Concept
From Impossibility to Impracticability
Impracticability
Impracticability of Performance
From Impossibility to Impracticability
Contract liability is strict, and impracticability is the doctrine that interrupts it. The maxim pacta sunt servanda, contracts are to be kept, makes an obligor liable in damages for breach even when the obligor is without fault and even when circumstances have made the contract more burdensome or less desirable than the obligor anticipated.1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 states the exception. Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without that party's fault by an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, the duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.2 Each phrase of that sentence becomes an element in the sections ahead. This section lays out the architecture: the default the rule interrupts, the cases that built the exception, its widening from impossibility to impracticability, and the question it answers.
Paradine v. Jane gives the default its classic statement: “[W]hen the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident or inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by his contract.”3 The reasoning is about allocation. The promisor made the promise without qualification and could have written protection into it, so the promisor carries the risk of whatever followed.
The exception takes its familiar form in Taylor v. Caldwell. Caldwell agreed to rent a music hall to Taylor for several days of musical performances. The hall burned down shortly before the first performance, and Taylor sued for breach of contract.4 No express term qualified Caldwell's obligation to provide the hall.5 The destruction, the court said, was “without the fault of either party” and so complete that the concerts could not be given. The question was “whether, under these circumstances, the loss which the plaintiffs have sustained is to fall upon the defendants.”6 The court answered no. Because the hall was “essential” to performance and the parties had contracted “on the basis of [its] continued existence,” its accidental destruction excused Caldwell's duty.7 In modern terms, the court treated the hall's continued existence as a basic assumption of the contract and implied a term that its destruction would excuse performance.8
The two cases read silence differently. Paradine treated an unqualified promise as binding whatever happened. Taylor asked what the parties had assumed, found that the hall's continued existence was part of that footing, and supplied the term the contract left unwritten. The modern explanation of the doctrine generalizes that move. Although the promise is absolute in its terms, it was not intended to cover the situation that arose, and the court is free to supply a term that will do justice.9 The Restatement says the same thing in its own words: because “the contract does not cover the case that has arisen, the court's function can be viewed generally as that . . . of supplying a term to deal with the omitted case.”10 Viewed that way, relief for impracticability does not interfere with freedom of contract.11
Impossibility is the easy case. The harder questions involve events that leave performance literally possible. An event may preclude performance in the contemplated fashion while leaving alternative methods open, or it may leave the contemplated performance available but make it so much more difficult or expensive that the performing party faces substantial losses on the contract.12 The early defense did not reach those cases. Had the fire merely damaged the music hall, an owner who reasonably could have restored it in time would have had no defense, because the owner's subjective inability or disinclination to do so would not support a claim of impossibility.13 The doctrine has since broadened, and it is now called impracticability in recognition of the change.14 Performance that is neither literally nor even subjectively impossible can still be impracticable when it is sufficiently different from what both parties contemplated at the time of contracting.15
The doctrine now appears in both UCC § 2-615 and Restatement (Second) §§ 261 to 272. The two differ in details, but the basic concepts are the same.16 Under the Code, a seller's delay in delivery or non-delivery, in whole or in part, is not a breach if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by a contingency whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract. Good-faith compliance with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order, whether or not it later proves invalid, has the same effect. Either way the seller must comply with paragraphs (b) and (c) of the section.17
The hypothetical shows the default at work: a more burdensome contract is not, for that reason alone, an excused one.18 The cost-increase cases later in this chapter test how far that default stretches.
Underneath the vocabulary, the doctrine answers a question about breach. Suppose a tidal wave carries a cabin, the subject of a sale contract, out to sea without the fault of either party, and the buyer sues the seller for damages. The court must decide whether the seller's failure to perform is excused. If it is, the seller is not in breach and owes no damages. The buyer need not perform either, so the contract terminates.19 Some events do not end a contract so completely but still excuse performance on its exact terms, a possibility the later sections on temporary and partial impracticability develop.20
Impossibility does not guarantee excuse. Suppose a construction company contracts to sell a specific new home to one buyer but inadvertently sells and conveys it to a second buyer. Performance for the first buyer is now impossible, yet the first buyer can still recover whatever damages can be proved, because the impossibility is the company's own fault.21 The doctrine operates as a defense, and the party invoking it must satisfy every element. Risk allocation is usually the predominant and pervasive consideration in applying them.22
Section 261 reaches further than the categories most often associated with it. A court may relieve a party of a duty stated without qualification if performance has unexpectedly become impracticable because of a supervening event. The next three sections of the Restatement apply the general principle to its traditional settings: death or incapacity of a person necessary for performance (§ 262), destruction of a specific thing necessary for performance (§ 263), and prohibition or prevention by law (§ 264).23 Those sections are instances of the principle and do not limit it. Like UCC § 2-615(a), § 261 states a principle broadly applicable to all types of impracticability and “deliberately refrains from any effort at an exhaustive expression of contingencies.”24
The idea of a basic assumption connects impracticability to its neighbors. Basic assumptions are often tacit. The defenses in this group do not turn on improper ways of obtaining assent. They rest on a different phenomenon: every person learns far more about the world than she could articulate, even to herself.25 An assumption need not be articulated to count, but it must be patent enough from the circumstances and the apparent purpose of the contract.26 What separates impracticability from mistake is timing. Mistake deals with a vital fact that already exists, while impracticability ordinarily relates to future events.27 Frustration of purpose marks the other border. Impracticability looks to the cost of performance, while frustration looks to the value or purpose of performance, as when a turn of events thwarts a party's purpose in contracting without impeding performance itself.28
Because the rule fills a gap, it yields when the parties filled the gap themselves. Section 261 discharges the duty unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary, and the Code's seller-excuse provision likewise applies except so far as a seller has assumed a greater obligation.29 A promise to perform regardless of events, or a clause that allocates the very event that occurred, leaves nothing for a court to supply. The elements ahead can now be taken one at a time: a supervening event, a basic assumption, performance made impracticable, absence of fault, and no assumption of the risk by the party who claims discharge.30