Concept
Elements of Frustration
Frustration of purpose
Elements of Frustration
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 265 states the whole doctrine in a single sentence, and that sentence holds four separate requirements. Where, after a contract is made, a party’s principal purpose is substantially frustrated without that party’s fault by an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, the party’s remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.1 The coronation cases showed that rule producing a result. This section takes the sentence apart, because each requirement has its own reason and breaks down on its own kind of facts.
In Mel Frank Tool & Supply, Inc. v. Di-Chem Co., the court, quoting the Restatement commentary, sorted the requirements into three: the frustrated purpose must have been a principal purpose of the party, the frustration must be substantial, and the non-occurrence of the frustrating event must have been a basic assumption on which the contract was made.2 The text of § 265 adds a fourth, that the frustration occur without the fault of the party seeking discharge. Another statement of the elements likewise pairs the basic-assumption requirement with a requirement that the adversely affected party not be at fault in causing the event.3 Section 265 also fixes the timing: the frustrating event must occur after the contract is made.
The four requirements divide the analytical work. The first two ask what the party lost. Principal purpose identifies the object at stake, and substantial frustration measures how badly the event damaged it. The third asks whether the event is one the contract should be read as leaving uncovered, and it uses the basic-assumption criterion that governs impracticability and UCC § 2-615(a).4 The Restatement’s rationale explains why that question matters. A contract made on a different basic assumption is regarded as not covering the case that arose; the case falls into a gap, and the ordinary solution is to discharge the obligor and shift the risk to the obligee.5 The fourth requirement asks who brought the event about. A claimant who clears one requirement must still clear the rest, so each screens out a different kind of weak claim.
Section 265 closes with a clause preserving a contrary indication in the language or circumstances of the deal. That clause raises a separate question, whether the parties already allocated the risk, which a later section takes up once the four requirements are met. The first requirement, principal purpose, identifies what the doctrine protects.
Principal Purpose
Section 265 protects only a party’s principal purpose, and the Restatement commentary quoted in Mel Frank defines the word precisely: the object must be “so completely the basis of the contract that, as both parties understand, without it the transaction would make little sense.”6 A mere reason for contracting does not meet that definition. The definition has two working parts, and each guards against a different kind of overreach.
The first part, that the object be the basis of the contract, screens out the ordinary party who simply had a reason for signing. Nearly every party has one, so a test satisfied by any reason would let almost every disappointed party claim discharge. The standard asks instead whether the deal loses its point without the object. A party whose bargain still makes sense after the event has lost something, but the contract continues to do the job both sides understood it to do.
The second part, that both parties understand the object as the basis of the deal, protects the party on the receiving end of the claim. A party’s private motivation is no part of the contract and cannot be the ground for disappointing the other side’s reliance, so the purpose must be so patent and obvious to the other party that it can reasonably be regarded as the shared basis of the contract.7 The purpose need not appear in the written agreement. The contract in Krell made no express reference to the coronation, yet the flat had been advertised as offering a good view of the festivities, the price was enhanced, and the defendant’s use was limited to the daytime. Nothing about using the flat or paying for it had become impossible or impracticable, but the performance had become totally useless to the defendant, and the court excused him.8
The same visibility can come from what the parties tell each other. Roadco rents a concrete mixing machine from Leaseco, and both know that Roadco needs the machine only because the government has just awarded it a contract to build a highway. The government then cancels the highway project. The cancellation does not affect Roadco’s ability to pay for the machine, but the reason for the deal is gone, and Roadco may have an excuse based on frustration of purpose, especially if it did not assume the risk of the cancellation.9
Frustration can strike one party’s purpose without touching the other’s. Only the contracting persons have purposes, and an event may frustrate the hopes and objects of one party while the purposes of the other are not affected at all.10 Leaseco still wants its rent and still has a machine to deliver, so its own aim is undisturbed. That does not weaken Roadco’s claim, because the doctrine requires Leaseco to have understood Roadco’s purpose, not to have held it.
The argument that fails most often is that the party’s purpose was profit. Most commercial contracts are made in the hope of gain, so if that hope counted as the principal purpose, no party could be held to a contract once its expected profit disappeared. Although profitmaking may in a sense be the purpose of a contract, the doctrine calls for a more penetrating examination of the parties’ mutual objective in entering the contract.11
The source’s own version of this problem asks the same question, who bore the risk of poor sales, and the analysis turns on whether the contract specifically allocated that risk and whether any usage points the other way.12
A buyer with mixed reasons presents the other recurring difficulty, and an exam question built on one is testing the word principal. Thomas contracts for $5,000 to ride a motor scooter, dressed as a hot dog, in a Thanksgiving Day parade on November 20. He does not own a scooter, so he agrees to buy one from Brands for $8,000, delivery on or about November 19, explaining that he has always wanted a scooter for riding in Central Park but needs this one by November 19 because of the parade. Brands delivers on November 21, and Thomas refuses delivery, claiming frustration.13 Brands knew of the parade, so the shared-understanding requirement is met as to that purpose. The difficulty lies in the word principal. The scooter cost $3,000 more than the parade paid, and Thomas himself had mentioned another use for it, so a court can find that the purchase still makes sense without the parade and that the principal purpose is not substantially frustrated.14
What separates Thomas from Roadco is the second use that both sides knew about. Roadco had one reason for the machine, and the cancellation ended it. Thomas had two, and Brands had been told of both, so the loss of one left the deal standing on the other. The delivery date shows that the parade mattered to Thomas; it does not show that the purchase would make little sense without it.
Substantial Frustration
Section 265 requires that the principal purpose be substantially frustrated, and the commentary quoted in Mel Frank gives that adverb two sentences of its own: “It is not enough that the transaction has become less profitable for the affected party or even that he will sustain a loss. The frustration must be so severe that it is not fairly to be regarded as within the risks that he assumed under the contract.”16 The court added that the rule deals with a change in circumstances that makes one party’s performance virtually worthless to the other.17 The previous requirement asked what sits at the center of the deal. This one asks how badly the event damaged it, and the answer must approach destruction.
Each half of the Restatement’s sentence does separate work. The first half, that unprofitability and even loss do not count, separates frustration from disappointment. A party who still receives what it bargained for has no complaint about what that thing is now worth, and if a loss were enough, a fixed-price contract would bind only the party the market happened to favor. The second half ties the doctrine to risk allocation. The shared objective is determined in light of the contract’s allocation of risk, so severity matters because a party who agreed to terms took the ordinary chance that the deal would turn out badly, and only an event that goes beyond that chance qualifies.18
The Restatement’s own illustration marks the line. A leases a gasoline station to B, and a change in traffic regulations so reduces B’s business that B can operate the station only at a substantial loss. B stops paying rent. Because B can still operate the station, B’s principal purpose of operating a gasoline station is not substantially frustrated, B’s duty to pay rent is not discharged, and B is liable to A for breach.19 The result is the same if the loss comes instead from a government regulation rationing gasoline or from termination of the franchise under which B obtained gasoline.20 The station stays open and the pumps still work; what the regulation took from B was margin. Courts call this category “economic” or “commercial” frustration and almost invariably deny relief, because the purpose of the contract survives and only the lessee’s expected profit is gone.21
A destroyed use produces the opposite result. In Doherty v. Monroe Eckstein Brewing, the lease provided that the only business to be carried on in the premises was the saloon business, and national Prohibition then made the sale of alcoholic beverages illegal. The lease was discharged. This was not a case of supervening illegality, because it was not illegal for the tenant to pay rent on unused premises; the holding was that the principal purpose, the sale of alcoholic beverages, was totally frustrated.22 The gas station and the saloon differ in what the event reached. The traffic rules left the use intact and shrank its returns, while Prohibition removed the use itself.
The cases therefore treat complete frustration of the principal use as the total or nearly total frustration the doctrine demands, and they deny the defense where the principal use is not completely frustrated.23 Even a totally frustrated purpose does not discharge a party who assumed the risk of the event, a point the next part develops.24
Goods contracts apply the same logic. A Canadian seller agreed to sell lamb pelts for delivery in Toronto and shipment to Philadelphia. Before the delivery date, United States regulations prohibited importation of pelts of that type, and the defendant refused delivery and asserted frustration. The court observed that the pelts could be shipped anywhere else in the world, because shipping instructions were not an essential part of the agreement, and it concluded that the buyer’s purpose was not totally frustrated even though the buyer may have suffered a loss.25 The result parallels Thomas’s scooter, which kept its use in Central Park: the thing bought still had a use, and the destination was incidental to the bargain. A buyer who has lost an opportunity has suffered a different injury from one who has lost the purpose of the deal.
The court in Lloyd v. Murphy framed the underlying question as whether the equities of the case, considered in light of sound public policy, require placing the risk of a disruption or complete destruction of the contract equilibrium on the defendant or the plaintiff.26 That framing explains why severity is an element in its own right. The more completely an event destroys the deal’s point, the harder it is to say that the party now complaining agreed to carry the risk of it, and the risk-allocation inquiry in the next part builds on that link.
Basic Assumption
Section 265 discharges a frustrated party only if the non-occurrence of the frustrating event was a basic assumption on which the contract was made. That is the criterion the Restatement applies to supervening events generally and the one UCC § 2-615(a) uses, so decisions under either doctrine help define it.28 A basic assumption is a background belief about the state of the world, so central to the deal that both parties make the contract on the footing that it will hold. The element asks whether the event contradicts that picture of the world, and the amount of harm the event causes is measured elsewhere, by the requirement of substantial frustration. The element also marks the limit of what the law protects, because relief is reserved for unexpected events that affect a material aspect of the parties’ bargain.29
The element is easiest to satisfy where performance depends on the continued life of a particular person or the continued existence of a specific thing. In those cases the parties ordinarily contract on the understanding that the person will live or the thing will continue to exist, so a death or destruction that is nobody’s fault discharges the duty.30 No clause need say so; the understanding is part of the background against which the deal is made. The same reasoning reaches frustration when what disappears is the occasion that gave the contract its point. In Krell the flat remained available and the rent remained payable, but the performance had become useless to the defendant, and the court excused him.31
Market shifts and cost changes sit on the other side of the line. Fluctuations in market conditions, including rises or falls in prices or in the cost of performance, are typically risks the parties assume when they make a contract, so they do not ordinarily meet the basic-assumption requirement and do not discharge the duty to perform.32 The reason follows from what a fixed price is for. The price settles in advance who carries the movement of the market, and if that movement could count as an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption, the contract would bind only the party the market happened to favor. A market slump thus fails here for a different reason than it fails the substantial-frustration requirement. The earlier requirement measures how badly the purpose was damaged, while this one asks whether the event is the kind the contract was made assuming would not occur.
Foreseeability bears on the element without controlling it. The Restatement commentary treats the foreseeability of the event as a factor in deciding whether its non-occurrence was a basic assumption, but the mere fact that the event was foreseeable does not compel the conclusion that it was not.33 The factor matters mainly because of what it suggests about risk. If the parties foresaw the likelihood of an event, they probably allocated the risk of it in the contract, expressly or impliedly, and even without foresight, commercial practice or surrounding circumstances may imply that the claimant assumed the risk.34 That risk-allocation question has its own section below.
The event must also occur after the contract is made. Chronology is the first sorting question, because frustration, like impracticability, concerns supervening events, and a mistaken belief about facts as they stood at signing belongs to the law of mistake.35 A purpose already frustrated when the parties signed is taught below in the section on frustration existing at formation.
Absence of Fault
The fourth requirement looks past the event to the claimant’s own part in it, because § 265 discharges the party only if its principal purpose is frustrated “without his fault.”37 Fault in this setting is a causal question: did the party seeking discharge produce the supervening event, or did it arrive from outside? The requirement follows from what discharge does. Discharge lifts a loss the contract never addressed off the claimant and places it on the counterparty, and the only justification for that shift is that the event lay beyond the claimant’s control. A party able to trigger the event itself would hold a way out of any bargain it came to regret.
When the claimant caused the event, the law does not treat the result as a frustration. A breach produced by one party’s action that prevents performance is called self-induced frustration, a phrase that is something of a misnomer because the event is a breach and gives no excuse.38 The same logic governs impossibility. A construction company that contracts to sell a specific new home to one buyer and inadvertently sells and conveys it to another has made the first contract impossible to perform, yet the contract is not excused, because the impossibility is the company’s own fault. The company remains liable, and the first buyer can recover whatever money damages can be proved.39 The word inadvertently carries weight in that example: fault does not require bad intent.
The requirement targets causing the event, not risky behavior in general. In Aluminum Company of America v. Essex Group, Inc., the court recognized the additional requirement that the frustration or impracticability must not be the fault of the party seeking relief, and it found the requirement met. Essex had not claimed or shown that Alcoa’s dealings during the contract caused or contributed to Alcoa’s losses, and the record showed that the great cost increases in power, electrolytes, and carbon were beyond Alcoa’s control.40 In CNA International Reinsurance Co. v. Phoenix, the court declined to bar an impracticability defense on the ground that the performer had caused his own death by a drug overdose, because the risky behavior was not directly related to performance of the personal-services contract.
A promisor who is already in material breach when the frustrating event occurs cannot invoke the defense either, because the party seeking to use it must not be guilty of contributory fault.41 The reason is chronological. A performance already withheld cannot be excused by an event that happens afterward, and the other party’s loss of what it was promised traces to the earlier breach, not to the event. This bar sits beside the causation inquiry, and a claimant can satisfy one while failing the other.