Concept
Conditions Versus Promises
Conditions (express and constructive)
Conditions Versus Promises
A condition and a promise do different work, and contract language rarely says which one it creates. A promise creates a duty, and failing to perform it is a breach that supports a claim for damages. A condition only holds a duty in suspension, and its failure is an event that did not happen. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 225(3) draws the line: the non-occurrence of a condition is not a breach unless a party is under a duty that the condition occur.1
One clause can therefore read as a promise, as a condition, or as both, and the reading decides what the disappointed party may do. Take a farm lease that requires the tenant to remove weeds. A judge is unlikely to read that clause as an express condition of the tenant’s right to remain in possession, and courts tend to read it as a promise. The promise reading lets the owner recover all the damages that can be proved. If the weeds grow bad enough to be a material breach, the owner may still end the lease, because a substantial failure defeats a constructive condition of the tenant’s right to stay (constructive conditions are taught below).2
Drafters therefore choose deliberately. A party who wants damages when an event does not occur must make that event a promised performance. A party who wants to act, or to refrain from acting, depending on the event must make it a condition, preferably an express one. The same event can be both, but experienced counsel know that promising an event may hand a court a ready-made reason not to read it as an express condition.3
The three subsections below take the possibilities in turn: a condition nobody promised, a condition that is also a promise, and a condition that depends on something a party can influence.
Failure Without Breach
When a condition fails and no one promised that it would occur, no one has breached. A duty subject to a condition is not due until the condition occurs or is excused, and a duty that was never due cannot be breached. That is why the plaintiff must prove, as part of the prima facie case, that the condition occurred or was excused.4 The contract survives the failure: both parties remain bound, but the party whose duty depended on the event is discharged from performing.5 Lawyers also draw a traditional, somewhat confusing line between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent. It mostly allocates the burdens of pleading and proof, though it can have substantive consequences too.6
The condition failed, so Bertha’s duty to take and pay never becomes due, and she may walk away from the deal.7 Sheng has no claim against her, because no duty of hers was owing. Bertha has no claim against Sheng, because Sheng never promised the outcome. The contract treated the certificate as a trigger, and nobody undertook to deliver it.
Gibson v. Cranage follows the same pattern. Perfect satisfaction was a condition that the plaintiff had to meet, or “cause to occur,” before the defendant’s duty to pay for the enlargement arose. Yet the plaintiff had no duty to provide that satisfaction and could not have faced a counterclaim for failing to.8 When the event is a condition precedent only, its failure discharges the promisor from her own performance but creates no claim for damages against the other party.9 The release runs in one direction, and liability runs in neither.
A condition can even exist with no duty on anyone to satisfy it. In a Restatement illustration, a landlord promises to make necessary interior repairs on a leased building and reserves no right to enter it. The tenant’s giving reasonable notice of repairs the landlord would not otherwise learn of is a condition of the landlord’s duty, although the tenant is under no duty to give notice.10 If the tenant stays silent, the landlord’s duty to repair never ripens, so leaving the repairs undone is no breach. The tenant, who promised nothing about notice, has not breached either.
The usual error is to infer breach from the bare fact that an expected event did not occur. Ask first whether anyone promised that the event would occur. If no one did, the answer is release without liability; if someone did, the next subsection applies.
Promissory Conditions
A term is a promissory condition when it is both a condition and a promise: one party promises, expressly or impliedly, that the event will occur and becomes liable for breach if it does not.12 A pure condition is the opposite case. It is simply an event on which performance depends; if the event fails, the dependent performance need not be rendered, and neither party incurs liability.13
Bertha and Sheng show the difference. Suppose Bertha has enough bargaining power to demand, besides the express condition, Sheng’s separate promise that the certificate will issue. If it does not, Bertha holds two options: she may walk away because the condition failed, or she may waive the condition and sue Sheng for breach.14 Waiver is taught later in this chapter, but note now that parties and courts often ignore or waive conditions, and that contracts often contain clauses providing that a party’s failure to enforce a right is not a waiver.15
A term can therefore fall into one of three groups, each with its own consequences:
- A pure condition, with no promise behind it, discharges the other party’s performance obligation but creates no claim for damages.16
- A promise that is not a condition supports damages for its breach, and a breach grave enough to be material may also defeat a constructive condition of the other party’s performance, as the weed-clause lease showed.17
- A promissory condition is both, so a material and total breach of the promise is also the non-fulfillment of the condition, and the victim may withhold its own performance and sue for damages.18
Timely arrival is both the carrier’s promise and a condition of the manufacturer’s duty to pay. As a condition, its failure means the payment duty never ripens, so the manufacturer may refuse to pay. As a promise, the late arrival is the carrier’s breach, so the manufacturer may also claim damages for the delay.19 The first consequence answers whether a duty is due, and the second answers whether someone did wrong.
A single land sale contract can hold pure and promissory conditions side by side. If the sale depends on a city’s approval of a pending rezoning application, the parties have staked the deal on an event neither controls, and nobody has guaranteed the outcome. The approval is a pure condition: if the city refuses, the buyer’s duty to pay never comes due, and the seller has no damages claim because no one promised that the city would say yes. The exchange at the center of the same contract works differently. Payment and conveyance each depend on the other, each party controls the performance it undertook, and each, by committing to perform, promised that it would be rendered. Those terms are promissory conditions.20 A party willing to take the risk may also guarantee an event beyond its control. Had the seller promised that the rezoning would be granted, a refusal by the city would be both a failed condition and a breach.21
Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. River Brand Rice Mills, Inc. is a well-known illustration of a promissory condition. An exporter had agreed to buy rice from a processor for December delivery and was obliged to give shipping instructions two weeks before delivery. Instructions for part of the rice arrived after the deadline, and the processor refused to deliver that part. The court found for the processor, reasoning that the December delivery date was fundamental to the processor’s obligation, so timely instructions were a promissory condition.22
That classification explains both halves of the result. As a condition, the instructions were what the processor’s duty to deliver depended on, so late instructions meant the duty never ripened. As a promise, the instructions were something the exporter had undertaken to supply, so their lateness was the exporter’s own default and not a neutral event.23 How serious a default must be before it justifies refusing to go on is a question for the separate reading on breach.
On an exam, ask two separate questions of any such term: did a party promise the event, and does the other party’s duty depend on it? A failed condition does not by itself prove breach, and a broken promise does not by itself prove a right to withhold performance. Each inference skips one of the questions.
Implied Duty of Effort
Section 225(3) makes a failed condition a breach only if a party was “under a duty that the condition occur,” and that duty need not be written down. When a condition depends on something a party can influence, such as a lender’s approval of a loan or the sale of the party’s own house, courts read the party to have promised reasonable, good-faith efforts to bring the event about, though not to guarantee that it will occur.25 The condition remains pure, because its failure still releases the party, but it now carries an ancillary promise whose breach has consequences of its own.
The financing contingency is the standard example. A buyer commits to purchase a house on the condition that the buyer obtains a mortgage loan. The grant of the loan is out of the buyer’s hands, because a lender must agree to make it, so the buyer cannot promise that it will be approved, and the condition is not promissory. Yet it would be a peculiar transaction, and probably not a contract at all for failure of consideration, if the buyer promised nothing about pursuing the loan.26
The implication has a purpose. If the buyer promised nothing about pursuing the loan, the buyer could let the condition fail and then announce a release, in effect turning the duty on and off at will. Such a power renders the obligation illusory, and a court might refuse to enforce the contract at all.27 Courts dislike that result and avoid it by reading the condition as containing an implicit covenant to use good faith or reasonable efforts, so that the condition language is treated as a covenant as well.28
The duty of effort arises only where there is something for the party to do. In the rezoning contract above, the application was already pending when the parties signed, so nothing remained for the buyer to do and the buyer owed no effort. Had the application not yet been made, the parties could have written a contract in which the buyer undertakes to submit and conscientiously pursue it but is excused from buying if it is declined. That buyer has promised to try without promising to succeed, and approval remains a condition of the buyer’s obligation to buy.29
The implied promise has two features. Its object is effort, not result: the outcome rests with a lender, a county board, or the purchaser of the promisor’s old house, and the condition exists so that the party relying on it does not bear the risk of what those outsiders decide. If the promise guaranteed the result, every failed condition would also support a damages claim, and the clause would turn into a promissory condition. The standard of effort is reasonable and honest, judged by what could be expected of a person in the promisor’s position. In an illustration, Byron’s contract to buy Stella’s property depends on his selling his own house at a stated minimum price. The test is whether Byron made an honest and genuine effort of the kind reasonably expected from someone in his position. He may have tried hard, but he was no experienced dealer, and the contract’s minimum price assumed a broker’s commission, so selling without an agent may have fallen short.30
Whether the effort was enough is often disputed, and the answer depends on what further effort could have accomplished. A buyer who makes no attempt to obtain financing plainly breaks the promise. A buyer who applies to a single lender, which refuses because of poor credit and insufficient income, may have done enough if every other lender uses the same standards, since further applications would be futile. If other lenders apply more lenient standards, failing to approach them breaches the promise of reasonable efforts.31
In Luttinger v. Rosen, home buyers made their obligation subject to financing at an interest rate not above 8½%, and they agreed to use due diligence in locating the loan. The trial court found that the buyers tried their best, and the only local bank willing to lend the needed sum offered 8¾%. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the rate limit was a condition precedent, that it had not been met despite diligent effort, and that the buyers could therefore terminate and recover their deposit.32 Because the effort promise was kept, the failed condition released the buyers without making them liable to anyone.
The condition did fail, but the buyer’s own inaction made it fail, so he broke the implied promise to pursue financing and cannot rely on the failure. Two consequences follow. As against him, the condition is excused, so his duty to buy is treated as due and his refusal to close is a breach.33 The broken effort promise is also a breach in itself, for which he is liable even though the main duty never ripened, and courts typically treat it as a material or total breach, much as if he had refused to complete the sale.34 The later section on prevention and hindrance takes up how far that excuse reaches.
A party who invokes the effort duty against the other side must show that it was broken. In Phoenix-Talent School District v. Hamilton, a school district agreed to buy land, and the contract made county approval of a lot line adjustment by a fixed date an express condition. The parties applied together, the county required further work, and approval missed the deadline. The district was willing to extend the deadline, the sellers were not, and the district sued for specific performance.35 The court found county approval to be a pure condition, because the county’s decision lay beyond the parties’ control, and it found that the parties had made mutual promises to cooperate in good faith in making the application. The sellers had cooperated fully, so they had not breached, and summary judgment went to them.36
The two cases mirror each other. In Luttinger, diligent effort protected the party who invoked the failed condition to escape the contract; in Phoenix-Talent, full cooperation protected the party who relied on the failure against a suit to enforce. In both, evidence of real effort separates a released party from a breaching one, so an exam answer should ask what the party actually did and should not treat a failed outcome as proof of breach.