described above. The first creates a promise to negotiate that can be enforced on its own. The second gives a court the kind of benchmark that the Canadian Export price would have furnished. The third moves the decision to a neutral third party when the parties cannot agree.
Step one triggers the traditional rule, and steps two and three are the ways out for the underlying deal. Step four concerns a different promise with a different breach question, so a stem can end with the supply arrangement unenforceable while the promise to negotiate remains alive.
Vague Terms
A vague term and a missing term can look alike in a short writing, yet the law treats them differently. When the parties were merely silent about a material term, or discussed it without purporting to agree on it, the term can ordinarily be implied from standard terms, trade or local usage, a prior course of dealing, or a course of performance after the agreement, or supplied by a court as a gap-filler. A purported agreement on a term left indefinite stands on different footing.19 The text of § 204 points the same way: it operates when the parties “have not agreed,” and parties who wrote a term, even loosely, did not omit it.20
The reason lies in what a gap-filler does. A court supplies a term because the parties would probably have agreed to it had the point come to their attention, or because it fits community standards of fairness. That is why a service agreement that never mentions price yields a reasonable price, and a contractor hired without a stated price is owed the usual charges for such work.21 The supplied term is one that silent parties most plausibly took for granted, so it completes their deal without contradicting anything they said. A vague term lacks that feature. Parties who purported to settle a point reached some understanding about it, and a standard fill would replace that unresolved understanding with a term the court chose. What vagueness raises is a doubt about whether the parties agreed on the point at all.
The doubt is serious only when the point is important. No contract arises when a material aspect of the agreement is left indefinite and neither interpretation nor construction can resolve the uncertainty, because the parties then never reached enough consensus to conclude a contract, and a court should not concoct one for them.22 A term is material when it is so central to the values exchanged that it forms a fundamental basis of the bargain, and the price a buyer will pay is a typical example. An indefinite term that falls short of that level must still be settled by the court if the dispute turns on it, but its uncertainty does not stop a contract from forming.23
The plumber hired with no word about price and the two writings above mark the line. The plumber and the homeowner were silent, so the usual charges for the work fill the gap. The associates and the landowner and buyer spoke to the term, and the words they chose leave a court unable to tell what they agreed. A common exam mistake is to reach for § 204 whenever a clause is unclear. The first question is whether the parties omitted the term or purported to settle it, because only an omission invites the gap-filler.
Vagueness does not always last. The working standard tolerates some indefiniteness when the evidence shows that the parties intended a contract and some means exists of resolving the uncertainty so that a breach can be identified and a remedy given.24 Two developments commonly supply that means. The first is performance. Parties who act under an agreement show what they took the vague words to mean, and performance “may either remove the uncertainty or militate in favor of recovery even if the uncertainty continues.”25 A later section of this chapter treats performance and reliance in full.
The second development is a selection among defined alternatives. Wilhelm Lubrication v. Brattrud involved a buyer who agreed to buy a stated quantity of motor oil in an assortment of weights, each with a definite price, and who repudiated before specifying the assortment. The court held the agreement too vague because the assortment was undetermined.26 Many courts reach the opposite result on similar agreements, and those that find the agreement definite ordinarily measure damages on the alternative least onerous to the party in breach.27 The second line of cases has a clear logic. The uncertainty concerns which of several defined performances the buyer will call for, a choice the buyer controls, so a breach is identifiable and the remedy is measurable on the cheapest option the breaching party could have selected.
Sometimes only part of an agreement is indefinite. A court may then disregard the indefinite part and enforce the rest, and the test is whether the parties would have entered into the agreement without the offending clauses.28 The test follows from why a vague term matters in the first place. A vague clause on a peripheral point, such as an incidental promise of cooperation in an otherwise definite sale, can be struck without changing what either side bargained for, so the remaining deal is the one they made. A vague clause on price or on the division of profits goes to the heart of the exchange, and striking it leaves nothing to enforce. Severability therefore tracks materiality: the more central the indefinite term is to the values exchanged, the less likely a court is to find that the parties would have contracted without it.29
The vague-term limit is chiefly a common-law limit. Under UCC § 2-204(3), contrary to the common-law approach, a gap-filler is available for a sale of goods even though the parties agreed to agree or purported to agree on a term left indefinite.30 A vague price clause in a sale of goods is therefore much less likely to be fatal than the same clause in a contract governed only by the common law. The Code’s condition still applies, however. A dispute over material terms that shows no intention to contract produces no contract, and a gap-filler then has nothing to complete.31
Terms Inconsistent With Intent
Reasonableness under § 204 is measured against the deal the parties made, so the second condition limits the court as much as it empowers it.33 In B. Lewis Productions, Inc. v. Angelou the court said that an agreement cannot be enforced if it lacks essential terms and the court cannot supply them in a reasonable fashion consistent with the parties’ intent, and it added that a court may not make a contract for the parties.34 A supplied term must therefore fit the agreement as the parties expressed it. The same decision also states the counterweight that keeps this restraint from becoming an excuse to void deals.
The first restraint protects terms the parties actually chose, and its reason comes from what a default is. A default applies to silence. Once the agreement speaks to a point, no silence remains, the condition that the parties “have not agreed” is unmet, and a court-chosen term would override a choice the parties made. The second restraint protects against burdens the parties never accepted. Even where the agreement is silent, “reasonable” means reasonable for this deal, so the court asks what these parties would probably have agreed to. A court that adds a liability neither side accepted has substituted its own sense of fairness for their bargain.
The buyer’s argument fails at its first step, because it treats a term the parties chose as though it were an omission. An express term displaces any default, even a term that later proves unwise, since a supplied term exists to approximate the bargain the parties probably would have struck, and they have already shown what that bargain was. The usual error is to reason that any unfavorable or incomplete-looking clause is a gap. The question that separates the cases is whether the parties spoke to the subject at all.
The same fidelity to intent forbids the opposite error. A court that finds the parties intended a contract is not free to walk away because a term is missing. In Angelou, the court had found in an earlier decision that the parties intended a contract, and it considered itself obligated to fill any gaps in their agreement if it reasonably could. It described voiding an agreement for want of essential terms as a step for “rare and extreme circumstances.”35
The incentive that arises once a deal turns sour explains the counterweight. A party who regrets a bargain has every reason to find some detail the parties left unsettled, such as price, the work to be done, or the time of performance, and to call it fatal. If that argument succeeded whenever an essential term was missing, indefiniteness would become an exit for the party who regrets the deal. Performance sharpens the point. A court should be especially willing to give the bargain a definite meaning when the plaintiff has fully or partly performed, because performance may remove the uncertainty or favor recovery even if some uncertainty remains.36 A court may sometimes conclude that no enforceable agreement was made, but evidence of intent to be bound or performance already rendered often makes that result inappropriate, and in those cases § 204 directs the court to supply a reasonable term.37
The two restraints answer one question from opposite sides: what did these parties intend? The court completes the deal by filling the gaps it can reasonably fill, and it stops where any term it chose would be its own invention. Voiding the agreement is left for the narrow case in which neither the agreement, nor the trade, nor the surrounding circumstances gives the court a way to fill an essential term consistently with the parties’ intent. An exam stem that asks whether a court may add a term, or whether a deal fails for a missing one, is testing which restraint is in play, and the first thing to ask is whether the agreement spoke to the point. If it did, the express term controls and the court may not add a contradicting one. If it did not, the next questions are whether the parties intended a contract and whether a reasonable fill exists.